Land law

Waiguru & another v Kihingo Village (Waridi Gardens) Ltd & 5 others [2026] KEELC 7139 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Case 256 of 2019
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The Notice of Motion dated 20 April 2026 seeking a stay of execution/status quo pending the Court of Appeal stay application was dismissed as unmerited, with costs. The court held that, having elected to seek stay under Rule 5(2)(b) in the Court of Appeal, the Applicant could not obtain provisional or holding stay orders from this court while that application was pending.

Supporting judgment passages

48. Entertaining such a request would sanction parallel proceedings over the same relief, encourage forum shopping and undermine the orderly and independent exercise of jurisdiction by the two courts. Indeed, the procedure adopted by the Applicant is unknown in law. This court can only entertain an application for stay of execution of its Judgment or Ruling pending appeal, and only where the Court of Appeal is not seized of the same application under Rule Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.

Paragraph 48 →

50. Ultimately, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 20th April, 2026 to be unmerited. The same is dismissed with costs.

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Issue 1Whether the Defendant/Applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated the conditions warranting the grant of stay of execution pending Appeal.

Held. No. The Motion was dismissed with costs. Although the issue was framed as one concerning the conditions for stay, the court rejected the application because it sought interim stay pending determination of the Applicant's already-filed Court of Appeal application under Rule 5(2)(b), rather than a substantive stay application before this court. The court did not determine the individual Order 42 Rule 6 conditions of substantial loss, delay, or security.

Ratio. The trial court and Court of Appeal have distinct and independent stay jurisdictions. A party may choose the forum, but once the Applicant has moved the Court of Appeal for stay under Rule 5(2)(b), that court is seized of the application and can grant interim relief. The trial court cannot grant provisional or holding orders over the same relief pending the appellate application, as that would permit parallel proceedings, forum shopping, and an unknown procedure.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

34. Having considered the Motion, affidavits and submissions, the sole issue that arises for determination is whether the Defendant/Applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated the conditions warranting the grant of stay of execution pending Appeal.

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Held

Supporting judgment passages

48. Entertaining such a request would sanction parallel proceedings over the same relief, encourage forum shopping and undermine the orderly and independent exercise of jurisdiction by the two courts. Indeed, the procedure adopted by the Applicant is unknown in law. This court can only entertain an application for stay of execution of its Judgment or Ruling pending appeal, and only where the Court of Appeal is not seized of the same application under Rule Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.

Paragraph 48 →

50. Ultimately, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 20th April, 2026 to be unmerited. The same is dismissed with costs.

Paragraph 50 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

46. It is trite that this court and the Court of Appeal exercise distinct and independent jurisdictions in applications for stay of execution pending appeal. As aforesaid, this court’s jurisdiction is anchored on Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, while that of the Court of Appeal is derived from Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.

Paragraph 46 →

47. A party is at liberty to elect the forum in which to seek a stay. Once the Applicant moved the Court of Appeal, that court became properly seized of the application and was competent to grant appropriate relief, including interim stay of execution or status quo orders pending its determination. This court cannot, therefore, grant provisional or holding orders merely to preserve the subject matter while awaiting the outcome of the application before the Court of Appeal.

Paragraph 47 →

48. Entertaining such a request would sanction parallel proceedings over the same relief, encourage forum shopping and undermine the orderly and independent exercise of jurisdiction by the two courts. Indeed, the procedure adopted by the Applicant is unknown in law. This court can only entertain an application for stay of execution of its Judgment or Ruling pending appeal, and only where the Court of Appeal is not seized of the same application under Rule Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.

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Case at a glance

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Background

Before this court for determination is the Defendant/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 20th April, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2010, and Order 42 Rule 6 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 seeking the following reliefs:

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Reasoning passage

Ultimately, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 20th April, 2026 to be unmerited. The same is dismissed with costs.

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SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the Defendant/Applicant had shown grounds for a stay of execution of the 19 February 2026 judgment, particularly a temporary stay pending determination of its Rule 5(2)(b) Court of Appeal application; and whether this court could grant such holding…

Material facts

The dispute concerned House No. D1 on L.R. No. 27754 within Kihingo Village. The judgment records that the Plaintiff/1st Respondent claimed to have purchased the property under an Agreement for Lease dated 25 September 2015, paid Kshs. 40,687,817, obtained…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROВІ

ELC CASE NO. 256 OF 2019

ANNE MUMBI WAIGURU………....PLAINTIFF/1st RESPONDENT

VERSUS

KIHINGO VILLAGE

(WARIDI GARDENS)LTD………...........DEFENDANT/APPLICANT

AND

CHRIS KABIRO……..1ST INTERESTED PARTY/2ND RESPONDENT

JAMES NDUNG’U

GETHENJI…......…..2ND INTERESTED PARTY/3RD RESPONDENT

AS CONSOLIDATED WITH

HCC 355 OF 2012

BETWEEN

CHRIS KABIRO T/A KABIRO

NDAIGA & COMPANY ADVOCATES………….……….......PLAINTIFF

AND

KIHINGO VILLAGE (WARIDI GARDENS) LTD...1ST DEFENDANT

WAGEMA LIMITED……………………………………...2ND DEFENDANT

MUGANDA WASILWA T/A

KEYSIAN AUCTIONEERS……………………………...3RD DEFENDANT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the Defendant/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 20th April, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2010, and Order 42 Rule 6 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 seeking the following reliefs:

a) That pending the hearing and determination of an Application under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules in the Court of Appeal or for such reasonable time to enable the Applicant to prosecute their Application under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, that the Honourable Court be pleased to grant a stay of execution of the judgement delivered by Hon. Angote on the 19th of February 2026, the decree and any other order extracted thereof.

b) That pending the hearing and determination of Civil Appeal No. E224 of 2026 Kihingo Village (Waridi Gardens) versus Anne Mumbi Waiguru that the Honorable Court be pleased to grant a stay of execution of the judgement delivered by Hon. Angote on the 19th of February 2026, the decree and any other order extracted thereof.

c) That in the alternative, that status quo be maintained as at before the date of the delivery of the judgement delivered by Hon. Angote on the 19th of February 2026.

d) That costs of this application be provided for.

2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Robert Gethenji, a Director of the Applicant Company, sworn on even date. He deponed that at all material times, the Applicant was and remains the registered proprietor of House Number 1D on Land Reference Number 27754 and reiterated his assertions as set out at trial.

3. He deponed that the trial court delivered judgment on 19th February 2026, granting the Plaintiff/1st Respondent an order of specific performance and directing the Applicant to execute all conveyancing documents necessary to effect the transfer of the suit property.

4. Aggrieved by the foregoing, he urged, the Applicant lodged Civil Appeal No. E224 of 2026, Kihingo Village (Waridi Gardens) vs Anne Mumbi Waiguru, challenging the judgment, together with an application under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules seeking a stay pending appeal. He deponed that the application was certified urgent and directions issued on 23rd March 2026, although it is yet to be fixed for hearing.

5. He deponed that the appeal challenges the validity of the purported sale of one residential unit forming part of the Applicant's integrated fifty-five-unit development, on the basis that the transaction was undertaken without compliance with the Applicant's constitution. He further contended that the trial court had erroneously granted specific performance notwithstanding the Plaintiff/1st Respondent's alleged failure to fulfil her contractual obligations.

6. The Defendant’s Director deposed that the matter is urgent because the judgment requires the Applicant to execute the conveyancing documents within thirty days, failing which the Deputy Registrar will execute them on its behalf. He further deponed that the Applicant's Chief Executive Officer has already instructed its former advocates, Dentons Hamilton Harrison & Mathews, to release the original title documents to facilitate completion of the sale, thereby making the grant of interim relief necessary to preserve the subject matter of the appeal.

7. According to Mr. Gethenji, unless execution is stayed, the appeal will be rendered nugatory because the transfer of the property will permanently divest the Applicant of its title before the issues raised on appeal are determined.

8. He further contended that there exists a real danger that the property will pass beyond the jurisdiction of the court, defeating the appeal altogether. He also stated, on the advice of counsel, that the judgment improperly compels the Plaintiff/1st Respondent's financier, a non-party to the proceedings, to furnish an irrevocable professional undertaking, thereby exposing it to prejudice without having been heard.

9. He therefore urged the court to grant a stay of execution and an injunction, or alternatively preserve the status quo pending the hearing and determination of the appeal. He maintained that the 1st Respondent will suffer no prejudice if the property is preserved, whereas the Applicant will suffer substantial and irreparable loss because the suit property is unique in character, location and development and cannot adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Finally, he deponed that the application has been filed without undue delay and urged the court to grant the orders sought.

10. In response, the Plaintiff/1st Respondent filed a replying affidavit sworn on 30th April 2026. She deponed that an applicant seeking a stay of execution under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules must satisfy three mandatory requirements, namely: demonstrate that it will suffer substantial loss if the stay is not granted; show that the application was made without unreasonable delay; and provide security for the due performance of the decree.

11. On the issue of substantial loss, she deponed that the Applicant had merely reiterated arguments that had been fully canvassed and determined at trial, all of which she denied. She further disputed the assertion that the intended appeal raised fresh or arguable issues, maintaining that this court cannot not sit on appeal over its own judgment.

12. The Plaintiff further deponed that the Applicant had deliberately refused to instruct its advocates to release the original title documents to facilitate registration of the transfer, thereby frustrating compliance with the decree while simultaneously seeking the court's equitable intervention. She asserted that the Applicant cannot rely on its own deliberate non-compliance as a basis for obtaining a stay.

13. The contention that implementation of the judgment will render the appeal nugatory was also disputed. It was urged that any transfer effected pursuant to the judgment could, if necessary, be reversed should the appeal succeed and that the alleged risk of the property being removed from the court’s jurisdiction was wholly speculative, given that the property is situated in Nairobi and cannot physically be taken beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

14. Similarly, she denied, the Applicant's contention that the involvement of her financier will occasion prejudice, stating that the financier had always been known to the Applicant. She asserted that the Applicant, having accepted over Kshs. 40,687,817 from her, could not now deny knowledge of the financing arrangements. She also rejected the Applicant's request for preservation of the status quo, contending that the true status quo was the Applicant's continued refusal to comply with the court's judgment.

15. The 1st Respondent further deponed that she, rather than the Applicant, stands to suffer substantial prejudice if a stay were granted. She explained that continued delay in completing the transaction had exposed her to increased lending rates, financing charges and additional legal expenses, despite having already paid Kshs. 40,687,817 towards the purchase price. She maintained that it was inequitable for the Applicant to retain both the purchase money and the property while delaying completion of the sale.

16. The Plaintiff/1st Respondent also disputed the Applicant's claim that the suit property was unique and incapable of valuation. She deponed that the property formed part of a larger development comprising fifty-five units and that the Applicant had itself produced a valuation report during the trial, demonstrating that its value was readily ascertainable. Consequently, any loss alleged by the Applicant was compensable by an award of damages and did not amount to substantial loss within the meaning of Order 42 Rule 6.

17. On delay, she deponed that although the Applicant had presented the application as urgent, it had waited approximately two months after delivery of judgment before filing it and had offered no satisfactory explanation for the delay. She contended that the application formed part of a continued effort to delay compliance with the judgment.

18. On security, the Plaintiff/1st Respondent deponed that the Applicant had neither offered nor proposed any security for the due performance of the decree, notwithstanding that such security is a mandatory requirement under Order 42 Rule 6. In her view, that omission is fatal to the application.

19. Finally, she deponed that granting a stay would deny her the fruits of a lawful judgment, occasion further financial loss and unjustly reward the Applicant's continued non-compliance with the court's orders. She therefore urged the court to find that the Applicant had failed to satisfy the threshold for stay of execution and to dismiss the application with costs.

Submissions

20. The Applicant filed written submissions dated 20th May 2026. Counsel submitted that the Applicant has satisfied all the requirements for the grant of a stay of execution pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely demonstration of substantial loss, prompt filing of the application, and provision of adequate security.

21. It was urged that the decree is not an ordinary money decree but one for specific performance, compelling the transfer of the suit property to the 1st Respondent. It was submitted that the judgment authorized the Deputy Registrar to execute the conveyancing documents should the Applicant fail to do so, with the result that the Applicant will permanently lose its proprietary interest in the property before the appeal is heard.

22. Relying on Sammy Some Kosgei vs Grace Jelel Boit [2013] KEHC 3219 (KLR) and Dhanji Jadra Ramji vs Commissioner of Prisons & Another [2017] eKLR, it was urged that loss of legal title constitutes substantial loss.

23. Counsel further argued that the intended appeal raised serious and arguable questions of law and fact, including whether the alleged sale was properly authorized by the Applicant company, whether the requisite corporate approvals existed, whether payments allegedly made outside the contractual framework could bind the company, and whether the remedy of specific performance was properly granted.

24. It was further submitted that the suit property, situated within the exclusive Kihingo Village development and valued at approximately Kshs. 280 million, is unique and incapable of adequate compensation by an award of damages. It was pointed out that judgment had been delivered on 19th February 2026, while the present application was filed on 20th April 2026, after the Applicant had diligently lodged Civil Appeal No. E224 of 2026 and an application for stay before the Court of Appeal under Rule 5(2)(b).

25. Cited in support was Utalii Transport Company Limited & 3 others vs NIC Bank Limited & another [2014] KEHC 7255 (KLR), James Wangalwa & Another vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR; and Republic vs KRA ex parte Stanley Mombo Amuti [2018] eKLR.

26. On security for the due performance of the decree, counsel submitted that the court retains discretion to determine the appropriate form of security. It was argued that, since the dispute concerned preservation of immovable property rather than payment of a money decree, the suit property itself, which remains registered in the Defendant/Applicant's name, constitutes sufficient security.

27. Relying on Butt vs Rent Restriction Tribunal(supra) and Arun C Sharma vs Ashana Raikundalia t/a A Raikundalia & Co Advocates & 2 others [2014 eKLR, counsel submitted that preservation of the property and maintenance of the existing status quo adequately safeguarded the interests of both parties without imposing oppressive conditions that would stifle the Applicant's right of appeal.

28. The Plaintiff/1st Respondent filed written submissions dated 8th July 2026. Counsel submitted that under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, an applicant seeking a stay of execution must satisfy three mandatory and cumulative requirements, to wit, demonstrate that substantial loss will result unless the order is granted, establish that the application was made without unreasonable delay, and furnish security for the due performance of the decree.

29. It was argued that the Applicant’s apprehension that the Plaintiff/1st Respondent might place the property beyond the court’s reach was speculative, as the immovable property remained within its jurisdiction and there was no evidence of an intention to defeat the appeal. Counsel further submitted that reliance on the 1st Respondent’s financing arrangements was misplaced, the Applicant having accepted the purchase price, and that mere conjecture and dissatisfaction with the judgment did not constitute substantial loss under Order 42 Rule 6.

30. It was urged that the application had not been brought expeditiously two months having elapsed between the delivery of judgment and the filing of the present application and that, despite characterizing the matter as urgent, the Applicant had offered no satisfactory explanation for the delay. Counsel contended that the application formed part of a continuing pattern intended to postpone compliance with the judgment rather than pursue a genuine appeal.

31. With regard to security, counsel submitted that Order 42 Rule 6(2)(b) expressly requires an applicant to furnish security for the due performance of the decree. It was argued that the Applicant had neither offered nor proposed any security whatsoever. Relying on Focin Motorcycle Co. Limited vs Ann Wambui Wangui & Another [2018] eKLR, counsel submitted that the provision of security is a mandatory statutory requirement and that the Applicant's failure to comply with it was fatal to the application.

32. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant had already invoked the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal by filing an application under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules seeking substantially similar relief. It was argued that, having elected to pursue interim relief before the appellate court, the Applicant ought not to maintain parallel proceedings before the trial court seeking identical orders.

33. Relying on Equity Bank Limited vs West Link Mbo Limited [2013] eKLR and Stanley Kangethe Kinyanjui v Tony Ketter & 5 Others [2013] eKLR, counsel submitted that the jurisdiction exercised under Rule 5(2)(b) is original, independent and discretionary, and that pursuing identical relief before two different courts exposed the parties to the risk of conflicting decisions and amounted to an abuse of the court process.

Analysis and Determination

34. Having considered the Motion, affidavits and submissions, the sole issue that arises for determination is whether the Defendant/Applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated the conditions warranting the grant of stay of execution pending Appeal.

35. The law with respect to stay of execution pending appeal is found in Order 42 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provides as follows:

“(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except appeal case of in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the Court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.

(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub rule (1) unless—

(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and

(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”

36. In Vishram Ravji Halai vs. Thornton & Turpin Civil Application No. Nai. 15 of 1990 [1990] KLR 365, the Court of Appeal, discussing the High Court’s [read ELC’s] jurisdiction under this order stated as follows:

“The Superior Court’s discretion to order a stay of execution of its order or decree is fettered by three conditions. Firstly, the applicant must establish a sufficient cause, secondly the court must be satisfied that substantial loss would ensue from a refusal to grant a stay and thirdly the applicant must furnish security. The application must of course be made without unreasonable delay.”

37. What arises from the foregoing is that the grant of orders of stay of execution is subject to the court’s discretion, the court in this respect being guided by the provisions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The question of how the court should exercise this discretion was extensively discussed by the Court of Appeal in Butt vs Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417 as follows:

“1. The power of the court to grant or refuse an application for a stay of execution is a discretionary power. The discretion should be exercised in such a way as not to prevent an appeal.

2. The general principle in granting or refusing a stay is; if there is no other overwhelming hindrance, a stay must be granted so that an appeal may not be rendered nugatory should that appeal court reverse the judge’s discretion.

3. A judge should not refuse a stay if there are good grounds for granting it merely because in his opinion, a better remedy may become available to the applicant at the end of the proceedings.

4. The court in exercising its discretion whether to grant [or] refuse an application for stay will consider the special circumstances of the case and unique requirements. The special circumstances in this case were that there was a large amount of rent in dispute and the appellant had an undoubted right of appeal.

5. The court in exercising its powers under Order XLI rule 4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules, can order security upon application by either party or on its own motion. Failure to put security for costs as ordered will cause the order for stay of execution to lapse.”

38. Further to the above, this court is now enjoined to give effect to the overriding objectives in the exercise of its powers as expressed in Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act and Section 1A of the Civil Procedure Act, to wit, the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes.

39. By way of a brief background, the present dispute concerned the ownership and sale of House No. D1 on L.R. No. 27754, situated within Kihingo Village. The 1st Respondent as Plaintiff instituted the suit seeking, inter alia, specific performance of an Agreement for Lease dated 25th September 2015, an order compelling the Defendant/Applicant to complete the sale transaction, a permanent injunction restraining any dealings with the suit property, and, in the alternative, a vesting order.

40. The Plaintiff’s/1st Respondent's case was that she lawfully purchased the suit property from the Defendant/Applicant, paid the agreed unsecured portion of the purchase price, was granted possession of the property in 2015, and remained ready and willing to complete the transaction. She contended that the Applicant acknowledged receipt of the payments but subsequently failed and refused to release the completion documents necessary to facilitate registration of the transfer and charge in favour of her financier, thereby breaching the agreement.

41. The 1st Interested Party/2nd Respondent similarly asserted a prior and superior interest in the suit property arising from an earlier agreement for lease executed in 2007. He contended that any subsequent sale to the Defendant/ 1st Respondent was void, having been undertaken in breach of subsisting court orders and the doctrine of lis pendens.

42. Upon considering the testimonies, evidence and the parties' submissions, the court found in favour of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent, holding that the Agreement for Lease was valid and enforceable; that the Plaintiff/1stRespondent had substantially performed her contractual obligations; and that the Defendant/Applicant had unjustifiably failed to complete the transaction by not releasing the completion documents. The court consequently granted the Plaintiff/1st Respondent the reliefs sought, including orders for specific performance.

43. Being dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Defendan/Applicant has preferred an appeal to the Court of Appeal and now seeks an order staying the execution of the judgment and decree pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal.

44. At the onset, the court notes that the Applicant has not sought before this court a substantive stay of execution pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Instead, the Applicant seeks what is framed as a stay of execution,

“pending the hearing and determination of an Application under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules in the Court of Appeal or for such reasonable time to enable the Applicant to prosecute their Application under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.”

45. The Applicant states that he has filed an application for stay before the Court of Appeal, which was certified urgent and in respect of which directions were issued on 23rd March 2026. In essence, he invites this court to grant interim orders staying execution pending the hearing and determination of that application.

46. It is trite that this court and the Court of Appeal exercise distinct and independent jurisdictions in applications for stay of execution pending appeal. As aforesaid, this court’s jurisdiction is anchored on Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, while that of the Court of Appeal is derived from Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.

47. A party is at liberty to elect the forum in which to seek a stay. Once the Applicant moved the Court of Appeal, that court became properly seized of the application and was competent to grant appropriate relief, including interim stay of execution or status quo orders pending its determination. This court cannot, therefore, grant provisional or holding orders merely to preserve the subject matter while awaiting the outcome of the application before the Court of Appeal.

48. Entertaining such a request would sanction parallel proceedings over the same relief, encourage forum shopping and undermine the orderly and independent exercise of jurisdiction by the two courts. Indeed, the procedure adopted by the Applicant is unknown in law. This court can only entertain an application for stay of execution of its Judgment or Ruling pending appeal, and only where the Court of Appeal is not seized of the same application under Rule Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules.

49. The Defendant/Applicant having chosen to move the Court of Appeal for a stay of execution should convince the said court to grant the said prayer, which prayer can be granted ex parte if the court is so convinced.

50. Ultimately, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 20th April, 2026 to be unmerited. The same is dismissed with costs.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 29th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Ms Wachuka holding brief for King’ara for Defendant

Mr. Otieno holding brief for Kiragu for 1st Interested party

No appearance for Plaintiff

Court Assistant; Tracy

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