Land law

Karanja v Holy Nation Prophet & Apostle Ministries & 2 others [2026] KEELC 6724 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Case E134 of 2025
Judgment date
19 October 2026
Judge(s)
MN Kullow

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The court held that it had jurisdiction and allowed the applicant’s 6 February 2026 motion. The defendants were ordered, within 30 days, to deposit Ksh 96,000 rent arrears into a joint interest-earning advocates’ account and to continue depositing rent there pending determination of the suit. Costs were to be in the cause.

Supporting judgment passages

19. The upshot of the above is that the Application dated 6th February 2026 is merited and allowed on the following terms;

Paragraph 19 →

i. The Defendants are to deposit the arrears of Ksh.96,000/= into a joint interest earning bank account in the names of the advocates within the next 30 days.

Passage 45 →

ii. Pending hearing and final determination of the suit, the Defendants shall continue paying rent which shall be deposited into the above joint account.

Passage 46 →
Issue 1Whether the Environment and Land Court was vested with jurisdiction to determine the suit notwithstanding that the subject matter was valued below Ksh 20,000,000.

Held. Decided. The court held that it had jurisdiction. A value below Ksh 20,000,000 did not oust the ELC’s jurisdiction; both the ELC and Magistrate’s Court could hear the claim, though the ELC could transfer it to the Magistrate’s Court for trial in the exercise of its powers.

Ratio. The monetary value of the subject matter does not, by itself, oust the ELC’s jurisdiction where the Magistrate’s Court also has jurisdiction; transfer to the Magistrate’s Court remains available.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

8. Before delving into the merits of the case, I have grappled with the question whether this court is vested with the jurisdiction to determine the suit. In the locus classicus case of Owners of Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil Kenya Ltd [1989] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated that: “Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law down tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.”

Paragraph 8 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

9. The argument put by the Defendants is that the value of the subject matter is below Kshs 20,000,000/=. This in my view which I so hold means that both this court and the Magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim. The value of the subject matter does not oust the jurisdiction of the ELC court except the court in exercise of its powers can transfer the matter for trial to the Magistrate’s court. It is my determination that this court has the jurisdiction.

Paragraph 9 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

9. The argument put by the Defendants is that the value of the subject matter is below Kshs 20,000,000/=. This in my view which I so hold means that both this court and the Magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim. The value of the subject matter does not oust the jurisdiction of the ELC court except the court in exercise of its powers can transfer the matter for trial to the Magistrate’s court. It is my determination that this court has the jurisdiction.

Paragraph 9 →
Issue 2Whether the Applicant was entitled to the interlocutory orders sought for rent arrears and continuing rent payments pending hearing and determination of the suit.

Held. Decided. The application was allowed. The court found that the lease was a binding, continuing agreement, with no six-month termination notice shown. The defendants could not unilaterally pay rent to a third party while remaining bound by their agreement with the applicant. The applicant established a prima facie case, satisfied the irreparable-harm limb notwithstanding that the loss was quantifiable, and succeeded on the balance of convenience. The defendants were ordered to deposit Ksh 96,000 arrears and continuing rent into a joint interest-earning advocates’ account pending the suit.

Ratio. Interlocutory injunctive relief requires a prima facie case, irreparable injury not adequately compensable in damages, and, where necessary, a favourable balance of convenience. A tenant remains bound by an unterminated tenancy agreement and cannot resort to self-help by redirecting rent to an unadjudicated third party merely because ownership is contested.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

10. Moving on to the merits of the application, I find that the only substantive issue for determination is whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders as prayed for.

Paragraph 10 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

16. The tenancy agreement includes a clear mechanism for termination that is a notice of 6 month given by each party. In this instance there is no notice to indicate such intention of termination and as it stands, the agreement is still much binding after having been renewed. This is implied by the increase in rent from Ksh 4000 to Ksh 8000/=. The Defendants cannot purport to pay rent to a third party yet they are still legally bounded by the agreement with the Applicant. The issue of who should be paid for rent is one that the court will determine and not the Defendants. In the present case, the Defendants’actions—specifically, paying rent to a third party while claiming they cannot pay rent to the Applicant since ownership is contested, is contradictory because they are still paying rent to the third party who has not been declared the owner of the suit property in any court of law as there are no orders attached to that effect. Such conduct amounts to self-help and is in direct violation of the landlord’s legal rights.This is proof of a prima facie case

Paragraph 16 →

17. The other limb is irreparable harm and the Applicant contend though this is a liquidated claim, the arrears keep accumulating on a monthly depriving them of their rights as the owners and urged the court to make orders so as to ensure continuity of payment of rents. I find that though the loss is quantifiable one, the Defendants are enjoying being in possession while paying rent to a third party and not the Applicant whom they entered into an agreement with and as such the 2nd limb has been met.

Paragraph 17 →

19. The upshot of the above is that the Application dated 6th February 2026 is merited and allowed on the following terms;

Paragraph 19 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

11. The conditions governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction in this jurisdiction are firmly anchored in the celebrated East African decision of Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co Ltd 1973 EA 358 where the Court pronounced that an Applicant must first establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, secondly demonstrate that he stands to suffer irreparable injury that would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages, and thirdly, that if the Court is in doubt on the foregoing, the application ought to be determined on the balance of convenience. These three conditions have since been consistently applied by our Courts as the governing standard for injunctive relief.

Paragraph 11 →

16. The tenancy agreement includes a clear mechanism for termination that is a notice of 6 month given by each party. In this instance there is no notice to indicate such intention of termination and as it stands, the agreement is still much binding after having been renewed. This is implied by the increase in rent from Ksh 4000 to Ksh 8000/=. The Defendants cannot purport to pay rent to a third party yet they are still legally bounded by the agreement with the Applicant. The issue of who should be paid for rent is one that the court will determine and not the Defendants. In the present case, the Defendants’actions—specifically, paying rent to a third party while claiming they cannot pay rent to the Applicant since ownership is contested, is contradictory because they are still paying rent to the third party who has not been declared the owner of the suit property in any court of law as there are no orders attached to that effect. Such conduct amounts to self-help and is in direct violation of the landlord’s legal rights.This is proof of a prima facie case

Paragraph 16 →
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Case at a glance

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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

The matter is coming up for the determination of the notice of Motion application dated 6th February 2026 which seeks the following orders

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Moving on to the merits of the application, I find that the only substantive issue for determination is whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders as prayed for.

Paragraph 10 →

Reasoning passage

The other limb is irreparable harm and the Applicant contend though this is a liquidated claim, the arrears keep accumulating on a monthly depriving them of their rights as the owners and urged the court to make orders so as to ensure continuity of payment of rents. I find that though the loss is quantifiable one, the Defendants are enjoying being in possession while paying rent to a third party and not the Applicant whom they entered…

Paragraph 17 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the Environment and Land Court had jurisdiction despite the defendants’ submission that the subject matter was valued below Kshs 20,000,000; and whether Samuel Njoroge Karanja had met the threshold for interlocutory orders compelling the defendants to…

Material facts

The applicant stated that he was allottee of Huruma Mathare Development Project–Infill Plot No K85A and had leased it to the defendants. He relied on an allotment letter dated 22 August 2007, a lease agreement dated 5 October 2011, and an account statement.…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS, NAIROBI

ELC CASE NO E134 OF 2025

SAMUEUL NJOROGE KARANJA......................................PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT

VERSUS

HOLY NATION PROPHET & APOSTLE MINISTRIES……………1ST DEFENDANT

MUKONYO GITHUKA……………………………………………2ND DEFENDANT

JAMES MACHARIA, GITHAI NGURE&MARY WANJIKU (Sued as trustees and officials of Holy Nation Prophetic & Apostle Ministries)……3RD DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

RULING

Introduction

1. The matter is coming up for the determination of the notice of Motion application dated 6th February 2026 which seeks the following orders

a) Spent

b) THAT pending hearing and determination of this suit, the Defendants be compelled to pay to the Plaintiff rent arrears in the sum of Ksh 96,000/= being arrears accrued from March 2025 to February 2026 together with accruing rent at the rate of Ksh 8,000/= per month until payment in full.

c) THAT pending hearing and determination of this suit, the Defendants be ordered to continue paying monthly rent of Ksh 8,000/= as and when it falls due

d) In default of prayer (2) and (3) above, this honourable court be pleased to issue such further orders as may safeguard the Plaintiff’s proprietary rights over the suit property.

e) Costs of this application be provided for.

2. The application was premised on grounds as in the supporting affidavit of the Applicant. He deponed that he was the allottee of the suit property known as Huruma Mathare Development Project -Infill Plot No K85A herein refereed to as the suit property. That he had entered into a lease agreement with the Defendants of which the Defendants had been paying rent upto until March of 2025 when they stopped and have continued accumulating arrears in the same

3. THAT the Defendants are still in occupation of the suit properties benefiting from the same without paying rent hence the filing of this application to prevent irreparable harm on the Applicant

4. The Defendants opposed the application via the replying affidavit sworn by Mary Mukonyo Githuka. She deponed that the Defendants do not deny having entered into an agreement with the Applicant and have been paying rent to him. That there was CMELC E140 OF 2023 TERESIA NJOKI VS MARY GITHUKA & 4 Others where the Applicant was an interested party and in the said matter the Nairobi City County had laid claim to the suit property and the basis of this, they stopped paying rent to the Applicant and entered into an agreement with the Nairobi City County.

5. THAT the question of ownership standing contested the court cannot determine such an application at an interlocutory stage as it will involve interrogating evidence in a full suit.

Applicant’s submissions

6. The Applicant reiterated the contents of his supporting affidavit and submitted on whether he had met the conditions for issuance of injunctive orders being;

i. Prima facie case

The Applicant relied on the allotment letter dated 22nd August 2007 which he alluded gave him rights as the owner, the Land Lease Agreement entered into as between himself and Defendants demonstrating the contractual relationship as to the terms that indicate the Defendants agreed to pay rent of Kshs. 8,000/= per month which sums had not been paid accumulating arrears of Kshs. 96,000/= as at February 2026 hence proof of prima facie case.

ii. On irreparable harm counsel submitted that the non-payment of rent by the Defendants yet still in occupation is detrimental to them and the court should direct the Defendants to pay up the arrears and rent or secure the said arrears.

iii. Counsel submitted that balance of convenience tilted in their favour.

Respondent’s submissions

7. Counsel insisted that the application was seeking to determine ownership at an interlocutory stage as the orders sough after were mandatory. He relied on the case of Abu Vs Mohamed & 10 Others (Environment & Land Case 100 of 2022) [2023] KEELC 18478 (KLR), and Barua & 4 Others Vs Mati & 6 Others [2025] KEELC 4063 (KLR)among others.

The other ground raised is that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application as the value of the subject matter is less than 20,000,000/= which is under the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court.

Analysis and determination

8. Before delving into the merits of the case, I have grappled with the question whether this court is vested with the jurisdiction to determine the suit. In the locus classicus case of Owners of Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil Kenya Ltd [1989] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated that: “Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law down tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.”

9. The argument put by the Defendants is that the value of the subject matter is below Kshs 20,000,000/=. This in my view which I so hold means that both this court and the Magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim. The value of the subject matter does not oust the jurisdiction of the ELC court except the court in exercise of its powers can transfer the matter for trial to the Magistrate’s court. It is my determination that this court has the jurisdiction.

10. Moving on to the merits of the application, I find that the only substantive issue for determination is whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders as prayed for.

11. The conditions governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction in this jurisdiction are firmly anchored in the celebrated East African decision of Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co Ltd 1973 EA 358 where the Court pronounced that an Applicant must first establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, secondly demonstrate that he stands to suffer irreparable injury that would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages, and thirdly, that if the Court is in doubt on the foregoing, the application ought to be determined on the balance of convenience. These three conditions have since been consistently applied by our Courts as the governing standard for injunctive relief.

12. The threshold for establishing a prima facie case was authoritatively settled by the Court of Appeal in Mrao Ltd. Vs First American Bank of Kenya & 2 Others (2003) KLR 125 where the Court held that a prima facie case is one in which, on the material presented before the Court, a tribunal properly directing its mind will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. This Court is in full agreement with that formulation and adopts it as the applicable standard

13. In the present case, the Applicant sees injunctive orders on the basis that he is the allottee of the suit property evidenced by an allotment letter, a lease agreement between the parties and the a statement of account showing the payments made to him by the Defendants .The Defendants on the other hand do not dispute the agreement , rather claim the issue of ownership is being challenged and the Applicant is not entitled to receive rent as a third party has established rights and is entitled to rents.

14. The question to ask is whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case warranting protection. There is an allotment letter in place and though letter of allotment does not confer any property rights, unless there is acceptance and offer in terms of complying with the conditions, the Defendants do not dispute this letter and neither do they dispute the agreement they entered into.

15. The lease agreement dated 5th October 2011 between Samuel Njoroge Karanja the lessee or landlord and 1st Defendant the lessor or tenant constitutes a legally binding contract. This agreement meets all the essential elements required for a valid contract under the law. Firstly, the agreement includes an offer—specifically, the offer of tenancy in exchange for rent. This offer was accepted by the tenant, the 1st Defendant signed by the 3rd Defendant as the trustee thereby establishing mutual consent. Secondly, the element of consideration is clearly present in the form of rent paymentsto be made which the tenant agreed to pay in return for the right to occupy the premises. Furthermore, the intention to create legal relations is evident from the formal nature of the document. The agreement is clearly worded, outlines the obligations of both parties, and was executed in writing. It was duly signed by both the landlord and the tenant and witnessed by two individuals. These formalities not only reflect the parties’ intention to be legally bound but also enhance the agreement's enforceability under the law.

16. The tenancy agreement includes a clear mechanism for termination that is a notice of 6 month given by each party. In this instance there is no notice to indicate such intention of termination and as it stands, the agreement is still much binding after having been renewed. This is implied by the increase in rent from Ksh 4000 to Ksh 8000/=. The Defendants cannot purport to pay rent to a third party yet they are still legally bounded by the agreement with the Applicant. The issue of who should be paid for rent is one that the court will determine and not the Defendants. In the present case, the Defendants’actions—specifically, paying rent to a third party while claiming they cannot pay rent to the Applicant since ownership is contested, is contradictory because they are still paying rent to the third party who has not been declared the owner of the suit property in any court of law as there are no orders attached to that effect. Such conduct amounts to self-help and is in direct violation of the landlord’s legal rights.This is proof of a prima facie case

17. The other limb is irreparable harm and the Applicant contend though this is a liquidated claim, the arrears keep accumulating on a monthly depriving them of their rights as the owners and urged the court to make orders so as to ensure continuity of payment of rents. I find that though the loss is quantifiable one, the Defendants are enjoying being in possession while paying rent to a third party and not the Applicant whom they entered into an agreement with and as such the 2nd limb has been met.

18. In the case of Pius Kipchirchir Kogo Vs Frank Kimeli Tenai (2018) eKLR Ombwayo J, defined the concept of balance of convenience as thus; The meaning of balance of convenience in favour of the Plaintiff is that if an injunction is not granted and the suit is ultimately decided in favour of the Plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the Plaintiff would be greater than that which would be caused to the Defendants if an injunction is granted but the suit is ultimately dismissed”. The Applicant has demonstrated identifiable stakes in suit property worthy of being protected pending the determination of the suit. I am satisfied that he will be prejudiced if orders are not granted. He succeeds on the 3rd limb.

Final disposition

19. The upshot of the above is that the Application dated 6th February 2026 is merited and allowed on the following terms;

i. The Defendants are to deposit the arrears of Ksh.96,000/= into a joint interest earning bank account in the names of the advocates within the next 30 days.

ii. Pending hearing and final determination of the suit, the Defendants shall continue paying rent which shall be deposited into the above joint account.

iii. The costs will be in the cause.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED virtually at NAIROBI on this 19th day of October 2026.

MOHAMMED N. KULLOW

JUDGE

Ruling delivered in the presence of: -

N/A for the Plaintiff/Applicant

Mr. Kwoko for the Defendant/Respondent

Ms. Mwangi Court Assistant

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