REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELCLC CASE NO. E508 OF 2025
TARABANA COMPANY LIMITED ………………….PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
=VERSUS=
THE NATIONAL LAND COMMISSION … 1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL …………….....2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
ROSPATECH COMPANY LIMITED ………3RD DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 3rd October 2025, brought under Article 159 of the Constitution (2010), Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Orders 40 and 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks the following orders:
a. Spent.
b. Spent.
c. That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a temporary order of injunction restraining the demolition of all developments existing on and erected on the Title Number known as L.R. No. 209/2759/9 situated in Ngara area, along Desai Road within Nairobi pending valuation of the developments thereon and the hearing and determination of the main suit filed herewith.
d. That this Honourable Court to issue such other or further orders that it may deem fit to grant in the circumstances.
e. That costs be in the cause.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff’s Director, Charles Kiri Thube sworn on even date.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
3. The deponent averred that, in 2014, the 3rd Defendant transferred L.R. No. 209/2759/9 (I.R. 12263) to him pursuant to a sale for Kshs. 24,000,000/=, which he paid in instalments. He stated that he conducted due diligence and confirmed that the 3rd Defendant was the registered owner, having been allocated the property by the 1st Defendant on 30th October 2009. He further stated that the 3rd Defendant had informed him that the original lessees, Harcharan Singh Sehmi and Harbhajan Singh Sehmi, had failed to renew the lease upon its expiry in 2001; consequently, the property reverted to the 1st Defendant, and the lessees were evicted.
4. He averred that, relying on those assurances and the official search, he obtained a loan of Kshs. 61,000,000/= from Prime Bank Limited, secured against the property. He used the proceeds to construct a multi-storey commercial and residential building and repaid the loan from the rental income.
5. He further averred that the former lessees challenged their eviction and initially succeeded, with the court holding that they had a legitimate expectation of renewal of their lease. The Appellate Court later set aside that decision and found him an innocent purchaser for value without notice. However, on 11th April 2025, the Supreme Court, in Petition No. E033 of 2023, overturned the Appellate Court’s decision and ordered, among other things, the demolition of the structures on the suit property within six months—a period due to expire on 11th October 2025.
6. He maintained that he was an innocent purchaser for value without notice, who had acquired and developed the property in good faith on the strength of the 3rd Defendant’s representation that it could pass good title. He contended that he was entitled to compensation for losses arising through no fault of his own. The Applicant is apprehensive that the developments would be demolished before they could be valued, thereby exposing him to irreparable loss. He urged the Court to grant the orders sought pending valuation and the hearing and determination of the application and suit. He added that the former lessees would suffer no prejudice, since they would still enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favour.
THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S CASE
7. The 1st Defendant filed Grounds of Opposition dated 17th February 2026 in opposition to the application. It contended that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case or to demonstrate a sufficient interest in the suit property, as it was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
8. It was further contended that the application was irregular because it sought an injunction to restrain the Supreme Court of Kenya's orders, contrary to Article 163(7) of the Constitution.
9. The 1st Defendant asserted that the application was misplaced, incompetent, baseless, untenable, incurably defective, null and void, and urged the Court to dismiss it with costs.
10. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSIONS
11. The Plaintiff filed its submissions dated 2nd March 2026.
12. On the principles governing interlocutory injunctions, Counsel relied on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358. Under that decision, an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, and must show that it might otherwise suffer irreparable injury not adequately compensable in damages. Where the court is in doubt, it determines the application on a balance of convenience. Counsel also cited Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KLR 125, which defined a prima facie case as one which, on the material presented, a tribunal properly directing itself would conclude that a right has been infringed by the opposite party, so as to call for an explanation or rebuttal.
13. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case. Counsel further submitted that the 1st Defendant did not dispute that the Plaintiff had constructed the developments on the suit property or that they had stood there for over twenty years. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff developed the property in the expectation of recouping its investment by letting it to tenants. Counsel argued that the impending demolition placed the Plaintiff’s interest in the developments at stake. Counsel stated that this formed the basis for the prayer for a stay of the demolition pending valuation and compensation.
14. Relying on Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR), Counsel submitted that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the parties' rights are determined. Counsel that the 1st Defendant had not shown how it would suffer if the orders were granted. Counsel further submitted that preserving the status quo would allow each party to be heard and the evidence regarding the history of the dispute to be examined.
15. Regarding the contention that the Plaintiff lacked sufficient interest and was not a bona fide purchaser, Counsel submitted that these were factual issues to be determined only at a substantive hearing, after examining the evidence, rather than in the Grounds of Opposition.
16. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Grounds of Opposition with costs and to proceed to hear and determine the application.
THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS
17. The 1st Defendant filed its submissions dated 27th March 2026.
18. Regarding whether the Plaintiff had met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction, Counsel relied on Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the principles set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KLR 125 and Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others [2014] eKLR. On irreparable loss, Counsel cited Kitho Civil & Engineering Co. Ltd v National Bank of Kenya Limited & another [2023] KECA 387 (KLR), which cited Esso Kenya Limited v Mark Makwata Okiya [1992] eKLR, to submit that an injunction will not issue where damages are an adequate remedy.
19. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had not established a clear and unmistakable right threatened with violation. Counsel further noted that, in Harcharan Singh Sehmi & another v Tarabana Company Limited & 5 others (SC Petition No. E033 of 2023), delivered on 11 April 2025, the Supreme Court ordered the Plaintiff to remove and demolish its structures on the suit property within six months, under the supervision of the Inspector General of Police. Counsel observed that the Plaintiff acknowledged this in paragraph 8 of the Supporting Affidavit of Charles Kiri Thube, dated 3 October 2025.
20. Counsel submitted that under Article 163(7) of the Constitution, this Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s decisions. Counsel relied on Munya v Kithinji & 2 others [2014] KESC 38 (KLR), Kidero & 4 others v Waititu & 4 others [2014] KESC 11 (KLR), Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 others [2012] KESC 8 (KLR), Asanyo & 3 others v Attorney General [2020] KESC 62 (KLR), Republic v Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 others (Amicus Curiae) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR) and Republic v Ayako [2025] KESC 20 (KLR) to submit on the doctrine of stare decisis.
21. Counsel argued that granting the injunction would amount to disobedience of the Supreme Court’s judgment, which the Plaintiff had failed to comply with even after the compliance period expired. In light of the foregoing, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case.
22. Counsel further submitted that, since the Supreme Court had found the Plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Plaintiff lacked sufficient interest in the suit property and therefore had no locus standi to seek the orders. To this end, Counsel relied on Njau & 5 others v City Council of Nairobi [1983] KECA 56 (KLR), Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (SC Civil Application No. 29 of 2014) and Edenbridge Capital Limited v SMEP Microfinance Bank Limited & 2 others [2026] KEHC 814 (KLR).
THE INTERESTED PARTY’S SUBMISSIONS
23. The Interested Party filed its submissions dated 16th June 2026
24. On behalf of the Interested Party, Counsel submitted that jurisdiction is everything and that without it the Court cannot take one more step. To support this point, Counsel relied on In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] eKLR and Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1. Counsel contended that the rights and obligations attaching to L.R. No. 209/2759/9 had been litigated before the Supreme Court and conclusively determined. Counsel asserted that the application was therefore an improper invitation to this court to sit in appeal, review or vary a final decision of the Supreme Court. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff’s recourse, if any, lay in seeking review before that Court.
25. Counsel noted that the Plaintiff’s affidavit acknowledged that the Interested Party had been reinstated as the lawful proprietor. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff’s right to occupy the property or maintain structures on it formed part of the substratum of the dispute before the Supreme Court. At paragraph 89 G(v) of its judgment, the Supreme Court directed the Plaintiff to remove and demolish its structures within six months, under the supervision of the 5th Respondent in that appeal.
26. Counsel submitted that the application was res judicata under Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act. To this end, Counsel relied on Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR and John Florence Maritime Services Limited & another v Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] eKLR. Counsel argued that each element of the doctrine of res judicata was met: the judgment of 11th April 2025 was final, on the merits, and rendered by a competent court; the present proceedings involved the same parties, or parties litigating under the same title; the same subject matter; and the same cause of action. Counsel further argued that a pause in execution to allow valuation would reopen a closed matter.
27. Relying on Article 163(7) of the Constitution, counsel contended that any injunction restraining the demolition would amount to an unlawful stay of execution of the Supreme Court’s final orders. On the principle of finality, counsel cited Justine Masolo Nyakundi v Attorney General & another [2022] eKLR. Counsel further stated that the Supreme Court had since dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for review or extension of time. In that ruling, the Supreme Court relied on Shollei v Judicial Service Commission & another [2023] KESC 8 (KLR) and held that it was functus officio, that the parties remained bound by its orders, and that it lacked jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance.
28. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the application is vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process, and should be dismissed with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
29. Having considered the application, the Grounds of Opposition and the rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether this Court can grant the orders sought in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sehmi & another v Tarabana Company Ltd & 5 others (Petition E033 of 2023) [2025] KESC 21 (KLR; and
b. Whether the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction.
30. Regarding the first issue, it is trite that jurisdiction is everything, and without it, the Court cannot take one more step. In Owners of Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] KLR 1, the Court of Appeal held that without jurisdiction a court has no power to take one more step and must down tools the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction. In Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] eKLR, the Supreme Court held that a Court’s jurisdiction flows from the Constitution, legislation, or both, and that a Court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction beyond what the law confers.
31. Under Article 163(7) of the Constitution, all Courts other than the Supreme Court are bound by the Supreme Court's decisions.
32. It is not in dispute that on 11th April 2025, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Sehmi & another v Tarabana Company Ltd & 5 others [2025] KESC 21 (KLR), in which it held that the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value cannot be invoked to protect a title to public land acquired illegally.
33. The Supreme Court, inter alia, held that the allotment of the suit property to Rospatech Limited, the 3rd Defendant herein, was procedurally flawed and therefore illegal; that Tarabana Company Limited was not a bona fide purchaser of the suit property for value without notice; and that its title to the suit property was invalid for all purposes. The Supreme Court directed the Chief Land Registrar to cancel Tarabana Company Limited’s title and to register the Appellants as proprietors of the suit property.
34. Of particular relevance to the application before this Court is order (v) of the judgment, in which the Supreme Court directed as follows:
“The structures and developments erected by the 1st respondent on the suit property be removed and demolished by the 1st respondent within six months from the date of this Judgment under the supervision of the 5th respondent.”
35. The Supreme Court record further shows that Tarabana Company Limited filed an application dated 25th September 2025 seeking an extension of time to comply with the said orders. By a ruling delivered on 30th January 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed that application. It held that it was functus officio and that the parties remained bound by the orders set out in the judgment.
36. Tarabana Company Limited subsequently sought a review of the judgment. In Sehmi & another v Tarabana Company Ltd & 5 others [2026] KESC 39 (KLR), the Supreme Court dismissed the review application. It held that the applicant had failed to satisfy the narrow and exceptional grounds for review and that its conduct in persistently filing applications without reasonable grounds amounted to an abuse of the Court process.
37. In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff seeks to stay the demolition of the developments on the suit property pending valuation and compensation. The demolition the Plaintiff seeks to stop is the very act the Supreme Court directed. An order of this Court restraining the demolition would suspend the execution of the Supreme Court's orders. It would also, indirectly, grant the extension of time that the Supreme Court declined to grant on 30th January 2026.
38. This Court does not sit on appeal from the decisions of the Supreme Court, nor does it have supervisory jurisdiction over that Court. Neither the Constitution nor the Environment and Land Court Act confers on this Court the power to stay, vary or suspend orders issued by the Supreme Court.
39. The Plaintiff contends that whether he has a sufficient interest in the suit property and whether he was a bona fide purchaser are factual issues that can only be determined at a full hearing. This Court does not agree. The Supreme Court conclusively determined those questions, and this Court cannot revisit them. Under Article 163(7) of the Constitution, this Court is bound by those findings.
40. It is also noteworthy that the application herein is dated 3rd October 2025. This was barely a week before the six months granted by the Supreme Court expired, and at a time when the application for enlargement of time was pending before that Court. The Plaintiff was therefore seeking from this court substantially the same relief that was pending before the Supreme Court, which the Supreme Court later declined to grant. This Court finds that the application attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court's orders and amounts to an abuse of the Court process.
41. On this basis, this court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to grant the orders sought in the application.
42. Regarding the second issue, although the finding on the first issue is sufficient to dispose of the application, this Court will, for completeness, consider whether the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction.
43. The principles governing the grant of a temporary injunction were laid down in the celebrated case of Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] as follows:
a) First, the applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success.
b) Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable harm which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages.
c) Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on a balance of convenience.
44. The first issue for determination is whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success.
45. A prima facie case was defined by the Court of Appeal in Mrao Ltd Vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others (2003) eKLR as follows;
“a prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case”. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”
46. The interest asserted by the Plaintiff in the developments on the suit property is derived from the title of Tarabana Company Limited. The Supreme Court declared that title invalid for all purposes. Article 40(6) of the Constitution provides that the protection of the right to property does not extend to any property found to have been unlawfully acquired.
47. The Plaintiff’s prayer for valuation and compensation fares no better. In Torino Enterprises Limited v Attorney General [2023] KESC 79 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that the appellant was not an innocent purchaser for value and therefore not entitled to orders for restoration or compensation. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that Tarabana Company Limited was not a bona fide purchaser and directed it to demolish the developments at its own instance, without any order for compensation.
48. Although the Plaintiff argued that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo and that the 1st Defendant had not shown how it would suffer if the orders sought were granted, the burden of establishing the conditions for the grant of an injunction lies on the applicant, not on the opposite party. Second, the status quo in this matter is the position established by the Supreme Court’s judgment. Under that judgment, the appellants are the registered proprietors of the suit property, and the developments thereon are to be removed. An order preserving the developments would not maintain the status quo; it would alter it.
49. Based on the material placed before this court, I find that the Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case with a probability of success.
50. In an application for interlocutory injunction, the Applicant has to satisfy the three conditions before an injunction is granted. In Nguruman Limited Vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated as follows: -
“…these are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially… if the applicant establishes a prima facie case that alone is not sufficient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satisfied that the injury the respondent will suffer, in the event the injunction is not granted will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law are an adequate remedy and the respondent is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the applicant’s claim may appear at that stage. If a prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration.
51. Having found that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, it is immaterial to consider the other limbs to be considered on the grant of a temporary injunction. In so finding, I am persuaded by the holding in Commercial Finance Co. Ltd vs Afraha Education Society & Others, C A Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1999, where the Court held that:
“……the judge should address himself sequentially on the conditions for granting an injunction instead of proceeding straight away to address himself on the third condition because where the Applicant has no registered interest in the land comprised in the title dispute and thereof has not demonstrated that it has a prima facie case with a probability of success no interlocutory injunction would be available.”
52. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Notice of Motion dated 3rd October 2025 is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to the 1st Defendant.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 19TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Gichana for the Interested Party
Kimata for the 1st Defendant
Vena – Court Assistant