Land law

Furncom Limited v Nairobi City County & another [2026] KEELC 6894 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Case E310 of 2022
Judgment date
19 October 2026
Judge(s)
TW Murigi

Case research

Open case research →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

By a Notice of Motion dated 18th June 2024, brought under Article 165(3)(a) of the Constitution and Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 2nd Defendant seeks to have the suit against the 2nd Defendant struck out with costs.

Paragraph 1 →

Reasoning passage

This Court finds that the application is competent.

Paragraph 44 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC CASE NUMBER E310 OF 2022

FURNCOM LIMITED………………………………………………. PLAINTIFF

-VERSUS-

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY …………………………………… 1ST DEFENDANT

MIDDLE EAST BANK KENYA LIMITED …………………..…2ND DEFENDANT

RULING

1. By a Notice of Motion dated 18th June 2024, brought under Article 165(3)(a) of the Constitution and Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 2nd Defendant seeks to have the suit against the 2nd Defendant struck out with costs.

2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face.

THE APPLICANT’S CASE

3. The deponent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit or any of the causes of action pleaded in the Plaint. He argues that under Article 165(3)(a) of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with exclusive and unlimited jurisdiction to entertain the claims and grant the reliefs sought.

4. He further contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the land rates owed by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant; whether the 2nd Defendant erroneously paid Kshs. 262,900/= to the 1st Defendant in respect of those rates; the Plaintiff’s claim for damages exceeding Kshs. 196,000,000/= for loss of profits and opportunity allegedly caused by the Defendants' negligence; and the amount the Plaintiff owes the 2nd Defendant under the banking facility. He argued that this Court cannot restrain the 2nd Defendant from exercising its statutory power of sale under the charge over L.R. No. 15941.

5. The deponent asserts that the suit is an abuse of the Court’s process, citing, among other things, the multiplicity of parties and causes of action. To support this assertion, the deponent relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bank of Africa Kenya Limited & another v TSS Investment Limited & 2 others [2024] KECA 410 (KLR).

THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE

6. The Plaintiff filed a Replying Affidavit, sworn on 5th February 2025 by its director, Solomon Njoroge Kiore, in opposition to the application. He averred that the application is misconceived, brought in bad faith, and intended to deny the Plaintiff its right of access to justice.

7. He argued that the application is incompetent because Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides for striking out pleadings, not suits, as the 2nd Defendant had sought.

8. On jurisdiction, he averred that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. He noted that Section 13(2)(a) expressly includes disputes relating to rates within that jurisdiction. He stated that the suit arose from the 1st Defendant's failure to register the Plaintiff, as registered proprietor of L.R. No. 15941, as the rateable owner under Section 7 of the Valuation for Rating Act. He added that the 1st Defendant continued to bill and issue receipts in the name of Muirigo Housing Development Company Limited, despite the Plaintiff’s payment of the rates.

9. He stated that the Plaintiff had obtained loans of Kshs. 13,000,000/= in 2015 and a further Kshs. 6,478,171/70 from the 2nd Defendant, both secured by a charge over L.R. No. 15941. Under the charge, the Plaintiff was required to pay the land rates and to furnish annual proof of payment, which it did. He further stated that since 2015 the 2nd Defendant had been copied on the Plaintiff’s correspondence seeking to have the 1st Defendant correct the proprietor’s name in its records.

10. He averred that, on 16th September 2020, the 2nd Defendant, without consulting the Plaintiff and contrary to the charge, debited Kshs. 262,900/= from the Plaintiff’s account and remitted it to the 1st Defendant as rates arrears. At the admitted annual rate of Kshs. 13,750/=, this amount represented approximately 19 years’ worth of rates, despite the loan term being only four years. He characterised the deduction as illegal and fraudulent.

11. He further contended that the Defendants colluded to falsify the rates statement to create a default and justify the sale of the suit property. To support this, he pointed to arrears of Kshs. 4,961,227/= said to be outstanding as at 4th November 2022, and to a rates demand of Kshs. 23,997,876/=, which, at the annual rate, equated to about 1,745 years of rates. He contended that the payment of Kshs. 262,900/= was made as 10% of administrative costs on interest to secure a waiver. He also averred that the Plaintiff was never served with any demand notes. He argued that the 2nd Defendant is a necessary party because it had to account for the alleged waiver by producing the public record required under Article 210(2) of the Constitution.

12. He contended that the dispute is not merely an accounting matter between a bank and its customer, but concerns the right of a registered proprietor of leasehold land to be registered as the rateable owner and to pay rates. He relied on Article 209(3)(a) of the Constitution and Section 20 of the Rating Act, which impose the obligation to pay rates on the rateable owner. He further stated that failure to pay rent and rates exposes the lessee to forfeiture by the head lessor, and that the dispute therefore concerns the use, ownership, and occupation of land. He also referred to the reliefs sought in the Plaint, including a mandatory injunction compelling the 1st Defendant to register the Plaintiff as the rateable owner of L.R. Nos. 15941 and 15950, and a declaration that the 1st Defendant’s failure to do so violated Article 40 read together with Article 260 of the Constitution.

13. Alternatively, he argued that even if this Court lacks jurisdiction over some of the prayers, it could apply the doctrine of severability, determine which prayers fall within its jurisdiction, and permit the Plaint to be amended to remove the remainder. Relying on D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd v Muchina [1982] KLR 1, Meya Agri Traders Limited v Elgon House (Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2020), Yaya Towers Limited v Trade Bank Limited (In Liquidation) [2000] eKLR, and Madison Insurance Company Limited v Augustine Kamanda Gitau [2020] eKLR the deponent argued that striking out is a draconian remedy, reserved for the clearest cases, and that a suit raising a triable issue, or one capable of being cured by amendment, should proceed to trial. He contended that striking out the suit would infringe the Plaintiff’s rights under Articles 25(c), 40, 47(1), 48, and 50(1) of the Constitution.

14. He further stated that, by a letter dated 28th October 2024, the Director of Public Prosecutions had directed the Directorate of Criminal Investigations to investigate the Defendants in connection with the matter.

15. He accused the 2nd Defendant of forum shopping and abuse of process. He stated that in HCCC No. E382 of 2022, Furncon Limited v Middle East Bank, the 2nd Defendant had contended that this Court had jurisdiction, yet it now asserted the contrary. He urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs on an indemnity basis and to allow the suit to proceed to full trial.

16. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.

THE 2ND DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS

17. The 2nd Defendant filed its submissions dated 15th January 2025.

18. On behalf of the 2nd Defendant, Counsel submitted that the application seeks the dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction. Counsel identified the claims against the 2nd Defendant as follows: whether it erroneously paid Kshs. 262,900/= to the 1st Defendant in respect of rates, in breach of contract; whether its negligence caused the Plaintiff to suffer loss of profits and opportunity exceeding Kshs. 196,000,000/=, together with interest at 35% per annum above the bank rate; whether the overdraft facility of Kshs. 5,000,000/= was a nullity; whether the Plaintiff was entitled to a credit for penalty interest and to a restructuring of the loan; whether the 2nd Defendant was entitled to issue a statutory notice of sale under the charge; whether it should be restrained from exercising its statutory power of sale over L.R. No. 15941; and the amount owed by the Plaintiff under the banking facility.

19. Counsel contended that under Articles 162(2)(b) and 165(5)(b) of the Constitution, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any of those claims. Counsel argued that the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 165(3)(a) because these were civil matters. Counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff filed an Amended Plaint on 30th May 2024 without leave of Court. Counsel stated that although the Plaintiff claimed that leave had been granted on 9th May 2024, the court record did not reflect this.

20. Counsel urged this Court to adopt the ruling delivered by Mogeni J. on 8 October 2024 in Transfleet Limited v Middle East Bank Kenya Limited & Others (ELC No. E018 of 2024) (unreported). Counsel also relied on *Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 Others* [2017] eKLR, in which the Court of Appeal held that this Court’s jurisdiction is confined to disputes concerning the use of land and to contracts incidental to such use and that it does not extend to mortgages, charges, or the collection of dues and rents, which fall within the civil jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court of Appeal further held that a charge is a disposition of land unconnected with its use.

21. Counsel contended that the dealings between the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff were independent of, and unrelated to, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 1st Defendant. In this regard, Counsel relied on Joel Kyatha Mbaluka t/a Mbaluka & Associates Advocates v Daniel Ochieng Ogola t/a Ogola Okello & Co Advocates [2019] eKLR to submit that jurisdiction is determined by the dominant issue in the dispute. Counsel also cited Bank of Africa Kenya Limited & another v TSS Investment Limited & 2 others [2024] KECA 410 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held that a suit intended to forestall a chargee’s statutory power of sale did not relate to the environment or to the use, occupation of, or title to, land.

22. Relying on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, as cited by the Supreme Court in In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] eKLR; Attorney General & 2 others v Okoiti & 14 others [2020] KECA 30 (KLR); Lemita Ole Lemein v Attorney General & 2 others [2020] eKLR; Joseph Gicheru v Michael Gicheru [2013] eKLR; and Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 others [2017] eKLR Counsel submitted that jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or statute and cannot be conferred by consent, acquiescence, or judicial interpretation. Counsel further submitted that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, that proceedings conducted without it are a nullity, and that a judge may only exercise the jurisdiction of the Court to which he or she was appointed.

23. Counsel urged the Court to strike out or dismiss the suit and the application against the 2nd Defendant with costs.

THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS

24. The 1st Defendant filed its submissions dated 27th January 2025

25. On behalf of the 1st Defendant, Counsel submitted that jurisdiction lies at the root of a Court’s authority, and that a Court must down its tools once it finds that it lacks jurisdiction. To support this point, Counsel relied on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1. Counsel further submitted that this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act is limited to disputes concerning the environment and the use, occupation of, and title to, land.

26. Counsel contended that the Plaintiff’s claim did not relate to title or use of land. Counsel explained that the Plaintiff’s complaint was that, although it had paid rates for L.R. Nos. 15941 and 15950 in Kasarani Sub-County, the receipts were issued in the name of Muirigo Housing Development Company Limited, which the 1st Defendant’s records identified as the owner. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff attributed its loss of Kshs. 262,900/= to the 1st Defendant’s failure to update its records. Counsel further submitted that these complaints, together with the Plaintiff’s claim of Kshs. 1,276,800,000/= plus interest for loss of development between 20th February 1995 and 2022, concerned billing, rate collection and the updating of records. Counsel contended that these were administrative, contractual and revenue matters within the High Court's jurisdiction.

27. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd Defendant, relating to unauthorised debits and the terms of an overdraft facility, were distinct from those against the 1st Defendant. Counsel argued that these claims were banking matters within the High Court’s Commercial Division’s jurisdiction.

28. Relying on Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] eKLR, Suzan Makena Mugambi v County Government of Embu & another [2019] eKLR, Bismal Investments Limited v African Banking Corporation Limited & 2 others [2023] KEELC 20424 (KLR), Patrick Musimba v National Land Commission & 4 others [2015] eKLR, Republic v National Environment Management Authority ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2011] eKLR, and Daniel Otieno Migore v South Nyanza Sugar Company Limited [2018] eKLR Counsel submitted that this Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to commercial, contractual, administrative or banking disputes in which land is merely incidental. Counsel urged the Court to allow the 2nd Defendant’s application and strike out the suit with costs to the 1st Defendant.

THE PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSIONS

29. The Plaintiff filed its submissions dated 6th February 2025. On behalf of the Plaintiff, Counsel submitted that the sole issue for determination is whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

30. On the competence of the application, Counsel argued that Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 permits the Court to strike out only a pleading, as defined under Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act. Counsel further submitted that the 2nd Defendant sought dismissal of the entire suit, not striking out the Plaint on any of the grounds set out in that rule. Counsel contended that the application is incompetent and failed to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. Counsel relied on Owners of Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] KLR 1, Kakuta Maimai Hamisi v Peris Pesi Tobiko & 2 others [2013] eKLR, and Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR to submit that jurisdiction is fundamental and that a Court without it has no basis to take any further step.

31. On the substantive issue, counsel submitted that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13(2)(a) of the Environment and Land Court Act, which covers disputes relating to land-use planning, title, and rates. Counsel argued that the Plaint sought, inter alia, a mandatory injunction compelling the 1st Defendant to register the Plaintiff as the rateable owner of L.R. Nos. 15941 and 15950, in place of Muirigo Housing Development Co. Ltd, pursuant to Section 7 of the Valuation for Rating Act; and a declaration that the 1st Defendant’s failure to do so violated the Plaintiff’s right to property under Articles 40 and 260 of the Constitution. Counsel further submitted that Article 209(3)(a) of the Constitution empowers county governments to impose property rates.

32. Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant was joined to the suit because of its actions regarding the rates. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff had complied with the rates covenant under the charge securing loans of Kshs. 13,000,000/= and Kshs. 6,478,171.70/=. Despite this, on 16th September 2020 the 2nd Defendant debited Kshs. 262,900/= from the Plaintiff’s account, without notice or consent, and paid it to the 1st Defendant for alleged rates arrears. Counsel argued that this raised triable issues on: the validity of the rates demand; the alleged arrears of Kshs. 4,961,227/= as at 4th November 2022; the alleged doctoring of the rates statement; and whether a party other than the rateable owner could receive a demand and make payment, having regard to Section 20 of the Rating Act and Article 210(2)(b) of the Constitution.

33. Counsel asserted that these were rate disputes, not a dispute over accounts between a banker and its customer.

34. Counsel further submitted that the issues relating to the charge were not pleaded in this suit. Counsel submitted that these issues concerned the validity of the facility, penalty interest, restructuring, the statutory notice of sale, and the amount due. Counsel stated that these matters are the subject of High Court Commercial Case No. E382 of 2022: Furncon Limited v Middle East Bank. Counsel further submitted that the 2nd Defendant raised them for the first time in its submissions and that the Plaint referred to the charge solely for context.

35. On the threshold of striking out, Counsel submitted that striking out is a draconian remedy that should be exercised only in plain and obvious cases where a pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action and cannot be cured by amendment. To support this point, Counsel relied on Uchumi Supermarkets Limited & another v Sidhi Investments Limited [2019] KECA 851 (KLR), which cited Co-operative Merchant Bank Ltd v George Fredrick Wekesa, Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1999; Trust Bank Limited v Amin Company Ltd & another [2000] KLR 164; D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd v Muchina [1982] KLR 1; Meya Agri Traders Ltd v Elgon House (2010) Ltd (Civil Appeal 15 of 2020) [2023] KECA 574 (KLR); and Yaya Towers Limited v Trade Bank Limited, Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2000.

36. Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant has not demonstrated any of the grounds under Order 2 Rule 15(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. Counsel further submitted that the 2nd Defendant had not shown that all the prayers in the Plaint fell outside this Court's jurisdiction.

37. In the alternative, Counsel urged the Court to apply the doctrine of severability, under which the Court would determine which prayers fall within its jurisdiction and either disregard any prayer outside its jurisdiction or allow the Plaintiff to amend the Plaint to remove it. It was argued that striking out the entire suit would infringe the Plaintiff’s rights under Articles 25(c), 40, 47(1), 48 and 50(1) of the Constitution.

38. Counsel contended that the application was an abuse of the Court’s process. Counsel asserted that the 2nd Defendant had filed a similar application in High Court Commercial Case No. E382 of 2022, arguing that this Court had jurisdiction. According to Counsel, the 2nd Defendant withdrew that application after the Court criticized it, yet now takes the opposite position here. Counsel argued that this amounted to forum shopping and bad faith, and urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

39. Having considered the application, the responses and the rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination:

a. Whether the application is competent; and

b. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims against the 2nd Defendant.

WHETHER THE APPLICATION IS COMPETENT

40. The Plaintiff argued that the application is incompetent as Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules permits the striking out of a pleading, not of a suit.

41. It is trite that jurisdiction is everything. The issue of jurisdiction may therefore be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and once raised, the court must determine it at the earliest opportunity.

42. The application challenges this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 165(3)(a) of the Constitution. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution requires this Court to administer justice without undue regard for procedural technicalities. Order 51 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules further provides that no application shall be defeated on a technicality or for want of form that does not affect its substance. Reliance on Order 2 Rule 15 does not oust this Court’s duty to determine its jurisdiction.

43. The Plaintiff relied on D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd v Muchina [1982] KLR 1, Uchumi Supermarkets Limited & another v Sidhi Investments Limited [2019] KECA 851 (KLR), Meya Agri Traders Ltd v Elgon House (2010) Ltd [2023] KECA 574 (KLR) and Yaya Towers Limited v Trade Bank Limited, Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2000. These authorities address whether a pleading discloses a reasonable cause of action, and presuppose that the court has jurisdiction to try it. Where jurisdiction is absent, the existence of triable issues does not avail a party.

44. This Court finds that the application is competent.

WHETHER THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE 2ND DEFENDANT

45. It is trite law that jurisdiction is everything, and without it, the court cannot take one more step in the case. The locus classicus on jurisdiction is the celebrated case of Owners of Motor Vessel ‘Lillian S’ vs Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (1989) eKLR, in which the Court held that:

“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings…”

46. Similarly, in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another vs Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, the Supreme Court stated as follows;

“A Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. …. Where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a Court of law, the Court must operate within the constitutional limits. It cannot expand its jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation….”

47. A Court derives its jurisdiction from the Constitution, legislation, or both. The jurisdiction of this Court is derived from Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act.

48. In Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR), the Court of Appeal considered the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction in relation to charges and held that this Court has jurisdiction over disputes connected with the use of land and contracts incidental to such use, but not over mortgages, charges, or the collection of dues and rents. Those matters fall within the High Court's civil jurisdiction.

49. The Court of Appeal affirmed that position in Bank of Africa Kenya Limited & another v TSS Investment Limited & 2 others* (Civil Appeal E055 of 2022) [2024] KECA 410 (KLR). It held that a suit seeking to forestall a chargee’s exercise of its statutory power of sale did not concern the environment, the use or occupation of land, or title to land.

50. Jurisdiction is determined by examining the pleadings to ascertain the true nature of the dispute. In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd Defendant are set out in the Plaint dated 20th September 2022 as follows:

a. that on 16th September 2020, the 2nd Defendant, without its knowledge or consent, debited its bank account with Kshs. 262,900/= and paid that sum to the 1st Defendant as rates.

b. At paragraph 12, the Plaintiff particularized the 2nd Defendant’s negligence as paying land rates without consulting it, debiting its account with an erroneous payment, failing to reverse the payment and failing to demand a refund from the 1st Defendant.

c. At paragraph 13, the Plaintiff pleaded loss of business from the Ministry of Education, schools and counties.

d. At paragraph 14, the Plaintiff pleaded that the overdraft facility of Kshs. 5,000,000/= advanced by the 2nd Defendant was a nullity.

e. At paragraphs 15 and 16, the Plaintiff pleaded the 2nd Defendant’s refusal to drop penalty interest and restructure the facility, and the issuance of a statutory notice dated 26th July 2022.

51. The reliefs sought against the 2nd Defendant are general damages for loss of business, a refund of interest charged on the debit balance of Kshs. 262,900/=, and a permanent injunction restraining the 2nd Defendant from selling, auctioning, offering for sale, or otherwise disposing of L.R. No. 15941.

52. The Plaintiff contends that its claim against the 2nd Defendant relates to rates. This Court is not persuaded. The question of whether the rates demanded by the 1st Defendant were due, and whether the Plaintiff ought to be registered as the rateable owner, lies between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The refund of Kshs. 262,900/= is sought against the 1st Defendant at prayer (a) in the Plaint. As against the 2nd Defendant, the question is whether a bank was entitled to debit its customer’s account and make a payment on its behalf, and whether in doing so it acted negligently. That is a dispute arising from the relationship of banker and customer and from the terms of the charge. It has no connection with the use and occupation of, or title to, land.

53. The claim in prayer (f) for general damages arising from loss of business is a tortious claim for economic loss. It does not relate to the use, occupation, or title to land.

54. The claims set out in the Plaint and the injunction sought in prayer (h) challenge the validity of the facility, the penalty interest, the refusal to restructure the facility, and the 2nd Defendant’s statutory power of sale. These matters fall squarely within the holdings in Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others and Bank of Africa Kenya Limited & another v TSS Investment Limited & 2 others.

55. The Plaintiff argued that the issues relating to the charge were not pleaded, and that the Plaint referred to the charge only for context. The Plaint does not support that argument. The Plaint pleads the nullity of the facility, and the prayer thereunder seeks to restrain the 2nd Defendant from exercising its power of sale. Further, by the Plaintiff’s own submissions, the Plaintiff seeks to restrain the 2nd Defendant from exercising its statutory power of sale in High Court Commercial Case No. E382 of 2022: Furncon Limited v Middle East Bank. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act bars a court from proceeding with a suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties pending before a court of competent jurisdiction.

56. Alternatively, the Plaintiff urged this Court to apply the doctrine of severability by determining which prayers fall within its jurisdiction and disregarding those beyond it. The claims against the 1st Defendant relate to the registration of the rateable owner and the imposition of rates. They fall within section 13(2)(a) of the Environment and Land Court Act and should therefore proceed to trial. The Plaintiff’s right of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution is not curtailed, as the Plaintiff remains at liberty to pursue its claims against the 2nd Defendant before the High Court, where a suit between the same parties is pending.

57. The Plaintiff accused the 2nd Defendant of forum shopping because the 2nd Defendant had argued in High Court Commercial Case No. E382 of 2022 that this Court has jurisdiction. However, a party’s position in another forum does not determine jurisdiction, which derives from the Constitution and statute. A litigant’s conduct, concession, or inconsistency cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court.

58. The Plaintiff also referred to the letter dated 28th October 2024 from the Director of Public Prosecutions, which directed investigations into the Defendants. The pendency of criminal investigations has no bearing on this Court's jurisdiction.

59. Although the 1st Defendant, in its submissions, urged this Court to strike out the entire suit, it filed no application seeking that relief. The application before this Court is confined to the suit against the 2nd Defendant. This Court therefore declines the invitation. In any event, Section 13(2)(a) of the Environment and Land Court Act expressly extends this court's jurisdiction to disputes relating to rates.

60. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the claims against the 2nd Defendant are not concerned with the environment or with the use, occupation, or title to land. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine those claims.

61. The upshot of the foregoing is that the application dated 18th June 2024 is merited and is hereby allowed on the following terms:

a. The suit against the 2nd Defendant is hereby struck out.

b. The suit shall proceed to hearing as against the 1st Defendant.

c. Costs shall abide with the outcome of the suit.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 19TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Ndegwa holding brief for Bwire for the Plaintiff

Esmail for the 2nd Defendant

Vena – Court Assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder