Land law

Waigwa v Momanyi & another [2026] KEELC 7413 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E075 of 2026
Judgment date
22 October 2026
Judge(s)
LG Kimani

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Background

The Plaintiff/Applicant, filed a Notice of Motion dated 13th March 2026 under Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court seeking, orders THAT:

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Question before the court

The issue for determination is whether the Applicant has satisfied the legal threshold for the grant of temporary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

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Reasoning passage

Accordingly, the Court finds that the orders sought in the current application are not appropriate at this juncture. However, notwithstanding that finding there is a genuine concern about the cause of the recurrent stormwater accumulation on the Plaintiff’s property, LR No. 6725/91. The parties have advanced competing explanations regarding the source and direction of the stormwater, the effect of developments on the adjoining…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC MISC. SUIT NO. E075 OF 2026

JOSEPH THOMI WAIGWA...........................PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT

VERSUS

FARAM MOMANYI. ……………………1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

WILSON MUKUNA MUNIALO…….…2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

RULING

1. The Plaintiff/Applicant, filed a Notice of Motion dated 13th March 2026 under Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court seeking, orders THAT:

1) Spent

2) THAT a temporary mandatory injunction be issued against the 1st and 2nd Respondents compelling them to drain and clear all rainwater currently settling on the Applicants Land Reference Number 6725/91 pending hearing and determination of this application and suit;

3) THAT a temporary mandatory injunction be issued against the 1st and 2nd Respondents to compel them to prevent rainwater coming from their Land Reference Number 6725/96 and 6725/95, respectively, from entering the Applicant's Land Reference Number 6725/91 pending hearing and determination of this application and suit.

4) THAT costs of this application be in the cause.

2. The Applicant, the registered proprietor of LR No. 6725/91, avers that he has lived with his family in a maisonette on the property for approximately 30 years. He alleges that in 2024, the 1st Respondent paved the access road to LR No. 6725/96 without installing adequate drainage, while the 2nd Respondent raised the level of the access road to LR No. 6725/95, causing rainwater to flow onto and accumulate on his property. He contends that the resulting flooding has interfered with his family's occupation and use of the maisonette, caused mental anguish, and resulted in significant property damage requiring costly repairs and landscaping.

3. The Applicant states that despite serving the Respondents with demand letters dated 22nd April 2025, they failed to remedy the alleged drainage problem. In his Supporting Affidavit, sworn by Joseph Thomi Waigwa, he annexes title documents, a survey map, photographs of the properties and flooding, the demand letters, and pleadings in support of his claims.

4. Citing the ongoing heavy rains and the risk of further damage rendering the maisonette uninhabitable, the Applicant seeks urgent court intervention through temporary mandatory injunctions requiring appropriate drainage measures and restraining the discharge of rainwater from the Respondents' properties onto LR No. 6725/91 pending the determination of the application and the suit.

Replying Affidavit

5. The 2nd Defendant/Respondent, Wilson Mukuna Munialo, swore a Replying Affidavit opposing the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 13th March 2026, stating that he was authorised to respond on his own behalf and on behalf of the 1st Respondent, Faram Momanyi. He contends that the application is an afterthought intended to compel the Respondents to fund renovations and drainage works that are the Applicant’s responsibility.

6. The 2nd Respondent avers that the properties lie in a natural valley and that the Applicant’s property is situated at a lower elevation, making it susceptible to flooding. He states that during the heavy rains of 2024, he voluntarily dug an emergency trench at his own expense to drain stagnant water from the Applicant’s compound but later covered it because it posed a safety risk to his children and contributed to flooding on his property. He further alleges that the Applicant had previously used his land for drainage and that the removal of the trenches during construction was necessary because they lay within his property boundaries.

7. The Respondent denies that the 1st Respondent’s cabro-paved access road, which he claims had existed for approximately ten years, or the gradient of his own access road altered the natural flow of water onto the Applicant’s property. He maintains that both properties have drainage systems and that the flooding results from the area’s natural topography. He further alleges that the Applicant’s six-foot stone wall and soil-filled gunny bags along the boundary obstruct the natural flow of water, causing it to accumulate within his compound.

8. The 2nd Respondent argues that the Applicant has provided no engineering report, topographical survey, hydrological analysis or other expert evidence linking the Respondents’ developments to the flooding. He also disputes liability for the alleged damage to the maisonette, contending that the claimed financial loss is quantifiable and has not been adequately demonstrated or attributed to the Respondents.

9. Regarding the demand letters dated 22nd April 2025, the Respondent states that discussions between the parties’ advocates suggested that the flooding was beyond their control. He maintains that he proposed a proper drainage channel with inspection manholes through an agreed easement and was willing to facilitate the arrangement, but the Applicant declined and insisted on open trenches, which he considered unsafe and unhygienic. He therefore contends that the balance of convenience favours the Respondents and urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

Further Affidavit

10. The Plaintiff/Applicant, Joseph Thomi Waigwa, swore a Further Affidavit in response to the Replying Affidavit dated 15th May 2026, reiterating the contents of his earlier affidavit.

11. The Applicant disputes the Respondents’ assertion that the flooding is attributable to the natural valley topography, maintaining that his property did not experience flooding from their parcels before 2024. He alleges that in or about May 2024, the 1st Respondent raised his plot using sandbags and constructed a cabro-paved driveway without adequate drainage, while the 2nd Respondent raised his plot and access road, altering the natural drainage pattern. He contends that these alterations diverted stormwater from the main road and the Respondents’ properties onto his lower-lying property and disrupted the historical drainage outlets at the rear of their parcels. He relies on photographs annexed to the affidavit to support these allegations.

12. The Applicant further denies that his boundary structures caused the flooding, stating that his boundary consists mainly of live hedges and that the barriers he installed to prevent water from entering his compound have proved inadequate against the increased volume of stormwater. He maintains that the recurrent flooding began only after the Respondents’ alterations in 2024 and that his attempts to resolve the dispute amicably have been unsuccessful.

13. He therefore reiterates that court intervention is necessary to prevent further flooding, property damage and interference with his quiet enjoyment of the premises, and urges the Court to allow the Notice of Motion dated 13th March 2026 as prayed, including the temporary mandatory injunctions sought.

Applicant’s Written Submissions

14. The Applicant filed written submissions dated 10th July 2026, identifying the principal issues as whether the requirements for temporary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions have been satisfied and whether the Respondents’ Replying Affidavit sufficiently rebuts his evidence.

15. Relying on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd, the Applicant submits that he has established a prima facie case, demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, and shown that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the orders sought. He contends that the chronology of events and photographic evidence support his allegation that the Respondents’ developments altered the existing drainage pattern, resulting in recurrent flooding and a continuing private nuisance. He further relies on Rylands v Fletcher, Articles 40 and 42 of the Constitution, and section 3 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act to support his claim that the flooding interferes with his proprietary rights and environmental well-being. He also invokes sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, arguing that the Respondents have failed to provide a credible alternative explanation for the flooding.

16. On irreparable harm, the Applicant submits that the recurring accumulation of stormwater progressively damages his maisonette, perimeter structures and landscaping, while interfering with his family's quiet enjoyment of the property. He argues that damages would not provide an adequate remedy and that immediate intervention is necessary to prevent further deterioration. He maintains that the balance of convenience favours restoring the drainage conditions that existed before the alleged alterations, as requiring the Respondents to manage stormwater appropriately would cause them less prejudice than continued flooding would cause him.

17. For the temporary mandatory injunction, the Applicant relies on Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agro-Export & Another, arguing that the case is unusually clear, presents special circumstances and provides sufficient assurance of success at trial to justify immediate relief. In response to the Respondents’ objections, he disputes that the flooding is attributable to the natural valley topography or his boundary structures, maintaining that the wall was erected as a protective measure and that stormwater enters through a gap between the wall and the 1st Respondent’s cabro pavement. He further challenges the assertion that the paving existed for approximately ten years, relying on his photographs to support his contention that the works were undertaken in 2024, and denies refusing genuine efforts to resolve the dispute amicably.

18. The Applicant consequently urges the Court to allow the application as prayed, grant the temporary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions sought, award him the costs of the application, and issue any further relief deemed just and expedient.

Respondents’ Written Submissions

19. The 1st and 2nd Defendants/Respondents filed written submissions dated 13th July 2026 opposing the Notice of Motion dated 13th March 2026. Relying on the Replying Affidavit sworn by Wilson Mukuna Munialo on 15th May 2026, they submit that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements for temporary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions and that their evidence sufficiently rebuts his allegations.

20. On the principles governing interlocutory injunctions, the Respondents rely on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, as applied in Liquid International Ltd v Panari Centre Ltd, arguing that the Applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case, demonstrate irreparable harm incapable of adequate compensation by damages, or show that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the orders sought. They maintain that the natural valley topography provides an alternative explanation for the flooding and that the alleged commencement of flooding in 2024 does not, by itself, establish that their developments caused it. They further contend that the Applicant’s perimeter wall and sandbag barrier obstruct the natural drainage of his compound, contributing to the accumulation of water.

21. The Respondents submit that the Applicant has produced no engineering, hydrological or topographical report establishing that their developments altered the natural flow of stormwater or caused the alleged flooding. They argue that the affidavits and photographs relied upon are insufficient to establish technical causation and cite Republic v National Environmental Management Authority ex parte Plexus Cotton Ltd [2014] eKLR in support of the importance of credible scientific or expert evidence in environmental claims. They also dispute the Applicant’s chronology, maintaining that the 1st Respondent’s cabro-paved access road existed for approximately ten years before the alleged onset of flooding.

22. On irreparable harm, the Respondents contend that the alleged damage to the Applicant’s house, boundary structures and landscaping is quantifiable and compensable by damages, particularly since its extent and attribution to the Respondents have not been established. They further argue that the balance of convenience favours refusal of the injunctions because the orders sought would require alterations to developments on their registered properties without independent evidence establishing liability. They rely on the 2nd Respondent’s previous assistance during the flooding and his proposal for a permanent drainage solution as evidence of willingness to resolve the dispute amicably.

23. Regarding the mandatory injunction, the Respondents rely on Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agro-Export & Another [1986] 1 ALL ER 901, as approved in Shariff Abdi Hassan v Nadhif Jama Adan [2006] eKLR, submitting that such relief should only be granted in a clear case involving special circumstances where the Court has a high degree of assurance that the injunction is justified. They contend that the disputed cause of the flooding, the absence of expert evidence and the substantive alterations required by the orders sought fall short of this threshold.

24. The Respondents consequently maintain that their Replying Affidavit raises a credible alternative explanation for the flooding and displaces the Applicant’s claim to a prima facie case. They urge the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

Analysis and Determination

25. The issue for determination is whether the Applicant has satisfied the legal threshold for the grant of temporary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

27. The jurisdiction of this Court to grant temporary injunctions is donated by Section 63(c) of the Civil Procedure Act, read with Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which empower the Court to preserve property that is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully dealt with pending determination of a suit and in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated.

28. The Court also exercises jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act to grant appropriate reliefs necessary for the preservation of property pending determination of disputes falling within its jurisdiction.

29. The principles governing the grant of interlocutory prohibitory injunctions were set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely that an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate that he stands to suffer irreparable injury that cannot adequately be compensated by damages, and, where the Court is in doubt, show that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction.

30. These principles were further considered in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal explained what constitutes a prima facie case.

31. A mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage attracts a higher threshold. In Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agro-Export & Another [1986] 1 ALL ER 901, the Court held that such an injunction should only be granted in exceptional and sufficiently clear circumstances, where special circumstances exist and the Court has a high degree of assurance that the injunction will ultimately be justified.

32. In Kenya Breweries Limited & Another v Washington O. Okeyo [2002] KECA 284 (KLR), the Court of Appeal, adopting the principles in Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agro-Export & Others, recognised that a mandatory injunction may be granted at an interlocutory stage in special circumstances, particularly where the case is clear and the Court has a high degree of assurance that the injunction has been rightly granted. The Court must be satisfied to a higher degree than would be required in the case of an ordinary prohibitory injunction.

33. In the present case, the question for determination is not simply whether the Applicant has demonstrated that flooding exists. The Applicant was required to establish, at the interlocutory stage and to the requisite degree:

a. the existence of a right requiring immediate protection;

b. the specific act or omission of the Respondents constituting the alleged infringement of that right;

c. a sufficiently clear causal connection between the Respondents' acts or omissions and the entry and accumulation of water on LR No. 6725/91;

d. that the positive orders sought are directed at the established source of the complained-of injury and are capable of implementation; and

e. special circumstances and a high degree of assurance that the orders are properly issuable before the hearing of the suit.

34. The Applicant asserts that the Respondents’ alterations to their respective properties in 2024 disrupted the established drainage pattern and diverted stormwater onto LR No. 6725/91, causing recurrent flooding and damage to his maisonette and surrounding structures. He relies on his affidavits, photographs and the chronology of events to establish the connection between the developments and the flooding. The Respondents, however, attribute the accumulation of water to the natural valley topography and the Applicant’s own boundary structures, and dispute that their developments caused or materially contributed to the alleged flooding.

35. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to make definitive findings on the cause of the flooding or determine liability, as those matters fall for determination at trial. Nevertheless, the Applicant must place sufficient material before the Court to establish a prima facie case against each Respondent. The photographs may demonstrate the presence of water on the Applicant’s property, but their evidential value in establishing the precise source and cause of the flooding must be considered alongside the competing explanations advanced by the parties. The absence of an engineering, hydrological or topographical report is not necessarily fatal to the application, but it is a relevant consideration given the disputed drainage patterns, property levels and direction of surface-water flow.

36. The Applicant’s assertion that flooding began only after the Respondents’ alleged alterations in 2024 is relevant, but the chronology alone does not conclusively establish causation. Equally, the Respondents’ contention that the flooding arises from the natural topography or the Applicant’s boundary structures is disputed. The Court must therefore exercise caution against accepting either account as established fact before the parties have had an opportunity to present further evidence at trial.

37. On the question of irreparable harm, the Applicant alleges continuing damage to his residential maisonette, boundary structures and landscaping, as well as interference with his family’s occupation and enjoyment of the property. The Court recognizes that recurrent flooding may occasion damage that is not adequately remedied by a subsequent award of damages, particularly where the habitability of a family home is threatened. However, the Applicant must demonstrate a sufficiently credible risk of such harm, rather than rely solely on general assertions.

38. Regarding the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh the risk of further flooding against the prejudice that the Respondents may suffer if required to alter their existing developments before the cause of the flooding is established. The proposed construction of a permanent drainage channel through an agreed easement may offer a practical solution, but the Court cannot assume that the parties have agreed on the route or that the proposed works would resolve the problem without further technical assessment.

39. The Applicant further sought an order for temporary mandatory injunctions. As stated in Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agro-Export & Another [1986] 1 ALL ER 901 and Shariff Abdi Hassan v Nadhif Jama Adan [2006] eKLR, such relief should be granted only in a clear case involving special circumstances and a high degree of assurance that the order is justified. In the present matter, the competing accounts concerning the properties’ levels, historical drainage routes and the source of the stormwater raise substantial factual questions.

40. An order compelling the Respondents to undertake specific drainage works or substantially alter their driveways at this stage could effectively determine part of the substantive dispute before trial. In the absence of sufficient technical evidence identifying the source of the flooding and the appropriate remedial measures, the threshold for such mandatory relief may not have been met.

41. Accordingly, the Court finds that the orders sought in the current application are not appropriate at this juncture. However, notwithstanding that finding there is a genuine concern about the cause of the recurrent stormwater accumulation on the Plaintiff’s property, LR No. 6725/91. The parties have advanced competing explanations regarding the source and direction of the stormwater, the effect of developments on the adjoining properties and the adequacy of the existing drainage systems. This problem, in the Court’s view requires a solution to prevent further harm while preserving the parties’ positions pending trial. Such interim solution ought to be sufficiently precise, practicable and supported by the evidence, without presupposing that either Respondent is responsible for the flooding.

42. Accordingly, the Court considers, in the interests of justice and to facilitate an informed determination of the dispute, it is appropriate that an independent technical assessment be undertaken before the contested issues are finally determined.

43. Accordingly, the Court orders and directs as follows:

1. The Notice of Moton dated 13th March 2026 is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

2. The Plaintiff and the Defendants shall, within fourteen (14) days, jointly identify and appoint an independent, duly qualified civil or drainage engineer, with appropriate expertise in stormwater management, to inspect LR Nos. 6725/91, 6725/96 and 6725/95 and the relevant adjoining drainage infrastructure. Upon

3. The inspection shall establish, as far as technically practicable, the existing ground levels and topography, the direction and source of stormwater flow, the adequacy of the existing drainage systems, and whether the developments or boundary structures on any of the properties have materially altered or obstructed the flow of stormwater. The engineer shall also recommend practical and proportionate remedial measures, including any appropriate drainage channel, easement or other works necessary to prevent or mitigate flooding.

4. The parties to this suit and their advocates or representatives shall be notified of the date and time of the inspection and afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend. Each party shall facilitate reasonable access to the relevant portions of their respective properties for purposes of the assessment.

5. The engineer shall prepare a report setting out the observations, findings, conclusions and recommended remedial measures, and file the report in Court and serve upon all parties within thirty (30) days of appointment, or within such further period as the Court may allow.

6. The costs of the inspection and preparation of the report shall initially be shared equally by the parties, without prejudice to the Court’s power to make an appropriate order on costs upon determination of the suit.

7. Pending further directions, the parties shall refrain from undertaking any material alteration to the existing drainage infrastructure or ground levels affecting the disputed drainage routes, except where reasonably necessary to avert an immediate danger or prevent serious damage, in which event the other parties shall be notified as soon as reasonably practicable.

8. Either party shall be at liberty to apply for further directions should any difficulty arise in implementing these orders.

The matter shall be mentioned for directions and/or further order orders on 26/1/2027.

Delivered, dated and signed via Microsoft Teams this 22nd day of October 2026.

HON. L. G. KIMANI

JUDGE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

The Ruling read in the presence of-

Wepoh for Defendant

Makori for Plaintiff/Applicant

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