REPUBLIC OF KENYA
ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELCLC CIVIL SUIT NO. E143 OF 2026
ZAKAYO MAINGI KANURI.…………………….....1ST PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
MARY PRISCILLA WAIRIMU WAMWEA……...2ND PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
=VERSUS=
RUTH NYAMBURA MUNYUA
(Suing as THE Administrator of the Estate of
The late Philip James Mwangi Munyua……………......……1ST DEFENDANT
KEVIN MAINA MUNYUA(Suing as the administrator
Of the Estate of the late Philip James Mwangi Munyua…...2ND DEFENDANT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 16th April 2026, brought under Order 40 Rules 1, 2, and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and Article 40 of the Constitution, the Applicants seek the following orders:
a. Spent.
b. Spent.
c. THAT a temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the Defendants/Respondents whether by themselves, their agents, servants, employees, assigns or any other person acting under their authority from trespassing upon, entering, evicting the Plaintiffs, selling, leasing, alienating, charging, developing, constructing on or in any other manner whatsoever interfering with all the parcel of land known as DAGORETTI/RUTHIMITU/760 pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
d. Spent.
e. THAT costs of this application be provided for.
f. Any other and further orders that this Honourable Court may deem fit and just to grant in the circumstances.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of Zakayo Maingi Kanuri, sworn on even date
THE APPLICANTS CASE
3. The deponent averred that on 29th June 2023, the Plaintiffs entered into a written agreement with the late Philip James Maingi for the purchase of the suit property and paid a deposit of Kshs 8,000,000/=, which was remitted to the vendor's account.
4. He further averred that upon payment of the deposit comprising 40% of the purchase price, they were granted vacant possession of the suit property in accordance with Clause 6 of the sale agreement.
5. He averred that it was a fundamental term of the agreement that the vendor would procure the discharge of the title from Bank of India to facilitate completion of the transaction, but despite repeated demands, the discharge had not been obtained.
6. He explained that upon taking possession, they obtained approval from Nairobi City County to renovate the property, and commenced the works at a cost of Kshs 2.2 million. He further stated that after substantially renovating the property, they were instructed to halt the works due to Milimani Misc Application No. E16 of 2023, which was subsequently withdrawn on 9th January 2024.
7. He stated that the Respondents were served on 16th February 2024 with a 21-day notice to complete, which remains outstanding. He further stated that, since February 2024, the Defendants have engaged in harassment and intimidation and have interfered with their possession of the suit property.
8. The deponent is apprehensive that unless the Defendants are restrained, they may evict them and dispose of the suit property or otherwise deal with it in a manner that would defeat the purpose of the suit.
THE RESPONDENTS’ CASE
9. The Respondents filed a replying affidavit sworn by Ruth Nyambura Munyua in opposition to the application.
10. The deponent averred that the Applicants had been served with a 21-day notice to rescind the agreement pursuant to Clause 10.1.1 of the sale agreement dated 29.6.2023. She further asserted that Clause 11 of the agreement sets out the applicable timelines and that failure to comply with them would result in the agreement lapsing.
11. She further averred that Clause 3.3 required the Applicant/purchaser, within 30 days of executing the agreement, to provide the vendor with an irrevocable professional undertaking and a bank guarantee from his financier in respect of the outstanding balance. Clause 8 further stipulated that, on or before the completion date and upon receipt of the professional undertaking and bank guarantee, the Applicant/purchaser was required to deliver the completion documents together with the original title. She contended that she had not yet received the documents, despite three years having elapsed since the impugned agreement.
12. She asserted that, under Condition 5 of the Law Society Conditions of Sale, the Applicants are not entitled to possession of the suit property until they have paid the full purchase price or authorized its release. She further asserted that the Applicants occupied the suit property as licencees in accordance with Condition 6(1) of the Law Society Conditions.
13. She argued that the Applicant cannot commence construction on the suit property, as he has not paid the full purchase price and the property has not been legally transferred to him.
14. In conclusion, she urged the Court to strike out the application with costs to the Respondents.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
15. Having considered the application and the response, the only issue for determination is whether the Applicants have met the threshold for the grant of an injunction.
16. The law governing applications for injunctions is outlined in Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides:
"Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—
a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or
b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit,
the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.”
17. The principles for granting an injunction were laid down in the celebrated case of Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co Ltd 1973 EA 358 as follows:
1) Firstly, the Applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success.
2) Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the Applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable harm which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages.
3) Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on a balance of convenience.
18. The first issue for determination is whether the Applicants have established a prima facie case with a probability of success.
19. A prima facie case was defined by the Court of Appeal in Mrao Ltd Vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others (2003) eKLR as follows;
“a prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case”. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”
20. The Applicants' case is based on the sale agreement dated 29th June 2023. They contend that they paid Kshs 8,000,000/-, being 40% of the purchase price, and were granted possession upon payment. The Respondents dispute the Applicants' entitlement to remain in possession. They argue that the Applicants were served with a 21-day notice to rescind the agreement for failing to comply with the contractual timelines. They also argue that the Applicants are not entitled to possession until the entire purchase price is paid and therefore their occupation is merely as licencees.
21. The evidence shows that the dispute between the parties concerns their contractual obligations, including whether the Applicants complied with the completion provisions, whether the Respondents were entitled to rescission of the agreement, and the legal nature of the Applicants' possession.
22. The Respondents’ contention that the Applicants failed to provide the required professional undertaking and bank guarantee raises a substantial question regarding compliance with the completion provisions. Similarly, the alleged issuance of a rescission notice raises the question of whether the agreement was validly terminated in accordance with its terms.
23. In Edwin Kamau Muniu Vs Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 2006), the Court held that;
“In an interlocutory application to determine the very issues which will be canvassed at the trial with finality, all the court is entitled at this stage is whether the applicant is entitled to an injunction sought on the usual criteria.
24. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to make a final determination regarding the disputed contractual issues or their validity.
25. Based on the material before the Court, the Applicants have demonstrated a contractual relationship in respect of the suit property and assert a possessory interest arising from that relationship. I find that the Applicants have established a prima facie case with a probability of success.
26. On the second limb, the Plaintiffs must show that, without an injunction, they will suffer irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. In Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:
“On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima facie, the nature and extent of the injury. Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.”
27. The Applicants contend that they are in possession of the suit property and have expended approximately Kshs. 2.2 million on renovations. They are apprehensive that, unless the orders sought are granted, they may be evicted and the property disposed of before the suit is determined.
28. The alleged risk of eviction, coupled with the possibility of a further disposition of the property, raises a concern that the subject matter of the suit may be altered before the parties’ contractual rights are determined.
29. In light of the foregoing, I find that the harm likely to result is irreparable and without an injunction the suit may be rendered nugatory.
30. On the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh the hardship the Applicants would bear if the injunction is denied against the hardship the Respondents would bear if the injunction is granted.
31. In Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR, the court defined balance of convenience as follows:
“The meaning of balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff is that if an injunction is not granted and the suit is ultimately decided in favour of the plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff would be greater than that which would be caused to the defendants if an injunction is granted but the suit is ultimately dismissed. Although it is called balance of convenience, it is really the balance of inconvenience, and it is for the plaintiffs to show that the inconvenience caused to them would be greater than that which may be caused to the defendants. Should the inconvenience be equal, it is the plaintiffs who suffer. In other words, the plaintiffs have to show that the comparative mischief from the inconvenience which is likely to arise from withholding the injunction will be greater than which is likely to arise from granting it.
32. The Applicants assert that they are in possession of the suit property and have paid a substantial deposit toward the purchase price. The Respondents, however, contend that the Applicants failed to fulfil essential completion obligations and that the agreement was subject to rescission.
33. Granting an unrestricted injunction could prejudice the Respondents if the agreement was validly terminated. Conversely, refusing any protection could expose the Applicants to eviction or dealings with the property before the court determines the validity and effect of the alleged rescission.
34. The appropriate course is to preserve the suit property pending the determination of the parties’ rights, without conferring upon the Applicants any interest beyond that provided for in the sale agreement.
35. The upshot of the foregoing is that the application is merited and is hereby allowed on the following terms:
a) A temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the Defendants/Respondents, whether by themselves, their agents, servants, employees, assigns or any other person acting under their authority from trespassing upon, entering, evicting the Plaintiffs, selling, leasing, alienating, charging, developing, constructing on or in any other manner whatsoever interfering with all that parcel of land known as DAGORETTI/RUTHIMITU/760 pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
b) The Applicants shall not undertake further construction, substantial renovations or other material alterations to the suit property pending the hearing and determination of the suit, without the Court’s leave.
c) Costs to abide with the outcome of the suit.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Ms Kathurima appearing together with Juma for the Plaintiffs
Amutala for the Defendants
Vena – Court Assistant