Land law

Philiposky v Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company & another [2026] KEELC 7241 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
Mbogo C.G.

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Background

Before this court for determination are two notices of preliminary objection dated 18th December 2024, and 24th April, 2025 respectively. On 7th February 2025, the 2nd respondent filed the notice of preliminary objection dated 18th December, 2024 seeking dismissal of the petition in limine on the following grounds:-

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Question before the court

From the above, the issues for determination are as follows:-

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Reasoning passage

The respondents’ objections principally challenge the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition concerns an intergovernmental dispute for which the Constitution and the Intergovernmental Relations Act prescribe mandatory alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. While any challenge to the jurisdiction of the court is undoubtedly capable of being raised as a preliminary objection, the court must still ascertain whether…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCLPET NO. E098 OF 2024

BRIAN PHILIPOSKY…….......................................................... PETITIONER

VERSUS

NAIROBI CITY WATER AND

SEWERAGE COMPANY………......................……………………1ST RESPONDENT

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY GOVERNMENT..…..............…….2ND RESPONDENT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination are two notices of preliminary objection dated 18th December 2024, and 24th April, 2025 respectively. On 7th February 2025, the 2nd respondent filed the notice of preliminary objection dated 18th December, 2024 seeking dismissal of the petition in limine on the following grounds:-

1. That by virtue of the express mandatory provisions of Article 189 (3) and (4) of the Constitution and Part IV of the Inter-Governmental Relations Act Cap 5G, the jurisdiction of this honourable court to hear and determine the matter on its own merit has been improperly and immaturely.

2. That the petitioner has not demonstrated that all reasonable measures to resolve the dispute amicably before instituting the instant judicial proceedings were or have been made by the parties as provided for under the law.

3. That the instant judicial proceedings have been undertaken contrary to the letter and spirit of the constitution as provided for under Article 159 of the Constitution.

4. That this petition is premature and an abuse of process of the court.

2. The 1st respondent subsequently filed the notice of preliminary objection dated 24th April 2025, also seeking the dismissal of the petition in limine, on the following grounds:-

1. That by dint of the express provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution and Part IV of the Inter-Governmental Relations Act No. 2 of 2012, this honourable court lacks original jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter on its own merit as reiterated by the High Court in County Government of Taita Taveta v Kenya Wildlife Services & another; Council of Governors & another (Interested Parties) [2021] eKLR.

2. That the petitioner has not fully exhausted all available alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided under Sections 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012 prior to invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this honourable court. As such, the jurisdiction of this honourable court has been invoked pre-maturely and this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this petition.

3. That the petition in its entirety is in flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Intergovernmental Relations Act No. 2 of 2012.

4. That this suit contravenes the well settled doctrines of constitutional avoidance and exhaustion of statutory provided dispute resolution mechanisms.

5. That the petition does not meet the threshold set out in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (1979) 1 KLR 154 and reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance, Civil Appeal No. 290 of 2012 as the petition has failed to specifically demonstrate with reasonable precision the manner in which the 1st respondent has violated their constitutional rights.

3. The preliminary objections were canvassed by way of written submissions. The 2nd respondent filed written submissions dated 10th April 2026, while the 1st respondent filed written submissions dated 12th October, 2026. The petitioner did not file his written submissions. Be that as it may, I have considered both preliminary objections and the written submissions filed.

4. The preliminary objections arise from the petition dated 3rd December 2024, filed by Brian Philiposky against Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company and Nairobi City County Government. The petition concerns the alleged infringement of constitutional rights arising from the exploitation and utilization of water from Sasumua dam, situated in Nyandarua County. The petitioner’s case is that the dam supplies water to residents of the 2nd respondent, while residents of Nyandarua county, where the dam is situated, have allegedly been denied adequate access to the water and have not received equitable benefits arising from the exploitation of the water resource.

5. The petitioner further alleges that the respondents have generated substantial revenue from the sale of water drawn from the dam without extending corresponding benefits to residents of Nyandarua county. He also alleges that the presence and management of the dam have contributed to environmental degradation, food insecurity and health challenges affecting residents living around the dam. Consequently, the petitioner seeks, among other reliefs, declarations requiring the respondents to facilitate access to water from the dam by residents of Nyandarua county, reserve a percentage of the water for their use, and remit a percentage of the revenue generated from the sale of water for the benefit of Nyandarua county and its residents. The petitioner maintains that the respondents’ actions and omissions have occasioned violations of constitutional rights and obligations relating to access to water, a clean and healthy environment, equality and equitable utilization of natural resources.

6. From the above, the issues for determination are as follows:-

i. Whether the preliminary objections raise pure points of law.

ii. Whether the dispute raised in the petition constitutes an intergovernmental dispute within the meaning of Article 189 of the Constitution and the Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012.

iii. Whether the petition is barred by the doctrines of exhaustion and constitutional avoidance.

7. In the celebrated case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, the court of appeal established that a preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law arising from the pleadings, which, if successfully argued, may dispose of the suit. The court further explained that a preliminary objection proceeds on the assumption that the facts pleaded by the opposing party are correct. It cannot properly be raised where facts must be ascertained or where the court is required to exercise judicial discretion.

8. In Oraro v Mbaja [2005] 1 KLR 141, Ojwang J. (as he then was) emphasized that a preliminary objection must not be intertwined with contested factual matters requiring proof through evidence. Where the determination of an objection necessitates an investigation of facts, the objection ceases to be a pure point of law.

9. The respondents’ objections principally challenge the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition concerns an intergovernmental dispute for which the Constitution and the Intergovernmental Relations Act prescribe mandatory alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. While any challenge to the jurisdiction of the court is undoubtedly capable of being raised as a preliminary objection, the court must still ascertain whether the objection can be determined from the pleadings and the applicable law without resolving contested facts. I am satisfied that the issue of jurisdiction, the applicability of statutory dispute resolution procedures are capable of consideration as preliminary points of law since their determination does not require an inquiry into contested matters of fact.

10. On the second issue, the respondents’ contended that the dispute before this court is an intergovernmental dispute which ought to have been subjected to the mechanisms prescribed under the Intergovernmental Relations Act before the institution of the petition. Article 189(3) of the Constitution provides as follows: -

“In any dispute between governments, the governments shall make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute, including by means of procedures provided under national legislation.”

11. Article 189(4) of the Constitution further requires parliament to provide procedures for settling intergovernmental disputes by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Pursuant to this constitutional requirement, parliament enacted the Intergovernmental Relations Act, Cap 265F. Part IV of the Act establishes the framework for resolving disputes between the national and county governments and amongst county governments. Section 30(1) of the Act provides that the provisions of that Part apply to disputes arising between the national government and a county government or amongst county governments. Section 30(2) further defines an intergovernmental dispute as a dispute between the national government and a county government or amongst county governments. Section 31 requires the national and county governments to take reasonable measures to resolve their disputes amicably and to exhaust the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided under the Act or other legislation before resorting to judicial proceedings.

12. The import of these provisions is that where a dispute properly falls within the category of an intergovernmental dispute, the parties are ordinarily required to exhaust the prescribed dispute resolution mechanisms before approaching the court. The respondents relied on the high court decision in County Government of Taita Taveta v Kenya Wildlife Services & another; Council of Governors & another (Interested Parties) [2021] KEHC 12920 (KLR) in which the high court considered the application of Article 189 and the Intergovernmental Relations Act to a dispute involving the sharing of benefits and revenue derived from natural resources. The principle emerging from the decision is that a court must examine the substance of a dispute and not merely the manner in which it has been framed. A party cannot circumvent a mandatory statutory dispute resolution mechanism simply by describing an otherwise intergovernmental dispute as a constitutional petition. However, whether a particular dispute constitutes an intergovernmental dispute, the same must be determined by reference to the parties involved, the nature of the dispute and the reliefs sought.

13. In Council of County Governors v Lake Basin Development Authority & 6 others [2017] KEHC 9634 (KLR), the court considered the meaning of an intergovernmental dispute within the framework of the Intergovernmental Relations Act. The court recognized the distinction between disputes involving the respective levels of government and disputes brought by individuals seeking to vindicate their own rights and interests. Article 189 and Part IV of the Intergovernmental Relations Act are concerned with disputes between governments. They do not establish a general procedural bar against every individual who seeks constitutional relief concerning the conduct of a county government or a public body exercising governmental functions. In this case, the petition has been instituted by an individual citizen and resident of Nyandarua county. Nyandarua county government is neither the petitioner nor a respondent in these proceedings. Neither has the petition been expressly instituted by the petitioner in his capacity as an authorized representative of Nyandarua county government.

14. The fact that the petitioner seek reliefs which may benefit residents of Nyandarua county does not transform the proceedings into a dispute between Nyandarua county government and Nairobi city county government. I am also mindful that the reliefs sought include declarations concerning the reservation of water from the dam for residents of Nyandarua county and the remittance of a percentage of the revenue generated from its sale. These prayers undoubtedly raise questions concerning the allocation and sharing of benefits derived from natural resources. However, the petition also raises allegations concerning the rights of individuals to access clean and safe water, the right to a clean and healthy environment, and the alleged adverse effects of the management of the dam upon residents living in its vicinity. These are matters which on the face of the petition, are capable of raising distinct constitutional questions concerning the rights of individuals and the obligations of public bodies.

15. Under Article 22(1) of the Constitution, every person has the right to institute court proceedings claiming that a right or fundamental freedom in the bill of rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened. Article 22(2) further permits proceedings to be instituted by a person acting in the interest of a group or class of persons, or in the public interest. Similarly, Article 258 of the Constitution confers standing upon persons seeking to challenge an alleged contravention of the Constitution, including those acting in the public interest.

16. In addition, I cannot overlook the fact that the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms invoked by the respondents are designed for disputes between governmental entities. The respondents have not demonstrated how the petitioner, as an individual citizen, would invoke those mechanisms in his own capacity.

17. On the third issue, the respondents have also invoked the doctrine of exhaustion, contending that the petitioner ought to have pursued the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms established under Sections 31 to 35 of the Intergovernmental Relations Act before approaching this court. In Muthinja & another v Henry & 1756 others [2015] KECA 304 (KLR), the court of appeal held as follows:-

“We see this as the crux of the matter in this and similar cases. It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside of courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.”

18. The doctrine presupposes the existence of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism which is applicable to the dispute and capable of being invoked by the party seeking relief. As I have already found, the petitioner is not a governmental entity and has not instituted the proceedings on behalf of Nyandarua county government. The respondents have not demonstrated that the dispute resolution mechanisms under Part IV of the Intergovernmental Relations Act are available to him in the capacity in which he has approached this court. In the absence of a demonstrated statutory mechanism applicable to the petitioner and capable of addressing the constitutional grievances pleaded, I am unable to find that the petition is premature for failure to exhaust the mechanisms prescribed under that Act.

19. The 1st respondent further invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The doctrine generally requires courts to refrain from determining constitutional questions where a dispute can properly and adequately be resolved on another legal basis. In Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others [2014] KESC 53 (KLR), the supreme court recognized the principle of constitutional avoidance and the importance of determining disputes through the appropriate statutory framework where possible. I agree that not every grievance arising from the actions or omissions of a public body necessarily raises a constitutional question warranting determination through a constitutional petition. However, the petitioner has expressly alleged violations of constitutional rights concerning access to water, environmental protection and the equitable utilization of natural resources. The petition also invokes Articles 42, 43, 69 and 70 of the Constitution. Whether these allegations are supported by sufficient evidence, or whether particular reliefs ought to be pursued under another statutory framework, are questions which may require examination of the circumstances giving rise to the petition. In my view, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance cannot be invoked at this preliminary stage to summarily terminate the petition without a proper determination of the nature and scope of the alleged constitutional violations.

20. As I conclude, and having read the petition, the petitioner has identified several constitutional provisions which he contends have been infringed, including Articles 27, 42, 43 and 69 of the Constitution. At paragraphs 20 to 29 of the petition, the petitioner sets out the factual basis of his grievances concerning the operation and management of the dam, the alleged denial of access to water by residents of Nyandarua county and the alleged failure to share benefits arising from the exploitation of the water resource. At paragraphs 36 and 37, the petitioner further alleges that the presence and management of the dam have contributed to adverse environmental and health consequences affecting residents living within its vicinity. The petitioner also identifies the respondents against whom the complaints are directed and sets out the reliefs he seeks from this court. In my view, these averments disclose the general nature of the alleged constitutional violations and the factual circumstances upon which the petitioner relies and which the 1st respondent is capable of identifying the case made against them. The petition is not so vague or incomprehensible as to render it incapable of adjudication.

21. From the above, I find that the notice of preliminary objection dated 18th December, 2024 and 24th April, 2025 both lack merit, and they are hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED & DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT

THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

HON. MBOGO C.G.

JUDGE

29/10/2026.

In the presence of:-

Mr. Benson Agunga – Court assistant

Ms. Munguti holding brief for Ms. Mwai for the Petitioner

Mr. Mativo for the 1st Respondent

Ms. Asasha holding brief for Mr. Wanyanga for the 2nd Respondent

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