Land law

Nyiro Homes Ltd v Prime Bank Ltd & another [2026] KEELC 7138 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

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Background

Before this court for determination is the 2nd Defendant/Applicant’s Chamber Summons dated 22nd May 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 1A & 1B, 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 2 Rule 15, and Order 7 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. He seeks the following reliefs:

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC LC NO E516 OF 2025

NYIRO HOMES LIMITED…..………….PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VERSUS

PRIME BANK LIMITED………… 1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

VARUN SHARMA RAJINDER (Sued in his own Capacity and as the Executor of the estate of

SUBOTH KUMARI SHARMA)……2nd DEFENDANT/APPLICANT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the 2nd Defendant/Applicant’s Chamber Summons dated 22nd May 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 1A & 1B, 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 2 Rule 15, and Order 7 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. He seeks the following reliefs:

i. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to strike out the 1st Defendant/Respondent’s Counterclaim dated 4th February 2026.

ii. THAT the costs of this Application be granted to the Applicant.

2. The summons is supported by the affidavit of Varun Sharma Rajinder, the 2nd Defendant/Applicant, sworn on an even date. He deponed that he has been sued both in his personal capacity and as the executor of the estate of the late Subodh Kumari Sharma and is therefore conversant with the matters giving rise to the application.

3. He explained that the Plaintiff’s suit concerns the enforcement and completion of a sale agreement dated 19th November 2024, relating to L.R. No. 209/7507, now known as Nairobi/Block 2/68 and that the suit also challenges the legality of the 1st Defendant’s purported withdrawal of consent to the transaction and its threatened exercise of the statutory power of sale. The Plaintiff’s claim, he urged, arises exclusively from that sale agreement and the parties’ conduct concerning the intended completion of the sale by private treaty.

4. According to Mr. Rajinder, the 1st Defendant subsequently filed a defence and counterclaim dated 4th February 2026, founded on alleged loan facilities, guarantees, banking arrangements and charge instruments involving Premier Agencies of Kenya Limited, Shankan Enterprises Limited and himself. He pointed out that the counterclaim seeks no substantive relief against the Plaintiff, Nyiro Homes Limited, despite the Plaintiff having instituted the suit.

5. It is his position that the counterclaim neither arises from the sale agreement nor concerns the Plaintiff’s claim for specific performance or the same transaction forming the subject of the suit and that the Plaintiff is not alleged to have been a borrower, guarantor, chargor or beneficiary of the banking facilities upon which the counterclaim is based, and no nexus has been established between its claim and the reliefs sought in the counterclaim. In his view, the 1st Defendant is improperly seeking to convert the proceedings into a debt-recovery action founded on separate lender-borrower relationships.

6. It was further urged that the counterclaim raises distinct questions concerning loan disbursements, banking facilities, guarantees, accounts, interest computations, securities and debt-recovery processes. Their determination will therefore require a separate inquiry unrelated to the issues arising from the sale agreement and that introducing those matters herein will unnecessarily complicate the proceedings, obscure the real issues in controversy and prejudice the fair and expeditious determination of the Plaintiff’s claim.

7. In support of the summons, the Plaintiff responded through a replying affidavit sworn by Dharmesh Shah, one of its directors dated the 22nd June, 2026. He stated that the counterclaim’s inclusion in the present proceedings will delay and impede the expeditious determination of the main suit.

8. According to him, the Plaintiff’s claim concerns the specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 19th November 2024, entered into with the 2nd Defendant and endorsed by the 1st Defendant in its capacity as chargee. In contrast, the counterclaim introduces two additional parties and seeks the recovery of sums allegedly advanced under separate commercial banking transactions.

9. The deponent averred that the Plaintiff is not a party to the transactions giving rise to the counterclaim, which explained why no relief had been sought against it. He maintained that the main suit and the counterclaim involve distinct parties and causes of action and cannot not conveniently be tried together. Further, he asserted, the counterclaim is purely commercial in nature and does not seek any relief concerning the suit property. It therefore falls outside the jurisdiction of this court and ought to be pursued before the commercial division of the High Court.

10. In opposition, the 1st Defendant, through Mr. George Wachira Mathui, its Senior Legal Manager swore a replying affidavit dated the 8th June, 2026. At the onset, he contested the competence of the application noting that it was not brought in accordance with Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and does not invoke any of the grounds for striking out a pleading under Order 2 Rule 15.

11. He further asserted that, having already filed a defence to the counterclaim, the 2nd Defendant could not invoke Order 7 Rule 12, which can only be relied upon before a reply to a counterclaim is filed. In any event, he maintained that the provision does not empower the court to grant the relief sought.

12. According to Mr. Mathui, contrary to the 2nd Defendant’s assertion, Order 7 Rules 8 and 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules expressly permit a counterclaim to be pursued against persons other than the Plaintiff, including persons who were not previously parties to the suit. He therefore maintained that the counterclaim is properly pleaded.

13. He further averred that the 2nd Defendant had mischaracterized the nature of the dispute. According to him, the Plaintiff’s suit challenges the 1st Defendant’s right, as chargee, to enforce its statutory remedies for the recovery of a debt secured by charges registered over the suit property. Correspondingly, the counterclaim seeks recovery of the debt secured by those same charges. He contended that the court has jurisdiction to determine that claim pursuant to Sections 2 and 91 of the Land Act.

14. He also disputed the assertion that the counterclaim would require an extensive and unrelated inquiry into the alleged indebtedness. He stated that the debt had been admitted on several occasions, including in the 2nd Defendant’s letter dated 12th January 2024. In that letter, the 2nd Defendant acknowledged outstanding sums of Kshs. 93,295,014.04 owed by Shankan Enterprises Limited and Kshs. 163,996,900.33 owed by Premier Agencies of Kenya Limited, while requesting the deferment of the intended auction of the suit property.

15. The 1st Defendant’s Senior Legal Manager consequently maintained that the counterclaim is directly connected with, and intertwined with the issues raised in the main suit and that both claims may conveniently be determined together. He urged the court to dismiss the application with costs.

16. The 2nd Defendant’s/Applicant’s counsel filed submissions dated 20th July 2026. Counsel submitted that although Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules generally requires applications to be brought by way of Motion, Order 7 Rule 12 merely provides that an aggrieved party may apply to the court without prescribing an exclusive procedure.

17. In any event, it was deposed, no prejudice had been demonstrated arising from the use of the Chamber Summons. It was urged that the court, guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, should determine the Motion on its merits.

18. According to counsel, the defence to the counterclaim and the present application are both dated 22nd May 2026 and filed contemporaneously and that the defence was filed as a protective measure to avoid the risk of an adverse default order and did not constitute a waiver of the 2nd Defendant’s right to challenge the competence of the counterclaim or the court’s jurisdiction.

19. Relying on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] eKLR, counsel argued that a jurisdictional objection may be raised at any stage and cannot be defeated merely because a reply to the counterclaim has been filed.

20. Counsel further submitted that the application is independently anchored on Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which empowers the court, at any stage, to strike out a pleading that discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious, prejudices or delays a fair trial, or otherwise constitutes an abuse of the court process. Accordingly, the limitation under Order 7 Rule 12 does not preclude the court from considering whether the counterclaim is liable to be struck out.

21. On the competence of the counterclaim, counsel submitted that as set out in Order 7 Rule 3, and expressed by the court in County Government of Kilifi vs Mombasa Cement Limited [2017] KECA 633 (KLR), a counterclaim constitutes a cross-claim by a Defendant against the Plaintiff which may conveniently be determined alongside the original action. In the present case, however, the 1st Defendant seeks no substantive relief against the Plaintiff, and instead directs its claims exclusively against the 2nd Defendant and other third parties rendering the same fatally defective.

22. In response to the 1st Defendant’s reliance on Order 7 Rules 8 and 9, counsel submitted that those provisions do not authorize a counterclaim exclusively against third parties and that Order 7 Rule 8 presupposes the existence of a valid counterclaim between the Defendant and the Plaintiff and merely permits the joinder of other persons necessary for its complete determination, while Rule 9 governs service upon such persons. Reliance in this regard was placed on Piedmont Investments Limited vs Standard Assurance Kenya Limited & 3 others [2025] KEHC 13148 (KLR).

23. It was urged that the predominant character of the counterclaim is the recovery of debts arising from a banker-customer relationship and that it therefore falls within the civil and commercial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 165(3) of the Constitution, rather than the jurisdiction of this court under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. Reliance was placed on Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited vs Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR) and Bank of Africa Kenya Limited & another vs TSS Investment Limited & 2 others [2024]eKLR.

24. The 1st Defendant filed submissions dated 3rd August 2026. Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant has not controverted the factual matters contained in the replying affidavit sworn by George Wachira Mathui on 8th June 2026 and that those facts should therefore be treated as undisputed. On the competence of the application, counsel argued that Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules is inapplicable because the 2nd Defendant has not specified any of the four statutory grounds upon which a pleading may be struck out. Cited in support was Mosi vs National Bank of Kenya Limited [2001] KEHC 842 (KLR).

25. As a consequence, it was noted, the application falls to be considered solely under Order 7 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Rules. However, that provision permits a party to apply for the exclusion of a counterclaim only before filing a reply to it and that since the 2nd Defendant has already filed a defence to the counterclaim, he is precluded from invoking that provision. In support herein the case of Kabuito Contractors Limited vs Mereka t/a Mereka & Co. Advocates [2003] KECA 186 (KLR), was cited.

26. Without prejudice to that objection, counsel submitted that the counterclaim was not rendered defective merely because no relief was sought against the Plaintiff in the original action and that Order 7 Rules 8 and 9 expressly permit a Defendant to bring a counterclaim against persons other than the Plaintiff, including persons who were not previously parties to the suit. Counsel again relied on Kabuito Contractors Limited (supra), where the Court of Appeal recognized that such additional parties may be joined and served with the defence and counterclaim.

27. Counsel further disputed the assertion that the counterclaim concerns a distinct and unrelated dispute. It was submitted that the Plaintiff’s suit challenges the 1st Defendant’s exercise of its statutory power of sale under charges registered over the suit property, while the counterclaim seeks recovery of the debt secured by those same instruments and that both claims arise from the same charges and concern cumulative remedies available to the 1st Defendant under Section 90(3) of the Land Act.

28. Relying on Daikyo Japan Motors Limited & 2 others vs Fairuz Feisal Yasin & another [2020] KEHC 10243 (KLR), counsel argued that allowing the counterclaim to proceed would avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and facilitate the comprehensive determination of the related disputes.

29. On jurisdiction, counsel submitted that the court had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in its ruling delivered on 19th March 2026, in which it granted an injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from exercising its statutory power of sale.

30. Counsel contended that the decision in Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited vs Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR) did not establish an absolute bar against the Environment and Land Court determining disputes between chargors and chargees. Rather, the court’s jurisdiction would be excluded where the predominant dispute concerned accounts or ordinary debt recovery. Also cited was Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited vs Catherine Kanini Kioko & 2 others [2018] KECA 387 (KLR).

31. In the alternative, counsel submitted that even if the court lacked jurisdiction over the counterclaim, Order 7 Rule 12 only permits its exclusion from the main suit, rather than its striking out. Accordingly, the proportionate course would be to sever the counterclaim and, if it falls within the High Court’s jurisdiction, transfer it to that court for separate determination.

Analysis and Determination

32. Having considered the Motion, responses and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are whether the present Motion is competent and whether the 1st Defendant’s Counterclaim should be struck out.

33. The 2nd Defendant seeks the striking out of the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim dated 4th February 2026. At the outset, however, the 1st Defendant challenges the competence of the application on the grounds that first, the same was brought by way of a Chamber Summons instead of a Notice of Motion, contrary to Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, second, it does not invoke any of the grounds for striking out a pleading prescribed under Order 2 Rule 15 and third, having already filed a Defence to the Counterclaim, the 2nd Defendant is precluded from relying on Order 7 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

34. In response, the 2nd Defendant contends that the application is competent notwithstanding its presentation by way of Chamber Summons, since Order 7 Rule 12 does not prescribe a particular procedure and the 1st Defendant has demonstrated no resulting prejudice. He further maintains that the application expressly invokes Order 2 Rule 15 and challenges the Counterclaim on the ground that it would prejudice and delay the fair trial of the suit. Lastly, he asserts that the Defence to the Counterclaim was filed contemporaneously with the application merely as a protective measure and did not waive his right to challenge either the Counterclaim or the court’s jurisdiction.

35. Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules requires all applications to be made by way of Motion and heard in open court, unless the court directs otherwise or the Rules expressly provide for their determination in Chambers. Although Order 7 Rule 12 does not prescribe the procedure for seeking the exclusion of a counterclaim, it must be read together with Order 51 Rule 1. The present application ought, therefore, to have been brought by way of a Notice of Motion.

36. The question, then, is whether the adoption of the wrong procedure is, by itself, fatal to the application. In Moses Mwicigi & 14 others vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 5 others [2016] eKLR, the Supreme Court underscored that procedural rules are important instruments in the administration of justice and that, in appropriate cases, non-compliance may render proceedings incompetent. It nevertheless acknowledged that procedure is not an end in itself and that strict adherence to procedural requirements should not be permitted to defeat substantive justice.

37. Despite having been brought by Chamber Summons, the application clearly sets out the orders sought and the grounds relied upon, and the 1st Defendant responded fully without demonstrating any uncertainty or prejudice. Striking it out solely for want of form would elevate procedural technicality over substance, contrary to Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act. The first objection therefore fails.

38. The second objection concerns the timing of the application under Order 7 Rule 12. The provision provides thus:

“Where a defendant sets up a counterclaim, if the plaintiff or any other person named in the manner aforesaid as party to such counterclaim contends that the claim thereby raised ought not to be disposed of by way of counterclaim, but in an independent suit, he may at any time before reply, apply to the court for an order that such counterclaim may be excluded, and the court may, on the hearing of such application, make such order as shall be just.”

39. The language of the Rule is plain. An application specifically seeking the exclusion of a counterclaim ought to be made before the applicant replies to it. The purpose of that requirement is to ensure that a party elects, at the earliest opportunity, whether to answer the counterclaim in the existing proceedings or to seek its determination in an independent suit.

40. It is common ground that the 2nd Defendant’s Defence to the Counterclaim and the present application bear the same date and were filed contemporaneously. Contemporaneous filing does not, however, satisfy the express requirement that the application be made “before reply.” Once the 2nd Defendant filed a substantive defence to the counterclaim, the procedural window provided by Order 7 Rule 12 closed. The explanation that the defence was filed protectively cannot displace the unambiguous terms of the Rule. This objection therefore succeeds.

41. Nonetheless, it is noted that the Motion is also expressed to be brought under Order 2 Rule 15, and part of the 2nd Defendant’s challenge is that the counterclaim falls outside this court’s jurisdiction. Unlike an application for exclusion under Order 7 Rule 12, an objection to jurisdiction may be raised at any stage, and the court is in any event obliged to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction before determining a dispute. Further, Order 2 Rule 15 permits the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike out a pleading on any of the grounds prescribed therein.

42. The 1st Defendant argues that the 2nd Defendant merely cited Order 2 Rule 15 without identifying the particular limb relied upon. Indeed, an applicant should ordinarily specify the precise ground invoked. However, the court must consider the application as a whole rather than isolate its heading from its supporting grounds and affidavit.

43. The application repeatedly asserts that the Counterclaim introduces unrelated parties and commercial claims, will prejudice or delay the fair trial of the principal suit, falls outside the court’s jurisdiction and amounts to an abuse of its process. These allegations substantially invoke Order 2 Rule 15(1)(c) and (d), and the 1st Defendant understood and fully responded to them. No prejudice has therefore arisen from the failure to specify the relevant sub paragraphs. The merits of those grounds will be considered under the second issue.

44. The next issue to consider is whether the 1st Defendant’s Counterclaim should be struck out? The jurisdiction to strike out a pleading is conferred by Order 2 Rule 15(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides:

“At any stage of the proceedings the court may order to be struck out or amended any pleading on the ground that—
(a) it discloses no reasonable cause
of action or defence in law; or
(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court,

and may order the suit to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.”

45. The four grounds under the Rule are distinct. A pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action where the pleaded facts do not establish an enforceable legal claim. A pleading is frivolous where it is groundless, fanciful or incapable of reasoned argument, and vexatious where it lacks bona fides or merely subjects the opposing party to unnecessary anxiety, trouble and expense.

46. An application may prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial where it is ambiguous, obscures the real controversy, raises immaterial issues or unnecessarily enlarges the scope, expense and duration of the proceedings. An abuse of process arises where the pleading misuses the Court’s procedure for a purpose for which it was not intended.

47. The power to strike out is nevertheless discretionary and draconian. It must be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest cases. In Blue Shield Insurance Company Ltd vs Joseph Mboya Oguttu [2009] eKLR, the Court of Appeal, applying D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd vs Muchina [1982] KLR 1, reiterated that a court should not embark upon a determination of the merits at the interlocutory stage.

48. The power is permissive rather than mandatory and should only be exercised where the impugned pleading is clearly and irredeemably untenable.

49. In the present case, the 2nd Defendant contends that the counterclaim is improperly constituted because it seeks no substantive relief against the Plaintiff in the original suit, but instead advances claims against him and two additional parties arising from separate loan facilities, guarantees and banking arrangements.

50. He further argues that those claims are unrelated to the Plaintiff’s claim for specific performance of the sale agreement dated 19th November 2024, and will prejudice and delay the fair trial of the suit and, being predominantly concerned with commercial debt recovery, fall outside this court’s jurisdiction. The Plaintiff supports that position, maintaining that it was not a party to the banking transactions underlying the counterclaim and that the main suit and the counterclaim involve distinct parties, causes of action and issues that cannot conveniently be tried together.

51. In response, the 1st Defendant contends that the counterclaim is properly constituted under Order 7 Rules 8 and 9, which permit claims against persons other than the Plaintiff in the original action. It further maintains that the two claims are sufficiently connected because the Plaintiff seeks to restrain the exercise of the statutory power of sale over the suit property, while the counterclaim seeks recovery of the debt secured by the charges registered over that property which debts have been duly acknowledged.

52. Against that background, it is necessary to consider the meaning and essential character of a Counterclaim. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition, defines a Counterclaim as:

“A claim for relief asserted against an opposing party after an original claim has been made; especially, a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a set-off against the plaintiff’s claim.”

53. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 42, similarly explains that where a claimant brings an action against a Defendant, and the Defendant has a cross-claim against that claimant which may properly be determined in the same proceedings, the Defendant is said to have a right of Counterclaim. The claim may be for money, an injunction, specific performance or declaratory relief. Its essential character, however, remains that of a cross-claim by the Defendant against the Plaintiff in the original action.

54. Order 7 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules gives effect to that understanding by permitting a Defendant to set off or set up, by way of Counterclaim against the Plaintiff’s claim, any right or claim accruing to the Defendant. Such a Counterclaim has the same effect as a cross-suit, thereby enabling the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same proceedings on both the original claim and the cross-claim.

55. Order 7 Rule 8 on which the 1st Defendant relies provides thus:

“Where a defendant by his defence sets up any counterclaim which raises questions between himself and the plaintiff, together with any other person or persons, he shall add to the title of his defence a further title similar to the title in a plaint, setting forth the names of all persons who, if such counterclaim were to be enforced by cross-action, would be defendants to such cross-action, and shall deliver to the court his defence for service on such of them as are parties to the action together with his defence for service on the plaintiff within the period within which he is required to file his defence.”

56. Order 7 Rule 9 states:

“Where any such person as is mentioned in rule 8 is not a party to the suit, he shall be summoned to appear by being served with a copy of the defence, which shall be served in accordance with the rules for regulating service of summons”

57. Admittedly, Order 7 Rules 8 and 9 permit the joinder of persons other than the Plaintiff. The provisions do not, however, dispense with the fundamental requirement that the Counterclaim must include a cross-claim by the Defendant against the Plaintiff in the original action.

58. The words “between himself and the Plaintiff together with any other person or persons” are instructive. They contemplate a claim by the Defendant against the Plaintiff whose complete determination requires the joinder of additional persons. They do not permit a Plaintiff’s suit to be used merely as a procedural vehicle for pursuing an independent claim exclusively against a co-defendant and newly joined parties, where no cause of action is pleaded and no relief is sought against the Plaintiff.

59. A similar position was taken in Kihara v Gituma t/a Dona Snacks & 2 others (Environment and Land Case Civil Suit 1190 of 2013) [2022] KEELC 13326 (KLR), where the court held that a claim by one Defendant exclusively against a co-defendant did not constitute a Counterclaim because it was neither a cross-suit nor a counter-action against the Plaintiff. Such a claim was distinct and ought to have been pursued in separate proceedings.

60. In the present case, the Counterclaim is brought by the 1st Defendant against Premier Agencies of Kenya Limited, Shankan Enterprises Limited and the 2nd Defendant. It is founded upon banking facilities allegedly advanced to the two companies, charges created by the deceased over the suit property, and guarantees and indemnities allegedly executed in favour of the 1st Defendant.

61. The 1st Defendant seeks judgment for Kshs. 72,701,886.29, Kshs. 2,491,305.90 and Kshs. 92,706,421.74, together with contractual interest and costs. It neither pleads a cause of action nor seeks any substantive relief against the Plaintiff. Ultimately, the 1st Defendant’s claim, being directed exclusively against the 2nd Defendant and other independent parties, does not qualify as a proper Counterclaim.

62. There is also the fundamental question of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction flows from the Constitution and statute. It cannot be conferred by the manner in which a claim is pleaded, the factual connection between disputes, the convenience of determining them together or the parties’ acquiescence.

63. The 1st Defendant contends that the court assumed jurisdiction when, on 19th March 2026, it granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the exercise of the statutory power of sale. Relying on Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited vs Catherine Kanini Kioko & 2 others [2018] KECA 387 (KLR), it further argues that this court is not precluded from determining disputes between chargors and chargees.

64. Although the alleged facilities were secured by charges over the suit property, the Counterclaim does not seek possession of the property, enforcement of the statutory power of sale, or a declaration concerning the validity, priority or enforceability of the charges. The reliefs sought are limited to payment of the outstanding loan balances, contractual interest and costs.

65. Determination of those claims would principally require the court to construe the letters of offer, loan agreements, guarantees and indemnities, examine the loan accounts, disbursements and repayments; and ascertain the liabilities of the borrowers and guarantors. The predominant issue in the counterclaim is whether the borrowers and guarantors owe the 1st Defendant the sums claimed.

66. The counterclaim is therefore, in substance, a commercial debt-recovery claim. In Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited vs Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that although a charge creates an interest in land, a dispute predominantly concerning lending arrangements, accounts, contractual obligations and recovery of debt does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court merely because the debt is secured by land.

67. Similarly, whereas indeed Sections 2 and 91 of the Land Act regulate charges and the remedies available to chargees, it does not enlarge the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act.

68. The interlocutory ruling delivered on 19th March 2026 does not alter that conclusion. An order preserving the suit property pending trial neither confers jurisdiction upon the court nor constitutes a final determination that every claim connected with the property falls within its mandate. Accordingly, the 1st Defendant’s Counterclaim falls outside the jurisdiction of this court.

69. The 1st Defendant urges that this court to simply transfer the Counterclaim to the High Court. However, in this instance, the defect is not merely one of forum as in the cited cases. As already found, the impugned pleading does not constitute a Counterclaim within the meaning of Order 7 Rules 3 and 8, since it discloses no cross-claim against the Plaintiff. It seeks relief exclusively against a co-defendant and newly introduced parties. Severance or transfer would therefore require the court to convert an incompetent Counterclaim into an independent commercial suit.

70. Consequently, the Chamber Summons dated 22nd May 2026 succeeds to the extent that the 1st Defendant’s Counterclaim dated 4th February 2026 is hereby struck out. For avoidance of doubt, this determination does not address the validity or merits of the alleged indebtedness and shall not prevent the 1st Defendant from pursuing its claim through independent proceedings before a court of competent jurisdiction.

71. The 1st Defendant shall bear the costs of the Motion.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 29th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Mr. Koech for Otwal for Applicant

Mr. Mutua for 1st Defendant/Respondent

Ms Munene for Koech for Plaintiff

Court Assistant: Tracy

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