Background
By a Notice of Motion dated 8th January 2026, brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 12 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiffs/Applicants seek the following orders:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
By a Notice of Motion dated 8th January 2026, brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 12 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiffs/Applicants seek the following orders:
Paragraph 1 →In the end, the application dated 8th January 2026 is incompetent and is hereby struck out with costs.
Paragraph 50 →Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the application is incompetent for want of a substantive suit. Accordingly, this Court is not properly seized of the dispute.
Paragraph 48 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC EP MISC NO. E001 OF 2026
FRED RATANDI ONDIEKI ………………………………………1ST PLAINTIFF
PHASE 4 MUGOYA ESTATE SOUTH C RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION ………………………………………………… 2ND PLAINTIFF
-VERSUS-
FLASHCOM SECURITY LIMITED …………………………… 1ST DEFENDANT
JOSEPH MACHARIA KARIUKI……………………………… 2ND DEFENDANT
CATHERINE MUTHONI MURAGURI …………………… 3RD DEFENDANT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 8th January 2026, brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 12 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiffs/Applicants seek the following orders:
a. Spent.
b. That pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-parties this Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order for an injunction restraining the Defendants, by themselves, servants/agents and/or otherwise, from excavating, developing, constructing and in any manner whatsoever interfering and dealing with the suit properties known as Lease
Nairobi Parcel No. Nairobi/Block 146/147, Nairobi/Block 146/146, and Nairobi/Block 146/121.
c. That pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-parties, the Honourable Court be pleased to issue an injunction order stopping the Defendants, by themselves, their contractors, servants and/or agents, from further continuing with the illegal construction and to restore the land forming the suit properties.
d. That this Honourable Court be pleased to compel the Defendants to produce in Court for inspection the actual development plans and approvals from the Survey of Kenya for the constructions.
e. That this Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other necessary order as required to safeguard the interests of the Plaintiffs.
f. That the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) at Akila Police Post, South C Station, assist in the enforcement of any orders issued herein.
g. That this Honourable Court be pleased to grant any further orders as may deem just and fit in the circumstances of this case.
h. That costs be in the cause.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of Fred Ratandi Ondieki, the Chairman of Phase 4 Mugoya Estate South C Residents Association, sworn on even date.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
3. The deponent averred that he is a registered homeowner and resident of Phase 4 Mugoya Estate, South C.
4. He averred that the Defendants were constructing commercial buildings on parcels Nairobi/Block 146/146, Nairobi/Block 146/147, and Nairobi/Block 146/121, contrary to the estate’s registered plan. He further averred that the excavation and construction posed health risks to the Plaintiffs and other residents.
5. He contended that the special conditions in the certificates of lease for all parcels within Nairobi/Block 146 restrict the use of the land and buildings to a single private dwelling for residential purposes only. He further averred that the Defendants changed the use of the subject properties from residential to commercial without the residents' consent or the national government's prior written approval, thereby rendering the purported change of use unlawful.
6. He further averred that the developments covered more than 50% of the land, contrary to the special conditions and the applicable development control regulations; failed to comply with the plans approved by the National Land Commission and the county government; and contravened the rules governing the civil servants’ housing scheme.
7. The deponent contends that the Defendants, who are not members of the residents’ association, failed to afford the Plaintiffs an opportunity to object to the change of use, as required by law. He further contends that the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs, as retired civil servants and senior citizens, have been deprived of their right to privacy.
8. Accordingly, he argued that the Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm unless the orders sought were granted.
THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S CASE
9. The 1st Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by its director, Shukri Sheikh Abdulrahman, on 10th March 2026 in opposition to the application. He averred that the 1st Defendant is the registered proprietor of L.R. Nos. 209/10505/146 and 209/10505/147, now known as Nairobi/Block 146/146 and Nairobi/Block 146/147. He further averred that the 1st Defendant is a stranger to any development on Nairobi/Block 146/121.
10. The deponent contends that the application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the Court’s process; that it is not founded on any substantive suit; and that it is based on conjecture and material non-disclosure. The deponent further contends that the application constitutes a collateral attack on the development approvals and licences granted to the 1st Defendant.
11. The deponent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 129(1)(a) of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, read together with Regulation 46(1)(f) of the Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003, and Section 78(b) of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019. He further contends that the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms before invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.
12. Regarding locus standi, the deponent argued that Section 41 of the Societies Act prevents the 2nd Plaintiff from suing in its own name. He further contended that the 1st Plaintiff failed to establish that he is an official of the 2nd Plaintiff, is authorized to depose on its behalf, or is a registered homeowner or resident of Phase 4 Mugoya Estate.
13. He averred that the development on the suit property comprises a medical facility. He stated that the 1st Defendant applied for and obtained approval from the County Government of Nairobi for a change of user and for its building plans, following publication at the site and in The Standard newspaper, and that neither the Plaintiffs nor any other resident raised an objection. He further stated that an Environmental Impact Assessment Project Report was prepared, during which the views of neighbours were sought through questionnaires, culminating in the issuance of a NEMA licence on 15th August 2024.
14. He averred that the 2nd Plaintiff was registered on 22nd December 2025, after the project had commenced, and that the Plaintiffs could not retrospectively challenge a development that had lawfully commenced before the 2nd Plaintiff came into existence. He contended that the application was motivated by malice, as the 1st Plaintiff, who resided nearby, was aware of the development, had never sought information regarding its approvals, and had never challenged the approvals or licences. He further stated that the signage at the site disclosed the requisite approvals.
15. He denied that any excavation was underway and maintained that the allegations of illegality, health risks, and invasion of privacy were unsubstantiated. He further stated that the National Land Commission and the Survey of Kenya have no role in approving or licensing developments.
16. He asserted that the development was consistent with the character of the neighbourhood. He further stated that the 1st Defendant had spent more than Kshs. 250,000,000/= on the project and had engaged third-party contractors. He added that, if the injunctive orders were granted, the 1st Defendant would suffer substantial loss and could face third-party claims.
THE APPLICANT’S RESPONSE
17. In a Further Affidavit dated 31st March 2026, the 1st Plaintiff stated that the 1st Defendant had not produced any building approvals, certificate of change of user, or other permits authorizing construction of a health facility on Nairobi/Block 146/146 and Nairobi/Block 146/147. He contended that no record existed of a registered change of user for the subject properties and that the construction was therefore unlawful.
18. He reiterated that the special conditions in the lease certificates restrict the subject property to a single private dwelling house, not a health facility.
19. He averred that, since the application dated 8th January 2026 was filed, the 1st Defendant had continued construction at a rapid pace, thereby increasing the risk to residents. He stated that water from the building had caused flooding within the estate, rendering it uninhabitable. He further averred that the site lacked adequate waste disposal, water supply, and sewerage drainage systems.
20. He argued that the 1st Defendant had failed to comply with conditions (a) to (n) of the National Construction Authority certificate of compliance it had submitted, and that the documents it relied on contained irregularities warranting the Court's strict scrutiny.
21. He averred that neither the 1st nor the 2nd Plaintiff had been notified of, or consented to, any change of user. He attached a list of homeowners and estate members who confirmed that they had not consented to the construction. He further contended that the persons listed in Exhibit B to the 1st Defendant’s replying affidavit dated 10th March 2026 were neither homeowners nor residents of the estate and were therefore not qualified to consent to the change of user.
22. He disputed the photographs of the change-of-user notices submitted by the 1st Defendant, asserting that no such notices had ever been displayed on the subject property and that the gate depicted did not belong to any building within the estate.
23. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE APPLICANTS’ SUBMISSIONS
24. The Applicants filed their submissions dated 31st March 2026.
25. On behalf of the Applicants, Counsel outlined the following issues for the Court’s determination:
a) Whether the 1st Plaintiff has capacity to institute the application; whether the 2nd Plaintiff appointed a representative to sue on its behalf;
b) Whether the 1st Defendant is constructing a health facility on Nairobi/Block 146/146 and Nairobi/Block 146/147 without a change of user; and
c) Whether the Defendants are undertaking developments without the requisite approvals.
26. Regarding the first issue, Counsel submitted that the 1st Plaintiff, as a Kenyan citizen, has a constitutional right to institute proceedings. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant had deposed that he is a homeowner and resident of Phase 4, Mugoya Estate. Counsel also submitted that under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 1st Plaintiff, as Chairperson of the 2nd Plaintiff, is authorized to sue on behalf of its members. To support this argument, Counsel relied on Kandara Residents Association & another v Ananas Holdings Limited, ELC No. 37 of 2020.
27. Counsel submitted that, under Articles 22 and 70 of the Constitution, the 2nd Plaintiff has standing despite being unincorporated, particularly in matters concerning the public interest and the environment.
28. On the merits, Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant had not produced any approval authorizing the construction of a health facility within a residential estate, or any change-of-user approval for Nairobi/Block 146/146 or Nairobi/Block 146/147. Counsel further submitted that none of the Defendants had produced building approvals for the ongoing construction.
29. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.
THE 1ST RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS
30. The 1st Respondent filed its submissions dated 9th April 2026.
31. On behalf of the 1st Respondent, Counsel submitted that prayers (i), (ii) and (iii) had been spent following the issuance of directions for the inter partes hearing. Counsel further submitted that prayer (iv) was equally spent, as the 1st Defendant had voluntarily exhibited its development approvals. Accordingly, there was nothing for the OCS, Akila Police Station, to enforce under prayer (vi).
32. Regarding jurisdiction, Counsel relied on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 to submit that this Court’s jurisdiction is ousted by Section 78(b) of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019, and Section 129(1)(a) of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, read together with Regulation 46(1)(f) of the Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiffs’ invitation for the Court to scrutinise the change of user and the NEMA licence constituted a collateral attack on those approvals. Counsel also submitted that the Plaintiffs had bypassed the National Environment Tribunal and the Nairobi County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee, contrary to the doctrine of exhaustion.
33. On locus standi, Counsel relied on Ali & 4 others v Kakaa & another [2026] KEELC 301 (KLR) to submit that the 1st Plaintiff had produced neither a title nor a lease to establish that he was a homeowner. Counsel further submitted that the register of residents on which he relied was fabricated and did not include the 1st Defendant. Relying on Republic v Registrar of Societies Ex parte Narok Muslim Welfare Association [2017] eKLR and Trustees Kenya Redeemed Church & another v Samuel M’Obiya & 5 others [2011] eKLR, Counsel submitted that a society registered under the Societies Act lacks capacity to sue in its own name. Counsel further submitted that the 1st Plaintiff had exhibited no authority from the 2nd Plaintiff to act on its behalf.
34. Counsel submitted that the suit is incompetent because it was instituted as a miscellaneous application without a plaint, contrary to Order 3 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Counsel relied on Proto Energy Limited v Hashi Energy Limited [2019] KEHC 12311 (KLR) and Chacha & another v Orbit Chemicals Industries Limited & another [2024] KEELC 3278 (KLR) to argue that an injunction must be anchored in a substantive suit.
35. On the merits, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs had not met the threshold established in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358. Counsel submitted that no prima facie case had been established, as the 1st Defendant had produced evidence of its change of user, approvals, and licences, none of which the Plaintiffs had challenged before the appropriate authorities. Counsel further submitted that the National Land Commission does not issue construction licences; that the Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any damage; that no complaint had been lodged with the police, NEMA, or the county government; and that, pursuant to Article 40 of the Constitution, the 1st Defendant was entitled to develop its property.
36. Counsel submitted that the further affidavit improperly introduced new evidence. To support this point, Counsel relied on Geotop Surveys Limited v Oldonyonyoike Group Ranch & another; Geoflex Consultants Limited (Intended Interested Party) [2022] KEHC 11394 (KLR). Counsel further submitted that the photographs annexed to the affidavit were inadmissible in the absence of a certificate under Section 106B of the Evidence Act. To support this, Counsel relied on The Clerk, Kisumu Assembly Service Board & 6 others [2015] eKLR. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
37. It is trite law that jurisdiction is everything, and without it, the Court must down its tools. This was the holding in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1.
38. The 1st Respondent contends that the order for injunction is not anchored on any substantive suit. The objection goes to whether this court is properly seized of the matter. The Applicants neither addressed this issue in their Further Affidavit nor in their Submissions.
39. The Applicants commenced these proceedings by way of a miscellaneous application dated 8th January 2026. The application is the only pleading on record. No plaint, originating summons or petition has been filed.
40. Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that every suit shall be instituted in such manner as may be prescribed by rules. Similarly, Order 3 Rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint, or in any other manner as may be prescribed.
41. The orders sought by the Applicant under prayers (b) and (c) are temporary injunctions. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules empowers the Court to grant a temporary injunction to preserve the subject matter of the substantive suit.
42. In Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited & another v Wanjala [2025] KEHC 3848 (KLR, the Court held that an application for an injunction cannot subsist on the basis of an application alone, and must be based on a suit seeking substantive relief. It stated:
“The now famous case of Giella v Cassman Brown E.A (1973) EA 350 states that an Applicant has to prove a prima facie case with a probability of success.
40. To this Court, it is clear that the prima facie case to be proved would be the substance in the suit, the subject of the interlocutory application. An application for an injunction cannot survive on the basis of an application alone. It has to be based on a claim by way of a suit, seeking substantive reliefs.
41. The Court refers to the decision in Cresta Investments Limited v Gulf African Bank Limited & another [2020] eKLR and Mbugua & another v Mbugua & 4 others (Miscellaneous Application E064 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 2405 (KLR) (16 January 2024) (Ruling) in support of this finding.
“Moreover, an application for injunction under Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules is predicated on a suit filed by the party seeking the injunction. An injunction without a substantive claim is a plea in vain and cannot lie in law or at all.”
43. In Riro v Kahonge & 3 others [2023] KEELC 16433 (KLR), the Court struck out an application for injunctive relief that was not grounded in a substantive suit. The Court held that such an application must be anchored in a suit commenced by a Plaint, Originating Summons, or Petition.
44. The absence of a substantive suit is not a procedural technicality that can be cured under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution. It goes to the very existence of the proceedings in which the court’s power to grant interlocutory relief is invoked.
45. In Joseph Kibowen Chemjor –vs William K. Kisera [2013]eKLR, the Court held that:
“There are times when all that a person wants is an order of court where the rights of the parties are not going to be determined. There is no “action” being enforced or being tried. In many such instances, it is the discretion of the court being sought or a procedural issue sought to be endorsed. The court in such a case is not being asked to determine any rights of the parties. Now, the Civil Procedure Rules do not specifically provide for the procedure to be followed where there is no “action”. In such instances, I think it is permissible for such person to file a miscellaneous application because the court is not asked to determine any issues between the parties. This is common and permissible where all that the party wants is a mere order from the court which does not settle any rights or obligations of the parties. This for instance can cover applications for leave to institute suit out of time or for leave to commence judicial review proceedings.
At this level, the court is not adjudicating on any rights. Where there is a call to adjudicate on rights of parties then it must be said that there is a “civil action” and this must be commenced in the manner prescribed by the Rules.”
46. The Applicant's dispute is contentious and requires the adjudication of rights. The orders sought can be granted only after the case has been heard on its merits. It goes without saying that a suit must exist on which this application can be based. Accordingly, a miscellaneous application is not an appropriate procedural vehicle for resolving this matter.
47. Although prayer (d) sought the production of documents, the 1st Respondent has already placed on record the leases, development permission, change of user, licences, and plans on which it relies. Whether those documents authorise the development is a matter for determination in a properly instituted suit, and this Court makes no finding on that issue.
48. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the application is incompetent for want of a substantive suit. Accordingly, this Court is not properly seized of the dispute.
49. Having determined that the orders sought cannot be granted, it would be an academic exercise to consider the remaining objections raised by the 1st Respondent. The Applicants are at liberty to institute proceedings in accordance with the law.
50. In the end, the application dated 8th January 2026 is incompetent and is hereby struck out with costs.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Ms Wambua for the Applicants
Muchoki for the 1st Defendant
Vena– Court assistant