Background
Before the Court is a Statement of Claim dated 19th February 2024, in which the Claimant seeks the following remedies as against the Respondent:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
Before the Court is a Statement of Claim dated 19th February 2024, in which the Claimant seeks the following remedies as against the Respondent:
Paragraph 1 →I have considered the pleadings, the evidence of CW1 and RW1, the Claimant’s submissions, and the authorities cited. The issues for determination are:
Paragraph 46 →In conclusion, the Claimant’s Claim succeeds, and orders are granted as follows:
Paragraph 77 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
CAUSE NO. E153 OF 2024
WILLIAM MWERESA OBEGE..................................................CLAIMANT
VERSUS
TRINITY TESS LIMITED T/A MUCHEKI CONSULTING.......RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT.
Introduction
1. Before the Court is a Statement of Claim dated 19th February 2024, in which the Claimant seeks the following remedies as against the Respondent:
a. Terminal dues totaling to Ksh. 2,328,139.32/= comprising payment in lieu of notice and compensation for wrongful dismissal.
b. Cost of this Suit
c. Interest on (a) and (b) above.
2. The Respondent entered appearance and filed a Statement of Defence dated 2nd May 2024, in opposition to the Claimant's Claim together with supporting claim documents.
3. The matter proceeded for hearing, and both the Claimant’s and Respondent’s cases were heard on 13th April 2026.
4. The Claimant testified in support of his case as CW1. He adopted his witness statement dated 19th July 2024 as his evidence in chief and produced his list and bundle of documents dated 19th February 2024 as exhibits 1-5 in the matter.
5. The Respondent’s Manager in charge of Software Implementation, Martin Kyalo Mwatu, testified on behalf of the Respondent as RW1. He adopted his witness statement dated 2nd May, 2024, as his evidence in chief and produced his list and bundle of documents of even date as exhibits 1-7.
6. Written submissions were received from the Claimant. The Respondent did not file submissions within the prescribed timelines and was therefore not considered.
The Claimant's Case
7. The Claimant's case is that he was employed by the Respondent vide an offer letter dated 5th August, 2019, and an employment agreement dated 9th August, 2019 as a Sage Enterprise Management Junior Technical Consultant. He states that he successfully completed his probation period and continued in the Respondent's employment.
8. It is his case that during the course of his employment, his position and remuneration were reviewed upwards and that, at the time of termination, he was earning a gross monthly salary of Kshs. 179,087.64.
9. The Claimant states that he served the Respondent for over four years and had no disciplinary case, prior warning or other disciplinary proceedings against him. He maintains that he served the Respondent in accordance with the terms of his employment and that his salary was reviewed upwards during his employment.
10. The Claimant further states that on 31st December 2023, the Respondent terminated his employment with immediate effect. He contends that the termination letter did not state any reason for the termination and did not allege any misconduct, poor performance, breach of trust, or sabotage against him.
11. He states that the letter instead provided that he would be paid one month's salary in accordance with his contract of engagement and further required him to complete his December timesheet, return the company laptop, and clear with the Respondent.
12. The Claimant contends that he was not issued with a notice to show cause, informed of any allegations against him, nor afforded an opportunity to respond before his employment was terminated. He therefore maintains that the Respondent did not comply with the requirements of Section 41 of the Employment Act.
13. The Claimant further contends that the allegations subsequently advanced by the Respondent to justify the termination, including gross misconduct, declining performance, client complaints, breach of fiduciary duty and risk of sabotage, did not appear in the termination letter.
14. It is his position that the allegations were raised for the first time in the Respondent's advocates' letter dated 6th February 2024, more than one month after the termination of his employment.
15. The Claimant testified that his role at the Respondent was initially that of a Sage E Management Junior Technical Consultant and that he subsequently became a Senior Consultant. He avers that the change in position had an impact on his salary.
16. During cross-examination, the Claimant told the court that his role was that of an ERP Technical Consultant and acknowledged that he had been a Sage E Management Junior Technical Consultant. He confirmed that the positions described as Sage E Management Junior Technical Consultant and Technical Consultant were similar, as stated in the offer letter.
17. On his remuneration, the Claimant testified that his monthly salary started at Kshs. 90,000 in 2019, but acknowledged that the offer letter dated 5th August 2019 reflected a gross salary of Kshs. 80,000. He confirmed that he had read his employment contract before signing it.
18. The Claimant further acknowledged during cross-examination that he was aware that being interested in other employment while still employed by the Respondent constituted gross misconduct. He nevertheless maintained that he did not agree that he had been fairly dismissed.
19. The Claimant confirmed that his role involved handling clients' passwords and that he had access to clients' systems, but disputed the suggestion that the Respondent terminated his employment in order to protect its clients' systems.
20. The Claimant further acknowledged that he knew that he was required to return the Respondent's property upon termination of his employment. He confirmed that he had not returned the company property. He further confirmed that he received a letter dated 31st December 2023 requiring him to return company property to facilitate payment of his terminal dues.
21. The Claimant further told the Court that he did not receive a response to the demand dated 6th February 2024. He nevertheless acknowledged that the copy of the demand on record bore a “received” stamp by his advocates.
22. On re-examination, the Claimant clarified that although his role at the commencement of his employment was that of a Junior Consultant, he was a Senior Consultant at the time of termination. He maintained that he was never informed of any misconduct necessitating the termination of his employment.
23. The Claimant states that the termination of his employment was wrongful and unlawful on account of failure to pay his dues, failure to comply with the notification and hearing requirements under Section 41 of the Employment Act, and termination of his services without affording him the right to be heard.
24. The Claimant prays that the court allow his claim.
The Claimant’s Submissions
25. It is submitted for the Claimant that the Respondent failed to establish a valid and fair reason for terminating his employment. The Claimant submits that the reasons the Respondent subsequently advanced, including gross misconduct arising from the Claimant's LinkedIn post indicating that he was “open to work,” were not contained in the termination letter.
26. It is the Claimant’s further submission that the Respondent had no social media policy prohibiting the conduct relied upon.
27. On procedural fairness, counsel submitted that the Claimant was terminated without being issued with a notice to show cause or being afforded an opportunity to be heard, contrary to Section 41 of the Employment Act. It was further submitted that the Respondent could not rely on reasons raised after the termination to justify the dismissal.
28. The Claimant submits that the employment contract he relies upon was binding on the Respondent, noting that the Respondent itself had produced the offer letter and employment agreement.
29. The Claimant relied on Sections 41, 43, 45 and 49 of the Employment Act, 2007, Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, and the cases of Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013]KEELRC 386 (KLR), Linsey Atieno Ojwang v Fusion Capital Limited [2017] KEELRC 443 (KLR); Kepha Moreno Bosire v Titus Naikuni & Another [2019] KEELRC 1159 (KLR); Kira v Kenya National Highways Authority [2025] KEELRC 3435 (KLR); Kenfreight (E.A.) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] KECA 409 (KLR) to support his case.
30. The Claimant submits that he is entitled to payment in lieu of notice and compensation for unfair termination under Section 49 of the Employment Act.
31. Counsel finally submitted that the Respondent was not entitled to withhold the Claimant's terminal dues on account of the unreturned company property.
The Respondents’ case
32. RW1 testified that the Claimant was formerly employed by the Respondent as a technical consultant. He states that in November 2023, while still employed by the Respondent, the Claimant published a post on his LinkedIn profile indicating that he was “open to work” and “looking for a new role.”
33. The Respondent states that the post demonstrated a lack of commitment to his employment, and that the Claimant’s performance had declined and that it had received complaints from clients concerning his attitude towards his duties.
34. The Respondent’s further case is that the Claimant’s conduct amounted to gross misconduct and a breach of trust and fiduciary responsibility.
35. It states that owing to the nature of the Claimant’s duties, he had access to highly confidential and proprietary information, including back-end administrative rights to the Respondent’s computer systems and those of its clients. The Respondent therefore considered his continued employment untenable and maintained that termination had to be effected summarily in order to protect its systems and client information.
36. RW1 stated that the Claimant’s declining performance and LinkedIn post had been discussed administratively, during which the Claimant was warned about the consequences of his conduct.
37. The Respondent maintains that the claimant’s conduct persisted and resulted in the termination letter dated 31st December 2023. It avers that the Claimant was paid his December 2023 salary in full and offered a one month’s salary in lieu of notice and a Certificate of Service upon returning the company laptop and other property in his possession.
38. On cross-examination, RW1 confirmed that the Claimant was not given notice of termination and that the reason for termination was not stated in the termination letter. He explained that the nature of the Claimant’s employment, including his access to sensitive data, made it inappropriate to give him notice.
39. He stated further that the Respondent discovered the Claimant’s interest in alternative employment through the LinkedIn post, and that he relied on clause 15.2 of the Employment Agreement, which provided for immediate dismissal for gross misconduct, and clause 12.3, which the Respondent contended regulated the Claimant’s conduct while employed.
40. RW1 further confirmed that the Claimant was not suspended and that no investigation was conducted before the termination. He also confirmed that there was no report of any actual data leakage.
41. RW1 told the court that although he referred to complaints concerning the Claimant’s performance, he acknowledged that the complaints were not produced before the Court. He further confirmed that the record of discussions between the Claimant and his line manager was not before the Court.
42. He further admitted that the Respondent had no policy prohibiting employees from maintaining LinkedIn accounts, and further confirmed that no warning letter had been issued to the Claimant.
43. On re-examination, RW1 maintained that clause 15.2.1 of the Employment Agreement prohibited breach of the agreement and that clause 12.3 contained protective covenants regulating the conduct of employees. He stated that the salary appearing in the agreement was Kshs. 80,000 and that no letter had been produced showing an increase to Kshs. 178,000.
44. RW1 reiterated that payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice had been offered and was awaiting return of the Respondent’s property. He maintained that the Claimant’s access to confidential systems justified the manner in which his employment was terminated.
45. The Respondent prays that the Claimant’s claim be dismissed with costs.
Analysis and Determination
46. I have considered the pleadings, the evidence of CW1 and RW1, the Claimant’s submissions, and the authorities cited. The issues for determination are:
i. Whether the Claimant’s termination was substantively justified and procedurally fair.
ii. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought
iii. Who should bear the costs of the suit.
Whether the Claimant’s termination was substantively justified and procedurally fair
47. On substantive justification, Section 43(1) of the Employment Act places upon the employer the obligation to prove the reason or reasons for termination, and where the employer fails to do so, the termination is deemed unfair under Section 45. Section 43(2) further requires the reason to be one which the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time of termination and which caused the employer to terminate the employee’s employment.
48. The Court of Appeal in Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 Others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR), recognized the distinction between substantive justification for termination of employment and procedural fairness, holding that the employer must establish the basis upon which the decision to terminate was made.
49. The termination letter of 31st December 2023, issued to the Claimant did not identify misconduct, poor performance, physical incapacity or any other reason for the termination. Indeed, RW1 expressly confirmed this position on cross-examination.
50. The Respondent has sought to rely principally on the Claimant's LinkedIn post indicating that he was “open to work” and “looking for a new role” as the reason for terminating his employment. The Claimant admitted on cross-examination that he knew that being interested in other employment while still employed by the Respondent constituted gross misconduct under his contract. That admission, however, does not in my view by itself establish that the Respondent terminated the Claimant’s employment for that reason.
51. Most significantly, the Respondent did not demonstrate that the LinkedIn post was investigated, that the Claimant was called upon to explain its meaning, or that a finding was made that the post amounted to misconduct.
52. RW1 admitted that no investigation was undertaken on the post, and there was also no evidence of actual leakage of confidential information belonging to the Respondent or any form of sabotage.
53. The Respondent did not also produce clients’ complaints in evidence. RW1 confirmed that the complaints and the alleged record of discussions with the Claimant were not before the Court.
54. In Radar Limited v Ali & another [2024] KEELRC 1421 (KLR), the Court emphasized that the reasons contemplated by Sections 43 and 45 are those genuinely believed by the employer to exist at the time of termination and that an unexplained or blank termination notice presents difficulty in satisfying the statutory requirement.
55. I therefore find and hold that the Respondent has failed to prove a valid and fair reason for the Claimant’s termination as required by Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007.
56. On whether the Claimant’s termination was procedurally fair, Section 41 requires an employer contemplating termination on grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity to explain the reason for which termination is being considered and to afford the employee an opportunity to make representations, with the right to be accompanied by another employee or union representative. The requirements of Section 41 are mandatory. (See Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR).
57. The Respondent's evidence before court on the termination of the Claimant’s employment, falls considerably short of these requirements. RW1 admitted that there was no notice of termination; that the termination letter contained no reason(s) for terminating the Claimant’s employment; that no investigation was undertaken, and no disciplinary hearing was held.
58. Further, the Respondent's argument that the Claimant's access to sensitive information justified dispensing with a hearing has no legal basis and cannot stand. Even in a case warranting summary dismissal, the statutory procedure under Section 41 is not and cannot be displaced. The Court of Appeal made this position clear in Kenfreight (E.A) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] KECA 409 (KLR), holding that payment in lieu of notice does not cure the employer's failure to comply with the statutory obligation to explain the allegations and hear the employee before termination of employment.
59. Likewise, in CMC Aviation Limited v Mohammed Noor [2015] KECA 775 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that summary dismissal without giving the employee an opportunity to be heard amounts to an unfair termination.
60. The fact that the Respondent considered the Claimant's continued access to its systems potentially risky could have justified taking interim protective measures, such as restricting access or suspension pending investigation, but did not entitle the Respondent to dispense altogether with the statutory disciplinary process.
61. I therefore find that the termination was procedurally unfair for want of compliance with Section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007.
Whether the Claimant is entitled to the remedies sought
Notice pay
62. The Claimant seeks Kshs.179,087.64 on account of one month's salary in lieu of notice.
63. The Respondent's own case is that it offered the Claimant one month's salary in lieu of notice. There is therefore no substantive dispute as to the Claimant's entitlement to one month's notice pay. The dispute concerns the amount and the Respondent's contention that the payment was conditional on the Claimant returning its property.
64. Section 35 of the Employment Act requires that an employee is issued a termination notice or payment in lieu thereof.
65. On the evidence before the court, the Claimant established that his remuneration had increased during the course of employment, although the Respondent challenged the precise salary applicable at termination, contending that the employment contract provides a gross salary of Kshs. 80,000/-.
66. The Claimant’s June 2023 pay slip produced in evidence shows that the Claimant’s gross pay stood at Kshs. 179, 087.64. As the custodian of employee records, the Respondent did not provide a contrary pay slip, nor did it deny issuing the one produced by the Claimant.
67. I will therefore base the award on the gross monthly salary indicated in the said pay slip, and not the entry salary of Kshs.80,000 proposed by the Respondent.
68. Further, the failure by the Claimant to return the Respondent’s laptop does not in my view extinguish the Respondent's obligation to pay earned contractual and statutory dues. If the Respondent had a lawful claim for the value or return of its property, that is a matter capable of being pursued in accordance with the law, and not a basis for unilaterally converting terminal dues into security for the property. In any event, the Respondent did not lodge a counterclaim for either the property or its value.
69. I therefore proceed to award the Claimant the sum of Kshs.179,087.64 on account of notice pay.
Compensation for unfair termination
70. Having found that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was both substantively and procedurally unfair, the Claimant is no doubt entitled to consideration for compensation under Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act.
71. The Claimant seeks the maximum twelve months' salary, amounting to Kshs.2,149,051.68. The Court of Appeal in Ol Pejeta Ranching Limited v David Wanjau Muhoro [2017] KECA 329 (KLR) and reaffirmed in Kimani v Gilanis Supermarket Ltd [2023] KECA 1145 (KLR), emphasized that an award under Section 49 must be based on the statutory factors and sound judicial principles, and should not be arbitrary.
72. The Claimant served the Respondent for approximately four years and four months, from August 2019 to December 2023. There is no established prior disciplinary record or warning against him. Further, the termination was immediate, and the termination letter did not explain the reasons for the sudden termination.
73. The Court notes that the Claimant was a technical consultant with skills capable of being utilized elsewhere. The Claimant had also acknowledged that he had expressed interest in alternative employment, and had failed to return company property.
74. There is also no evidence before the Court that the Claimant made substantial efforts to mitigate his losses or that he was unable to secure alternative employment.
75. In Bloomingdale Rose Kenya Ltd v Nderitu [2023] KEELRC 1698 (KLR), the Court emphasized that even where termination is unfair, the maximum twelve months' compensation must be justified by the Section 49(4) factors.
76. In the circumstances of this case, I deem an award of seven months’ (7) salary sufficient compensation for the unfair termination.
77. In conclusion, the Claimant’s Claim succeeds, and orders are granted as follows:
a) A declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment was substantively and procedurally unfair and unlawful.
b) That the Respondent shall pay the Claimant:
i. One month's salary in lieu of notice of Kshs.179,087.64.
ii. Seven months' gross salary as compensation for unfair termination, being Kshs.1,253,613.48.
c) The monetary award shall attract interest at court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full.
d) For the avoidance of doubt, the awards are subject to the applicable statutory deductions
e) The Respondent shall issue the Claimant with a Certificate of Service within 14 days of this judgment.
f) The Respondent shall also bear the costs of the suit.
78. It is so ordered.
SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED BY VIDEO-LINK AND IN COURT AT NAIROBI THIS 8TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
C. N. BAARI
JUDGE
Appearance:
Mr. Ochieng present for the Claimant
Ms. Chiveli present for the Respondent
Ms. Esther S -C/A