Background
The Plaintiffs commenced this suit by way of a Plaint dated 9th May 2022, seeking the following reliefs:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Plaintiffs commenced this suit by way of a Plaint dated 9th May 2022, seeking the following reliefs:
Paragraph 1 →In conclusion, this Court finds that the suit is merited and the counterclaim partially merited. This Court makes the following orders:
Paragraph 117 →In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that, although the notice dated 16 March 2019 was regular in form and timing, the 1st Defendant had not, as of the date of the notice, discharged its obligations under Clause 7 so as to be in a position to complete. Accordingly, the purported termination was invalid, and the Defendants breached the agreement by failing to provide the completion documents required under the sale agreement.
Paragraph 85 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC NO. E167 OF 2022
ALLIANCE VENTURES AND HOLDINGS
COMPANY LIMITED..…………………………………………… 1ST PLAINTIFF
HOMECITI AFRICA LIMITED …………………………………. 2ND PLAINTIFF
JOSHUA WARIUA KIRUGUMI …………………….…………. 3RD PLAINTIFF
JANE WANJIRA NDIRA ……………………………………….. 4TH PLAINTIFF
=VERSUS=
RHINELAND HOUSEHOLDS LIMITED ……………..……… 1ST DEFENDANT
WOLFGANG QUADFLIEGOTTO …………………….….. 2ND DEFENDANT
SUSAN NJERI HEIDLER …………………………………….. 3RD DEFENDANT
JUDGEMENT
1. The Plaintiffs commenced this suit by way of a Plaint dated 9th May 2022, seeking the following reliefs:
a) The sum of Kshs 5, 180, 000/- plus interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from 13/3/2017 until payment in full.
b) The sum of Kshs 3,173,530/- being compensation for damaged and lost items.
c) General damages for unlawful and wrongful eviction
d) General damages for mental torture, psychological suffering and emotional distress.
d) Costs
e) Interest at court rates on b), c), d) and e) above.
2. The Defendants filed a Joint statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 20th October 2022, denying the Plaintiffs claim. In the counterclaim, the Defendants seek the following orders:
a) The Plaintiff's suit be dismissed with costs and the counterclaim allowed.
b) The 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs to pay the Defendants the sum of Kshs. 5,300,000 owed in rent arrears plus interests from 1st February 2017.
c) The 1st Plaintiff to pay the Defendants interest on the purchase price at the rate of 18% per annum from 6th April 2019.
d) General damages for breach of contract.
e) Cost of the suit.
3. The Plaintiffs filed a reply to the defence and defence to the counterclaim dated 20th April 2023 denying the Defendants claim.
THE PLAINTIFFS CASE
4. The Plaintiffs called two witnesses in support of their case.
5. (PW1) Joshua Wariua Kirugumi, the 3rd Plaintiff, adopted his witness statements dated 9th May 2022 and 25th April 2023 as his evidence in chief. He also produced the documents in the list of even date to support his evidence.
6. PW1 testified that he is a director of both the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs through which he conducts business in construction and the supply of goods and services, and that the 4th Plaintiff, his wife, is a co-director of the 2nd Plaintiff. He testified that at all material times the 1st Defendant was the registered proprietor of parcel No. Nairobi Block 110/212, measuring approximately 0.1830 Ha together with the developments thereon.
7. He further testified that on 19th October 2016, the 1st Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant entered into an agreement for the sale of a half portion of the suit property for a purchase price of Kshs 27,000,000/=. He explained that the agreement, among other terms, provided for a 10% deposit of Kshs 2,700,000/=; financing of the balance through a bank loan; suit premises were sold subject to an existing charge in favour of Equity Bank Limited securing Kshs 20,000,000/=; a completion period of 90 days or 7 days from registration of transfer; subdivision of the property by the 1st Defendant to create the suit premises; delivery of completion documents at least 21 days before completion; and an 18% per annum default interest rate.
8. He informed the Court that the 1st Defendant later requested additional payments to facilitate the subdivision of the suit property. He stated that the 1st Plaintiff acceded to the request and made further payments totalling Kshs 2,480,000/=, bringing the total deposit paid to Kshs 5,180,000/=.
9. He testified that, in February 2017, in consideration of the deposit paid and the delay in subdividing the property, the parties agreed that his family would take possession of the suit premises pending completion. He further testified that the 1st Plaintiff obtained a financing facility of Kshs 21,600,000/= from Cooperative Bank of Kenya in January 2017, which lapsed after 90 days because the 1st Defendant failed to provide the completion documents. He also testified that, on 23rd July 2020, the 1st Plaintiff, through the 2nd Plaintiff, obtained an alternative facility from KCB Kenya Limited. He submitted that, despite a demand made on 5th November 2020, the 1st Defendant failed to provide the completion documents, causing the facility to lapse and resulting in the 2nd Plaintiff’s loss of the appraisal fee of Kshs 540,000/=.
10. He informed the Court that the 1st Defendant's purported completion notice, dated 16th March 2019, had been issued without the requisite completion documents and was therefore null and void. He further contended that the accompanying demand for rent of Kshs 100,000/= was unfounded in the absence of a tenancy agreement.
11. He described the completion notice dated 16th March 2019 as malicious, contending that it was issued shortly after the payment on 13th February 2019. He maintained that the completion notice was never served on him or the 1st Defendant, and that it only came to his attention in early May 2020.
12. He stated that his advocates responded on 12th May 2020, but the 1st Defendant did not reply and continued to engage him and his wife regarding performance. He further testified that he kept the 1st Defendant informed of financing offers from Cooperative Bank and KCB Limited, including documents the 3rd Defendant supplied to his wife via WhatsApp on 15th March 2020 to facilitate the valuation.
13. He testified that his family resided as neighbours of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants from February 2017, sharing and later assuming common expenses, obtaining a separate electricity meter, and undertaking renovations and improvements to the suit premises with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 1st to 3rd Defendants.
14. He further testified that, on 11th March 2022, the 1st to 3rd Defendants, acting through their agents and hired personnel, forcibly evicted them from the suit premises without notice. The eviction resulted in movable property being scattered across the adjacent public road, left the family—including a sick child—exposed overnight, and caused damage to and loss of specified items valued at Kshs 3,173,530/=, including a Praktiker/Meister universal machine, a solar water heating system, and various household items and appliances, the particulars of which were pleaded. He informed the Court that their employee was assaulted during the eviction and that both the eviction and the assault were reported to Marurui Police Station on 12th March 20222 under OB No. 8/12/3/2022. The matter remained under investigation.
15. He asserted that they had suffered psychological and emotional distress, as well as public humiliation, as a result of the eviction. He maintained that it had become untenable for them to continue living as neighbours of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants.
16. Based on the foregoing, he maintained that the 1st Defendant's breach of the agreement and unlawful eviction discharged the 1st Plaintiff from its obligations under the agreement, entitling it to rescind the agreement and claim a refund of Kshs 5,180,000/=, together with interest at 18% per annum from 13th March 2017 until payment in full. The 2nd to 4th Plaintiffs further claimed compensation of Kshs 3,173,530/= for damaged or lost items.
17. He denied entering into any tenancy agreement with the 1st Defendant, whether in writing or by email, and denied paying monthly rent of Kshs. 100,000/= or owing any rent arrears. He described the emails relied upon by the Defendants as fabricated. He further denied having been served with a proclamation notice and stated that no auctioneers or negotiations were involved before the family's departure. He testified that the eviction compelled him to relocate his children to Nyeri, caused the family business to collapse, and led his wife to leave the country in search of employment.
18. PW1 described the 3rd Defendant's allegation that he and his wife had voluntarily vacated the suit premises after negotiations with auctioneers in the presence of the police as misleading. He further denied having promised to settle rent arrears, asserting that no rent arrears were outstanding.
19. He stated that the police officers present declined to intervene to prevent the eviction, prompting him to file a complaint with the Independent Policing Oversight Authority under complaint serial number 00178. He further denied engaging or contracting any person or company to remove the family's household items of that the family voluntarily vacated the premises following an auction, asserting that no auction had taken place.
20. In cross-examination, he maintained that the 2nd and 4th Plaintiffs were not strangers to the transaction. He confirmed that a deposit of Kshs. 2,700,000/= had been paid and stated that, pursuant to clause 1(b), HFCK was to finance the balance, although such financing had not been secured at the time of signing. He admitted receiving the 21-day notice dated 16th March 2019, to which counsel responded on 12th May 2020. He denied that a tenancy existed between the parties or that any proclamation had been served. He maintained that no distress for rent had occurred, and stated that two of his children became seriously ill following the eviction.
21. In re-examination, he explained that the 2nd Plaintiff was referenced in the Letter of Offer because its cash flows were intended to service the mortgage. He further testified that the HFCK financing provision was superseded by a subsequent agreement dated 17th February 2017, which substituted Cooperative Bank. He stated that the 1st Defendant acknowledged receipt of Kshs. 4,000,000/= in a letter dated 30th September 2019, which also recorded that the subdivision was ongoing and remained incomplete as at 5th November 2020. He further stated that he had never met anyone from Lysajoy Auctioneers in 2021 and added that they were evicted in March 2022 without having been served with any document or demand.
22. (PW2), Jane Wanjera Dira, the 4th Plaintiff, adopted her witness statement dated 9th May 2022 as her evidence in chief. She echoed the evidence of PW1. She added a laptop valued at Kshs. 49,000/= to the schedule of loss, which was financed by her former employer, Cooperative Bank.
23. In cross-examination, she testified that, although she was not a signatory to the sale agreement, she was not a stranger to the transaction, given her position as a director of the 2nd Plaintiff. She also confirmed that no separate agreement existed between the 1st Defendant and any of the 2nd ,3rd or 4th Plaintiffs.
24. She disputed the 1st Defendant's acknowledgement of Kshs. 4,700,000/= as incomplete, noting that a further Kshs. 480,000/= was reflected in a Family Bank statement. She characterized the completion notice as unlawful. She denied that the Yahoo emails belonged to her or that she had entered into any rental agreement. She stated that KCB's financing offer was dated 23rd July 2020, after she had received the completion notice. She acknowledged that receipts were unavailable but produced receipts for a chest freezer and a laptop, the latter of which had been financed through Cooperative Bank. She stated that she had signed the cheques and RTGS transfers relating to the transaction and confirmed that the total amount paid was Kshs. 5,190,000/=.
THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE
25. The Defendants called one witness in support of their case.
26. DW1 Susan Njeri Heidler, the 3rd Defendant, adopted her witness statement dated 20th October 2022 as her evidence in chief. She also produced the documents in the list of even date in support of her evidence.
27. DW1 testified that she is a director of the 1st Defendant and a partner of the 2nd Defendant. She testified that, on 19th October 2016, the 1st Defendant entered into a sale agreement with the 1st Plaintiff in respect of the suit property. She further testified that the agreement provided for the subdivision of the parent parcel and the issuance of new title deeds for the resulting portions. She acknowledged the existence of the Sale Agreement dated 19th October 2016 but denied that the 1st Defendant was required to deliver the completion documents 21 days before the completion date. Instead, she asserted that this obligation would arise only upon receipt of an acceptable professional undertaking from the 1st Plaintiff's advocates or financier, which was never provided. She informed the Court that the suit property had since been sold to a third party and that the 1st Defendant no longer held title to it.
28. She testified that, while the subdivision process was ongoing, the 1st Plaintiff sought to obtain financing for the purchase. She explained that, upon receipt of the Sub-Division Certificate, the 1st Defendant was prepared to complete the sale, having been advised that new title deeds would be issued within one month of submission of the requisite documents. She stated that the 1st Defendant nevertheless granted the 1st Plaintiff additional time to secure financing. However, after six months had elapsed and repeated assurances remained unfulfilled, it became apparent that the 1st Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to complete the purchase.
29. She denied that any agreement existed under which the 1st Plaintiff would take possession of the suit property in consideration of the deposit paid. Instead, she asserted that possession was granted to the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs at their request pursuant to a tenancy agreement commencing in February 2017, at a monthly rent of Kshs 100,000/-. She contended that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs repeatedly defaulted on rent, making payments only between September 2018 and February 2019, thereby giving rise to the counterclaim.
30. She denied that Cooperative Bank had made any offer to the 1st Plaintiff or that any suitable undertaking had been issued to secure the release of the title documents.
31. She testified that the 1st Defendant, through its advocates, issued a completion notice dated 16th March 2019 pursuant to Clause 10(b) of the sale agreement. She explained that the 1st Plaintiff did not respond and that, upon expiry of the notice, the agreement was rescinded without further notice, in accordance with Clause 10 of the sale agreement. She further stated that the 1st Defendant thereafter accepted an offer from a third party for the entire property and discontinued further processing of the title deeds for the approved subdivisions.
32. DW1 maintained that the 1st Plaintiff was required at all times to provide the 1st Defendant's advocates with a suitable and acceptable undertaking before any completion documents could be released to the 1st Plaintiff's advocates or financiers, and that no such undertaking had ever been provided. She denied having any knowledge of a financing offer made to the Plaintiffs by Cooperative Bank or any other financier. She further stated that the 1st Defendant had received no request from KCB Bank or its lawyers for documents relating to the suit property. She asserted that the loan facility referred to in the Plaintiffs' documents appeared to have been negotiated in favour of the 2nd Plaintiff, whom she described as a stranger to the 1st Defendant and to the sale agreement, and to whom the 1st Defendant owed no obligation.
33. She testified that the 3rd and 4th Plaintifffs occupied the property under a separate tenancy established through email correspondence at a monthly rent of Kshs 100,000- commencing in February 2017. She further testified that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs had defaulted on rent except for the period from September 2018 to February 2019.
34. Regarding the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs' departure from the premises, she testified that a proclamation notice in respect of rent arrears of Kshs. 5.3 million was issued on 5th October 2021, and that auctioneers attended the premises on 11th March 2022 to execute it. She stated that, following negotiations between the 1st Defendant and the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs, the auctioneers did not remove the household goods.
35. She informed the Court that, after acknowledging their financial difficulties and inability to pay the arrears, the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs were permitted to vacate the premises voluntarily with their belongings, on the undertaking that they would settle the outstanding rent. She further testified that police officers from Marurui Police Station attended and witnessed the Plaintiffs loading their goods and vacating the premises without interference. She denied that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs were evicted from the suit property or that the 1st Defendant had caused them any mental anguish, and attributed any loss or damage to property, if any, to the firm the Plaintiffs engaged to carry out the move. She vehemently denied the allegations of a forcible and violent eviction, asserting instead that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs voluntarily vacated the premises in compromise of a proclamation notice lawfully served in distress for rent. She asserted that the police officers present at the scene confirmed that the distress process had been lawfully executed and witnessed the Plaintiffs voluntarily loading and removing their goods. She maintained that any damage to or loss of the household goods was attributable to the movers engaged by the Plaintiffs rather than to the Defendants.
36. She acknowledged that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had been neighbours of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs for approximately five years and described their relationship as strained, citing the Plaintiffs’ failure to pay rent and contribute to utility bills. She further stated that the 2nd Plaintiff was entirely unfamiliar with the sale agreement dated 19th October 2016 and the proceedings.
37. In cross-examination, she confirmed that she had signed the agreement dated 19th October 2016, together with the subsequent part-payment agreements. She confirmed that the purchase price for half of L.R. No. 110/212 was Kshs. 27,000,000/=, that the deposit was Kshs. 2,700,000/=, and that the total payments received amounted to Kshs. 4,700,000/=, leaving an outstanding balance of Kshs. 22,300,000/=. She referred to Clause 3, which concerns the completion date, and Clause 1(c), which concerns payment of the balance.
38. DW1 confirmed that there was no written tenancy agreement and that she had relied on the emails instead. She acknowledged that the sale agreements made no provision for rent. She stated that the 3rd Plaintiff was her tenant in his personal capacity. She also acknowledged that she had no company resolution authorising the lease of the property and no records showing payment of the six months' rent she claimed had been paid.
39. DW1 further testified that a Subdivision Certificate had been issued in 2018 but was not among the completion documents. She acknowledged that a search dated 20th April 2022 showed the property remained registered in her name and had not been subdivided, that a valuation report dated 28th August 2020 postdated the completion notice, and that, at the time, the entire property was charged to Equity Bank. She was unable to demonstrate that the bank had approved the subdivision or released the title as at March 2019. She confirmed that the property had since been sold to a third party who was in occupation, although title had not yet passed because full payment remained outstanding.
40. DW1 acknowledged that she and her husband caused the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs to vacate the premises on 11th March 2022 due to rent arrears of Kshs. 4,800,000/=. She stated that she had no demand letter, evidence that the proclamation had been served, or a signed acknowledgement of receipt. She could not explain the one-year gap between the proclamation and the auctioneers' attendance in March 2022. She acknowledged that the proclamation did not state that it had been issued for distress for rent. She maintained that she had negotiated with the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs in the presence of the auctioneers, but could not explain why police officers were also present.
41. She further testified that the completion notice dated 16th March 2019 was issued pursuant to Clause 10 of the sale agreement and that, upon expiry of the stipulated 21-day notice period, the agreement was automatically terminated without any further notice of rescission. She contended that the Plaintiffs' letter dated 12th May 2020 could not revive an agreement that had already been terminated.
42. She denied receiving any request from KCB Bank or its lawyers for the completion documents. DW1 maintained that she was under no obligation to provide those documents without an appropriate undertaking; that the sale agreement had already been terminated by that time; and that, in any event, the loan facility in question was being negotiated for the benefit of the 2nd Plaintiff, who was a stranger to the Defendants.
43. After the hearing concluded, the parties agreed to file and exchange their written submissions.
THE PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSIONS
44. The Plaintiffs filed their submissions dated 5th April 2026.
45. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, Counsel submitted that the Court cannot rewrite the terms of a contract agreed upon by the parties. Counsel relied on National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & Another [2001] eKLR to submit that parties are bound by their contractual terms unless coercion, fraud or undue influence is established
46. Counsel further submitted that, because the completion documents required under clause 7 included the mutation form, and the variations made the release of the balance of the purchase price conditional upon registration of a charge over the suit property itself, subdivision necessarily had to precede transfer, which, in turn, had to precede the release of any financing. Counsel further submitted that a vendor unable to produce the mutation form or the original title could not, under the contract's own internal logic, have been in a position to complete.
47. Counsel submitted that a vendor issuing a completion notice must be ready, able, and willing to complete the transaction. In support of this submission, Counsel relied on David Mwose Mwaluko v Erastus Kiarie Gitau [2021] KEELC 558 (KLR), where a purported rescission was held to be invalid because the vendor had not procured the completion documents and was therefore unable to satisfy the readiness condition in the sale agreement. Counsel also relied on Thrift Homes Limited v Kays Investment Limited (Nairobi HCCS 1512 of 1998) [2015] KEHC 5591 (KLR), where the vendor's failure to provide the original title for preparation of the transfer instrument was held to defeat any claim to a valid rescission and to render the vendor responsible for frustrating the sale under the Law Society Conditions of Sale. Counsel submitted that the sale agreement in this case was expressly subject to the Law Society Conditions of Sale, which impose the same readiness requirement on a party seeking rescission, and that this requirement was not met.
48. On the doctrine of estoppel, Counsel submitted that a party that continues to accept payment after a contractual deadline may not subsequently rely on that deadline as a basis for rescission. Counsel further submitted that the 1st Defendant’s acceptance of payment 145 days after the sale agreement precluded it from relying on the 90-day completion period.
49. Counsel submitted that a vendor who has not validly rescinded an agreement is not entitled to retain any deposit paid. Accordingly, the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to recover the full deposit, together with contractual interest pursuant to Clause 11 of the sale agreement.
50. Counsel further submitted that a company may act only through its duly authorised organs and that, pursuant to Section 35 of the Companies Act, 2015, any person purporting to contract on behalf of a company without authority conferred by a board resolution acts ultra vires, thereby rendering the purported act null and void. Counsel relied on Jurist Enterprises Limited v Tabete Company Limited & another (Civil Appeal E070 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 12682 (KLR), to submit that, in the absence of a board resolution authorising the 1st Defendant to grant a tenancy over property already subject to an existing sale agreement, no valid tenancy could have been created.
51. Counsel further submitted that an inconsistency in a party's own case regarding the tenant's identity amounted to impermissible approbation and reprobation. Counsel relied on Nafula v Baron Capital Limited (Civil Suit 43 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 16931 (KLR) and the English authorities of Evans v Bartlam [1937] 2 ALL ER 649 and Banque de Moscou v Kindersley [1950] 2 ALL ER 549, as approved in Republic v Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of Kenya Ex-parte Mundia Njeru Geteria [2010] eKLR, to submit that a party cannot blow hot and cold in litigation.
52. Counsel relied on the maxim that the party who alleges must prove, submitting that neither the existence of the tenancy nor the alleged payment of six months' rent had been established. In the alternative, Counsel argued that, even if a tenancy were established, it would bind only the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs in their personal capacities and could not be set off against amounts paid to the 1st Defendant by the 1st Plaintiff, as corporate and personal liabilities are legally distinct.
53. Counsel invoked the burden of proof, submitting that the defence's account of a negotiated voluntary departure and its attribution of damage to an unnamed moving company were unsupported assertions that the Defendants had failed to discharge. Counsel further submitted that non-compliance with Rule 12(1)(b) of the Auctioneers Rules, which requires a certificate of service, was fatal to the claim that the proclamation notice had been validly served. Counsel submitted that the Defendants' failure to call the auctioneers as witnesses invited an adverse inference against their account.
54. Counsel submitted that damages for unlawful eviction should be assessed at Kshs 10,000,000/=. Counsel relied on Pampa Grill Limited & another v North Lake Limited & another [2021] KEELC 2938 (KLR), in which the Court awarded Kshs 5 million. Counsel further submitted that inflation and the aggravating factor of malice, together with the fact that the eviction was carried out for the benefit of a third-party purchaser, justified an increase in that amount and the inclusion of a punitive element in the award. Counsel also relied on Neser v Globology Limited & 7 others (Cause E033 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 1777 (KLR), in which an award of Kshs 1,000,000/= was granted for psychological distress, as a comparator supporting an enhanced award of Kshs 2,000,000/= in view of the aggravated circumstances pleaded.
55. Counsel submitted that a counterclaim pleaded jointly against all Plaintiffs, without specifying their respective liabilities, is impermissibly vague. Counsel further submitted that interest is a creature of contract and cannot be awarded in the absence of a contractual provision authorizing it. Counsel relied on this principle to challenge both the claimed interest on rent arrears and the claimed interest on the purchase price.
56. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to grant the orders sought in the Plaint and dismiss the counterclaim with costs.
THE DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS
57. The Defendants filed their submissions dated 1st May 2026.
58. On behalf of the Defendants, Counsel identified the following issues for the Court's determination:
a) Whether the 1st Defendant validly issued a 21-day completion notice dated 16th March, 2019 under Condition 4 of the Law Society Conditions of Sale, lawfully rescinded the sale agreements and forfeited 10% of the purchase price amounting to Kshs. 2,700,000/=;
b) Whether the distress for rent levied against the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs was lawful under the Distress for Rent Act, Cap 293, or amounted to unlawful eviction; and
c) Whether the Defendants are entitled to the reliefs sought in the counterclaim.
59. Counsel submitted that the 1st Plaintiff paid Kshs. 4,700,000/= in three instalments between October 2016 and March 2017, leaving an outstanding balance of Kshs. 22,300,000/=. Counsel further submitted that the 1st Defendant issued a completion notice dated 16th March, 2019, requiring the 1st Plaintiff, within 21 days, to pay the balance or provide a professional undertaking and to settle rent arrears of Kshs. 3,200,000/= for 32 months of occupation. The notice stipulated that, in the event of non-compliance, the agreement would be rescinded, 10% of the purchase price would be retained as liquidated damages, and distress would be levied.
60. Counsel argued that the 1st Plaintiff failed to tender the balance or provide an undertaking. Counsel submitted that, following service of a valid completion notice, this failure constituted a repudiatory breach, entitling the vendor to rescind the agreement and forfeit the deposit. Relying on Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89, Counsel submitted that a deposit serves as security for performance and may be retained by the vendor upon the purchaser’s default, even in the absence of an express forfeiture clause. Counsel also relied on National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & another [2001] eKLR to emphasize the sanctity of contract. Counsel further submitted that Clause 10.2 of the sale agreement provided for termination upon expiry of the notice period, without requiring a rescission notice.
61. Counsel contended that the 1st Plaintiff’s assertion that its non-payment was justified by the absence of statutory approvals was contradicted by the record. Counsel submitted that, at all material times, the 1st Defendant was ready, able, and willing to complete the transaction, having obtained development permission for the subdivision from the County Government of Nairobi on 8th June, 2017, and approval from the National Land Commission on 17th November, 2017. The 1st Defendant had also instructed its surveyors to seek the chargee’s consent from Equity Bank on 28th September, 2017.
62. Counsel submitted that a contract for the sale of land gives rise to mutual and dependent covenants, with the purchaser’s obligation to pay and the vendor’s obligation to convey title constituting concurrent conditions. Relying on Kingston v Preston (1773) 2 Doug KB 689, Counsel submitted that a party may not demand performance from the other party without first performing, or tendering readiness to perform, its own obligation. Counsel argued that the 1st Plaintiff’s default brought the transaction to a standstill and prevented completion of the final survey registration.
63. Counsel further submitted that a purchaser who has not demonstrated readiness, willingness, and ability to pay cannot hold the vendor responsible for non-completion. In support of this submission, Counsel relied on Mwanasokoni v Kenya Bus Services Ltd [1985] KECA 82 (KLR), Dharmshi v Karsan [1974] EA 41, and Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Limited v Luigi Gasperini & another [2023] KECA 1184 (KLR). Counsel also invoked the maxim that no party may take advantage of its own wrong, relying on New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1, as well as the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity. Counsel contended that, having remained in default of Kshs. 22,300,000/= for years, the 1st Plaintiff was not entitled to relief against forfeiture.
64. Counsel submitted that the financing allegedly obtained through the 2nd Plaintiff was irrelevant, as there was no privity between the 2nd Plaintiff and the Defendants. Counsel further submitted that the evidence demonstrated that the 1st Plaintiff was unable to secure financing to comply with the completion notice.
65. Counsel submitted that the resolution of the 2nd Plaintiff, signed by the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs, confirmed that they occupied the property under a tenancy separate from the sale agreement. Counsel contended that the tenancy, at a monthly rent of Kshs. 100,000/=, was entered into by email. Counsel further submitted that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs took possession under the tenancy before completion and that their failure to pay rent led to the distress.
66. Counsel submitted that rent had been paid only for the period from September 2018 to February 2019, leaving arrears of Kshs. 3,200,000/= for 32 months. Counsel submitted that, pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Distress for Rent Act, the 1st Defendant instructed licensed auctioneers to issue a proclamation notice on 5 October 2021. Counsel further submitted that, when the auctioneers attended the premises on 11th March 2022, accompanied by officers from Marurui Police Station, the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs vacated peacefully and voluntarily after promising to settle the arrears.
67. Counsel relied on Gusii Mwalimu Investment Co. Ltd & 2 others v Mwalimu Hotel Kisii Ltd [1996] eKLR and George Hannington Zephaniah Aduda t/a Aduda Auctioneers & Another v. C.Y.O. Owayo [2008] eKLR to submit that a landlord who distrains for rent arrears in accordance with the Act does not commit trespass. It was further submitted that Section 15 of the Act protects a landlord and an auctioneer from being deemed trespassers ab initio on account of irregularities. Reliance was also placed on Anaheim Investments Limited v Karen Auto Mart Limited [2021] KEHC 48 (KLR).
68. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the suit with costs and to allow the counterclaim with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
69. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record and the parties' submissions, the following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether the rescission notice dated 16th March 2019 terminated the sale agreement dated 19th October 2016;
b. Whether a tenancy relationship existed between the 1st Defendant and the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs;
c. Whether the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs were unlawfully evicted from the suit property;
d. Whether the Plaintiffs have proved their claim for loss and damage; and
e. The orders which should issue.
WHETHER THE RESCISSION NOTICE DATED 16TH MARCH 2019 TERMINATED THE SALE AGREEMENT DATED 19TH OCTOBER 2016
70. It is not in dispute that the 1st Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant entered into a sale agreement dated 19th October 2016 for the purchase of a subdivided portion of Nairobi/Block 110/212 for a consideration of Kshs 27,000,000/-.
71. This Court is mindful of the principle that a Court of law cannot rewrite a contract between the parties. In National Bank of Kenya Ltd vs. Pipe Plastic Samkolit (K) Ltd [2011] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:
“A court of law cannot rewrite a contract between the parties. The parties are bound by the terms of their contract, unless coercion, fraud or undue influence are pleaded and proved.”
72. This principle was reaffirmed in Pius Kimaiyo Langat vs. Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd [2017] eKLR the Court of Appeal stated:
“We are alive to the hallowed legal maxim that it is not the business of Courts to rewrite contracts between parties. They are bound by the terms of their contracts, unless coercion, fraud or undue influence are pleaded and proved.”
73. Under the sale agreement, 90% of the purchase price was to be financed through a bank facility, payable within 90 days of the agreement or within seven days of registration of the transfer and charge in the purchaser's favour, whichever occurred first. Vacant possession was to be delivered upon full payment of the purchase price.
74. Pursuant to Clause 7, the Vendor's advocates were required to deliver the original certificate of title, original mutation, letter of consent, executed transfer, and the listed ancillary documents 21 days before the completion date, upon receipt of a professional undertaking from the financier’s advocates that was acceptable to them.
75. Clause 10 entitled either party to terminate the agreement if the other party breached its obligations or failed to perform, including by failing to pay the purchase price, subject to the applicable Law Society Conditions of Sale.
76. Termination was to be effected by written notice specifying the breach and allowing the defaulting party at least twenty-one (21) days from the date of the notice to rectify it. If the default was not rectified within that period, the agreement would automatically terminate upon expiry of the notice, without the need for a further notice of rescission. If the Purchaser failed to comply, the Vendor was entitled to forfeit the deposit of Kshs 2,700,000/=
77. The agreement was varied by a further agreement dated 17th February 2017, which acknowledged payment of an additional Kshs 1,500,000/= and recorded that the outstanding balance of Kshs 22,800,000/= would be financed by Co-operative Bank of Kenya rather than Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya. A subsequent agreement dated 13th March 2017 acknowledged receipt of a further Kshs 500,000/=, bringing the total amount paid to Kshs 4,700,000/=.
78. The Plaintiffs adduced evidence of payments of Kshs 2,700,000/= on 5th November 2016, Kshs 1,500,000/= on 17th February 2017, Kshs 500,000/= on 22nd March 2017, and Kshs 480,000/= on 13th February 2019, together with a letter of offer from Co-operative Bank dated 16th January 2017 and a further offer from KCB Bank dated 23rd July 2020.
79. The 1st Defendant's completion notice, dated 16th March 2019, asserted that the Plaintiffs were in default of their obligations to pay the balance of the purchase price or provide a professional undertaking, and granted them 21 days to comply with Clause 10 of the agreement. In letters dated 21st November 2019 and 12th May 2020, the Plaintiffs’ advocates disputed the validity of the notice, asserted that completion remained conditional upon subdivision, the requisite approvals, and the discharge of the existing charge in favour of Equity Bank Limited, and denied the existence of any tenancy.
80. Although the initial agreement was entered into on 19th October 2016, with a 90-day completion period, the Defendants did not issue a completion notice until 16th March 2019. During this period, the Defendants received further deposits from the Plaintiffs, including one made less than a month before the notice was issued. In light of the parties’ conduct up to the issuance of the notice, time was not of the essence. In Sisto Wambugu Vs. Kamau Njuguna (1983) eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that time becomes of the essence once reasonable notice is issued:
“but the relevant statement says that contracts for the sale of land commonly give the vendor the right to rescind the sale if the purchaser does not pay on the appointed day. The law is that this right can only be exercised where time is of the essence, or if it is not, after the party who is not at fault has given reasonable notice to the defaulting party making time of the essence………In this case the agreement of 1958 did not state that time was of the essence nor did the appellant give the necessary notice making time of the essence. In my view in 1966 when the appellant received the two amounts of Kshs.600 and Kshs.900 he affirmed the contract with new additional conditions that he would be paid Kshs.2,400 extra and the respondent would complete by January 1967. The respondent did not do anything to rectify his failure to complete in January 1967 until possibly by 1974 when, Micah said; there was a fruitless attempt to take Kshs. 2,000 to the appellant. In my opinion as the appellant had taken the necessary steps to make time of the essence he could not repudiate the contract on the ground of unreasonable delay by the respondent to perform”
81. The 3rd Defendant contends that no obligation to deliver the completion documents arose unless the Plaintiffs' financiers provided a suitable professional undertaking, and that Clause 7 makes delivery of those documents conditional upon receipt of such an undertaking. It is apparent that, as at 16th March 2019, the Defendants were not ready to complete the agreement. In cross-examination, DW1 failed to produce evidence that the subdivision process had been finalised, despite a Subdivision Certificate for the suit portion having been issued in 2018.
82. A search conducted on 20th April 2022 confirmed that the parent parcel remained registered in her name and had not been subdivided. Furthermore, when the rescission notice was issued, the entire property remained charged to Equity Bank Limited, as evidenced by a search conducted on 18th August 2020. DW1 did not establish that the chargee had approved the subdivision or released the title by March 2019. In the absence of these documents as at the date of the notice, the Vendor could not be regarded as ready to complete the transaction.
83. It is evident that the 1st Plaintiff failed to obtain an appropriate professional undertaking from its financier. The 1st Defendant also breached the agreement by failing to complete the subdivision, obtain the mutation, secure title to the subdivided property, and obtain the chargee's consent. Obtaining the completion documents was a separate and antecedent obligation of the vendor, without which no financier could reasonably have provided an undertaking.
84. The mortgage facilities offered by Cooperative Bank and KCB Bank were conditional upon the registration of a charge over the title registered in the borrower's name. The Banks were unable to issue any undertakings due to the Vendor's failures.
85. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that, although the notice dated 16 March 2019 was regular in form and timing, the 1st Defendant had not, as of the date of the notice, discharged its obligations under Clause 7 so as to be in a position to complete. Accordingly, the purported termination was invalid, and the Defendants breached the agreement by failing to provide the completion documents required under the sale agreement.
86. In David Mwose Mwaluko v Erastus Kiarie Gitau [2021] KEELC 558 (KLR) and Boniface Kevin Omondi & another v Malborough Properties Ltd [2015] KEHC 7366 (KLR), the Court articulated the principle that a vendor must be ready and willing to fulfil their contractual obligations when issuing a rescission notice
87. The Defendants contend that the property has since been sold to a third party who is in occupation, and that the 1st Defendant intends to transfer title to that party. Accordingly, specific performance of the sale agreement in favour of the Plaintiffs is no longer a remedy available to this Court. The appropriate remedy for the 1st Defendant's breach is therefore restitution and compensation, rather than an order compelling completion of an agreement that can no longer be performed.
88. This Court finds that the 1st Plaintiff has established that it paid Kshs. 5,180,000/= as the purchase price and that the 1st Defendant breached the contract. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is entitled to the restitution of the funds paid.
89. Regarding the interest claimed, this Court notes that Clause 11 of the sale agreement provides for interest at 18% per annum where non-completion is attributable to the other party. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at 18% per annum on Kshs. 5,180,000/=. As to the date from which interest should accrue, it should run from the date of breach, namely 16th March 2019, rather than from 13th March 2017, as pleaded.
WHETHER A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE 1ST DEFENDANT AND THE 3RD AND 4TH PLAINTIFFS
90. The Defendants contend that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs occupied the suit property not pursuant to the sale agreement, but under a separate tenancy allegedly arising from email correspondence, at a monthly rent of Kshs. 100,000/=. They assert that the Plaintiffs fell into arrears, save for a limited period, thereby giving rise to the 1st Defendant's counterclaim. The 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs deny the existence of any tenancy between themselves and the 1st Defendant. They maintain that their occupation of the suit property was pursuant to the sale agreement; that no rent was ever agreed upon or paid; and that the email correspondence the Defendants relied upon as evidence of a tenancy was fabricated.
91. The terms of the sale agreement conferred no right of possession on the Plaintiffs before payment of the purchase price in full. The 3rd Plaintiff admitted that they took possession of the suit property in February 2017, well before any such payment had been made. Accordingly, their possession from that date required a renegotiation of the contract, which is not reflected in their pleaded case.
92. DW1 produced email correspondence between the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, which recorded an agreement to pay rent of Kshs. 100,000/= from around August or September 2018 until completion of the sale in support of the alleged tenancy. The Plaintiffs denied any connection with the email addresses used in that correspondence. This court is not persuaded by that denial.
93. Most notable is the email dated 20th October 2019, in which the 2nd Defendant is recorded as lamenting the outstanding rent arrears while, in the same communication, acknowledging that he was still awaiting the professional undertaking from the Plaintiffs' advocates, a detail specific to this transaction. The Plaintiffs offered no answer to this document beyond a bare denial of authorship, unsupported by any competing explanation as to who else might have written it or why. Such denial does not displace direct documentary evidence of this nature.
94. Section 57 of the Land Act provides that where the proprietor of land permits the exclusive occupation of the land, or any part of it, by another person at a rent but without any agreement in writing, that occupation is deemed to constitute a periodic tenancy, the period being that by reference to which rent is payable and which is terminable by notice of a length not less than that period. As the rent here was agreed on a monthly basis, the resulting tenancy would be a monthly periodic tenancy.
95. Based on the evidence on record, this Court finds that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs exclusively occupied the suit property from February 2017, and that by August or September 2018 the parties had reached an understanding that rent of Kshs. 100,000/= per month would be paid pending completion of the sale.
96. Given that the 1st Defendant is a limited liability company, and that the correspondence establishing the tenancy was exchanged between the 2nd and 3rd Defendants without distinction, this Court finds that the tenancy and the arrears claimed by way of counterclaim are attributable to the 1st Defendant, the registered proprietor of the suit property, on whose land the occupation occurred and in whose interests the directors were evidently corresponding. The absence of a formal board resolution concerns internal corporate governance and does not by itself defeat the 1st Defendant's entitlement to rent accruing from the occupation of its own land.
WHETHER THE 3RD AND 4TH PLAINTIFFS WERE UNLAWFULLY EVICTED FROM THE SUIT PROPERTY
97. This Court has already found that a periodic monthly tenancy existed between the 1st Defendant and the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs from around August or September 2018, at a monthly rent of Kshs. 100,000/=. According to the unrefuted averments, rent was paid through February 2019. It is not in dispute that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs vacated or were removed from the suit property on 11th March 2022.
98. Accordingly, arrears began to accrue in March 2019 and, calculated to the last complete month preceding the events of 11th March 2022, cover a period of 36 months, resulting in arrears of Kshs. 3,600,000/=. This figure differs from the sum of Kshs. 4,800,000/= appearing on the face of the proclamation notice, which purported to claim rent from February 2017. However, no tenancy agreement existed as at that date.
99. The question that then arises is whether the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs were served with a notice terminating the tenancy agreement. The notice dated 16th March 2019, issued under clause 10(b) of the sale agreement seeking rescission of that agreement, also threatened distress for the rent alleged to be outstanding at the time.
100. There is no evidence to indicate that this notice was issued or intended to terminate the periodic tenancy identified above. Section 57 of the Land Act requires that a periodic tenancy be terminated by notice of a duration no shorter than the tenancy period—in this case, one month—and expiring on a rent day. A 21-day notice relating to an entirely separate contractual relationship, namely the sale agreement, does not satisfy this requirement in either duration or substance. The 3rd Defendant failed to produce any documentary evidence of such a termination. This Court finds that no valid notice terminating the tenancy was ever given to the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs.
101. It is trite that a landlord may not resort to self-help to recover possession of tenanted premises merely because rent is in arrears. In Harjinder Singh Plaha v Surjit Singh Dhian [2014] eKLR the Court stated:
“I do not think that it is proper for any landlord to engage the law of the jungle and forcefully evict any tenant. A landlord needs to give proper notice to vacate, and if the notice is ignored, he needs to engage the proper court for an order of eviction.”
102. Distress for rent, which the 1st Defendant did in fact pursue through Lysajoy Auctioneers, is not, in itself, a lawful means of repossessing immovable property or removing a tenant from occupation. The Auctioneers Rules prescribe the procedure for distress for rent. Rule 11 requires that the auctioneer first be furnished with either a court warrant or a letter of instruction. Rule 12(1) then requires the preparation of a proclamation. A written notice of seven days must then be given to the owner of the goods. If no payment of the sum specified in the warrant or letter of instruction is made upon expiry of that notice, the goods are to be removed to another premises and kept in safe custody. An advertisement of sale must follow within seven days, and the sale itself must be conducted within a further seven days thereafter.
103. This Court has weighed the two competing accounts of the events of 11th March 2022. The 3rd Plaintiff's account, corroborated by OB No. 8/12/3/2022 at Marurui Police Station and by a complaint lodged with the Independent Policing Oversight Authority under serial No. 00178, describes a forcible entry by more than ten hired men, an initial refusal by the police to intervene, and a departure under duress at around 1.00 a.m.
104. The Defendants' account, based solely on DW1's evidence, is that the departure was negotiated and voluntary and occurred in the presence of the police, following the auctioneers' attendance pursuant to the proclamation. During cross-examination, DW1 was unable to produce a demand letter for rental arrears, a letter of instruction to Lysajoy Auctioneers, evidence that the proclamation had been served, or any signed acknowledgement of its receipt. She was also unable to explain the approximately five-month interval between the proclamation dated 4th October 2021 and the auctioneers' attendance in March 2022. DW1 did not explain the presence of police officers if, as she maintained, the departure had been consensual.
105. Based on the evidence on record, this Court finds that the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs were evicted from the suit property on 11th March 2022 without valid notice terminating the tenancy and without due process of law. The existence of rent arrears of Kshs. 3,600,000/= entitled the 1st Defendant to pursue recovery of those arrears, whether by distress against movable property lawfully attachable or by suit, but did not entitle its directors or agents to take possession of the suit property by force. Accordingly, this Court finds that the eviction of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs was unlawful.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE PROVED THEIR CLAIM FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE
106. It is well established that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. This principle was articulated in David Bagine v Martin Bundi [1997] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal, citing Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Limited [1948] 64 TLR 177, held that:
“... special damages in addition to being pleaded, must be strictly proved as was stated by Lord Goddard C.J. in Bonham Carter vs. Hyde Park Hotel Limited [1948] 64 TLR 177 thus:
"Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove damage, it is not enough to write down the particulars and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying, 'this is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages.' They have to prove it"
107. The Plaintiffs particularised loss and damage to household items in the sum of Kshs. 3,173,530/=, as follows:
f. Praktiker/Meister universal Machine - Kshs 2,000,000/=
g. Solar water heating system - Kshs 500, 000/=
h. Wall Unit - Kshs 200, 000/=
i. Outdoor lighting - Kshs 100, 000/=
j. Chest freezer - Kshs 65, 795/=
k. Furniture - Kshs 163, 000/=
l. Blender w - Kshs 4,395/=
m. Laptop - Kshs 49, 000/-
n. Cooker - Kshs 22, 995/=
o. LG fridge - Kshs 30, 295/=
p. Sony HiFi system -Kshs 38, 050/=
108. Applying the standard set out above, this Court may allow only those items for which documentary evidence of value has been provided and must disallow the remainder, regardless of whether the underlying loss is genuine.
109. The Plaintiff’s bundle of documents contains receipts for the Praktiker/Meister universal machine, the Sony HiFi system, the chest freezer, the blender, the laptop, the cooker, the fridge and the furniture. The validity of these documents was not challenged. Accordingly, this Court finds that specific proof of loss and damage in the sum of Kshs. 2,373,530/- was established.
110. No documentary evidence was placed before this Court in respect of the solar water heating system, the wall unit or the outdoor lighting. The claim in respect of those three items, totalling Kshs. 800,000/=, has not been strictly proved and is accordingly disallowed.
111. The Plaintiffs also sought general damages under two heads: first, for unlawful eviction; and second, for mental anguish, psychological suffering, and emotional distress arising from the unlawful eviction. The evidence relevant to the assessment of damages—including the manner in which the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs were evicted from the suit property, the relocation of their children to Nyeri, the disruption to their schooling, the collapse of the family business, and the 4th Plaintiff's departure from the country for employment—supports both prayer (c) and prayer (d). Accordingly, this Court consolidates prayers (c) and (d) into a single award of general damages for unlawful eviction, covering both the eviction itself and its proven emotional and material consequences, rather than assessing them as separate heads.
112. The Plaintiffs relied on Pampa Grill Limited & another v North Lake Limited & another [2021] KEELC 2938 (KLR), where the Court awarded Kshs. 5,000,000/= for illegal eviction. They also relied on Neser v Globology Limited & 7 others (Cause E033 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 1777 (KLR), in which KShs. 1,000,000/- was awarded for psychological distress.
113. Having taken into account all the foregoing factors, including the forced eviction and relocation of the children, this Court considers Kshs. 6,000,000/= sufficient in the circumstances.
THE ORDERS WHICH SHOULD ISSUE
114. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have proved their suit and claim for restitution and special and general damages. The 1st Defendant has equally established its counterclaim for rental arrears.
115. As to the 1st Defendant's claim for general damages for breach of contract, it is trite that general damages cannot be awarded for breach of contract, as the only damages that can be granted for such breach are specific in nature. This principle was aptly summarized in Consolata Anyango Ouma v South Nyanza Sugar Company Limited MGR HCCA No. 53 of 2015 [2015] eKLR as follows:
“The next question is whether the appellant was entitled to damages as a result of the breach. As a general principle, the purpose of damages for breach of contract is, subject to mitigation of loss, the claimant is to be put as far as possible in the same position he would have been if the breach complained of had not occurred. This is principle is encapsulated in the Latin phrase restitution in integrum (see Kenya Industrial Estates Ltd v Lee Enterprises Ltd NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 54 of 2004 [2009]eKLR, Kenya Breweries Ltd v Natex Distributors Ltd Milimani HCCC No. 704 of 2000 [2004]eKLR). The measure of damages is in accordance with the rule established in the case of Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9. Exch. 341 that the measure of damages is such as may be fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally from the breach itself or such as may be reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made and a probable result of such breach (see Standard Chartered Bank Limited v Intercom Services Ltd & Others NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2003 [2004]eKLR). Such damages are not damages at large or general damages but are in the nature of special damages and they must be pleaded and proved (see Coast Bus Service Ltd v Sisco Murunga Ndanyi & 2 others, NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 192 of 92 (UR) and Charles C. Sande v Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd, NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1992 (UR)).”
116. In any case, this Court has found that the 1st Defendant, not the Plaintiffs, was primarily in breach of the sale agreement. Although the Plaintiffs did not furnish a professional undertaking as contemplated by Clause 7, that obligation was contingent on the 1st Defendant completing the sale, which it failed to do. Accordingly, no interest is awardable to the 1st Defendant on its counterclaim under Clause 11 of the sale agreement, as that provision applies only to the party not in default.
117. In conclusion, this Court finds that the suit is merited and the counterclaim partially merited. This Court makes the following orders:
a Judgment for the Plaintiffs as follows:
i. Kshs. 5,180,000/=, being a refund of sums paid under the sale agreement dated 19th October 2016, together with interest thereon at 18% per annum from 16th March 2019 until payment in full.
ii. Kshs. 2,373,530/=, being special damages for loss of and damage to household property.
iii. General damages to the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs for unlawful eviction in the sum of Kshs. 6,000,000/-.
b) Judgment for the 1st Defendant on its counterclaim in the sum of Kshs. 3,600,000/=, being proved rent arrears.
c) The sums awarded under sub-paragraphs (a)(ii), (a)(iii) and (b) above shall attract interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.
d) Each party bears its own costs.
JUDGMENT SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Thuku for the Plaintiffs
Owuocha for the Defendants
Vena-Court assistant