REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC L JR NO. E069 OF 2025
REPUBLIC ............................................................... APPLICANT
VERSUS
THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY GOVERNMENT ..... RESPONDENT
ROYAL NAIROBI GOLF CLUB ……………..……………….. EX-PARTE
JUDGEMENT
1. Pursuant to this Court’s leave granted to the Ex Parte Applicant on 17th September 2025, it commenced judicial review proceedings vide the Notice of Motion application dated 18th September 2025 in which it seeks the following Orders:
a) An order of Certiorari removing to this Honourable Court for purposes of being quashed the rates payment demands, requests and invoices dated 18th May 2022, 14th March 2023, 28th October 2024 and 22nd May 2025 purported to be issued to the Applicant by the Respondent with respect to the property known as LR No. 209/14042.
b) A Declaration that the Applicant’s golf course
comprised in Land Title Number LR No. 209/14042, on Muchai Drive, Nairobi, was and is exempt from the payment of rates with respect to the area comprising the outdoor golf course grounds pursuant to the provisions of Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act Chapter 266 and Section 22 of the Rating Act, Chapter 267.
c) An Order of Prohibition, prohibiting the Respondent either by itself or agents from issuing any other or further rates payment demand notices, requests and/or invoices with respect to the Applicant’s golf course comprised in Land Title Number LR No. 209/14042, on Muchai Drive, Nairobi without factoring in the exemption granted to outdoor sports grounds under Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act Chapter 266 and Section 22 of the Rating Act, Chapter 267.
d) An Order of Mandamus compelling the Respondent to comply with the applicable laws, regulations, rules and procedures in assessing and levying land rates with respect to the built areas of the Applicant’s golf course comprised in Land Title Number LR No. 209/14042, on Muchai Drive, Nairobi.
e) The cost of this application be in favour of the Ex-parte Applicant.
2. The Notice of Motion is premised on grounds on its face, the statutory statement and the verifying and supplementary affidavits of Jacob Omondi, the Ex parte Applicant’s General manager. He avers that the Ex parte Applicant, herein referred to as the “Applicant”, is the registered lessee /occupier of LR No. 209/14042 (Grant No IR 87503), situated along Muchai Drive within Nairobi and that its use and occupation of the Golf Course and the Administrative Block erected thereon dates back to 1950 when it was issued with a Grant No I.R 9685 for a term of 50 years from 1st January 1950, which grant was originally registered as LR No. 209/4202/R.
3. He claims that the suit property was allocated on condition that it would be used as a Golf Course and other sports purposes only. Further, that upon expiry of its Lease, the Applicant applied for extension and consequently surrendered the original leasehold title to the Government in exchange for a new Grant registered as No I.R. 87503, for another term of 50 years from 1st November 1999 under new registration, LR No. 209/14042 and duly notified the Respondent of the changes and legitimately expected that upon the surrender of LR 209/4202/R and issuance of the new grant LR No. 209/14042, the Respondent would update its valuation records and roll to reflect the current land reference number and issue appropriate demands for rate accordingly.
4. He points out that the Applicant’s regular yearly chargeable land rates for its built areas on the suit property as invoiced by the Respondent over the years was Ksh.199,750/- per year, but in 2022, the Respondent erroneously sent it two conflicting rates demand notices for the same property, one under the previously surrendered title number LR 209/4202/R and another under the current title number LR 209/14042 and took no action to rectify the anomaly despite being notified and continued doing so in the years 2023 and 2024.
5. He points out that for LR 209/4202/R, the Respondent sent the Applicant rates payment invoices dated 19th May 2022 for Kshs.220,716/- (Ksh.199,750 as principal and penalties of Kshs.20,966), 26th January 2023 for Kshs.260,842/- (principal Kshs.199,750/- and penalties of Kshs.61,092) and 29th January 2024 for Kshs.199,750/-. Further, that with regard to LR 209/14042, the Respondent issued Rates Payment Requests dated 18th May 2022 for Kshs.401,473,600, 14th March 2023 for Kshs.345,998,100/-, and 28th October 2024 for Kshs.578,500,630.
6. He avers that the said invoices were unilaterally prepared and issued without the Respondent considering the exemption granted to outdoor sports under Section 27 (1) (f) of the Valuation for Rating Act, Cap 266 and Section 22 of the Rating Act, Cap 267 in consequence of which it illegally imposed a “Current Year Land Rates” and purported to penalize it for alleged failure to pay land rates, and wrongfully imposed an illegal Land Rates Arrears and accrued penalties purporting to illegally backdate the penalties and Land Rates Arrears by seven (17) years without any ostensible reason and in violation of Section 21 of the Rating Act, which provides for a limitation of twelve (12) years upon which unpaid rates can be demanded by the rating authority.
7. He claims that the Respondent has resorted to threatening the Applicant with disconnection of water supply to its Golf Course and thereby grinding its operations to a halt, conduct that amounts to oppressive and unfair administrative action contrary to Article 47 of the Constitution, and violates the Applicant’s right under Article 50 (1), 40, and 43 of the Constitution. He also contends that the impugned invoices are irrational, unreasonable, discriminatory, unconstitutional, unlawful, and against the Applicant’s legitimate expectation.
Response
8. The application is opposed by the Respondent vide the replying affidavit of Isaac Nyoike, its Director, Valuation. He avers that LR No. 209/4202/R, which is approximately 197.347 acres was entered in the Respondent’s records in the valuation roll of 1980 and then 193.353 acres were exempted from valuation and 3.997 acres were valued for rating at unimproved site value (USV) of Kshs.799,000/=. He claims that later, the Applicant informed the Respondent of amalgamation of LR No. 209/4202/R with government land LR No’s 209/4202/5 and LR No. 209/4234/1 to form LR No. 209/1402 which was approximately 200.052 acres. He claims that LR No. 209/1402 was then revalued due to the said changes in land reference number and the acreage, at unimproved site value of Kshs.67,710,000/=, and a new account number created.
9. He contends that during that time, it became apparent that the Applicant operates as a private members club and is not open to the public and as such, it did not qualify for exemption under Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act, (now repealed), which exemption was only granted on the condition that the land was not used for profit. Further, that, under Section 38 (3) (h) of the Rating Act, 2024, land used for public outdoor sports is exempted from being valued for purposes of rates thus the suit property does not qualify as there is no evidence that it is a public outdoor sports club, which is non-profit making thus it should pay rates as demanded.
10. He insists that upon disclosure of the 2019 draft valuation roll, a public notice was published in the standard newspaper on 21st May 2021 and Kenya Gazette under Gazette Notice No. 4849, giving members of the public notice to inspect the draft valuation roll and make objections as per Section 9(3) of the Valuation for Rating Act (now repealed).
11. Mr. Jacob Omondi, the Applicant’s General manager swore a supplementary affidavit in response to the Respondent’s reply. He avers that the Applicant, for the period preceding 24th December 2024, qualified for exemption under Section 27 (1)(f) of the Valuation for Rating Act, which exempted land used for outdoor sports ground, adding that historical valuation practice recognized that only developed portions of Golf Club land was rateable. He insists that the Applicant is a not for profit members club, operating as a company limited by guarantee. He also contends that the Respondent’s interpretation of the National Rating Act 2024, to apply it to impose rates on its Golf Course contravenes the rules of interpretation espoused at Section 9(3) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act.
12. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
Submissions
13. The Applicant submits that in determining the suit, the Court ought to limit itself to the irregular and unlawful process and manner in which the Respondent’s impugned administrative action was undertaken and not carry out a merit review of the said decision. It insists that it was exempted from rating under Section 27 (1)(f) of the Valuation for Rating Act. Further, that the National Rating Act, 2024 commenced on 24th December 2024, and under Section 23(3) (c) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, the repeal of a written law does not affect any right incurred under the repealed enactment.
14. It submits that it is a company limited by guarantee and under Section 7 of the Companies Act, its income must be applied solely toward the promotion of its primary statutory objects and no portion thereof may have transferred directly or indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or profit to the guarantors.
15. It insists that its facility fits within the purposive and rational definition of ‘public outdoor sports’ under section 38 (3) (h) of the National Rating Act, as any member of the public are free to use the golf course subject to an application process. It argues that recharacterization of the facility as a non- exempt private membership club coupled by absence of rates demands for decades constitutes a breach of its legitimate expectation as espoused in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others [2014] KESC 53 (KLR).
16. Further, that the statutory interpretation of “public purpose’ under Section 2 of the Land Act and its meaning at Section 38 of the National Rating Act must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of statutory interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court in Stanbic Bank Kenya Ltd v Santowels Ltd (Petition E005 OF 2023) [2024] KESC 31 (KLR) (28 June 2024) (Judgement), bearing in mind that ‘public purpose’ cannot be defined with any certainty and /or reduced into a definite list. It urges the Court to apply a purposive and contextual analysis rather than retreating into literalism when defining ‘public outdoor sports’. To this end, the case of Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & another [2019] KESC 16 (KLR) was relied upon.
17. It also submits that while a rating authority is required to exercise its power on the basis of accurate information, given that it imposes financial obligations upon a property owner and can threaten their right to property, the Respondent failed to undertake administrative diligence and issued rating demands in excess of jurisdiction, in error of law and in breach of the rules of natural justice thus it should be compelled to extinguish historical entry for LR NO. 209/4202/R and rate LR 209/1402 as exempt property used for outdoor sports.
18. To buttress its averments, the Applicant also relied on the following decisions: Secretary of State for education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1976) JELR 91638 (HL); Municipal Council of Mombasa v Republic; Umoja Consultants Ltd (Interested Party) [2002] KECA 8 (KLR); Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] KESC 8 (KLR); Mount Kenya Bottlers Ltd & 3 others v Attorney General & 3 others [2019] KECA 500 (KLR); Krish Commodities Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority [2018] KECA 415 (KLR), and Kenya National Examination council v Republic ; CGN & 9 others (Ex parte) [1997] KECA 58 (KLR), Okoiti v Njenga & 7 others (Sued as the registered trustees of the Agricultural Society of Kenya) & 19 others (Petition 33 of 2019) [2022] KEHC 74 (KLR) (26 January 2022) (Judgement)
19. On its part, the Respondent cites the case of Dande & 3 others v Inspector General National Police Services & 5 others (Petition 6 (E007) 4 (E005) & 8 (E010 of 2022 (consolidated) 2023 KESC 40 (KLR) to submit that the instant application has been brought under the provisions of the Constitution thus the Court ought to evaluate it on merit. Further, that rates charges flow from the use of land and being that the suit property is being used for a private membership club, it did not qualify for exemption under Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act (now repealed), which provided for exemption on condition that the land was used for outdoor sports not for profit and is neither entitled to exemptions under Section 38 (3)(h) of the Rating Act, 2024, which it urges the Court to read together with Section 2 of the Land Act and employ the mischief rule in its interpretation of the word ‘public’ used therein, to find that it was aimed at preventing persons such as the Applicant from absconding their payment duties under the guise of Section 27 of the repealed law.
20. It also submits that even from the provisions of the Applicant’s Memorandum of Association, the Applicant cannot be said to be providing outdoor sports for the public but rather for its members exclusively at a fee. It also argues that just because a company is limited by guarantee does not mean that it cannot make profit. On a without prejudice basis, it submits that when the Applicant admits non-members to its club, they pay to access its facilities thereby creating profit for them. Further, that the Applicant failed to prove that it was exempted from paying rates by producing its audited financial statements /or a gazette notice evidencing exemption as pursuant to Section 107 of the Evidence Act.
21. It is also the Respondent’s submission that failure to collect rates previously while the Applicant operated as a profit-making enterprise was unlawful hence the expectation for exemption based on Section 27 of Valuation for Rating Act was contrary to the law thus invalid. Further, that should the Court find that the Applicant had a legitimate expectation under Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act (repealed), the same has been overwritten by Section 38 of the National Rating Act, 2024. It insists that its decision to charge rates for the suit property was not unreasonable/irrational as alleged.
22. To buttress its averments, the Respondent relied on the following authorities: Kaume v Kiambu Club Limited [2026] eKLR; Kamande v Ololosho & 2 others [2026] eKLR; Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 others Ex parte Rongo University [2018] KEHC 9643; Kenya Revenue Authority v Export Trading Company Ltd [2022] KESC (31); Fanikiwa Limited & 3 others v Sirikwa Squatters Group & 17 others [2023] KESC 105.
Analysis and Determination
23. I have considered the instant Notice of Motion application including the respective affidavits, the Statement of facts, annexures as well as rivalling submissions, and the only issue for determination is whether the ex parte Applicant is entitled to the orders of Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition as sought.
24. The Applicant explains that it is the registered lessee of LR No. 209/14042 (Grant No IR 87503), situated along Muchai Drive, issued upon surrender of the original lease, LR No. 209/4202/R. It is its case that the Respondent unlawfully assessed land rates on its Golf Course situated on the suit property, without recognizing the statutory exemption applicable to outdoor sports grounds under Section 27 (1) (f) of the Valuation for Rating Act, Cap. 266. Further, that the Respondent erroneously issued two invoices for LR No. 209/14042 and LR No. 209/4202/R without considering that the latter parcel was surrendered.
25. On its part, the Respondent contends that the property was lawfully revalued following the amalgamation of the original parcel with other parcels of land and the issuance of a new title, resulting in the creation of a new rating account. Further, that the Applicant’s Golf Course does not qualify for exemption from land rates because it operates as a private members’ club that is not open to the general public and the public pay to access the club. It further argues that the exemption under Section 27 of the repealed Valuation for Rating Act was unavailable to the Applicant and that Section 38(3)(h) of the National Rating Act, 2024, limits the exemption to land used for public outdoor sports. The Respondent insists that the Applicant has failed to prove its entitlement to exemption and urges the Court to dismiss the application as lacking merit.
26. The Applicant insists that its Golf Course comprised in LR No. 209/14042, was and is exempt from the payment of rates with respect to the area comprising the outdoor Golf Course grounds pursuant to Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act Chapter 266 and Section 22 of the Rating Act, Chapter 267. On its part, the Respondent insists that the Applicant operates as a private members club and does not qualify for exemption under Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act, and under Section 38 (3) (h) of the Rating Act, 2024, which exempts land used for public outdoor sports.
27. Section 27 (1) (h) of the Valuation for Rating Act (repealed) provides that:
“(1) No valuation for the purposes of any rate shall be made in respect of any land which is used, or, is bona fide intended to be used within a reasonable time, directly and exclusively for any of the following purposes;
f) outdoor sports;”
28. While Section 38 (1) and (3) (h) of the National Rating Act provides that:
(1) For purposes of this section—
“public purposes” has the meaning assigned by section 2 of the Land Act (Cap. 280).
(3) Valuation for purposes of rating shall not be conducted with respect to any land that is used for purposes of —
(h) public outdoor sports.
29. Under Section 2 of the Land Act, public purposes is defined to mean among other things; “public parks, playgrounds, gardens, sports facilities and cemeteries”.
30. Lord Diplock in the case of Council for Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, at 401D provided the criteria on judicial review when he stated thus:
“Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when...one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’...By ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it...By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness’...it applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it...I have described the third head as ‘procedural impropriety’ rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision.'
31. On judicial review, the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 2 S.C.R. 817 6 observed thus:
“The values underlying the duty of procedural fairness relate to the principle that the individual or individuals affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and have decision affecting their rights, interests, or privileges made using a fair, impartial and open process, appropriate to the statutory, institutional and social context of the decisions.”
32. While, in the case of Municipal Council of Mombasa vs. Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd (Interested Party) Civil Appeal No. 185 of 2001 [2002] KECA 8 (KLR), it was held that:
“Judicial review is concerned with the decision making process, not with the merits of the decision itself: the Court would concern itself with such issues as to whether the decision makers had the jurisdiction, whether the persons affected by the decision were heard before it was made and whether in making the decision the decision maker took into account relevant matters or did take into account irrelevant matters…The court should not act as a Court of Appeal over the decider which would involve going into the merits of the decision itself such as whether there was or there was not sufficient evidence to support the decision…It is the duty of the decision maker to comply with the law in coming to its decision, and common sense and fairness demands that once the decision is made, it is his duty to bring it to the attention of those affected by it more so where the decision maker is not a limited liability company created for commercial purposes but it a statutory body which can only do what is authorised by the statute creating it and in the manner authorised by statute.”
33. In the case of County Government of Kwale v Kenya Airports Authority [2017] eKLR, the Judge stated that imposing rates on exempted property would amount to acting ultra vires;
“....a County Government would not only be acting ultra vires in imposing rates on exempted properties but would also be in contravention of Article 209(5) of the Constitution.”
34. Before making a determination on whether the Respondent’s action was legal, the Court will first determine whether the Golf Course was and is exempt to payment of rates and will consider whether it has the discretion to interpret section 38 of the Rating Act in the manner invited by the parties herein, in the context of judicial review proceedings. From the definition of what is exempt from rates, the aforementioned legal provisions indicated ‘outdoor sports’. I note the dispute herein revolves around the Applicant’s Golf Course which is engaged in outdoor sport. From the averments in the affidavits, the Applicant had been exempted from paying rates for the Golf Course under the repealed Act, until 2024 when the Respondent served it with the rates notices for two parcels of land, which included arrears and penalties.
35. In imposing the impugned rates, the Respondent was to be guided by the law. Anything done outside of the law would therefore be unprocedural. It should not be lost to this Court that the Valuation for Rating Act and the Rating Act were repealed by the National Rating Act which took effect on 24th December 2024. However, by the time of repeal, the impugned rates invoices had been issued, and since the law does not act in retrospect, I opine that the applicable laws are the repealed statutes as well as the National Rating Act.
36. The Court of Appeal in the case County Government of Kwale v Kenya Airports Authority [2017] KECA 75 (KLR) stated as follows:
“The power to impose property rates by County Governments is enforced through the provisions of Rating Act and Valuation for Rating Act both of which according to Paragraph 7 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution are to be construed with necessary alterations, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions in order to bring them into conformity with the Constitution."
37. The Court in the case of Eastern Produce Kenya Limited, Siret Tea Company Limited, Kakuzi PLC (Kaboswa Estate), Kibwari PLC, Toyoi Investments Limited, Kipkeibon Estates Limited & another v County Government of Nandi [2021] KEELC 4173 (KLR) laid out an elaborate procedure for levying of rates as follows:
“The Valuation of Rating Act (Cap 266) specifically gives a county power to levy rates and sets out elaborate procedure for levying of rates as follows: Valuation Rolls to be prepared at least once every 5 years; values to be entered in the Roll; Power to amend valuation roll and to cause supplementary valuation roll to be prepared; Valuers to have power of entry and inspection and to obtain information; Contents of draft valuation roll; Basis of valuation; Deposit of draft Valuation and Supplementary Valuation Roll, which is open for public inspection, taking of copies or extracts, publication by notice to call for objections, sending to every rate payer within 21 days after the laying before a meeting of local authority (County Government); Objections to draft valuation and supplementary valuation rolls; Valuation Court to hear objections; and Appeals to Higher Courts."
38. The Court of Appeal in Tata Chemicals Magadi Limited v County Government of Kajiado [2025] KECA 1721 (KLR) stated that:
“40. Assuming that all the premises leased from the National Government by the appellant were not public land, and were rateable properties, the determination of the land rates payable was under the since repealed Rating Act and the Valuation for Rating Act. The Acts mandated a formal process for valuing properties, including the creation and maintenance of a valuation roll, which was essential for determining fair rates based on the property’s value. The legislations ensured legal compliance, fairness and transparency in land rating, as the laws provided a uniform framework for valuation, public participation, and establishment of valuation rolls. They allowed landowners to object to valuations and ensure their interests were considered. Lastly, the Acts prevented arbitrary taxation and ensured accountability in revenue collection for public service….42 The respondent did not put in place an open and accountable framework for determining the payable land rates, and the appellant as a landowner was not provided with an open and objective framework that allowed it the opportunity to challenge whatever rates that the respondent was proposing that it pays. Article 201 of the Constitution was breached.” Emphasis Mine
39. The Applicant seeks judicial review orders of Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition on the basis that the Respondent’s decision to issue it with the impugned rates invoices was irrational, illegal and in breach of their legitimate expectation. In this instance, the Respondent revised the rates the Applicant was expected to pay for its Golf Course, without notice. The Respondent proceeded to issue two notices for rates which included backdated penalties of seventeen (17) years, yet the Golf Course was one, as the previous title had been surrendered.
40. From the Respondent’s explanation, there is no indication that it alerted the Applicant that it was recharacterizing the Golf Course from being a place conducting outdoor sports to being a private members club for purposes of paying rates. Further, it did not inform the Applicant that it was to pay rate arrears for seventeen (17) years including penalties. The Respondent did not explain why it was sending revised rates for two parcels of land yet one was no longer in existence due to surrender of the previous title.
41. The Applicant insists that it had legitimate expectation that since it was engaged in outdoor sports, it was not supposed to pay rates for the Golf Course. However, the Respondent argues that since the Applicant is a private members club, it is not undertaking the sport for public hence it has to pay rates. In the case of the Minister for Civil Service 1985 1AC 375 cited by Warsame J (as he then was) in Registered Trustees Supreme Council Of Kenya Muslim v The Attorney General & 2 Others [2012] KEHC 5587 (KLR) it was held as follows:
“—for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision must affect (the) other person by depriving him of some benefits or advantage which either, (i) He had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) He has received assurance from the decision maker will, not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.”
42. Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act provides that any person who is aggrieved by an administrative action or decision may apply for review of the administrative action or decision to— (a) a court in accordance with section 8; or (b) a tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred in that regard under any written law. Subsection (2) provides that a court or tribunal under subsection (1) may review an administrative action or decision on any of the grounds listed in the said section.
43. From the facts as presented including my analysis above while associating myself with the aforementioned decisions as well as the cited legal provisions, I find that failure by the Respondent who was engaged in administrative action to engage with the Applicant in introducing rates to be paid for the Golf Course, which was classified as an outdoor sport in the repealed Act, was arbitrary and offended the rules on legitimate expectation. I note in 2022, the Respondent sent two conflicting rates demand notices for the same property, one under the previously surrendered title number LR 209/4202/R and another under the current title number LR 209/14042 and took no action to rectify the anomaly despite being notified and continued doing so in the years 2023 and 2024. To my mind I opine that the Respondent’s actions were contrary to section 7 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act.
44. Further, I find that the Respondent failed to undertake proper public participation when it commenced to change the rates payable for the Golf Course, yet under the repealed law, the Applicant had been exempted from paying the said rates as the Golf Course. I opine that this hence amounted to ‘procedural impropriety’. I further find that the Respondent’s refusal to heed to the Applicant’s request to review the rates payable contravened the Rules of Natural Justice as well as the provisions of the Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act including Articles 40, 47 and 50 of the Constitution. I find that the Applicant actually had a legal right to expect the performance of a legal duty by the Respondent to properly interpret the available laws governing outdoor sports including the previous exemptions while issuing the disputed rate notices. It was unreasonable for the Respondent to threaten to disconnect water services to the Golf Course because the Applicant was disputing the rates payable. Further, it was imperative upon the Respondent to grant the Applicant audience on the issue of rates payable for its Golf Course.
45. It is my considered view that the Respondent failed to undertake administrative diligence and it should be compelled to extinguish historical entry for LR NO. 209/4202/R and rate LR 209/1402 as exempt property used for outdoor sports.
46. To my mind, I find that the Respondent’s actions of blatantly declining to undertake review of the rates payable on the Golf Course was irrational and infringed on the Applicant’s rights. It seems to me the Applicant was not accorded fair treatment as required by the law.
47. I note the Applicant sought for a declaration that the property was not rateable. Further, the Respondent contended that the Court should conduct a merit review of the orders sought by the Applicant. In the case of Dande & 4 others v Inspector General, National Police Service & 2 others (Civil Appeal 246 of 2016) [2022] KECA 170 (KLR) (18 February 2022) (Judgment), the Court of Appeal held that:
‘While this may have been relevant and pertinent
information, the question that arises is whether the judicial review Court was the proper forum to determine and direct the information and evidence that was gathered during the investigations, and the manner of its collection by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. In our view, it was not, in light of the standards of review which limit a judicial review court’s interventions in merit review. It was emphasized by this Court in Suchan Investment Limited vs. Ministry of National Heritage & Culture & 3 others, (2016) KLR that while Article 47 of the Constitution as read with the grounds for review provided by section 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act reveals an implicit shift of judicial review to include aspects of merit review of administrative action, the reviewing court has no mandate to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator.’
48. From the facts as presented, noting that the Applicant commenced these proceedings through the traditional judicial review process as envisioned under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, at this juncture, I opine that the Court cannot undertake a merit review nor make declaratory orders herein.
49. Based on my analysis above, I find the instant Notice of Motion application merited and will proceed to allow it in the following terms:
a) An order of Certiorari be and is hereby issued removing to this Honourable Court for purposes of being quashed the rates payment demands, requests and invoices dated 18th May 2022, 14th March 2023, 28th October 2024 and 22nd May 2025 purported to be issued to the Applicant by the Respondent with respect to the property known as LR No. 209/14042.
b) An Order of Prohibition, be and is hereby issued prohibiting the Respondent either by itself or agents from issuing any other or further rates payment demand notices, requests and/or invoices with respect to the Applicant’s golf course comprised in Land Title Number LR No. 209/14042, on Muchai Drive, Nairobi without factoring in the exemption granted to outdoor sports grounds under Section 27 of the Valuation for Rating Act Chapter 266 and Section 22 of the Rating Act, Chapter 267.
c) An Order of Mandamus be and is hereby compelling the Respondent to comply with the applicable laws, regulations, rules and procedures in assessing and levying land rates with respect to the built areas of the Applicant’s golf course comprised in Land Title Number LR No. 209/14042, on Muchai Drive, Nairobi.
d) The cost of this application is granted the Ex-parte Applicant.
DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
CHRISTINE OCHIENG
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Agwara for Applicant
Munywoki for Respondent
Court Assistant: Joan