Land law

Mungai v Juma, Basuben & Basuben (As Administrators of the Estate of Petronila Cherono Chumo – Deceased) & 3 others [2026] KEELC 7121 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
23 October 2026
Judge(s)
T. Murigi

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Background

By a Notice of Motion dated 19th December 2025, brought under Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, Rule 3(2) of the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and Orders 8 Rules 3 and 5 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks the following orders:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Having considered the application, the response and the rival submissions, the only issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the orders sought.

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Decision / orders

In the end, a finding is made that the Notice of Motion dated 19th December 2025 is merited and is hereby allowed in the following terms:

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Reasoning passage

The principle is not a panacea and does not excuse indolence. In the present case, however, the error concerns the reproduction of documents. The application was also filed on 19th December 2025, ten days after the deficiency came to light at the hearing on 9th December 2025, and in accordance with the court’s direction. This Court finds that the application was made without undue delay.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC NO. 279 OF 2019

IBRAHIM FAROOQ MUNGAI……………………………………... PLAINTIFF

=VERSUS=

JUDITH CHEPKOECH JUMA, NICKSON KIPNGENO BASUBEN

AND RAYMOND KIBET BASUBEN

(as administrators of the estate of PETRONILA

CHERONO CHUMO [DECEASED] )................................... 1ST DEFENDANT

JACLINE CHEPNGENO CHUMO ……...……...………….. 2ND DEFENDANT

THE CHIEF LAND REGISTRAR …………...……………..…. 3RD DEFENDANT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL ………..…………..…... 4TH DEFENDANT

RULING

1. By a Notice of Motion dated 19th December 2025, brought under Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, Rule 3(2) of the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and Orders 8 Rules 3 and 5 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks the following orders:

a. Spent.

b. That leave be and is hereby granted to the Applicant to produce the complete and clear copies of the incomplete/illegible copies of the Sale Agreement dated 2nd March 2015, the Supplemental Agreement dated 25th June 2015, the KCB Letter of Offer dated 17th February 2015, the Property Search dated 21st June 2021, and the Title dated 22nd October 2013 filed in the Plaintiff’s Further List and Bundle of Documents dated 17th January 2023 with the complete copies annexed to the Supporting Affidavit herein.

c. That the complete/legible copies of the said Sale Agreement, Supplemental Agreement, KCB Letter of Offer, Property Search and Title annexed to the Supporting Affidavit herein as per Prayer 2 above, be deemed as properly filed and served for all purposes of this suit.

d. That the costs of this Application be in the cause.

e. That such further or other relief be granted as this Honourable Court may deem just and fit to grant in the interest of justice.

2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff sworn on even date.

THE APPLICANT’S CASE

3. The Applicant averred that he instituted the suit on 26th August 2019 through the firm of M/S Rajab & Mbogo Advocates. He stated that at the time of filing, he handed over to his former advocates, for copying and filing, the original, complete and legible Sale Agreement dated 2nd March 2015, the Supplemental Agreement dated 25th June 2015, the KCB Letter of Offer dated 17th February 2015, the Property Search dated 21st June 2021 and the title dated 22nd October 2013.

4. He further averred that his former advocates filed a List and Bundle of Documents dated 17th March 2022 and a Further List and Bundle of Documents dated 17th January 2023, both of which were consolidated into the trial bundle dated 17th January 2023. He explained that he subsequently changed advocates and filed a Notice of Change of Advocates on 13th October 2023 in favour of M/S Githara & Associates Advocates. He further stated that he had filed all his lists and bundles of documents before his current advocates came on record.

5. He averred that the matter proceeded to hearing on 9th December 2025, and that during cross-examination by Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants, clerical errors and omissions were noted in the copies of the Sale Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement filed with the court. He averred that his current advocates, who had prepared for trial using the original documents, did not discover the missing pages in the trial bundle until that point. He stated that his advocates presented the originals to counsel for the Defendants and to the court for verification, to demonstrate that the deficiencies arose from bona fide clerical errors and not from any want of authenticity. He averred that his advocates then sought leave to substitute the incomplete copies, and the court directed that he make a formal application.

6. He further averred that upon further review, the KCB Letter of Offer and the Title were also found to be incomplete, and the Property Search was found to be illegible. He sought leave to produce complete and legible copies of these documents. He averred that the originals of all the documents were in his possession and that their production was essential to the just determination of the real issues in dispute. He annexed complete copies of the originals to replace the incomplete copies on record.

7. The Applicant contends that a litigant should not be punished or unduly prejudiced by the mistakes, negligence or procedural errors of his former advocates, and that the best evidence rule under Section 67 of the Evidence Act requires the production of primary evidence, the most reliable form of proof. He averred that including the complete documents would not cause the Defendants irreversible prejudice, as they would have sufficient time to review them.

THE RESPONDENT’S CASE

8. The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 12th January 2026 by Nickson Kipngeno Basuben, one of the administrators of the estate of Petronila Cherono Chumo (deceased) in opposition to the application. The deponent contends that the application is fatally and incurably defective, misconceived, frivolous, vexatious, incompetent and an abuse of the court process.

9. He averred that at the hearing on 9th December 2025, the only issue arising during the Plaintiff's cross-examination was that the Sale Agreement dated 2nd March 2015 and the Supplemental Agreement dated 25th June 2015 had not been signed by the purchaser. He further averred that no issue was raised regarding the KCB Letter of Offer dated 17th February 2015, the Property Search dated 21st June 2021, or the Title dated 22nd October 2013. He contended that including those documents in the application was an attempt to steal a match on the Defendants and to reopen the pre-trial conference through the back door.

10. He averred that the Plaintiff had ample time to file his documents, having been granted leave to file the Further List and Bundle of Documents dated 17th January 2023, and ought to have noticed and regularised the omissions then or during preparation for the hearing. He stated that a change of advocates did not negate the procedural rules governing the filing of documents before the hearing date is fixed. He further averred that the Plaintiff not only adopted his witness statement but also adopted his lists and bundles of documents dated 17th March 2022 and 17th January 2023 as his evidence in chief.

11. The deponent contended that the Plaintiff’s possession of the originals in court showed that he was aware of the errors but failed to regularise them at the pre-trial conference or by application before the hearing date was fixed. He argued that the Defendants could not be sacrificed at the altar of the Plaintiff’s negligence, that Counsel’s reliance on the originals for trial preparation could not cure that negligence, and that the Plaintiff was to blame. He disputed that the Plaintiff’s advocates prepared for trial using the originals, stating that the only purported originals displayed in court were the Sale Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement, neither of which the Court or the Defendants’ Counsel examined.

12. He averred that Order 3 Rule 2 and Order 7 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules require parties to file their documents before the pre-trial conference to ensure the trial proceeds seamlessly. Accordingly, he argued that the Plaintiff’s errors were not mere mistakes or procedural errors but grave breaches that could not be cured at that stage. On the best evidence rule, he stated that the documents admitted in chief were copies, not originals, and that the Plaintiff brought the originals to court as an afterthought.

13. He contended that the Plaintiff approached a Court of equity with unclean hands, arguing that equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent. He averred that the Plaintiff had premeditated and schemed to wait until the anomaly was discovered during cross-examination before producing the originals.

14. Regarding prejudice, he stated that the suit property belonged to the Defendants’ late mother and formed part of her estate. He noted that the suit was filed in 2019, had proceeded through a pre-trial conference, and was already at trial, with the Plaintiff having testified under oath and been cross-examined. He urged the court to exercise its discretion judiciously by considering the reason for the late filing, the stage of the proceedings, and the prejudice to the Defendants. He maintained that the application lacked merit, was brought in bad faith as a delaying tactic and an abuse of judicial time, and should be dismissed with costs.

15. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.

THE PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSIONS

16. The Plaintiff filed his submissions dated 12th March 2026.

17. On behalf of the Plaintiff, Counsel relied on Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act and submitted that justice should be administered without undue regard for procedural technicalities, with a view to the just, expeditious, proportionate and accessible resolution of disputes. Counsel further relied on Methuselar Keyah Lubembe v Albina Kipkemoi [2019] KEHC 2804 (KLR) to submit that in deciding whether to grant leave, the court weighs the benefit of admitting the documents against the harm occasioned by refusal, on both sides, and asks what decision would serve the ends of justice.

18. Counsel submitted that denying leave would prejudice the Plaintiff, as the documents were material to the issues in controversy, particularly the history and ownership of the suit property.

19. Counsel invoked the right to a fair hearing under Article 50 of the Constitution, arguing that the Defendants would suffer no prejudice because the documents were already on record and only the missing pages needed to be added. Counsel further submitted that the originals were available for verification, the defence case had not yet commenced, and the Plaintiff had not closed his case. The Defendants would also have a full opportunity to cross-examine the Plaintiff on the documents.

20. Counsel submitted that admitting the documents would not ambush the Defendants and would assist the Court in conclusively determining the dispute.

21. On the best evidence rule, Counsel relied on Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act and on In re the Estate of Charles Ndegwa Kiragu alias Ndegwa Kiragu (Deceased) [2016] KEHC 6987 (KLR). Counsel submitted that primary evidence constitutes the best evidence and must be produced first, and that where the original is within a party’s reach, inferior proof ought not to be admitted. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff had the originals and brought them to court on the hearing date. Counsel urged the court to permit the filing of a true reflection of the originals, which would be available for inspection by the court and the Defendants.

22. Counsel submitted that the omission of pages and the illegibility of some documents resulted from copying errors made by the Plaintiff’s former advocates, M/S Rajab & Mbogo Advocates, who prepared the trial bundle dated 17th January 2023 before being replaced by M/S Githara & Associates Advocates.

23. Counsel argued that the mistake by Counsel should not be visited upon the Plaintiff, particularly as it was noted at an early stage of the hearing. Counsel relied on Keengwe t/a Keengwe & Co Advocates v Mohamed (Civil Appeal 1 of 2024) [2024] KEHC 10626 (KLR), which in turn cited with approval Belinda Murai & 9 others v Amos Wainaina [1978] eKLR, to submit that a mistake by Counsel should not foreclose access to justice.

THE DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS

24. The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed their submissions dated 11th April 2026.

25. On their behalf, Counsel submitted that the matter had proceeded to a pre-trial conference, where the Plaintiff sought and obtained leave to file a further list of documents. The Plaintiff later filed the Further List and Bundle of Documents dated 17th January 2023.

26. Counsel contended that the Plaintiff had ample time—spanning several years—to discover that the agreements were incomplete but negligently failed to do so until cross-examination. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff’s possession of the originals on the hearing date demonstrated that he had discovered the defects earlier but waited until they were raised during cross-examination. Relying on Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Counsel submitted that it is intended to promote early disclosure, narrow the issues, and facilitate an expeditious trial. Counsel further submitted that a failure persisting for more than two years after the further list was filed could not be regarded as a mere mistake. Counsel argued that the application was reactive and tactical, that equity aids the vigilant rather than the indolent, and that delay defeats equity.

27. Counsel submitted that Article 159 of the Constitution cannot be used to override procedural rules and should be invoked only in exceptional circumstances. Counsel relied on Raila Odinga & 5 others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 others [2013] eKLR, Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 6 others [2013] eKLR and Mwicigi & 14 others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 5 others [2016] KESC 2 (KLR), to submit that Article 159(2)(d) does not relieve litigants of the obligation to comply with procedural requirements, that courts should not grant relief to parties who demonstrate scant respect for rules and timelines, and that procedure is the handmaiden of justice.

28. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff offered no satisfactory explanation for filing incomplete agreements in 2022 and 2023. Counsel submitted that the omission was not a typographical, pagination or clerical error, as the documents were central transactional documents evidencing the alleged purchase, and the copies filed were incomplete and unsigned by the purchaser.

29. Counsel contended that, having sought leave to file a further list, the Plaintiff’s current advocates ought to have reviewed the case and regularised the documents rather than attributing the issue to the former advocates. Counsel submitted that the claim that the Plaintiff relied on the originals to prepare for trial was speculative. Counsel argued that the defect concerned the documents’ authenticity, probative value, enforceability, and credibility, and that the Plaintiff was seeking not to regularise their form but to replace defective evidence with improved evidence after the trial had commenced.

30. Counsel reiterated that the suit property formed part of the estate of the Defendants’ deceased mother, that the suit was filed in 2019, that the matter had gone through pre-trial conference, and that the Plaintiff was testifying on oath having adopted his bundles.

31. Counsel submitted that allowing substituted documents during cross-examination would alter the evidentiary landscape midstream, potentially require re-evaluation of pleadings and further witness preparation, increase costs and delay the matter contrary to Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 159(2)(b) of the Constitution. Counsel relied on Kakuta Maina Hamisi v Peris Tobiko & 2 others [2013] eKLR to submit that Article 159(2)(d) is not a panacea for curing all defaults in litigation.

32. On abuse of process, counsel set out the chronology from the filing of documents in 2022 and 2023, through certification of the matter as ready for hearing, adoption of the bundles, exposure of defects in cross-examination, and the filing of the application. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff sought to mend a broken case after testing defective evidence. Counsel relied on Iderus v Hussein & 10 others [2025] KEELC 1180 (KLR), which cited with approval Beinosi v Wiley 1973 (4) SA 721, to submit that an abuse of process occurs when procedures intended to facilitate the pursuit of truth are used for extraneous purposes.

33. Counsel submitted that no issue was raised at the hearing on 9th December 2025 regarding the KCB Letter of Offer, the Property Search and the Title. Counsel further submitted that their inclusion was gratuitous and opportunistic, amounting to an attempt to reopen the pre-trial conference through the back door.

34. Counsel submitted that the Court’s discretion is available only where lawful and justifiable reasons are advanced, and that it cannot be exercised to assist a party who has flouted procedure. In the alternative, counsel urged that any discretion be exercised judiciously, having regard to the reason for the delay, the stage of the proceedings, the availability of the evidence during case preparation, and the prejudice to the opposite party. Counsel contended that no adequate explanation had been offered, that the trial had commenced, and that allowing the application would reward negligence and encourage last-minute production of evidence.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

35. Having considered the application, the response and the rival submissions, the only issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the orders sought.

36. It is trite that the Civil Procedure Rules require parties to disclose, at the earliest opportunity, the documents they intend to rely on.

37. Order 3 Rule 2 requires a plaint to be accompanied by a list of documents and copies thereof, while Order 11 provides for case management at the pre-trial stage. The aim is to narrow the issues and ensure that no party is taken by surprise at trial. However, these rules are not an end in themselves. They serve the overriding objective set out in Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act and in Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act, namely the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes.

38. This Court has discretion to extend the time prescribed for the performance of any act. Section 95 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows:

“Where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Act, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.”

39. Order 50 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules further provides that:

“Where a limited time has been fixed for doing any act or taking any proceedings under these Rules, or by summary notice or by order of the court, the court shall have power to enlarge such time upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require, and such enlargement may be ordered although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed.

Provided that the costs of any application to extend such time and of any order made thereon shall be borne by the parties making such application, unless the court orders otherwise.”

40. Although the discretion to extend time is wide, it must be exercised judicially. In Salat vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR), the Supreme Court set out the following principles governing the exercise of discretion in an application for an extension of time:

“It is incumbent upon the applicant to explain the reasons for delay in making the application for extension and whether there are any extenuating circumstances that can enable the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant. This being the first case in which this Court is called upon to consider the principles for extension of time, we derive the following as the underlying principles that a Court should consider in the exercise of such discretion:

a. Extension of time is not a right of a party. It is an equitable remedy that is only available to a deserving party at the discretion of the Court;

b. A party who seeks for extension of time has the burden of laying a basis to the satisfaction of the court;

c. Whether the court should exercise the discretion to extend time, is a consideration to be made on a case to case basis;

d. Whether there is a reasonable reason for the delay. The delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the Court;

e. Whether there will be any prejudice suffered by the respondents if the extension is granted;

f. Whether the application has been brought without undue delay; and

g. Whether in certain cases, like election petitions, public interest should be a consideration for extending time.”

41. Regarding the admission of further material after the expiry of the applicable timelines, the Supreme Court in Odinga & 7 Others vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 others [2013] KESC 1 (KLR) held as follows:

“The parties in the petition had a duty to ensure that they complied with their respective timelines, and the court ought to adhere to its own. There must be a fair and level playing field so that no party or the court lost the time that they were entitled to and no extra burden should be imposed on any party or the court as a result of omissions or inadvertence which were foreseeable or could have been avoided. If the further affidavit was small or limited so that the other party was able to respond to it, then the court would be considerate, taking into account all aspects of the matter. However, where the new material introduced was so substantial involving not only a further affidavit but massive additional evidence so as to make it difficult or impossible for the other party to respond effectively, the court would exercise caution and care in the exercise of its discretion to grant leave for the filing of the further affidavit and admission of additional evidence.”

42. In Attorney General v Zinj Limited [2021] eKLR, the Supreme Court set out the principles that govern additional evidence as follows:

a) the additional evidence must be directly relevant to the matter before the court and be in the interest of justice;

b) it must be such that, if given, it would influence or impact upon the result of the verdict, although it need not be decisive;

c) it is shown that it could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, was not within the knowledge of, or could not have been produced at the time of the suit or petition by the party seeking to adduce the additional evidence;

d) where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes any vagueness or doubt over the case and has a direct bearing on the main issue in the suit;

e) the evidence must be credible in the sense that it is capable of belief;

f) the additional evidence must not be so voluminous making it difficult or impossible for the other party to respond effectively;

g) whether a party would reasonably have been aware of and procured the further evidence in the course of trial is an essential consideration to ensure fairness and due process;

h) where the additional evidence discloses a strong prima facie case of willful deception of the Court;

i) The Court must be satisfied that the additional evidence is not utilized for the purpose of removing lacunae and filling gaps in evidence. The Court must find the further evidence needful;

j) a party who has been unsuccessful at the trial must not seek to adduce additional evidence to, make a fresh case in appeal, fill up omissions or patch up the weak points in his/her case;

k) the Court will consider the proportionality and prejudice of allowing the additional evidence. This requires the court to assess the balance between the significance of the additional evidence, on the one hand, and the need for the swift conduct of litigation together with any prejudice that might arise from the additional evidence on the other.

43. In Kanyarkwat Group Ranch & 4 others vs Joseph & 3 others [2022] KEELC 15037 (KLR), the Court disapproved of the practice of filing evidence piecemeal, stating:

“Such practice not only occasions injustice to the other parties in the case but defeats the whole overriding objective of the law, of both Section 3(1) and (2) of the ELC Act and Section 1A (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Act, of just, expeditious, proportionate and efficient resolution of disputes, and Article 159(2)(b) of the Constitution that justice shall not be delayed. The law does not envisage such a situation. The practice ought to stop. Courts not to encourage this practice. A party has to show that he could not, with all due diligence, access the evidence at the time of filing the suit or his Defence or Counterclaim. To file witness statements in ‘instalments’ is nothing but a travesty of justice and a practice of unleashing secret weapons when met with strong cases or keeping cards under the table for mischievous ends other than those of justice. A party should endeavor by all means to present his case or evidence at once. Absent of that, the burden is higher for him to satisfy the Court why he did not avail the evidence at the first time he presented his case before the Court.” (emphasis added)

44. In Methuselar Keyah Lubembe v Albina Kipkemoi [2019] KEHC 2804 (KLR) the Court held that:

“In deciding whether to grant leave or not, a court of law would weigh the benefit to be achieved by allowing the documents against the possible harm to be suffered by refusal. That question is asked and considered on both sides of the case – the plaintiff's case as well as the defendant's case.  That question is normally fashioned as to what decision would in the circumstances of each case serve the ends of justice.”

45. In the matter at hand, it is not in dispute that the five documents are already part of the Plaintiff’s Lists and Bundles of Documents dated 17th March 2022 and 17th January 2023. The Defendants have had them since then, and the Plaintiff adopted them as part of his evidence-in-chief on 9th December 2025. The Plaintiff does not seek to introduce documents of which the Defendants had no prior notice. Rather, he seeks to place on record complete and legible versions of documents already on record. The material is limited in scope and not voluminous. It neither introduces a new cause of action nor changes the character of the suit.

46. This Court is nevertheless mindful of the Defendants’ contention that the omission is not merely clerical. The Defendants submit that the copies of the Sale Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement on the record do not bear the purchaser’s signature and that, accordingly, the proposed substitution would alter their evidential character.

47. Granting leave to place a document on the record is distinct from establishing its authenticity or determining the weight it should be accorded. Whether the originals in the Plaintiff’s custody are authentic and whether the parties executed them at the material time are questions of fact to be determined at trial through cross-examination and an assessment of the evidence as a whole. These matters cannot be resolved at this interlocutory stage. The discrepancy between the copies initially filed and the originals now produced remains a matter on which the Defendants may cross-examine the Plaintiff and make submissions to the Court.

48. Sections 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act provide that the contents of a document may be proved by primary or secondary evidence, and that primary evidence means the document itself, produced for inspection by the court. Section 67 requires documents to be proved by primary evidence, except in the cases set out in Section 68. The Plaintiff avers that the originals are in his custody. The court’s ultimate duty is to determine the dispute on the best evidence available. Retaining incomplete copies on record while excluding the originals of the very instruments on which the claim rests would not serve that end.

49. In explaining the omission, the Plaintiff attributed it to copying errors made by his former advocates, M/S Rajab & Mbogo Advocates. The Defendants contended that the Plaintiff had ample time to identify and remedy the defect. This Court agrees that the omission ought to have been detected earlier, particularly following the change of advocates on 13 October 2023, when the current advocates came on record and prepared for trial. Accordingly, the explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, no evidence has been placed before this Court to support the allegation that the Plaintiff deliberately withheld the complete documents or intended to await their discovery during cross-examination.

50. It is well settled that the mistake of counsel should not be visited upon a litigant. In Belinda Murai & 9 others v Amos Wainaina [1979] KECA 25 eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:

“A mistake is a mistake. It is no less a mistake because it is an unfortunate slip. It is no less pardonable because it is committed by senior counsel, though in the case of a junior counsel the court might feel compassionate more readily. A blunder on a point of law can be a mistake. The door of justice is not closed because a mistake has been made by a person of experience who ought to have known better. The court may not forgive or condone it but it ought certainly to do whatever is necessary to rectify it if the interests of justice so dictate.”

51. The principle is not a panacea and does not excuse indolence. In the present case, however, the error concerns the reproduction of documents. The application was also filed on 19th December 2025, ten days after the deficiency came to light at the hearing on 9th December 2025, and in accordance with the court’s direction. This Court finds that the application was made without undue delay.

52. With respect to Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, the Defendants correctly submitted that it does not relieve litigants of their obligation to comply with procedural rules. However, the provision is intended precisely for this type of situation, in which the defect does not go to the root of the suit and refusing the indulgence would elevate a copying error into a determination of the substantive dispute.

53. With respect to the KCB Letter of Offer, the Property Search, and the Title, these documents are already on record. The Defendants have not demonstrated that providing complete and legible copies would prejudice their case. The application aims to regularise the record. It would serve no useful purpose to regularise two documents while leaving the other three incomplete, only for objections to be raised at a later stage. This Court does not consider their inclusion to constitute an attempt to reopen the pre-trial conference.

54. Regarding prejudice, the Plaintiff remains under cross-examination; his case has not been closed, and the defence case has not commenced. Section 146(4) of the Evidence Act empowers the court to recall a witness for further examination. Any prejudice to the Defendants can be cured by producing the originals for inspection, recalling the Plaintiff for further cross-examination on the documents, granting the Defendants leave to respond, and making an appropriate order as to costs. The court is mindful that the suit property forms part of the estate of the Defendants’ deceased mother and that the suit has been pending since 2019. This concern is best addressed by enforcing strict timelines, not by excluding evidence.

55. This Court is not satisfied that the application constitutes an abuse of the court process within the meaning set out in Iderus v Hussein & 10 others [2025] KEELC 1180 (KLR).

“Again the Court of Appeal in Abuja, Nigeria in the case of Attahiro V Bagudo 1998 3 NWLL pt 545 page 656, stated that the term abuse of court process has the same meaning as abuse of judicial process. The employment of judicial process is regarded as an abuse when a party uses the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice. It is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. The term abuse of process has an element of malice in it.

In the Nigerian Case of Karibu-Whytie J Sc in Sarak v Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR 9pt 264) 156 at 188-189 (e) the concept of abuse of judicial process was defined:-

“The concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise, it implies circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. Its one feature is the improper use of the judicial powers by a party in litigation to interfere with the administration of justice …”The same Court went on to give the understated circumstances, as examples or illustrations of the abuse of the judicial process:-

(a) “Instituting multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues or a multiplicity of action on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to begin the action.

(b) Instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts even though on different grounds.

(c) Where two similar processes are used in respect of the exercise of the same right for example, a cross appeal and a respondent’s notice.

(d) (sic) meaning not clear))

(e) Where there is no loti of law supporting a Court process or where it is premised on frivolity or recklessness.”

56. Weighing the benefit of admitting the complete documents against the harm that refusal would cause to both parties, the balance favours allowing the application on terms.

57. In the end, a finding is made that the Notice of Motion dated 19th December 2025 is merited and is hereby allowed in the following terms:

a. The Plaintiff is granted leave to produce the complete and clear copies of the incomplete/illegible copies of the Sale Agreement dated 2nd March 2015, the Supplemental Agreement dated 25th June 2015, the KCB Letter of Offer dated 17th February 2015, the Property Search dated 21st June 2021, and the Title dated 22nd October 2013 filed in the Plaintiff’s Further List and Bundle of Documents dated 17th January 2023, which complete copies have been filed with the application herein.

b. That the complete/legible copies of the said Sale Agreement, Supplemental Agreement, KCB Letter of Offer, Property Search and Title annexed to this application dated 19th December 2025 are hereby deemed as properly filed and served for all purposes of this suit.

c. The Plaintiff shall be recalled for further cross-examination by the 1st and 2nd Defendants on the said documents.

d. The 1st and 2nd Defendants are at liberty to file and serve a supplementary list of documents and/or witness statements limited to the said documents within 14 days of the delivery of this ruling.

e. The costs of this application shall be borne by the Plaintiff in favour of the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

.................................

Vena – Court Assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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