Land law

Ayah v Kenya Railways Corporation & 2 others [2026] KEELC 7107 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Constitutional Petition E064 of 2025
Judgment date
22 October 2026
Judge(s)
T. Murigi

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Background

By a Petition dated 4th August 2025, the Petitioner seeks the following reliefs

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Decision / orders

The upshot of the foregoing is that the Petition is merited and is hereby allowed against the 1st Respondent. The Cross Petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed. The Petition is allowed on the following terms:

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. E064 OF 2025

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 3(1), 10, 22(1) & 165(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA;

AND

IN THE MATTER OF CONTRAVENTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 19, 20, 21(1), 40(1) read with 260 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 22 AND 23(1) OF THE REGISTRATION OF TITLES ACT (CHAPTER 281 OF THE LAWS OF KENYA) Now repealed and transitioned as SECTIONS 24, 25 AND 26(1) OF THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT (NO. 3 OF 2012)

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE UNLAWFUL TRESPASS ONTO AND ILLEGAL, ULTRA VIRES AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVICTION OF THE PETITIONER OVER L.R. No. 3734/774 ALONG MZIMA SPRINGS LANE LAVINGTON

-BETWEEN-

DR. RICHARD TIMOTHY AYAH…………………………………PETITIONER

=VERSUS=

KENYA RAILWAYS CORPORATION ……………………… 1ST RESPONDENT

THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL ………..… 2ND RESPONDENT

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE …………………3RD RESPONDENT

JUDGEMENT

1. By a Petition dated 4th August 2025, the Petitioner seeks the following reliefs

a. A Declaration that the Petitioner, being holder of a registered Leasehold over L.R No. 3734/774 (I.R 21925) Mzima Springs Lane, Lavington, has a justiciable interest protectable under Article 40 read with 260 of the Constitution of Kenya, and the substance of rights of a proprietor under Section 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act (Chapter 300 of the Laws of Kenya);

b. A Declaration that the Petitioner's fundamental rights and freedoms to the protection of property being L.R. No. 3734/774 (I.R. 21925) Mzima Springs Lane Lavington, as guaranteed under Articles 10 and 40 read with 260 of the Constitution of Kenya, were contravened by the actions of agents of the 1st and 3rd Respondents invading and forcibly evicting the Petitioner from the property without due process;

c. An Order of the Honourable Court be and are hereby issued directing the Board and the Managing Director /Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Respondent, to within twenty four (24) hours of issuance of this Order by the Honourable Court, to vacate the property known as L.R No. 3734/774 (I.R No. 21925/1), Mzima Springs Lane, Lavington, and remove all guards or any person whosoever present and guarding the property for the 1st Respondent, and to restore the Petitioner in possession of the said property;

d. An Order of the Honourable Court be and is hereby issued, directed at the 3rd Respondent, by himself and/or agents, to within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance of this Order by the Honourable Court, to remove all Police Officers manning or guarding the property known as L.R No. 3734/774 (I.R No. 21925/1), Mzima Springs Lane, Lavington, and to restore the Petitioner in possession of the said property;

e. A permanent prohibitory Order be and is hereby issued restraining the 1st Respondent, whether by agents, servants and through any party whatsoever, from doing the following acts or any of them, that is to say from leasing, selling, disposing of, letting, cancelling and/or revoking the Petitioner's registered Leasehold interest over the property known as L.R No. 3734/774 (I.R No. 21925/1), unless by an Order of a competent Court, after due hearing of the Petitioner;

f. An Order for damages for unlawful eviction;

g. The costs of the Petition be borne by the Respondents, on an indemnity basis;

h. The Honourable Court do make any such other or further Orders as it may deem just and expedient in the circumstances to remedy the violation of the Petitioner's fundamental rights.

2. The Petition is supported by the grounds in the Petition together with the supporting affidavit of the Petitioner sworn on the even date.

THE PETITIONER’S CASE

3. The Petitioner averred that on 24th March 1998, he entered into a Lease Agreement with the 1st Respondent for the property known as L.R. No. 3734/774 (I.R. No. 21925/1), Mzima Springs Lane, Lavington for a term of 99 years commencing on 1st February 1998. He stated that the consideration was Kshs. 2,000,000/= and the annual rent Kshs. 160,000/=.

4. He averred that the lease was registered against the title as entry No. 4 on 30th September 1999, and that he was therefore entitled to the full rights of a proprietor under Sections 22 and 23(1) of the Registration of Titles Act (repealed), as preserved by Sections 24, 25 and 26(1) of the Land Registration Act.

5. He further averred that he took possession of the suit property in 1998 and had enjoyed quiet possession for nearly three decades. He stated that he had paid the agreed charges under the lease to the 1st Respondent, with his last payment of Kshs. 201,000/= made on 30th June 2025. He contended that, according to the 1st Respondent's statements of account, he had overpaid by Kshs. 47,000/=.

6. The Petitioner stated that, on 19th July 2025, the 1sT Respondent’s agents, accompanied by armed police officers, entered the suit property and forcibly evicted him and his security guards. He averred that the eviction took place during the lease term and without notice, demand, or a Court order. He further stated that he had since been denied access to the property, while his belongings remained inside.

7. He averred that he reported the matter to Muthangari Police Station under O.B. No. 30/21/07/2025, lodged a complaint with the Directorate of Criminal Investigations on 22nd July 2025, and recorded a statement on 24th July 2025. He further stated that no action had been taken to restore him to possession.

8. He explained that the 1st Respondent had attempted a similar eviction against Boss Freight Terminals Limited in Mombasa, where the court issued conservatory orders restraining the eviction for failure to follow due process.

9. He argued that his registered leasehold interest constitutes property within the meaning of Article 260 of the Constitution and is protected under Article 40 of the Constitution. He submitted that Sections 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act vest a registered lessee with the leasehold interest and all related rights and privileges, which may not be defeated except as provided by the Act. He also relied on Section 26(1) of the Land Registration Act and the Court of Appeal’s decision in Dr Joseph N.K. Ng'ok v Justice Moijo Ole Keiwua & 2 Others, Civil Appeal No. 60 of 1997 (unreported), concerning the sanctity of title.

10. The Petitioner contended that, as at 19th July 2025, the 1st Respondent was aware of his registered lease, which had 72 years remaining. He asserted that the Respondents had not challenged the legality or validity of his title. He further argued that any interference with his rights would be lawful only if carried out in accordance with the Land Registration Act and other applicable written law. He further contended that forcibly evicting him without notice, due process, or a Court order violated his right to property under Article 40, read together with Article 260 of the Constitution.

11. The Petitioner argued that the 1st Respondent, a public body established under the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, took administrative action by deciding to evict him. He further argued that such action could lawfully be taken only in accordance with the rules of natural justice, including the right to be heard. He maintained that any administrative action taken in breach of those rules is void. To support this argument, he relied on General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] 2 All ER 337, Attorney General v Ryan [1980] AC 718, and Mirugi Kariuki v Attorney General, Civil Application No. 70 of 1991. Accordingly, he contended that the 1st Respondent's decision to enter and take possession of the suit property was void and that its continued implementation was unlawful.

12. The Petitioner argued that Article 244(c) of the Constitution and the National Police Service Act require the National Police Service to uphold constitutional standards on human rights and fundamental freedoms. He contended that the 3rd Respondent's officers acted unconstitutionally by using arms to facilitate his eviction without a Court order. He further contended that they had no constitutional or legal basis for remaining on the suit property.

13. The Petitioner contends that unless the Court intervened, he would lose his interest in the suit property and his rights would continue to be violated. Accordingly, he urged the Court to allow the Petition as prayed.

THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S CROSS-PETITION

14. The 1st Respondent filed a Cross-Petition dated 9th June 2026 and a replying affidavit sworn by its Acting Corporation Secretary, Stanley Gitari, in opposition to the Petition. In the Cross-Petition, the 1st Respondent seeks the following orders:

a. That the Petition be declined and the Cross Petition allowed.

b. An order cancelling the registration of the leasehold over L.R. No. 3734/774 (I.R. 21925) Mzima Springs Lane, Lavington, issued in favour of the Petitioner against the 1st Respondent's title.

c. That the costs of the Cross Petition and the Petition be borne by the Petitioner.

d. Such other orders and reliefs as the Court may deem fair, expedient and just.

15. The deponent averred that the 1st Respondent is the registered proprietor of the suit property. It contended that a proprietor cannot rely on a title document as proof of ownership without first establishing the validity of the root of title.

16. He further averred that the suit property had been leased to the Petitioner under an agreement dated 24th March 1998, without following due procedure.

17. He relied on Sections 14(4) and (5) of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, contending that the Corporation may convey, transfer, or surrender land that is surplus to its existing and future requirements. He argued that public or trust land must be surrendered to the Government and may not be conveyed or transferred to another person without the consent and direction of the Minister responsible for lands. He further contended that, under these provisions, any disposal of its land requires approval from both its Board and the Ministry of Lands.

18. The deponent averred that the lease was executed without the consent of its Board or the approval of the Ministry of Lands. He further averred that the property was leased for 99 years to circumvent Sections 13 and 14 of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act. He maintained that the suit property is public land and may be disposed of only in strict compliance with those provisions.

19. The deponent relied on Clause 3(b) of the lease, which entitles the lessor to re-enter the land and repossess it in its former condition, without prejudice to any remedy for an earlier breach of covenant by the lessee. The deponent averred that, on 19th July 2025, the 1st Respondent regained possession of the suit property and fully assumed ownership.

20. He relied on the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio to argue that, once an illegality is brought to its attention, a Court should neither enforce an illegal contract nor assist in enforcing obligations arising from an illegal transaction where the party seeking assistance is implicated in the illegality.

21. He also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others, Petition No. 8 (E010) of 2021. He argued that the right to property under Article 40 of the Constitution is subject to the limitations set out in Article 40(6), which excludes protection for unlawfully acquired property. The deponent disputed the disposition of the suit property on procedural grounds and seeks its cancellation and the reversion of title to the 1st Respondent.

22. In its Cross Petition, the 1st Respondent also relied on Articles 2(1), 2(5), 2(6), 3, 10, 27(1), 27(4) and (5), 40, 43, and 50 of the Constitution as part of its constitutional basis.

23. In conclusion, the 1st Respondent urged the Court to dismiss the Petition and allow the Cross Petition with costs.

THE 2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENT’S CASE

24. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents opposed the Petition through their Response dated 9th September 2025.

25. They contend that they are strangers to the lease and to the dealings between the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent. They asserted that those transactions were between the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent alone, and that they are not privy to them.

26. They denied that officers of the 3rd Respondent participated in the alleged forcible eviction of the Petitioner from the suit property. They also denied the Petitioner's allegations that the police and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations had failed to address his complaints.

27. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents stated that they are strangers to the Petitioner's claim that he holds a registered leasehold interest in the suit property, protected under the Land Registration Act. They acknowledged the constitutional right to property, the definition of property, and the legal principle that titles are indefeasible, but did not concede that these provisions applied in the Petitioner's favour.

28. They denied violating the principles of natural justice. They further denied that the 3rd Respondent had contravened Articles 10 and 244 of the Constitution or the National Police Service Act.

29. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents denied that the Petitioner is entitled to any relief against them.

30. The Petition was canvassed by way of written submissions.

THE PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS

31. The Petitioner filed his submissions dated 24th March 2026.

32. On the right to property, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner's registered leasehold interest constitutes property within the meaning of Article 260 of the Constitution and is protected by Article 40. Counsel argued that, under Article 40(3) of the Constitution, the State may not deprive a person of any property or an interest in property except in accordance with the Constitution and an Act of Parliament.

33. Counsel submitted that the Petitioner's rights, acquired under Section 23(1) of the repealed Registration of Titles Act, were preserved by Sections 105 and 106 of the Land Registration Act and are now protected by Sections 24, 25 and 26 of that Act. Counsel argued that, under Section 26(1), a certificate of title is prima facie evidence that the registered proprietor is the absolute and indefeasible owner. Counsel further submitted that a title may be challenged only on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation to which the proprietor is proved to be a party, or where it was acquired illegally, unprocedurally, or through a corrupt scheme. On the sanctity of title, Counsel relied on Dr Joseph N.K. Arap Ng'ok v Moijo Ole Keiwua & 4 Others [1997] eKLR.

34. Counsel submitted that the lease governs the relationship between the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent. Counsel argued that Clause 3(b) permits the lessor to re-enter only if rent has been in arrears for twenty-one days, the lessee has breached a covenant, or the lessee has become bankrupt or compounded with creditors. Counsel further submitted that Clause 4 requires any notice under the lease to be in writing. Counsel contended that none of these conditions had arisen, that the 1st Respondent had alleged no breach, and that no written notice had been issued before re-entry.

35. Regarding the 1st Respondent's reliance on Section 14(4) of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, Counsel submitted that the provision does not apply to the Petitioner's lease. Counsel argued that the provision governs the conveyance, transfer, or surrender of land through which the Corporation disposes of its entire interest. By contrast, a lease grants only part of the lessor's interest, while the lessor retains the reversion. Counsel relied on Patel v Kenya Railways Corporation & 4 Others (Constitutional Petition E006 of 2021) [2022] KEELC 2523 (KLR), which, Counsel submitted, recognised this distinction. Counsel further contended that the provision does not refer to leases and that interpreting it to include leases would improperly encroach upon the legislature's role.

36. Counsel further submitted that Section 14(4) does not require the Corporation's Board to approve the disposal of land, and that the 1st Respondent was reading a requirement into the provision that it does not contain.

37. Alternatively, Counsel submitted that any obligation to obtain approvals rested with the 1st Respondent, as the disposing entity, rather than with the Petitioner. Counsel argued that the 1st Respondent was the applicant for, recipient of, and custodian of any such approvals and could not shift its own default to the Petitioner, an innocent lessee for value. Counsel further contended that, because the lease was executed under the 1st Respondent's seal, registered by the Chief Land Registrar, and acted upon for nearly three decades—with rent received and accounted for under successive Boards—the only available presumption is that the necessary approvals were obtained.

38. Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent bore the burden of proving its allegation that the lease was obtained without due procedure, in accordance with Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act. Counsel further argued that the 1st Respondent adduced no evidence to discharge that burden.

39. Counsel submitted that only the Court may cancel a registered title under Section 80 of the Land Registration Act. Counsel argued that cancellation requires a finding that the registration was obtained by fraud or mistake, and that the proprietor knew of it, caused it, or substantially contributed to it. Counsel contended that no Court had made such a finding and that the 1st Respondent could not cancel the Petitioner's title by self-assessment and forcible re-entry. Counsel submitted that, if the 1st Respondent wished to challenge the Petitioner's title, it should file a suit.

40. On the right to fair administrative action, Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent is a public body and that evicting the Petitioner during the lease term constituted administrative action. Counsel argued that Article 47(1) of the Constitution and Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act entitled the Petitioner to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action, including a hearing. Counsel further contended that an administrative decision made in breach of the rules of natural justice is void. To support this argument, Counsel relied on General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] 2 All ER 337, Attorney General v Ryan [1980] AC 718, Mirugi Kariuki v Attorney General, Civil Application No. 70 of 1991, Republic v G.G. Gachihi, Land Registrar/Registrar of Titles, Ex parte Varun Industrial Credit Limited [2013] eKLR and Dickson Ngigi v Commissioner of Lands, Civil Appeal No. 297 of 1997 [1998] eKLR.

41. Counsel submitted that even if the 1st Respondent believed the Petitioner's title had been unlawfully acquired and was therefore not protected under Article 40(6), it was still required to observe due process under Articles 47(1), 48 and 50 of the Constitution, Sections 26, 80 and 87 of the Land Registration Act, and Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act. Counsel argued that unlawful acquisition must be established through the prescribed legal process, not by dispossessing the proprietor. Counsel relied on Adan Abdirahani Hassan & 2 Others v Registrar of Titles & Others [2013] eKLR, in which the court held that a proprietor whose title is challenged on the ground that the land is public has a legitimate expectation of a hearing before any administrative action is taken.

42. Regarding the police's conduct, Counsel submitted that Article 244(c) of the Constitution requires the National Police Service to uphold constitutional human rights standards. Counsel also relied on Section 73 of the National Police Service Act, the oath of office in the Fourth Schedule, Article 10 of the Constitution, Order 1(1) and (2) of Chapter 21 of the National Police Service Standing Orders, and the National Police Service Delivery Charter, 2015. Counsel argued that the 3rd Respondent's officers had no lawful basis to facilitate the eviction without a court order or to remain on the suit property. In doing so, Counsel contended, they contravened Articles 10, 40, 47(1), and 244(c) of the Constitution.

43. On remedies, Counsel submitted that Article 23(3) of the Constitution provides for appropriate relief, including damages, necessary to vindicate the violated rights. Counsel contended that the respondents failed to demonstrate that any limitation of the Petitioner's rights was justified. Relying on Peter M. Kariuki v Attorney General [2012] eKLR, Counsel submitted that assessing damages is a matter of judicial discretion, guided by prevailing conditions and comparable awards. Counsel also cited Kenneth Stanley Njindo Matiba v Attorney General, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 94 of 2014, and Koigi Wamwere v Attorney General [2015] eKLR, where awards ranged from Kshs. 12,000,000/= to Kshs. 20,000,000/=. Counsel proposed Kshs. 20,000,000/= in general damages, taking into account the value of the land, lost opportunities, and the duration and impact of the violation.

44. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to allow the Petition as prayed.

THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

45. The 1st Respondent filed its submissions dated 9th June 2026.

46. Counsel submitted that the registration of the Petitioner's 99-year leasehold interest in the suit property was unlawful and should be cancelled, and that the property should revert to the 1st Respondent. Relying on Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others, Petition No. 8 (E010) of 2021, Counsel further submitted that a party cannot establish ownership solely on the basis of a registered title where irregularities in the acquisition process are admitted or discovered.

47. Counsel contended that the Petitioner admitted that the procedure required by the Kenya Railways Corporation Act was not followed when he acquired his leasehold interest, but maintained that the 1st Respondent was responsible for ensuring compliance. Counsel further submitted that it did not matter who bore that duty. Counsel submitted that an illegality—particularly one involving public property—cannot be ignored or accepted merely because the beneficiary is not shown to have directly violated the law. Counsel argued that the issue is whether the law was followed. A title or registration obtained without compliance is defective and cannot be protected under Article 40 of the Constitution.

48. With regard to the claim for damages arising from unlawful eviction, Counsel submitted that damages constitute a common law remedy, distinct from the constitutional remedy of compensation provided for under Article 23(3)(e) of the Constitution. Counsel argued that the claim must therefore be assessed in accordance with common law principles and that it fails because the damages were neither particularised in the pleadings nor strictly proved by the evidence.

49. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Petition and allow the Cross Petition.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

50. Having considered the Petition, the Cross-Petition and the rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination:

a. Whether the Petitioner's leasehold interest over L.R. No. 3734/774 was lawfully acquired;

b. Whether the 1st Respondent's re-entry and repossession of the suit property on 19th July 2025 was lawful;

c. Whether the 3rd Respondent violated the Petitioner’s Constitutional rights; and

d. What reliefs should issue

WHETHER THE PETITIONER'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN L.R. NO. 3734/774 WAS LAWFULLY ACQUIRED

51. The 1st Respondent asserts that the lease for the suit property was unlawfully acquired. Section 107 of the Evidence Act provides that:

(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.

(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

52. Section 109 of the Evidence Act places the burden of proving a particular fact on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence.

53. On the standard of proof in constitutional petitions, the Supreme Court in Samson Gwer & 5 others v Kenya Medical Research Institute & 3 others [2020] eKLR held that:

“It is already the standpoint of this Court, as regards standard of proof, that this assumes a higher level in respect of constitutional safeguards, than in the case of the ordinary civil-claim balance of probability. The explanation is that, virtually all constitutional rights-safeguards bear generalities, or qualifications, which call for scrupulous individual appraisal for each case.”

54. It is not disputed that the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent entered into a lease dated 24th March 1998 for the suit property, for a term of 99 years commencing on 1st February 1998. The lease was registered against the title as entry No. 4. Both parties produced identical copies of the lease and the certificate of title. The Petitioner also produced a provisional certificate of title dated 17th June 1999. The 1st Respondent does not dispute the lease or its registration but contends that it was granted without due procedure.

55. Article 40(1) of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to acquire and own property of any description. Article 40(3) bars the State from depriving a person of property of any description, or of any interest in property, unless the deprivation results from an acquisition of land in accordance with Chapter Five, or is for a public purpose or in the public interest and is carried out in accordance with the Constitution and any Act of Parliament that requires prompt payment in full of just compensation. Article 40(6) provides that the rights under that Article do not extend to any property found to have been unlawfully acquired.

56. Section 26(1) of the Land Registration Act provides that:

The certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon registration, or to a purchaser of land upon a transfer or transmission by the proprietor shall be taken by all courts as prima facie evidence that the person named as proprietor of the land is the absolute and indefeasible owner, subject to the encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions contained or endorsed in the certificate, and the title of that proprietor shall not be subject to challenge, except—

(a) on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person is proved to be a party; or

(b) where the certificate of title has been acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme.

57. The 1st Respondent relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others [2023] KESC 30 (KLR), which held that:

“As held by the Court of Appeal in Munyu Maina v Hiram Gathiha Maina Civil Appeal No 239 of 2009 [2013] eKLR, where the registered proprietor’s root title is under challenge, it is not enough to dangle the instrument of title as proof of ownership. It is the instrument that is in challenge and therefore the registered proprietor must go beyond the instrument and prove the legality of the title and show that the acquisition was legal, formal and free from any encumbrance including interests which would not be noted in the register.”

58. This Court is bound by the foregoing decision. However, this does not relieve a party challenging a title of the burden of proving the alleged irregularity. The question is whether the 1st Respondent has presented evidence before this Court establishing that the Petitioner's lease was granted in breach of the law.

59. The 1st Respondent relied on Sections 13 and 14 of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, Cap 397. Section 13(2)(h) empowers the Corporation:

to sell, let or otherwise dispose of any property, movable or immovable, which in the opinion of the Board is not necessary for the purposes of the Corporation:

Provided that the Corporation shall not sell, let or otherwise dispose of any building or land placed at its disposal by the Government otherwise than with the consent of, and on conditions agreed by, the Government.

60. Section 14(4) provides that:

The Corporation may at any time convey, transfer or surrender any land surplus to both its existing and future requirements by a conveyance or a deed of surrender either for, or without, consideration:

Provided that land which was public land or trust land shall be surrendered to the Government and shall not be conveyed or transferred to any other person unless the Minister responsible for lands shall consent and so direct.

61. The Kenya Railways Corporation Act commenced on 20th January 1978. It was therefore in force when the lease was executed in 1998 and governed the 1st Respondent's authority to grant the lease.

62. The Petitioner argued that Section 14(4) applies only to the outright conveyance, transfer, or surrender of land and not to a lease under which the lessor retains the reversion. That argument does not resolve the matter, since Section 13(2)(h) expressly applies to the letting of the Corporation's property. Under either provision, the requirements on which the 1st Respondent relies turn on questions of fact: whether the suit property was land placed at the Corporation's disposal by the Government or public land within the meaning of Section 14(6); whether the Board had formed the opinion that the land was unnecessary for the Corporation’s purposes; and whether the consent of the Government or the Minister responsible for lands had been obtained.

63. The 1st Respondent did not lead evidence on any of these matters. It did not produce any vesting order or other document showing how it came to hold the suit property, or that the Government had placed it at its disposal. It did not produce the minutes of its Board for the relevant period, nor any record indicating that the Board had not considered or approved the lease. It did not produce any correspondence with the Ministry of Lands or the Commissioner of Lands showing that consent had been sought and refused, or that consent had never been sought. The Acting Corporation Secretary merely asserted that the lease had been granted without the Board's consent or the Ministry of Lands' approval.

64. All records relevant to these questions are in the 1st Respondent's custody and relate to matters within its knowledge, within the meaning of Section 112 of the Evidence Act. The 1st Respondent cannot discharge its burden by a bare averment and then invite this Court to cancel a registered title on unsubstantiated allegations.

65. It is material that the lease was executed by the 1st Respondent under its common seal and registered by the Registrar of Titles. The 1st Respondent then received rent under the lease for nearly three decades, with the final payment made on 30th June 2025. Before 19th July 2025, it never challenged the lease, either in writing or before any court or tribunal. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this conduct is consistent only with the 1st Respondent treating the lease as valid.

66. The Cross Petition seeks the cancellation of the registration of the lease. The power of this Court to cancel a registration is found in Section 80 of the Land Registration Act, which provides as follows:

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court may order the rectification of the register by directing that any registration be cancelled or amended if it is satisfied that any registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake.

(2) The register shall not be rectified to affect the title of a proprietor, unless the proprietor had knowledge of the omission, fraud or mistake in consequence of which the rectification is sought, or caused such omission, fraud or mistake or substantially contributed to it by any act, neglect or default.

67. The 1st Respondent neither pleaded nor proved fraud or mistake in registering the lease. The Petitioner acquired the lease for valuable consideration of Kshs. 2,000,000/= and remained in possession until 19th July 2025. There is no evidence that he knew of, caused, or contributed to any irregularity. Accordingly, the threshold under Section 80 has not been met.

68. Based on the evidence presented, this Court finds that the Petitioner lawfully acquired the leasehold interest in L.R. No. 3734/774, which is protected under Article 40 of the Constitution. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Cross Petition is without merit.

WHETHER THE 1ST RESPONDENT'S RE-ENTRY AND REPOSSESSION OF THE SUIT PROPERTY WAS LAWFUL

69. The 1st Respondent admitted that on 19th July 2025 it entered the suit property and regained possession pursuant to Clause 3(b) of the lease, which provides as follows:

That if the said rent or part thereof hereby reserved or any other payment due here under shall be in arrears for the space of twenty-one days next after any of the days whereupon the same ought to have been paid as aforesaid whether the same shall have been legally demanded or not or if there shall be any breach non-performance or non-observance by the Lessee of any of the covenants or conditions herein before contained and on his part to be performed and observed or if the Lessee shall become bankrupt or enter into any arrangement with or for the benefit of its debts by composition or otherwise then and in any such case it shall be lawful for the Lessor at any time thereafter to enter into or upon the demised premises or any part thereof in the name of the whole and the same to have again repossess and enjoy as in its former state anything herein contained to contrary not withstanding and without prejudice to any right of action or remedy of the Lessor in respect of any antecedent breach of any covenants by the Lessee herein before contained or in respect of all loss any damage the Lessor may hereby sustain.

70. The right of re-entry under Clause 3(b) arises only in three circumstances: where rent is in arrears for twenty-one days, where the lessee breaches a covenant, or where the lessee becomes bankrupt or compounds with his creditors. The 1st Respondent neither alleged nor proved that any of these circumstances applied. On the contrary, the Petitioner produced the 1st Respondent's statements of account, which show that he had paid his rent and was in credit at the time of the eviction.

71. Even where a right of re-entry has accrued, its exercise is governed by Section 73 of the Land Act, which provides as follows:

i. Subject to the provisions of section 76 and to any provisions to the contrary in the lease, the lessor shall have the right to forfeit the lease if the lessee—

(a) commits any breach of, or omits to perform, any agreement or condition on his part expressed or implied in the lease; or

(b) is adjudicated bankrupt; or

(c) being a company, goes into liquidation.

ii. The right of forfeiture may be—

(a) exercised, where neither the lessee nor any person claiming through or under him is in occupation of the land, by entering upon and remaining in possession of the land; or

(b) enforced by action in the court.

(3) The acceptance by the lessor of any rent after the service of a notice of forfeiture under section 75 does not operate as a waiver of the lessor’s right of forfeiture unless the lessor has by any other positive act shown an intention to treat the lease as subsisting.

72. Section 75 of the Land Act further provides for notice before forfeiture as follows:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the lease, no lessor shall be entitled to exercise the right of forfeiture for the breach of any agreement or condition in the lease, whether expressed or implied, until the lessor has served on the lessee a notice of not less than thirty days—

(a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and

(b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach within such reasonable period as is specified in the notice; and

(c) in any case other than non-payment of rent, requiring the lessee to make compensation in money for the breach,

and the lessee has failed to remedy the breach within thirty days thereafter, if it is capable of remedy, and to make reasonable compensation in money.

73. In the present case, the Petitioner was in occupation of the suit property through his security guards, who were removed during the eviction. The 1st Respondent was therefore not entitled to forfeit the lease by physically entering the property. Its only lawful recourse was to bring an action in Court. No notice was issued under Section 75 of the Land Act or Clause 4 of the lease. The re-entry therefore contravened both the lease and the Land Act.

74. The 1st Respondent is a statutory corporation established under the Kenya Railways Corporation Act. Its decision to evict the Petitioner and to take possession of the suit property constituted an administrative action. The Petitioner contends that the Respondent violated his right to fair administrative action. The right to be heard is a constitutional right enshrined in Articles 47 and 0 of the Constitution and Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act. Article 47(1) of the Constitution provides that:

1) Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair.

(2) If a right or fundamental freedom of a person has been or is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action.

75. Section 4(3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides that:

Where an administrative action is likely to adversely affect the rights or fundamental freedoms of any person, the administrator shall give the person affected by the decision–

(a) prior and adequate notice of the nature and reasons for the proposed administrative action;

(b) an opportunity to be heard and to make representations in that regard;

(c) notice of a right to a review or internal appeal against an administrative decision, where applicable;

(d) a statement of reasons pursuant to section 6;

(e) notice of the right to legal representation, where applicable;

(f) notice of the right to cross-examine, where applicable; or

information, materials and evidence to be relied upon in making the decision or taking the administrative action.

76. The administrator shall accord the person against whom administrative action is taken an opportunity to-

b attend proceedings in person or in the company of an expert of his choice;

c be heard;

d cross examine persons who give adverse evidence against him; and

e request for an adjournment of the proceedings where necessary to ensure a fair hearing.

77. The right to fair administrative action cannot be gainsaid. In Judicial Service Commission -v- Mbalu Mutava & another (2015) eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:

“Article 47(1) marks an important and transformative development of administrative justice for it not only lays a constitutional foundation for control of the powers of state organs and other administrative bodies, but also entrenches the right to fair administrative action in the Bill of Rights. The right to fair administrative action is a reflection of the national values in article 10 such as the rule of law, human dignity, social justice, good governance, transparency and accountability. The administrative actions of public officers. State organs and other administrative bodies are now subjected to the principle of constitutionality rather than to the doctrine of ultra vires from which administrative law under common law developed.”

78. Similarly, in Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 Others v Ferdinand Ndungu Waititu & 4 Others [2014] eKLR.the Court held that;

257.Fair hearing, in principle incorporates the rules of natural justice, which includes the concept of audi alteram partem (hear the other side or no one is to be condemned unheard) and nemo judex in causa sua (no man shall judge his own case) otherwise referred to as the rule against bias. Peter Kaluma, Judicial Review: Law, Procedure and Practice 2nd Edition (Nairobi: 2009) at page 195, notes that the rules of natural justice generally refer to procedural fairness in decision making. Further he analyses the two mentioned concepts of the rules of natural justice and states [at pages 176 and 177] that it is the duty of the courts, when dealing with individual cases, to determine whether indeed the rules of natural justice have been violated and noting that “although the necessity of hearing is well established, its scope and contests remain unsettled.”

79. The Petitioner was evicted without notice, reasons, or an opportunity to be heard. The decision was made and carried out in a single step.

80. The 1st Respondent contends that the suit property is public land. Even if that were established, the outcome would remain unchanged. In Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 2 others; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (Amicus Curiae) [2021] KESC 34 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that even when the State seeks to recover public land, it must give adequate notice before evicting occupants and must follow due process.

81. Section 152C of the Land Act requires that any decision to evict people from public land be communicated in writing to all affected persons at least three months before the eviction, by notice published in the Gazette and in a newspaper with nationwide circulation. No such notice was issued.

82. In the end, this Court finds that the 1st Respondent's re-entry into and repossession of the suit property on 19th July 2025 were unlawful. These actions deprived the Petitioner of his interest in property otherwise than in accordance with the law, in violation of Article 40(3) of the Constitution, and violated his right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.

WHETHER THE 3RD RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

83. The Petitioner contended that officers of the National Police Service, acting under the 3rd Respondent, used firearms to facilitate his eviction without a court order and remained on the suit property thereafter, thereby violating Articles 10, 40, 47 and 244(c) of the Constitution. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents denied that any police officer participated in the eviction.

84. The Petitioner produced the Occurrence Book entry from Muthangari Police Station, his complaint to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and the statement he recorded on 24th July 2025. In that statement, he described the evictors as unidentified armed individuals. He did not name any officer, provide a service number, photographs, or other records placing police officers at the scene, nor did he call a witness to support that claim.

85. The burden of proving the involvement of the 3rd Respondent's officers rested with the Petitioner. The evidence presented before this Court does not establish that the individuals who evicted him were police officers, nor does it establish that any police officers have remained on the suit property under the authority of the 3rd Respondent. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not proved the alleged violations by the 3rd Respondent.

WHAT RELIEFS SHOULD ISSUE

86. Having found that the Petitioner lawfully holds a registered leasehold interest in the suit property and was unlawfully evicted by the 1st Respondent, the Court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to the declarations sought, except as against the 3rd Respondent. The Petitioner is also entitled to restoration of possession and an order protecting his leasehold interest from interference except through due process.

87. Regarding damages, the Petitioner seeks compensation for the violation of his constitutional rights, a remedy that this Court may grant under Article 23(3)(e) of the Constitution. The amount of compensation is a matter of judicial discretion and should be determined by considering the nature and duration of the violation, as well as its impact on the Petitioner. In Southern Engineering Company Ltd v Mutia [1985] KECA 49 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held as follows:

... measurement of the quantum of damages is a matter for the discretion of the individual Judge, which of course has to be exercised judicially and with regard to the general conditions prevailing in the country generally, and to prior decisions which are relevant to the case in question.

88. Relying on Matiba v The Attorney General [2017] KEHC 9163 (KLR) and Koigi Wamwere v Attorney General [2015] eKLR, the Petitioner proposed an award of Kshs. 20,000,000/=. However, those decisions concerned detention and torture and are not comparable to the violation in the matter at hand. In Kungu & another (Suing as the administrators of the Estate of Kungu Kagiri t/a Monte Carlo Club) v English Press Properties Limited & 2 others [2024] KEELC 556 (KLR), the Court awarded Kshs. 720,000/- as general damages and Kshs. 500,000/- in punitive damages for unlawful eviction. In Sawa v Bakary [2026] KECA 1094 (KLR), Kshs. 250,000/- was awarded for unlawful eviction from commercial premises. In Ojwang & 2 others v Onyango (Environment & Land Case 53 of 2019) [2024] KEELC 271 (KLR), Kshs. 3 million was awarded as general damages for unlawful eviction.

89. This Court has found that the Petitioner was forcibly dispossessed of property he had lawfully occupied for nearly three decades, without notice or a hearing. He has remained out of possession, with his belongings still inside the property, since 19th July 2025. In these circumstances, this Court considers Kshs. 5,000,000/= to be reasonable compensation for the violation of the Petitioner's rights under Articles 40 and 47 of the Constitution.

90. The Petitioner seeks costs on an indemnity basis but did not establish exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the ordinary rule. The 1st Respondent shall bear the costs of both the Petition and the Cross Petition.

91. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Petition is merited and is hereby allowed against the 1st Respondent. The Cross Petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed. The Petition is allowed on the following terms:

a. A declaration is hereby issued that the Petitioner, being the registered lessee of L.R No. 3734/774 (I.R No. 21925/1), Mzima Springs Lane, Lavington, holds an interest in property protected under Article 40 as read with Article 260 of the Constitution, and enjoys the rights of a registered proprietor under Sections 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act.

b. A declaration is hereby issued that the 1st Respondent violated the Petitioner's rights under Articles 40 and 47 of the Constitution by forcibly evicting him from the suit property on 19th July 2025 without notice and without due process.

c. An order is hereby issued directing the 1st Respondent, within 7 days of the date of this judgment, to vacate the suit property, to remove all guards and other persons present on the suit property on its behalf, and to restore the Petitioner to possession.

d. A permanent injunction is hereby issued restraining the 1st Respondent, whether by itself, its agents, servants or any person acting on its behalf, from leasing, selling, disposing of, letting, cancelling or revoking the Petitioner's registered leasehold interest over the suit property, save by an order of a competent court made after the Petitioner has been heard.

e. The Petitioner is awarded Kshs. 5,000,000/= as compensation for the violation of his constitutional rights, payable by the 1st Respondent, together with interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.

f. The prayer for orders against the 3rd Respondent is dismissed.

g. The Cross Petition dated 9th June 2026 is dismissed.

h. The 1st Respondent shall bear the costs of the Petition and of the Cross Petition.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 22nd DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Ndegwa holding brief for Mukuha for the Petitioner

Akatch for the 1st Respondent

Vena – Court Assistant

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