Land law

Ndung’u & another v Nyairo [2026] KEELC 6896 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elcl Appeal E019 of 2026
Judgment date
22 October 2026
Judge(s)
Mohammed N. Kullow

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Background

Before this Court is an appeal against the Judgment and Decree of Hon. M. A. Otindo, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 28th January 2026 in Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court MCELC No. E190 of 2025 as consolidated with MCELC Nos. E188, E450, E451, E452, E456, E457 and E489, all of 2025.

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Reasoning passage

Consequently, I find no error in the learned trial Magistrate assuming jurisdiction over the consolidated suits. The challenge founded on want of jurisdiction therefore fails.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS, NAIROBI

ELCL APPEAL NO. E019 OF 2026

ESTHER WAMBUI NDUNG’U.............................................................1ST APPELLANT

ISHMAEL ELISHA ESIKOTE.................................................................2ND APPELLANT

-VERSUS-

GILBERT ONGUSO NYAIRO................................................................RESPONDENT

(Being an Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of Hon. M. A. Otindo, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 28th January 2026 in Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court MCELC No. E190 of 2025 as consolidated with MCELC Nos. E188, E450, E451, E452, E456, E457 and E489, all of 2025)

JUDGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. Before this Court is an appeal against the Judgment and Decree of Hon. M. A. Otindo, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 28th January 2026 in Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court MCELC No. E190 of 2025 as consolidated with MCELC Nos. E188, E450, E451, E452, E456, E457 and E489, all of 2025.

2. In the impugned Judgment, the learned trial Magistrate found in favour of the Plaintiffs and entered judgment against the Defendants in the following terms:

a) A declaration is hereby issued that the distress for rent levied against the Plaintiffs was illegal, irregular and unlawful.

b) A permanent injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants or auctioneers from selling, disposing of, or in any manner interfering with the Plaintiffs’ household goods seized pursuant to the unlawful distress.

c) An order is hereby issued compelling the Defendants to forthwith release and return to the Plaintiffs all household goods seized.

d) A permanent injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendants from evicting the Plaintiffs or otherwise interfering with their quiet possession of the respective suit premises otherwise than in accordance with the law.

e) The 3rd Defendant’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

f) Costs of the consolidated suits are awarded to the Plaintiffs.

3. The Appellants, being aggrieved by the whole of the said Judgment and Decree, preferred the present appeal through a Memorandum of Appeal dated 11th February 2026. In the said Memorandum of Appeal, the Appellants faulted the learned trial Magistrate on the following grounds:

1. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law by failing to appreciate that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to rent collection as settled in Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] eKLR.

2. THAT the learned Magistrate erred both in fact and law in dismissing the appellants defence and counter claim which challenged the courts jurisdiction to hear matters relating to rent.

3. THAT the learned Magistrate erred both in fact and law fact in finding that the process for the distress for rent and the distress for rent was unlawful.

4. THAT the learned Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in issuing a permanent injunction against the 1st appellant who is the administrator of the suit property.

4. On the basis of the foregoing grounds, the Appellants seek that the Judgment and Decree of the Chief Magistrate’s Court in Milimani MCELC No. E190 of 2025 as consolidated with MCELC Nos. E188, E450, E451, E452, E456, E457 and E489, all of 2025 be set aside; that the same be substituted with a judgment and decree finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters relating to rent; that the impugned Judgment be further substituted with a finding that the distress for rent was lawful; and that the costs of the appeal be awarded to the Appellants.

SUBMISSIONS

5. The appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions filed by the respective parties. The Appellants identified the central question as whether the Memorandum of Appeal dated 11th February 2026 had merit and addressed the grounds of appeal under three broad issues, namely, the jurisdiction of the trial court, the legality of the distress for rent and the grant of the permanent injunction.

6. On jurisdiction, they submitted that the dispute before the trial court concerned collection of rent arising from a landlord–tenant relationship and was therefore a contractual and commercial dispute falling outside the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. They contended that the Magistrate’s Court had consequently entertained the matter under the wrong jurisdictional framework.

7. In support of that proposition, the Appellants relied on Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 Others [2017] eKLR, Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR, and In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission, Constitutional Application No. 2 of 2011 [2011] eKLR, for the propositions concerning the limits of the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court and the principle that jurisdiction must exist before a court proceeds to determine a matter.

8. On the legality of the distress, the Appellants submitted that the 1st Appellant was duly authorised to act on behalf of the estate pursuant to the limited grant issued in Succession Cause No. E650 of 2023 and was empowered to collect and preserve the estate, including rental income. They maintained that the Respondent was in occupation of the suit premises, was in rent arrears and had failed or refused to remit rent to the estate account despite instructions to do so. According to the Appellants, the distress process was thereafter lawfully commenced, a proclamation notice was issued and the subsequent warrants of attachment followed in the proper sequence.

9. They further submitted that, having acted within her lawful authority as administrator, there was no basis for the permanent injunction issued against the 1st Appellant and urged that the impugned judgment be set aside and substituted with findings that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the distress for rent was lawful.

10. The Respondent opposed the appeal and submitted that the Appellants had misconstrued the nature of the dispute before the trial court. He maintained that his claim was not one for recovery, assessment or determination of rent arrears, but arose from the allegedly unlawful entry into the suit premises, seizure of his household goods and interference with his possession through a distress process said to have been undertaken without compliance with the statutory procedure.

11. The Respondent consequently argued that the dispute concerned occupation and possession of land and therefore fell within the jurisdiction conferred upon the Environment and Land Court and the Magistrate’s Court exercising environment and land jurisdiction. In support of that position, he relied on Republic v Chengo & 2 Others [2017] KESC 15 (KLR), Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 Others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR) and In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission, Constitutional Application No. 2 of 2011 [2011] KESC 1 (KLR).

12. On the distress for rent, the Respondent submitted that the evidence before the trial court established that no prior demand for rent, proclamation notice, inventory of goods or statutory notice was issued before his household goods were seized. He further submitted that the Appellants’ own evidence confirmed those procedural deficiencies and that the authority conferred upon the 1st Appellant by the limited grant did not entitle her to resort to self-help or dispense with the mandatory statutory procedure governing distress for rent.

13. He maintained that the learned Magistrate was therefore correct in finding the distress illegal, irregular and unlawful and in granting the permanent injunction. On the applicable principles governing injunctive relief and the consequences of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure, the Respondent relied on M/S NICO Auctioneers Ltd & Another Vs M/S Mwalimu Hotel Kisii Ltd [1996] KECA 167 (KLR). He ultimately urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with costs.

Issues for Determination

21. Having considered the Record of Appeal, the grounds of appeal and the parties’ respective written submissions, the following issues arise for determination:

a) Whether the learned trial Magistrate had jurisdiction to hear and determine the consolidated suits.

b) Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the distress for rent was illegal, irregular and unlawful and in dismissing the Appellants’ defence and counterclaim.

c) Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in granting the permanent injunctive reliefs against the 1st Appellant and, ultimately, whether the appeal is merited.

Analysis and Determination

a. Whether the learned trial Magistrate had jurisdiction to hear and determine the consolidated suits

22. The contest on jurisdiction arises from two competing characterizations of the dispute before the trial court. The Appellants contend that the dispute was essentially concerned with the collection of rent arising from a landlord–tenant relationship and was therefore an ordinary civil dispute outside the jurisdiction of the court sitting as an Environment and Land Court.

23. The Respondent’s position is that the proceedings were not instituted for the recovery, assessment or collection of rent, but to challenge the manner in which distress was levied against him, the removal of his household goods and the threatened interference with his occupation and quiet possession of the premises. It is therefore necessary to ascertain the true nature of the controversy that was presented before the trial court.

24. The Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another Vs Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, Appliction No 2 of 20111 held that: “A court’s jurisdiction flows from either the constitution of legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law..”

24. The importance of identifying the proper court was further underscored by the Supreme Court in Republic Vs Chengo & 2 Others [2017] KESC 15 (KLR). In distinguishing the constitutional mandates of the High Court and the specialised courts established under Article 162(2), the Supreme Court held:

“[52] In addition to the above, we note that pursuant to Article 162(3) of the Constitution, Parliament enacted the Environment and Land Court Act and the Employment and Labour Relations Act and respectively outlined the separate jurisdictions of the ELC and the ELRC as stated above. From a reading of the Constitution and these Acts of Parliament, it is clear that a special cadre of Courts, with suis generis jurisdiction, is provided for.  We therefore entirely concur with the Court of Appeal’s decision that such parity of hierarchical stature does not imply that either ELC or ELRC is the High Court or vice versa. The three are different and autonomous Courts and exercise different and distinct jurisdictions. As Article 165(5) precludes the High Court from entertaining matters reserved to the ELC and ELRC, it should, by the same token, be inferred that the ELC and ELRC too cannot hear matters reserved to the jurisdiction of the High Court”

25. The jurisdiction relevant to the present dispute is anchored in Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, which concerns disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land. Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act gives effect to that mandate and expressly includes disputes relating to land use, tenure, rents, land administration and management and contracts or instruments granting enforceable interests in land. At the subordinate court level, section 26 of the Environment and Land Court Act, read together with section 9(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, clothes designated Magistrates with jurisdiction to determine environment and land disputes falling within their prescribed pecuniary limits.

26. The difficulty in the present appeal does not therefore arise from an absence of statutory jurisdiction over landlord–tenant matters altogether. It arises from the Appellants’ argument that the particular dispute was one for the collection of rent and consequently fell on the ordinary civil side of the court. It is on that basis that the Appellants principally relied upon Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited Vs Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 Others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR).

27. In that case, the Court of Appeal was considering whether a dispute arising from a charge over land belonged before the High Court or the Environment and Land Court. In addressing contracts referred to under section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, the Court held:

“Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the ELC to deal with disputes relating to contracts under Section 13 of the ELC Act ought to be understood within the context of the court’s jurisdiction to deal with disputes connected to ‘use’ of land as discussed herein above. Such contracts, in our view, ought to be incidental to the ‘use’ of land; they do not include mortgages, charges, collection of dues and rents which fall within the civil jurisdiction of the High Court.”

28. That passage lends support to the Appellants’ proposition only if the controversy before the trial court was, in substance, one for the collection of rent. The decision must therefore be considered together with the Court of Appeal’s identification of the actual cause of action that was before it. The Court stated: “However, it bears repeating that the cause of action herein was never the charge (instrument) but the amounts due and owing thereunder. Neither the charge instrument nor the creation of an enforceable interest thereunder, were disputed. The main questions to be determined were the tabulation of the sums owing and whether statutory notices had issued prior to the attempted statutory sale.”

29. The Court ultimately found that the dominant issue in that case was the settlement of amounts owing in a contractual relationship between banker and borrower. The significance of the decision, therefore, is not that every dispute in which rent or another monetary obligation is mentioned automatically falls outside environment and land jurisdiction. Rather, a court must look beyond the label attached to the dispute and identify the predominant issue requiring determination. Where the substance of the action is recovery or computation of a contractual debt, the fact that land is implicated does not alter the essentially commercial character of the dispute.

30. Applying that approach to the present appeal, the pleadings before the trial court assume particular importance. The Respondent did not institute the suit seeking a determination of how much rent was payable, an account of rent, recovery of rent or enforcement of an obligation to pay rent. His pleaded case was that he was in occupation of the suit premises as a tenant and had discharged his rental obligations.

31. His grievance arose when his household goods were allegedly seized and removed from the premises in the course of distress which he contended had been levied without prior demand, proclamation or notice. He further complained of a threatened sale of those goods and threatened interference with his continued occupation of the premises. The substantive reliefs he sought were directed towards restraining the disposal of the seized goods, compelling their return and protecting his continued occupation and quiet possession of the premises.

32. The fact that the Appellants asserted that rent was in arrears does not, by itself, alter the character of the Respondent’s cause of action. Whether rent was actually outstanding was relevant because it formed the basis upon which the Appellants claimed entitlement to levy distress. It was not, however, the ultimate relief that the court had been asked to grant. The trial court was required to determine whether the Appellants could lawfully take the measures complained of against a tenant who was in occupation of the premises and whether the manner in which those measures were undertaken complied with the law.

33. The Defence and Counterclaim reinforce that conclusion. While the 1st Appellant asserted an entitlement to rent and maintained that distress had properly been levied, she also put in issue the legal basis upon which the Respondent occupied the premises by challenging the validity of the tenancy entered into after the death of the proprietor. The controversy therefore extended beyond a demand for payment. It engaged the Respondent’s asserted tenancy, his right to occupation and the legal authority under which that occupation could be interfered with. The very defence mounted by the Appellants thus required the trial court to interrogate the parties’ respective rights in relation to the occupation of the premises.

34. It is this feature which distinguishes the present matter from Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited Vs Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 Others (Supra) In that case, the instrument creating the interest in land was not in dispute and the predominant controversy remained the amounts payable under the lending arrangement. In the present appeal, there was no suit by the Appellants before the trial court merely seeking judgment for outstanding rent. The alleged arrears furnished the reason advanced for levying distress; the controversy presented for judicial determination was whether that distress and the consequent interference with the Respondent’s possession and occupation were lawful.

35. I have also considered the argument founded upon the succession proceedings. The 1st Appellant relied upon the limited grant issued in Succession Cause No. E650 of 2023 as the source of her authority to collect and preserve the estate. That issue does not, in my view, change the jurisdictional character of the suit. The trial court was not invited to determine the validity of the grant, identify beneficiaries, administer or distribute the estate. The grant merely formed part of the basis upon which the 1st Appellant asserted authority to deal with the property and collect income accruing to the estate. Whether, in exercising that authority, she complied with the law governing the relationship between landlord and tenant and the levying of distress remained a separate matter for determination.

36. When the pleadings are viewed as a whole, the reference to rent cannot therefore be isolated from the tenancy and the Respondent’s occupation of the premises. The dispute was principally concerned with the lawfulness of distress, the seizure of property from the demised premises and the threatened interference with a tenant’s possession. Any determination concerning the existence of rent arrears was incidental to deciding whether the right to levy distress had arisen; it was not the predominant object of the suit.

37. I therefore find that the present dispute is distinguishable from a bare claim for collection of rents contemplated in Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited Vs Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 Others Supra Its predominant character concerned a tenancy, occupation of land and the lawfulness of measures taken to interfere with that occupation. Those are matters falling within the jurisdiction conferred upon a designated Magistrate under section 9(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act read together with section 26 of the Environment and Land Court Act.

38. Consequently, I find no error in the learned trial Magistrate assuming jurisdiction over the consolidated suits. The challenge founded on want of jurisdiction therefore fails.

b. Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the distress for rent was illegal, irregular and unlawful and in dismissing the Appellants’ defence and counterclaim.

39. The contest under this issue is not whether distress for rent is, in itself, an available remedy to a landlord. The real question is whether the distress undertaken against the Respondent was carried out in the manner prescribed by law. The Appellants maintain that the 1st Appellant, being an administrator of the estate, was entitled to collect rent from the suit premises and that the Respondent’s failure to remit the alleged arrears justified the instruction of the 2nd Appellant to levy distress. The Respondent disputed both the alleged arrears and the legality of the process adopted in removing his household goods.

40. In the impugned Judgment, the learned trial Magistrate considered the evidence relating to the actual process of distress and found that no demand had been demonstrated before the distress was levied and, more importantly, that there was no evidence that a proclamation and inventory had been served upon the Respondent prior to the removal of his goods. The learned Magistrate consequently found that the statutory procedure governing distress had not been complied with. That finding must be tested against the applicable provisions of the Auctioneers Rules and the evidence that was placed before the trial court.

41. Rule 5(1) of the Auctioneers Rules, 1997 expressly provides that Part III of the Rules applies to attachment and sale of movable and immovable property under warrants of court and letters of instruction from third parties, including distress for rent and repossession. Rule 11(1)(a) further requires a letter of instruction concerning movable property to identify, among other matters, the exact amount to be recovered, the person against whom execution is to be undertaken, the exact location of the goods and, where ascertainable, the goods to be attached. The process of distress is therefore governed by a prescribed statutory framework and is not left to the discretion of either the landlord or the auctioneer.

42. More particularly, Rule 12(1) sets out the sequence to be followed where movable goods are involved. Under Rule 12(1)(b), the auctioneer is required to prepare a proclamation in Sale Form 2, indicating the value and condition of the specific items, with the inventory being signed by the owner of the goods or an adult person residing or working at the premises. Where such person refuses to sign, the auctioneer is required to certify that refusal.

43. Rule 12(1)(c) then requires the owner to be given seven days’ written notice in Sale Form 3 within which the goods may be redeemed by payment of the amount stated in the warrant or letter of instruction. It is only upon expiry of that period without payment that Rule 12(1)(d) permits removal of the goods to safe premises for auction. Rule 12(1)(g) puts the matter beyond doubt by expressly providing that the auctioneer shall “not remove any goods under the proclamation until the expiry of the grace period.”

44. The statutory sequence is important. The proclamation and inventory precede removal; the seven-day redemption period follows; and removal comes only after that period has expired without payment. Indeed, Sale Form 2 itself informs the debtor that the proclaimed goods are to remain in his or her custody for seven days and will only thereafter be removed unless the amount due together with the costs of distress is paid. Thus, the issue before the trial court was not merely whether documents bearing the title “proclamation” or “notification” existed, but whether those documents were issued and served in the sequence contemplated by Rule 12 before the Respondent’s goods were taken away.

45. Upon reconsidering the record, I find that this is where the Appellants’ case encounters difficulty. Their evidence was that the 1st Appellant had instructed the auctioneer after the Respondent allegedly failed to remit rent to the estate account and that a proclamation was issued. The Respondent’s evidence, however, was that his household goods were removed from the premises without any prior proclamation or inventory having been served upon him. The material relied upon by the Appellants did not satisfactorily demonstrate that the proclamation contemplated under Rule 12(1)(b) was served, that the seven-day notice under Rule 12(1)(c) was allowed to run, and that removal occurred only after expiration of that period. The learned trial Magistrate was therefore entitled to find that the prescribed process had not been proved to have been followed.

46. The 1st Appellant’s status as administrator does not alter that conclusion. The limited grant of letters of administration ad colligenda bona entitled the administrators to take steps towards collecting and preserving the estate. That authority could properly form the basis upon which the 1st Appellant demanded or received rent belonging to the estate. It did not, however, exempt her or the auctioneer acting on her instructions from compliance with the Auctioneers Rules once distress was chosen as the means of enforcement. The authority to collect rent and the lawfulness of the means employed to enforce its payment are separate questions.

47. I am therefore unable to fault the learned trial Magistrate for distinguishing between the 1st Appellant’s authority over the estate and the legality of the distress process. Even assuming that rent was due, the Appellants were still required to demonstrate compliance with Rule 12 before the Respondent’s goods could lawfully be removed. The absence of satisfactory proof of that compliance was sufficient to sustain the finding that the distress, as undertaken, was illegal, irregular and unlawful.

48. The same conclusion bears upon the counterclaim. To the extent that the counterclaim relied upon the 1st Appellant’s status as administrator, the alleged rent arrears and the challenge to the Respondent’s tenancy as justification for the impugned distress, those matters could not cure non-compliance with the prescribed procedure. The learned trial Magistrate was therefore entitled to reject the counterclaim insofar as it sought to validate the distress and to decline to determine succession questions concerning the validity of grants, beneficiaries or distribution of the estate.

49. I consequently find that the learned trial Magistrate did not err in holding that the distress for rent was illegal, irregular and unlawful or in dismissing the counterclaim on that basis.

c. Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in granting the permanent injunctive reliefs against the 1st Appellant and, ultimately, whether the appeal is merited

50. The Appellants’ complaint under this ground is that the learned trial Magistrate ought not to have issued a permanent injunction against the 1st Appellant because she was acting in her capacity as administrator of the estate. That argument must, however, be considered in light of the precise terms of the order made by the trial court and the findings already reached on the legality of the distress.

51. The learned trial Magistrate had found that the distress undertaken against the Respondent was unlawful and had ordered the release and return of the household goods seized pursuant to that process. Having so found, the court proceeded to restrain the Defendants from selling, disposing of or otherwise interfering with those goods and further restrained them from evicting the Respondent or interfering with his quiet possession of the premises “otherwise than in accordance with the law.” The injunction was therefore not an absolute prohibition against the 1st Appellant exercising her lawful functions as administrator. It was directed at preventing any further interference with the Respondent except through a lawful process.

52. This distinction is material. The 1st Appellant’s authority as administrator entitled her to take lawful steps to collect and preserve income belonging to the estate. It did not confer a right to recover possession, levy distress or otherwise interfere with a tenant’s occupation outside the procedure prescribed by law. The permanent injunction did not extinguish those lawful powers. It merely required that any future action against the Respondent be undertaken in accordance with the applicable law.

53. In those circumstances, and having upheld the learned Magistrate’s finding that the impugned distress was unlawful, I find that the injunctive relief flowed from the established violation. The order preserved the Respondent’s quiet possession while at the same time leaving open to the Appellants the right to pursue any lawful remedy that may otherwise be available to the estate. I therefore find no error in the grant of the permanent injunction.

54. The third ground of appeal accordingly fails. Having found that the trial court had jurisdiction, that the finding on the illegality of the distress was supported by the evidence and the applicable law, and that the injunctive reliefs were properly granted, there is no basis upon which this Court can interfere with the impugned Judgment.

Disposition

55. The upshot of the foregoing is that the appeal lacks merit. The Memorandum of Appeal dated 11th February 2026 is hereby dismissed and the Judgment and Decree of Hon. M. A. Otindo, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 28th January 2026 in Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court MCELC No. E190 of 2025 as consolidated with MCELC Nos. E188, E450, E451, E452, E456, E457 and E489, all of 2025, is hereby upheld.

56. Costs ordinarily follow the event. The Respondent, having successfully resisted the appeal, shall have the costs of the appeal.

It is so Ordered.

DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED virtually at NAIROBI on this 22nd day of October, 2026.

MOHAMMED N. KULLOW

JUDGE

Judgement delivered in the presence of: -

N/A for the Appellant

Ms. Mwenda for the Respondent

Ms. Mwangi Court Assistant

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