Background
By an application dated 11.2.2026, the 1st defendant seeks;
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
By an application dated 11.2.2026, the 1st defendant seeks;
Paragraph 1 →The issue for determination is whether the 1st defendant has made a case for imposition of security for costs and whether the plaintiff has succeeded in refuting the suggestion that he is not capable of meeting any attendant or resultant costs if his suit were to fail.
Paragraph 99 →Specifically, in paragraph 19 it is deposed that the plaintiff's unknown status as well as unknown assets, both real and movable, provides the 1st defendant unfair and inequitable protection from legal attachment of execution and, as such, this court needs to order the provision of security to ensure the 1st defendant is also adequately catered for in the event the instant suit is dismissed.
Paragraph 128 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC SUIT NO. E421 OF 2022
IBRAHIM MAHAMED ABEY……………..PLAINTIFF/RESPODENT
VERSUS
TIMSALES LIMITED …………………. 1ST DEFENDANT/APPLICANT
CHIEF LAND REGISTRAR ……….. 2ND DEFENDANT/RESPODENT
DIB BANK KENYA LTD ………… 3RD DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
RULING
1. By an application dated 11.2.2026, the 1st defendant seeks;
i. An order that the plaintiff to provide/ furnish security for costs amounting to Ksh. 20 million or such other sum this court may deem fit within 30 days from the date of making such order or within such other period as the court may deem fit.
ii. The security so ordered be deposited in a joint interest-earning account of a reputable bank /financial institution in the joint names of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, respective advocates on record.
iii. Order that, in default of compliance with prayer No. (1) within the time limit directed, the proceedings be stayed, and the plaintiff's suit against the 1st defendant be dismissed for failure to furnish security for costs.
2. The grounds are set out on the face of the application and in a supporting affidavit of Onkar Raj, a director of the 1st defendant, sworn on 11.2.2026. The 1st defendant states that it acquired the suit property in 1968 as per conveyance annexed as OR-1, which is prime property for Upperhill Estates along Menlik Road, in Hurlingham, where prices are high, making it a valuable asset to it, whose title has been in its possession free from any encumbrances.
3. It is deposed that the suit property is leased out to a 3rd party tenant, namely Ngure Kagwi t/a Cryasell Investment, as per a lease agreement attached as OR-2.
4. The 1st defendant deposes that since 1968 it has been in actual, constructive and continuous occupation with no encumbrance or sale to 3rd parties.
5. The 1st defendant deposes that the plaintiff’s status and whereabouts are unknown, as he is represented by one Suleiman Ibrahim Surrow under a power of attorney dated 7 11 2022, a copy attached as OR-3.
6. The 1st defendant deposes that the whereabouts, residence and attachable assets, real or movable within Kenya of the plaintiff are unknown to it despite reasonable efforts to ascertain the same.
7. The 1st defendant states that the only known (assets) connected to this dispute is the suit property which is the subject of contested ownership in these proceeding is therefore not a reliable indicator of ability to satisfy a future decree for costs.
8. The 1st defendant representative deposes that the plaintiff fraudulently acquired a title deed in respect of LR No.1/252 and obtained a new land reference number 1/1405 Nairobi and proceeded to charge the suit property to the 3rd defendant in sums amounting to over KSH 300 million as per the annexed fraudulent title with the charged entries marked OR-4.
9. The 1st defendant deposes that the plaintiff is currently in default and the 3rd defendant proceeded to exercise its statutory power of sale, which necessitated the instituting of High Court civil suit No. E 046 of 2022, Meridian Energy Limited versus DIB Bank Kenya Limited Timsales Ltd, in which interim reliefs were obtained owing to the instant ownership dispute, to which the 1st defendant was enjoined as an interested party as per the annexed plaint dated 14.2.2022 marked OR -5.
10. The 1st defendant deposes that the most recent search from the land registry on LR No.1/252 dated 26 5 2025 indicates that the applicant is the bona fide registered and beneficial proprietor of the suit property as per the annexed copy marked OR-6.
11. The 1st defendant deposes that its advocate on record advises it that there is a real risk that, if the plaintiff's claim is dismissed, the 1st defendant will be unable to recover its costs from the plaintiff, thereby occasioning prejudice to the plaintiff; apart from the suit property, the plaintiff has no other known asset and/or income to meet such costs in the event the 1st defendant is successful.
12. The 1st defendant deposes that the facts set out in the defence and counterclaim dated 23.1.2025 and in the witness statement and bundle of documents clearly show that the defence and the counterclaim are bona fide with a significant chance of success.
13. The 1st defendant deposes that it is trite law that a property in dispute cannot be used to show sufficient means of meeting its costs, and given that the plaintiff has no other known assets or income which may be executed in satisfaction of a decree of costs, it would be prejudicial to it as it stands to suffer substantial loss since it will be unable to recoup any damages or costs against the plaintiff.
14. The 1st defendant deposes that in total, the estimated cost for this suit will far exceed KSH 15 million and therefore it is only fair that the plaintiff be ordered to deposit this sum as security to avoid a situation where costs cannot be recovered by it.
15. The 1st defendant states that the plaintiff's unknown status, as well as unknown assets, both real and movable, provides the 1st defendant unfair and inequitable protection from legal attachments of execution and as such.
16. It is deposed that court needs to order a provision of security so as to ensure that the 1st defendant is adequately catered for in the event of the instant suit being dismissed. The 1st defendant states that, in the above circumstances and pending the conclusion of this suit, a deposit of KSh. 20 million may be deemed adequate security, which conditions fall within the jurisdiction of this court to impose.
17. The application is opposed by the plaintiff through an affidavit of Suleiman Ibrahim Suroww sworn on 10.8.2026. The deponent states that he is an agent of the plaintiff duly authorized vide a power of attorney No.P/A 7574811 dated 7 11 2022 and registered on 8.11.2022 to act, execute, all necessary documents and testify on his behalf over the suit property relying also on documents from page 1 to 77 marked as S15-04 deposes that the plaintiff is an elderly man of advanced age, who is the lawful and registered proprietor of LR No 1/1405, LR No. 2129993 formerly No. 1/252 situated in kilimani Nairobi as per a certificate of title and official search as per exhibited in pages 5-8.
18. The deponent states the record held by the county also demonstrates that the petitioner is a rightful owner of the suit property as per printouts on pages 9 to 19 of the exhibit. T
19. The plaintiff's agent deposes that this suit was necessitated following concerted effort by the 1st defendant to deprive him of the suit property contrary to the law.
20. The deponent terms the Millimani case number MCELC E253/2022 as based on a false claim to fraudulently obtain interim orders through material misrepresentation of the nature of the suit land, its ownership, and possession, leading to dismissal on 4.11.2022 for lack of jurisdiction as per exhibits on pages 35 to 45.
21. The deponent deposes that the 1st defendant also manipulated records held by the city/county to show that it is the rateable owner of the suit property, a scheme which the plaintiff discovered on or about December 2022.
22. The deponent deposes that on 27.3.2023, the court issued orders that the parties maintain the prevailing status quo on the suitland pending hearing and determination of the case, which orders, unfortunately, the 1st defendant flouted by purporting to have the reconstruction of the land register for LR No.1/252 vide gazette notice number 14189 dated 19 .10. 2023, which the plaintiff objected to vide his letter dated 26 .10 .2023 appearing on pages 46- 47 of the exhibits.
23. The deponent deposes that it has been established that unscrupulous police officers attached to the DCI have been investigating the suit property for nearly two years at the behest of the 1st defendant without its knowledge or notice, which is almost over in respect of the subject matter, yet they have not even allowed the plaintiff to record his statement or present his documents for interrogation.
24. It is averred that the above developments led to the plaintiff and the deponent instituting Nairobi HCC CR Petition No. E 613 of 2024 against the DCI and the DPP as the 1st defendant is in an unholy with the 1st defendants were abusing the criminal justice system by undertaking skewed investigation with a view to having them charged in relation to the subject matter, to intimidate them gain an unfair advantage, and prejudice the claim before court.
25. The deponent states that the 1st defendant is colluding with fraudsters within the DCI to have the plaintiff and the deponent arrested when the matter came up for hearing and to lead to dismissal for want of prosecution for non-attendance of the hearing.
26. The deponent deposes that in the judgment delivered on 13.8 2025 the court held that the investigation conducted by the 1st defendant was an abuse of the legal process, was actuated by an ulterior and improper motive and was designed to circumvent and prejudice the pending civil proceedings as per judgment dated 13.8.2025 exhibited at pages 48 to 70.
27. The deponent deposes that the court further held that the said investigation violated the plaintiff's rights under Articles 10, 27, 47, 50 and 232 of the Constitution, quashed the same, issued an order of probation and awarded costs.
28. The affiant deposes that on 9.7 2025 the instant suit was adjourned to 23rd and 26th February 2026 before the instant application was filed on 11 February 2026, which was not a coincidence; rather, the filing more than 4 years after the suit was filed, a few days to the main hearing and after thwarted attempts to institute criminal proceedings against them demonstrates a clear abuse of the court process.
29. It is deposed that the 1st defendant, having failed to secure an advantage over the plaintiff through the criminal justice system, has now resorted to the present application for inflated costs, which is yet another tactic calculated to intimidate the plaintiff, stifle his claim and deny him access to justice.
30. The affiant terms the application a non-starter, an abuse of court process calculated to frustrate the fair and expeditious determination of this suit on merit. The plaintiff deposes that the application does not meet the holding in Westmont Holdings SDN-BHD versus CBK and others [2023] KESC 11 (KLR).
31. It is deposed that the agent's address has been disclosed with an evident ID Number 9220571, has stated that he is a male adult of sound mind residing in Nairobi; the defence and counterclaim describes him as of sound mind and residing in Nairobi, and therefore having adduced those facts, the 1st defendant cannot now be heard to allege otherwise for merely grounding the notice of motion.
32. The affiant deposes that the parties are bound by the pleadings; the 1st defendant cannot approbate and reprobate by alleging that the plaintiff's residence is known in its defence and counterclaim and alleging the contrary in the application, without amending the earlier pleadings.
33. The deponent denies that the plaintiff is litigating by proxy; otherwise, the donation of a power of attorney is a lawful and recognised instrument under Kenyan law.
34. The deponent deposes that the plaintiff is an old man residing in Nairobi, and that his advanced age and practical difficulties occasioned that he found it necessary and prudent to donate the power of attorney to enable the deponent to act on his behalf in prosecuting this suit and other related matters.
35. The deponent denies that donation of the power of attorney amounts to litigation by proxy, nor does it disclose any impropriety warranting an order for the security of costs.
36. The plaintiff's agent deposes that there is nothing placed before the court to substantiate impropriety in conducting the hearing; otherwise, the claim that litigation is being undertaken through proxy remains speculative, unsubstantiated, and made in bad faith.
37. The plaintiff's agent says the claim that the plaintiff owns no known asset or income to meet his financial obligations.
38. The plaintiff's agent states that no evidence has been adduced to substantiate the allegation; it is deposed that the suit property is worth more than KSH 300 million, and that proprietary interest therein is likely to succeed, for there is a title deed; the 3rd defendant acknowledged it was a good title and used it as security following extensive due diligence.
39. The plaintiff's agent denies that the plaintiff has allegedly defaulted on paying their loan; on the contrary, the plaintiff deposes that the loan has substantially been repaid, through monthly payments of approximate KSH 5 million every month since 2023 going by the statements of loan facility as of 10.8.2026 as per pages 74 to 77 of the exhibits.
40. The plaintiff's agent deposes that the 1st defendant has not produced any statement of account, demand, notice of default, or other evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff has ever been in default or is currently in default, making the contention that the plaintiff is unable to meet an order for security for costs speculative and unsupported by any evidence.
41. The plaintiff's agent deposes that the suit property's worth is in excess of KSH 300 million and his continued repayment of the facility demonstrates to the contrary.
42. The plaintiff deposes that the court in the Westmont Holdings SDN-BHD VS CBK suit has settled the law that where the plaintiff is a Natural person, an order for security for costs cannot be made merely on account of his or her impecuniosity, as doing so would offend his right to access justice under Article 48 of the Constitution.
43. The plaintiff deposes that even if he was impoverished, this court cannot on that basis alone issue an order for security of costs against him, as it would amount to impeding the right to access justice on account of poverty.
44. On the figure of KSH 20 million, the plaintiff terms the same as unsubstantiated and excessive. The plaintiff deposes that, going by the holding in the Westmont case (supra), the figure of KSH 20 million was set aside and replaced with KSh 6 million, the court underscoring that courts are not bound to fix security at a substantial or punitive amount; otherwise, any amount made must be just, proportionate and not oppressive.
45. The plaintiff's agent in this case deposes that the 1st defendant has not laid any basis, computation or justification for arriving at the figure of Ksh 20 million.
46. The plaintiff's agent deposes that an order for security for costs cannot properly be made for a sum which is neither pleaded nor supported by evidence, especially when the same is manifestly excessive, arbitrary and disproportionate to any cost that could reasonably be anticipated in a suit of this nature.
47. The plaintiff's agent deposes that, as evidenced by attempts to influence the outcome of the pending proceedings by having the plaintiff maligned, the call for KShs 20 million is nothing but an abuse of court process calculated to intimidate the plaintiff and have him relinquish his claim over the property.
48. The plaintiff's agent deposes that the orders sought should not issue as it would be punitive and would amount to denial of the plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution. The court record shows that no other respondent has filed responses to the application.
49. The 1st defendant relies on written submission dated 18.8.2026. After setting out the introduction, pleadings and application record, and the factual timeline matrix, the 1st defendant isolates three issues for the court’s determination.
50. On whether a proper basis has been established to involve Order 29 CPR, the 1st defendant submits that the court has discretion to order security for costs to ensure an innocent defendant, forced into court to defend a frivolous or complex suit, is not left holding a Pyrrhic victory, a cost decree against a phantom, insolvent or untraceable plaintiff.
51. Relying on the ratio decided in Westmont, holding SDN-BHD vs CBK & Others [2023] KESC 11(KLR), the 1st defendant urges the court to allow the application.
52. On whether the plaintiff's agent replying affidavit exposes fatal internal inconsistencies, contradictory official addresses and is an untenable attempt to use the disputed property as proof of solvency, the 1st defendant submits that Order 26 Rule 6 CPR contains no statutory deadline barring a defendant from invoking it before a trial commences.
53. The 1st defendant submits that it is trite law that such an application is most appropriately brought before the full burden of trial costs are incurred, such as on the witness preparation, trial advocacy fees, expert valuation review, and trial alternances, which are heavily concentrated at the trial stage itself.
54. The 1st defendant submits that it would be completely illogical to require a defendant to seek security years in advance before the trial costs become imminent, or post-trial when the costs have already been expended without protection.
55. The 1st defendant submits that the record reveals that the proceedings were repeatedly delayed by the plaintiff's own parallel tactics, including the filing of a constitutional petition.
56. Therefore, the 1st defendant submits that it moved expeditiously on 11.5.2026, ahead of a scheduled hearing date, precisely to secure its defence costs before entering the crucial full trial.
57. The 1st defendant submits that the aim was not to circumvent or scuttle the scheduled hearing and that, in any event, the presiding judge was on transfer; thus, no hearing would have taken place save to attend and take fresh hearing dates.
58. The 1st defendant submits that if the plaintiff is solvent and bona fide, as claimed by his proxy, it then means also he is capable of depositing the money.
59. The 1st defendant submits that the two addresses provided by the plaintiff in paragraph 24 and in exhibits S15-04 constitute a fatal discrepancy, begging the question of which is the true physical abode of the plaintiff where his attachable assets are exposed, and exposing the plaintiff, who cannot even maintain consistent records concerning his basic address, to the danger that Order 26 civil procedure rules were enacted to prevent.
60. The 1st defendant, concerning paragraphs 25 and 26 of the replying affidavit, submits that what paragraph 3 of the counterclaim states has fundamentally been misread by the plaintiff, as it is not an admission of unencumbered attachable asset within Kenya.
61. As to paragraphs 36 and 40 of the replying affidavit, the 1st defendant terms the same as a legal nullity, for a property directing impeached and sought to be cancelled in a pending suit cannot be proved to have security or proof of financial capability to satisfy future costs.
62. Reliance as placed on CMC aviation limited versus kenya airways limited crucier limited 1978 KECA 9 (KLR) that pleadings and extrapolated to this suit on claims over assets are not proof of value, or ownership until strictly adjudicated.
63. The 1st defendant submits that it has not expressly or impliedly admitted in its pleadings the assertion of ownership of the suit property as put forth by the plaintiff, but to the contrary, the entire suit rejects such notion.
64. The 1st defendant submits that should it succeed in the counterclaim, the alleged plaintiff's KSh 300 million wealth may vanish into thin air, leaving it with a cost decree against an empty shell.
65. The 1st defendant submits that to evade an order for security, the Westmont Holdings case has been invoked. The 1st defendant submits that the said case only protects genuine, impoverished litigants from being locked out of court, but not litigants who boast of massive liquid cash flows while refusing to deposit security.
66. The 1st defendant submits that the admission by the proxy in paragraph 38(b) of the replying affidavit is devastating to his case, in that if he makes at least KSh 60 million per year, to clear the bank loan, then an order for security for costs cannot stifle his claim or cause impecuniosity.
67. The 1st defendant submits that either the plaintiff is a wealthy individual with immense liquid funds, depositing KSH 20 million with zero hardship. The 1st defendant says that the plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time, one hand in paragraph 27 of the affidavit saying that he deposits tens of millions in cash to a bank to demonstrate solvency while simultaneously weeping poverty to deny their applicants security for costs.
68. The 1st defendant submits that the plaintiff has never set foot in court, sworn an affidavit or declared his known assets, other than conducting his business through a proxy.
69. The 1st defendant submits that whereas a power of attorney is a recognised legal instrument, utilising a proxy to prosecute a high-stakes land claim against a 1968 registered owner, while keeping the principal entirely hidden from potential execution, presents a textbook case for Order 26 civil procedure rules relief.
70. On whether Ksh 20 million is proportionate and a necessary safeguard the 1st defendant submits that given that the suit property is prime commercial real estate in Nairobi, valued at KSH 300 million and given the complexity of the conveyance history, expert land searches and senior advocacy required to defend the title and prosecute the counterclaim, the cost will easily range between KSH 15 to 20 million and therefore ordering for security of cost to be deposited ensures complete neutrality no one will suffer financial prejudice as the money earns interest, while the 1st defendant is secured against an empty victory.
71. The 1st defendant submits that when the rhetoric in the replying affidavit is stripped away, the plaintiff's position is exposed as self-contradictory, bad in law and deeply inequitable.
72. The plaintiff relies on a written submission dated 29.8.2026. After the introduction and brief facts, the plaintiff submits that Order 26 of the Civil Procedure Rules grants the court's discretion to order for security for costs, which discretion must be judicial, exercised upon consideration of the circumstances of each case and without unjustifiably impeding a party's right to access to justice guided by the principles set out in the Westmont Holdings case (supra).
73. The plaintiff submits that the sole question for determination is whether the 1st defendant has established any unique circumstances warranting an order for security of deposit to the tune of KSH 20 million.
74. The plaintiff submits that the 1st defendant has not met the threshold, for there is no real risk of non-recovery, based on evidence other than mere speculation. The plaintiff submits that he who alleges must prove, rather than allege as was held in Kenya Education Trust versus Katherine SM Whitton civil appeal number 310 of 2009 .
75. The plaintiff submits that no evidence has been tendered by way of search, financial record, valuation, official inquiry or other evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff lacks assets within Kenya or would be unable to satisfy a cost order, including the alleged default on loan repayments contrary to the statement of account produced.
76. The plaintiff submits that the factual premises upon which the application seek to establish the inability to pay cost is far-fetched, lacks legal or factual foundation.
77. Similarly, the plaintiff submits that the applicant has not established or demonstrated any efforts it undertook to establish the plaintiff's financial position or any actual inability to meet any award of costs, other than unfounded allegations. Regarding the power of attorney making the plaintiff a proxy litigant, the plaintiff terms the arguments misconceived since a duly executed and registered power of attorney is a lawful instrument, and therefore its use does not or cannot be characterised as litigation by proxy.
78. The plaintiff submits that nothing has been produced to show that its power of attorney is invalid, that the plaintiff does not exist, or that he has ceased to have any interest in the proceedings.
79. The plaintiff submits that it is not substantiated that the proceedings are being conducted without his authority, more so when the replying affidavit explains that the plaintiff is an elderly man of advanced age and, given the vigour of litigation, had to execute the power of attorney to ensure that his interest in the suit property is well protected.
80. Therefore, the plaintiff submits that no basis upon which the court can infer that the plaintiff is a nominal party or that his claim is being prosecuted by an undisclosed person has been laid.
81. The plaintiff submits that the applicant is out to seek to contest a lawful procedural arrangement as evidence of financial impropriety whilst adducing any evidence capable of supporting that conclusion.
82. Regarding the alleged address discrepancy, the plaintiff, relying on Omar Hassan versus Watson Miguera and others [2021] KEELC 1481 (KLR), submits that the procedure act not only has a description of the physical address of the plaintiff but also goes ahead to give particulars of his National ID, Land Number and the place of abode.
83. Therefore, the difference highlighted in the written submission by the 1st defendant does not demonstrate that residence is untraceable or show risk of future non-enforcement of the decree for costs.
84. The plaintiff submits that after the 1st defendant alleged the said discrepancies for the DCI to investigate, including inquiries into the power of attorney and the advocate who witnessed it, and upon proof that the same was validly executed by an existing plaintiff, the 1st defendant, in concert with the DCI, instead began accusing them of money laundering.
85. Given the foregoing, the plaintiff submits that the 1st defendant cannot plausibly contend that the plaintiff's identity or whereabouts are unknown or that he would be beyond reach of the court in enforcement of any cost order.
86. It is further submitted that the suit is not frivolous and that the counterclaim has merits.
87. The plaintiff submits that matters regarding the merits of his plaint or merits of the counterclaim are substantially disputed and constitute the very issues to be determined at the hearing.
88. The plaintiff submits that, having displayed a copy of the certificate of title, the same remains prima facie proof of ownership and at a preliminary stage the court cannot summarily characterise the claim as frivolous, vexatious or a sham. On the contrary, the plaintiff submits that the suit is about questions concerning competing titles and ownership which require determination at the fair trial.
89. It is submitted therefore that the 1st defendant should not be permitted to obtain, indirectly through interlocutory applications for security, a determination of matters that properly belong to the trial.
90. The plaintiff submits that the timing of the application is suspect and should be a material consideration. In this case since 2022, the application is coming after the scheduled years and shortly before hearing dates of 23rd & 26th February 2026, and immediately following the 1st defendant’s attempts to coerce the plaintiff over his claims through the DCI & the DPP which unfortunately were thwarted by the petition number by the petition number is 613 of 2024.
91. The plaintiff submits that the 1st defendant has not demonstrated any material change in the plaintiff's circumstances between the commencement of the suit and February 26, which suddenly created the alleged risk of non-recovery.
92. As to the justification to seek a figure of Ksh 20 million as security, the plaintiff submits that there is no bill of costs, taxation, notes, compensation or order, based on the Advocates Remuneration Order or other material demonstrating how the figure was reached.
93. The plaintiff submits that the amount remains an assertion which is not backed by evidence of actual or reasonably anticipated cost. Reliance is placed on Macro Toob Explosive Limited Versus Mamujee Brokers Limited [1988] (KLR) 730 and in Westmont Holding (supra) that the court must consider the circumstances of each case.
94. The plaintiff submits that nothing has been tendered to bear any reasonable relationship between the figure and the cost which may ultimately be recoverable.
95. The plaintiff submits that the applicants cannot, through written submission without more, allege the matter is complex and requires senior advocacy, yet no evidence is availed of the alleged fees as necessary to defend the suit and prosecute the counterclaim.
96. The plaintiff submits that the application and the prayers sought, as presented, are not about security but aims to stifle the claim, or make the claim conditional upon the ability to immediately raise Ksh 20 million and deny his constitutional rights under Article 4 of the constitution which is about Westmont decision warned hence the court to grant an order with practical effects of determining the suit before hearing it on merits.
97. On whether the effects of criminal investigations are relevant, the plaintiff submits that the judgment in Petition Number E 613 of 2024 is relevant only to the broader circumstances in which the application is brought, its timing and conduct.
98. The plaintiff submits that the 1st defendant has failed to establish the statutory and evidential basis for the security for costs, that the plaintiff is unknown, untraceable, lacks assets and is unable to satisfy a future award of costs.
99. The issue for determination is whether the 1st defendant has made a case for imposition of security for costs and whether the plaintiff has succeeded in refuting the suggestion that he is not capable of meeting any attendant or resultant costs if his suit were to fail.
100. Security for costs is defined as money, property or a bond deposited in court by a party suing to secure the payment of costs while the case is ongoing and to protect the sued party if eventually the suing party loses.
101. The basis for imposing costs of litigation in civil litigation is section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. Costs follow the event as a general rule unless there are reasons to depart from the general rule. In this case, it means that a successful party to a litigation is entitled to costs.
102. Ordinarily, costs are generally granted at the end of the litigation and are not intended to punish the unsuccessful party or the claimant for bringing the suit. In Rai versus Rai [2014] KESC 37 (KLR), the court said that costs are at the discretion of the court. The court said that a party who has succeeded in court has no right to cost unless and until the courts award it for the court has absolute and ,,,, discretion to award or not to award costs,in accordance with the law and the ends of justice.
103. Security for costs therefore is a procedural litigation tool intended to protect a defendant against the risk that, if successful, it may be unable to recover costs from the unsuccessful party. Therefore, an order can be made pending hearing and details of a suit.
104. In an application for security of costs, an applicant ought to establish that the respondent in the proceeding would be unable to pay costs.
105. In Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dixon Mwenda Kithinji & others 2014 eKLR, the court said that it is not enough to allege that a respondent will be unable to pay costs in the event that he is unsuccessful. The court said that the onus is on the applicant to prove such inability or lack of good faith that will make an order for security for costs reasonable.
106. The guidelines and the principles to apply in cases of this nature were set out in Westmont Holdings SDR BHD versus CBK and others, Petition No. 16 into (E023 of 2021. The court said that the imposition of costs is constitutional since the law grants the court such powers to impose costs.
107. In the absence of clear guidelines on what a court considers when making such an order, to address the gap, it developed 21 principles to be considered, namely.
1) Prospect of success or merits of the proceedings
1) The genuineness of the proceedings.
2) The impecuniosity of the plaintiff.
3) Whether the plaintiff's impecuniosity is attributable to the defendant's conduct.
4) Whether the plaintiff is effectively in the position of the defendants.
5) Whether an order for security for costs would stifle the proverbs and/or impede access to Justice.
6) Whether the proceedings involve a matter of public importance.
7) Whether there has been an admission or payment in court.
8) Whether delay by the plaintiff in commencing proceedings has prejudiced the defendant.
9) The cost of proceedings.
10) Whether the security sought is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute.
11) The timing of the application for security for costs.
12) Whether an order for costs made out of the principal would be enforceable within the Republic of Kenya.
13) Whether there is any convenience or otherwise of enforcing a Kenyan court judgment so ordered in the County of a non-respondent plaintiff or appellant.
14) If the printing is a natural person or order for security for costs cannot be made merely on accounts of insolvency or impecuniosity.
15) Security for costs is to be given in such manner at such a time and on such terms as the court may by order direct.
16) If the plaintiff failed to comply with an order under this rule, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed.
17) Respondent has no known property in Kenya.
108. The power must be exercised judicially and particularly based on sufficient evidence that the respondent is unable to pay costs in the event he is unsuccessful, to ensure that the ends of justice are met as opposed to assisting a party to act in the abuse of the court process.
109. While exercising such a discretion, the court must balance the competing interests between the parties to ensure that the order of the court does not impede the right to access justice as enshrined in Article 48 of the Constitution, as read together with Article 159(1) of the Constitution.
110. An application for security for costs ordinarily should be made as soon as reasonably possible once the grounds for bringing it are known or could with due diligence have become known. In Sweeney & another vs The Voluntary Health Insurance Board [2026] IESC 302, almost eight months passed.
111. The court termed the delay as truly extraordinary, sufficient to justify refusing security. The court explained the rationale for treating the delay as a special circumstance that the plaintiff should know as early as reasonably possible, whether security would be required.
112. The court said that once delay moves beyond weeks or even months, the explanation for that delay assumes increasing importance and therefore unexplained delay may be sufficient to tip the balance against security, even without specific prejudice.
113. The court said that where the delay exceeds one year, with no or insufficient explanations for a significant part of that delay, the balance shifts towards refusing security in the absence of a pressing exigency of justice.
114. In Noormohamed Abdulla v Patel (Ranchhodbhai Jivabhai) [1962] E.A. 447 (Court of Appeal), the court held that an order for security of costs, not directed towards enforcing payment but designed to ensure that a litigant, when by reason of near insolvency, is to pay the costs when he is on a measure of protection to the other parties. Stratosat Datacom (Proprietary) Limited v Raadgevend Bureau Krijger Services (Kenya) Limited & Another [2012] eKLR, the court said that the application for security for costs should not be used as a weapon against a case of a plaintiff and therefore a party who makes the application should at least annex a draft bill of cost to enable the court evaluate how the amount sought it arrived at.
115. In Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & others [2014] eKLR, the court said that it is imperative that security of costs is awarded based on the subject matter and scale provided for in the Advocates Remuneration Order.
116. In Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited Vs Salim Siullan Motor & Others [2012], the court laid down the principles to be considered, one being its possibility or probability that the plaintiff will be deterred from pursuing his claims by an order for security for costs; and, more importantly, a sufficient recourse for not ordering security.
117. In Indemnity Insurance Company of N. America & Others v Kenya Airport Company Limited [2001] eklr, the court said that a well-known principle is that a person instituting legal proceedings in this country and being abroad, so that no adverse order could effectively be made against him if unsuccessful, is by the Rules of Court compelled to give security for costs.
118. In Shah & 2 Others v Shah & 2 Others [1982] eKLR, Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1981 where there was a power of allowing, the court said that security is normally required from a plaintiff who resides outside the jurisdiction of the country.
119. In AECOM ROA (PTY) Limited v Kenya National Highways Authority [2019] eKLR, Civil Case No. 309 of 2017, ruling delivered on 5 March 2019 the court delivered an order granting security for costs for a delay of 2 years.
120. In George Gakubu Mbuthia & others vs HFCK & others, Civil Appeal No. 173 of 2010, the court underscored that the purpose of an order for security of costs is to ensure that a litigant who is unable to pay the costs of the litigation, should he lose, is dissertated litigation except upon terms that afford some measure of protection to the other parties.
121. The court said that the onus was on the applicant to prove such inability or lack of good faith which would make such an order reasonable.
122. The court said that such an order is to protect both parties so that the court does not readily employ or use the power of striking out a suit, as this is defined to risk the suit. In Magiri Nguthari vs Gideon Kimanthi & Ngathari [2010] KECA 211 (KLR), the court declined to order security for costs as it would have been oppressive, and the dispute was a family one.
123. The court said that if the respondent and his legal advisers thought the claim by the appellant was frivolous, the alternative procedure was frivolous.
124. The applicant in this matter has invoked Order 26 of the Civil Procedure Rules, saying that the plaintiff has defaulted on repaying the loan and the 3rd defendant has proceeded to exercise the power of statutory sale, which necessitated the institution of High Court Civil Suit No. E046 of 2022, Meridian Energy Limited v DTB Bank of Kenya Limited & Timsale Limited, to what interim orders were obtained owing to the instant suit.
125. The 1st defendant in paragraphs 14 & 19 of the supporting affidavit has deposed that, apart from the alleged ownership of the suit property, the plaintiff does not have any other known assets and/or income to meet the 1st defendant's costs if the 1st defendant is successful.
126. In paragraph 17, the 1st defendant states that it could be extremely prejudicial for it to suffer substantial loss since it will not be able to recoup any damages or costs against the plaintiff.
127. The capacity, status, known assets and the whereabouts of the plaintiff have been questioned by the 1st defendant both in paragraph 19 of the supporting affidavit and in the written submission.
128. Specifically, in paragraph 19 it is deposed that the plaintiff's unknown status as well as unknown assets, both real and movable, provides the 1st defendant unfair and inequitable protection from legal attachment of execution and, as such, this court needs to order the provision of security to ensure the 1st defendant is also adequately catered for in the event the instant suit is dismissed.
129. In answer to the said allegation, the deponent to the replying affidavit has sworn paragraphs 24-40; he refers the court to the power of attorney as the evidence and the admission of the facts by the 1st defendant in the defence and counterclaim, for parties are bound by their pleadings.
130. He denies that he is a proxy or that the plaintiff is litigating through a proxy. He says the power of attorney is lawful and a recognised instrument in Kenyan Law. So, he is validly appointed to act as an agent. He says that holding a power of attorney does not disclose any impropriety warranting an order for security of costs.
131. The deponent says that there is no evidence that the suit is being conducted improperly; the issue of proxy litigation remains speculative, unsubstantiated, and made in bad faith and cannot form a basis for security of costs.
132. The deponent avers that the defendant’s invitation to infer impropriety from the mere existence of a duly executed and registered power of attorney without adducing evidence of impropriety is misplaced and without lawful or factual basis.
133. On assets or pecuniary status of the plaintiff, the deponent says that there is nothing to show default of the loan or inability to repay the loan of Ksh 300 million or lacking financial capacity to meet financial obligations, or to show impecuniosity.
134. The deponent refers to the statement of account dated 10.8.2026, which shows that there is no uncleared loan. He says that he is the one who manages the plaintiff’s account. The deponent is silent on the existence of the High Court matter where there are interim orders stopping the exercise of the statutory power of sale.
135. The law is that once sufficient evidence is produced, then the evidential burden shifts to the defendant to prove otherwise. See Raila Odinga vs IEBC [2017] eKLR. Once doubts remain as to financial ability and the status of a party to a suit, the court has to interrogate the issue.
136. It is the duty of the court to hold the ring even-handed. It is not the duty of the court to disadvantage a defendant while giving no legitimate advantage to the plaintiffs. The court aims to make sure it is done in an even-handed manner.
137. The applicant has laid the basis for believing that this suit is a case of proxy litigation and that the plaintiff’s status and financial capacity, assets, place of residence or abode and his means of income.
138. The court notes that when the issues were raised, the plaintiff in person has not seen fit to answer to the said serious allegation made to his person and character, yet they go to the very core of this suit.
139. Despite the foregoing, the deponent to the replying affidavit has invited the court to hold and find that he holds valid authority to represent the plaintiff as an agent, and that there is no impropriety in the documents he holds to suggest that this is a proxy litigation as alleged, as a basis to order security for costs.
140. It is trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings. The general rule is that there must be a valid basis to apply for striking out the plaint or forcing a litigant to be made to pay security for costs to pursue what he thinks is a rightful claim.
141. Locus standi in a suit goes to the jurisdiction of the court. In this suit, the plaintiff is allegedly represented by an agent holding a power of attorney. A power of attorney is defined under Black Laws Dictionary as an instrument authorising a person to act as an agent or an attorney of the person granting it. It confers rights upon an agent to represent a principal.
142. Section 4 of the Registration of Documents Act provides that all documents conferring or purporting to confer, declare, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, in or over immovable property be registered.
143. Section 79 of the Land Registration Act provides for the maintenance of a register and a file for power of attorney. Section 26(13 & 14) of the Transfers Act provides that a power of attorney shall be attested by at least one witness and shall be registered within 30 days of execution if made in Kenya.
144. In Francis Mwangi Mugo Vs David Kamau Gachango [2017] eKLR, the court held that there is a difference between the requirement of registration and the requirement to pay stamp duty. The court said that registration is the formal entry of a document in a specified register so that a certain right may pass.
145. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides that a court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney has been executed and authenticated.
146. The ingredients of a valid power of attorney include identification of the parties, legal capacity, proper stamp duty payment and registration. See In Re Estate of Tirima Ole Kuya (Deceased) [2015] KEHC 8850 (KLR).
147. The power of attorney held by the plaintiff’s agent is dated 7.11.2022. It is a specific power of attorney prepared in Form No. LR A(6) and Land Registration General Registration 2017. It gives the plaintiff power to execute all necessary affidavits or court documents and to testify on behalf of the donor in the Chief Magistrate's ELC No. E253 of 2022 over LR No. 1/1405.
148. A specific power of attorney delegates specific matters and transacts as defined in the form. This ensures that the power granted is focused ad litem. While completing the form LRA (6), several supporting documents are required to ensure that the application is valid and actionable. They include the title number, personal details of the donee, name, address, phone number, email, passport postmark PIN, ID, Passport number, personal details of the donor including a passport photo, KRA Pin and ID/Passport details are also required. Signatures of the parties must be made in the presence of an advocate. All these lend legitimacy to the document and ensure that the donor understands what is being granted.
149. Powers of attorney are governed by the Power of Attorney Act, Cap 36, Laws of Kenya. The Act requires the power of attorney to be in writing, signed by the donor and attested by at least one witness to ensure that the authority granted is legally recognised and enforceable. A donor must be of sound mind to grant such authority. It must be attested and verified by an advocate. If it involves land, it must be registered at the land registry.
150. Stamp duty must be paid as per the Stamp Duty Act, Cap. 480. Form No. LR A – 7 relates to an irrevocable power of attorney. It covers various aspects like property management, financial decision-making, and legal affairs. It is granted in situations where one is unable to manage property or finances due to illness or incapacity during a lengthy trial or relocation, in a complete property transaction and on permanent authority to make legal decisions.
151. A power of attorney may be challenged in court. In Cornel L. Shisanya vs Ngambeu Nursery School and others [2014] eKLR, the court found the applicant lacked locus standi to make the applicant for he had general power of attorney which did not qualify him to be substituted in place of the plaintiff.
152. In Kombo, suing in her capacity as a holder of power of attorney on behalf of her husband, Richard Komboi versus Ingonga [2024] KEELC 662 (KLR) 15th February 2024 [ruling], the court held that the power of attorney was specific that the donee is to act in the name of the donor and that, under the power of attorney, she could only file the plaint in the name of Richard Komboi and could sign the pleadings.
153. The court held that whereas the plaintiff had stated in the plaintiff that she was suing in her capacity as holder of a power of attorney, the power of attorney did not permit her to pose as the plaintiff. The court said that pursuant to the power of attorney, only the husband could be the plaintiff.
154. In Ndwiga vs Mburu Kariuki & Company, Advocate, Civil Misc. Application E069 of 2,,,,,, [2026] KEHC 4342 (KLR) the position of an appointed of the power of attorney was an issue for making averments under Order 18 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Rule while wearing the shoe of the applicants advocate and acting as such.
155. The court said that even though the power of attorney is a formal authorisation given by one person to another to act on their behalf, where physical presence is impossible or impractical, it does not allow persons not qualified as advocates to prepare legal documents or appear in court on behalf of the donor.
156. The court cited with approval Jack Khanjira & another vs Safaricom Limited [2012] KEHC, where the court held that the act of not having a katana in drawing or signing an instrument, assuming audience in court and exercising them under the general power of attorney, including seeking costs, were illegal.
157. In Karanja vs Ombati [2025] KEELC 1409 (KLR), the issue was whether the power of attorney was valid, as per section 26(4) & 15 of the Trustees Act and section 7 of the Land Registration Act, making the suit incompetent ab initio. The court held that under section 26 (3) and (4) of the Trustees Act, execution and attestation are critical.
158. The court said that failure to register the power of attorney rendered the instrument invalid and made Harry Karanja lack capacity to institute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff, which fatality could not be cured by Article 159 of the Constitution.
159. In this matter, the court has keenly looked at the plaint dated 14.12.2022. The titular heading does not indicate that the signatory of the verifying affidavit is suing in his capacity as holder of a defined power of attorney dated 7.11.2022, concerning this suit. The said power of attorney in the specific case No. ELC 253 of 2022 at the Chief Magistrate's Court, brought by the 1st defendant against the 3rd defendant, the plaintiff herein, the Chief Land Registrar and the auctioneers and any other related court matter touching on property L.R. No. 1/1405.
160. The power of attorney before court lacks vital details as to when it was received and presented for registration. The details of the official fees, valid receipt number, mandatory accompanying documents, of the two parties, name, stamp of the advocate who witnessed and attested to the same.
161. The power of attorney lacks details of when it was registered in the register of powers of attorney. It lacks the date, year and month; the signature of the land registrar, his name, seal, registrar’s stamp and number.
162. Fundamentally, the plaint, on its face, other than the verifying affidavit, does not plead the capacity in which the plaintiff authorised the agent to file the suit on his behalf as an agent. A Capacity to sue is governed by law. Authority to sue must be executed and accompany the plaint under Order 4 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Order 4 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules is specific that a plaintiff who sues in a representative capacity shall state so in the body of the plaint. The same applies to a defendant under Order 5 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
163. Order 19 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules is also clear on the description, true place of abode, and postal address of a deponent. Order 9 Civil Procedure Rule relates to recognised agents. Order 9 Rule 1 CRP provides that appointment of an agent must be in writing.
164. Order 9 Rule (2) CPR relates to recognised agents to include holders of a power of attorney or an affidavit sworn by a party authorising them to make such appearances and applicants and do such acts on behalf of the parties. All these are subject to the approval of the court.
165. Order 9 Rule (3) & (4) Civil Procedure Rules relate to service of process upon a recognised agent and acceptance of the same by the agent.
166. Order 9 Rule 4(2) Civil Procedure Rules provides that such an appointment may be special or general and shall be made by an instrument in writing signed by the principal, and such instrument or, if the appointment is general, a certified copy thereof shall be filed in court. From the foregoing, even if the power of attorney dated 9.11.2022 was to be extended to cover this suit, still the signature of the plaintiff authorising the agent to appear, prosecute, and testify before this court in that capacity is missing.
167. One of the issues that had been raised, in Westmont case was the multiple identities of Jasmin, a named agent/attorney. It had been alleged that Westmont did not exist in the eyes of law and that the suit had been filed by a phantom.
168. From the case law cited above and the unique circumstances of this case, the fears, concerns and reservations raised by the 1st defendant on the capacity, status and whereabouts of the plaintiff, who has not unmasked himself in this court by formally authorising the agent to act on his behalf, raise more doubts and bring into question his ability to meet the resultant costs herein.
169. The description, signatures and particulars of the plaintiff as alluded to above are missing in the verifying affidavit, the supporting affidavit and in three witness statements accompanying the plaint.
170. Order 2 Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that every pleading shall be signed by an advocate or a recognised agent as per Order 9 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules or by a party if he sues in person. In Vipin Maganlal Shah & Another v Investment & Mortgages Bank Limited & 2 Others [2001] eKLR and in Regina Kavenya Mutuku & 3 Others v United Insurance Co. Ltd [2002] eKLR the court said that an authenticated document is not a pleading of anybody and amounts to a nullity.
171. Order 4 Rule 1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules is clear that an authority to sue shall be in writing, signed by the party giving it, and shall be filed in court.
172. In Hezekiah Kipkorir Maritime & others vs Philip Kipkoech Tenai & others [2016] eKLR, the court held that a suit brought without authority was against Order 11 (011) Rule 91 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
173. Even after issues have been raised from the foregoing, the deponent to the replying affidavit has not substantiated that he has authority, express or implied, to swear on the status, known income, or financial capacity of the plaintiff. The same applies to the plaintiff.
174. The plaintiff statement account alleged to show repayment of the loan is not from a known account of the plaintiff. The nexus between the so-called Meridioius Energy Limited and the plaintiff or the agent has not been disclosed, established, verified, or authenticated. There is no attached express authority from the plaintiff, authorising the agent to swear to the replying affidavit. The statement of account is not authenticated by the 3rd defendant in a manner complying with the law on certification of documents.
175. The maker of the document is not indicated. Though the power of attorney is signed and has a photo of the donor, his passport number also is missing.
176. The deponent, while commenting on the existing and pending suit at the Commercial Division of the High Court as a result of default or failure to repay the loan, says that and that there are no arrears. Further, the deponent wants the court to believe that the plaintiff has enough income to assert that he has been repaying the loan at Ksh 5 million every month since 2023 to date.
177. This would mean that the plaintiff by now would have repaid Ksh 180 million. A bank statement to show this has not been availed by the agent; yet he says that he is in charge of the plaintiff's accounts. It is the agent who is alleging that the plaintiff has repaid the loan and that there are no loan arrears. Existence of facts on the evidence of the plaintiff: his known source of income, known assets in Kenya. Fell on the plaintiff to discharge the burden.
178. The deponent simply wants the court to believe his written submission which in law cannot take the place of evidence submissions as held in Daniel Toroitich Moi vs Mwangi Stephen & Another [2014] eklr; that written submission are marketing language, each side endeavours to convince the court that its case is the better one.
179. A statement made on oath should, as a matter of fact, be expressly denied on oath. If not challenged, it remains a fact, as was held in Kenya Akiba Micro Financing Limited v Chebii & 14 Others (Civil Case 644 of 2005) [2012] KEHC 5590 (KLR) (4 May 2012) (Ruling).
180. Shortcuts are fine, as long as one are sure it won't land him in a ditch, as was held in James Njorro Kibutiri vs Eliud Njau Kibutiri [1983] KLR 62.
181. It is the plaintiff who has opted to use the deponent to swear the replying affidavit on his behalf, yet he attached no authority to do so in both the verifying and the replying affidavit.
182. The peculiar circumstances make the court find that the 1st defendant has met the test set out in Westmont Holdings SDR BHA vs CBK & others [2023 KESC 11 (KLR) generally and in particular on prospects of success of its defence & counterclaim, lack of genuineness by the plaintiff and his alleged agent, the impecuniosity of the plaintiff, among others.
183. As to the submission that the figure suggested is unjustified, in Tom Ojienda & Associates versus Nairobi city county civil appeal 273 of 2020 ( 2026 KECA 1617 (KLR) the court cited Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others (No. 3) [1972] E.A. 162 (CA)and enya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot and Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR) (2 August 2024) (Judgment), the courts laid down the general principles on which taxation proceeds to prevent exploitation of parties and with regard to inter alia compensation of costs or expense reasonably incurred by the successful party.
184. The court cited Joreth Limited v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 E.A. 92 that the figure for taxation of a bill of costs ought to be determined from the pleadings, settlement, nature and importance of the cause or matter, the interest of the parties, and any other relevant circumstance.
185. The taxation of fees and party-to-party costs is governed by the Advocates Remuneration Order. See also in Tom Ojienda 7 another vs Nairobi City Court Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2020.
186. It is trite law that full instruction fees are earned when an advocate acts on clients’ instruments to defend the suit by filing the defence. See also First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] EA 64.
187. It is the pleadings that form the basis for determining instrument fees before judgment, as held in Peter Muthoka & another vs Ochieng & others [2019] eKLR. Party-to-party costs are the reasonable litigation costs that one party is ordered to pay the other. A party who calls forth the event by instituting a suit will bear the costs if the suit fails, unless he shows legitimate reason why the general rule should not apply. See Rai vs Rai (supra).
188. It is not in dispute that, other than defending the suit, the 1st defendant has raised a counterclaim dated 23.1.2026, which the plaintiff is defending through a reply to the defendant & defence to the counterclaim dated 23.1.2026.
189. In the plaint dated 14.12.2022, at paragraph 13, the plaintiff admits that the market value of the suit property was valued at Ksh 420 million on 14.6.2022. The plaintiff has pleaded loss at paragraph 23 of the plaint. He is seeking 6 principal prayers, including general damages for trespass and exemplary damages.
190. In the reply to the defence & defence to counterclaim dated 17.7.2023, the plaintiff admits taking loan facilities against the title for the suit property for close to Ksh 190 million.
191. He blames the 1st defendant for forcible entry onto the suit property; hence the basis for general and exemplary damages for trespass, dispossession and unlawful occupation of the suit property.
192. From the pleadings and admissions by the plaintiff, the amount proposed for security by the 1st defendant cannot be said to be ridiculous, colossal or unjustified. As held in Marco & Explosives Limited v Mamujee Brothers Limited [1988] KLR 230, the figure should be reasonable and not oppressive.
193. The plaintiff, in his statement of plaint, reply to the defendant and defence to the counterclaim, has admitted the circumstances leading to this matter and the contestations over the same leading to in litigation in other courts.
194. In Peter Onyanja Onyiego v Kenya Ports Authority [2004] eKLR, the court held that a verifying affidavit must be sworn by the plaintiffs themselves or authorised agents. An affidavit can be sworn by anyone else as long as that person is possessed of the fact or information that he deposes on, which, under the rules of evidence, is admissible.
195. In this matter, the deponent lacks the authority to swear. He has not disputed the value of the suit property. A party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. An affidavit whose sources of facts and information is not disclosed has defects. See Microsoft Corp. Vs Mitsumi Computer Garage Limited [2001] KLR.
196. A defendant's armoury to seek cushion filing the legal costs he may incur includes, inter alia, an application for security for costs under Order 26 Civil Procedure Rules.
197. The plaintiff has not come out of the shadows to expressly deny and depose that the figure proposed is unreasonable, colossal, astronomical, oppressive and illogical. Affidavits play a crucial role. They contain evidence and arguments required for the court's determination as sworn evidence. Affidavits aid the court in making informed decisions.
198. In this application, having found the purported agent of the plaintiff lacking express authority to appear, swear, and plead on behalf of the plaintiff, it follows that his replying affidavit will be taken with a pinch of salt.
199. It falls short of challenging the supporting affidavit to the motion before the court. To say the least, it raises more doubts as to the credibility, truthfulness, genuineness, and status of the plaintiff.
200. The court has been told that the plaintiff was awarded costs after the suit by the 1st defendant was dismissed at the lower court.
201. There is no evidence or substantiation that the application seeks to stifle the plaintiff from prosecuting the matter and/if allowed will infringe on the right to access justice.
202. It has not come out of the mouth of the plaintiff that he is targeted by the 1st defendant as a way of financially and judicially muzzling him through this application.
203. The upshot is the court find the application to have merit. Prayers No. 1,2 & 3 are granted.
204. Orders accordingly.
Dated, signed and delivered this 21st Day of October,2026 at Milimani, Nairobi.
HON JUSTICE C.K NZILI
JUDGE
In the presence of ;
Mr. Too for Atoka for the 1st defendant
Mr Ndegwa for the plaintiff
V.Nyamondi for 3rd defendant
Court Assistant: Julius
Legal Researcher; Bevalyn N.