REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC NO. 719 OF 2016
PAUL THUO NJAMBI...................................DECREEHOLDER
VERSUS
JAMES WAWERU MUTURI.................JUDGEMENT DEBTOR
RULING
1. Vide a Notice of Motion dated 21st April, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3 and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 22 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Decree Holder/Applicant seeks the following reliefs:
i. That there be an order for eviction of the Defendant, James Waweru Muturi, his agents, servants, employees, family and or any person claiming through the Defendant from the parcel of land known as plot 675 in Kayole Spring Valley Resettlement Scheme.
ii. That there be an order allowing the Plaintiff to demolish the illegal structure erected by the Defendant on the suit property.
iii. That there be an order directing the officer commanding Kayole Police Station or any other officer under him to supervise compliance with the orders herein and ensure law and order are maintained during execution.
iv. That costs of this application be borne by the Defendant.
2. The Motion is premised on the facts set out on the face thereon and supported by the affidavit of Paul Thuo Njambi, the Applicant herein of an even date. He deponed that on 9th May, 2017, this court in a ruling on an interlocutory application declared the Respondent a trespasser and issued a mandatory injunction compelling him to vacate plot 675 (hereinafter the suit property).
3. In May 2017, he stated, the Respondent vacated the suit property, a fact acknowledged by both parties and affirmed by the Court of Appeal. However, during the pendency of the suit, the Respondent clandestinely re-entered a portion of the property, where he erected an illegal structure from which he now operates a car wash.
4. According to Mr. Njambi, this court delivered judgment on 20th November 2025, declaring him the lawful owner of the suit property, issued a permanent injunction restraining the Respondent from interfering with the property, and awarded him damages for trespass together with costs and interest.
5. He deponed that, despite having full knowledge of the judgment, the Respondent has refused to vacate the suit property or remove the illegal structures erected thereon. He maintained that, unless the orders sought are granted, the Respondent's continued occupation will persist in infringing his constitutionally guaranteed right to property.
6. In response, the Respondent swore a replying affidavit dated 4th May, 2026. He deponed that he fully vacated the suit property prior to the filing and hearing of the present application and as a consequence, the orders sought are spent, unnecessary, and incapable of enforcement.
7. He explained that immediately upon vacating the suit property, the Applicant took vacant possession thereof and fenced the same with iron sheet hoarding and that the Applicant subsequently commenced and completed developments on the property, which is now occupied by third parties demonstrating that the Applicant has long since regained possession.
8. With regard to the adjacent riparian area in front of plot no. 381, he deponed that the three trees he had planted in 2001 to prevent soil erosion were recently cut down and the timber removed by a person known as Thuo, allegedly under the protection of goons.
9. He stated that he reported the incident at Kayole Police Station under OB No. 64 dated 3rd April 2026, and also sought the intervention of the Nairobi City County Government. He clarified that the incident was unrelated to his compliance with the court order requiring him to vacate the suit property.
10. He further deponed that the Applicant has continued to interfere with and harass workers at the frontage of plot No. 381, and urged the court to restrain the Applicant from interfering with the quiet use and enjoyment of that area.
11. The Applicant filed a further affidavit dated 16th July, 2026. He deponed that the Respondent's replying affidavit is incompetent and fatally defective, having been filed by the Respondent in person while he was still represented by counsel, contrary to the mandatory provisions of Order 9 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
12. He further deponed that after he raised the procedural irregularity during the mention of the matter on 11th May, 2026, the Respondent hurriedly filed a notice of intention to act in person dated 14th May, 2026. According to the Applicant, the notice did not cure the defect. Having been filed after the delivery of judgment, the notice was itself incompetent for want of leave of the court or the consent of the outgoing advocates, as required under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
13. On the merits, Mr. Njambi asserted that, although the Respondent had vacated part of the suit property and he had had developed a portion of plot no. 675, the Respondent had wrongfully assumed that the undeveloped section belonged to him and had unlawfully re-entered it on the pretext that it constituted riparian land. He maintained that, if the Respondent had indeed vacated the suit property as alleged, then he could have no legitimate objection to the issuance of eviction orders.
14. He further deponed that the Respondent is seeking to revive the argument that this court had already rejected in its judgment, namely that the suit property constituted riparian land. According to the Applicant, the area on which the Respondent has established a car wash, is in fact located across the stream and formed part of plot no. 675.
15. The Plaintiff denied the allegations contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the replying affidavit terming them as false, misleading, and irrelevant to the issues before the court, and urged the court to allow the application so that he could enjoy the fruits of his judgment.
16. The Respondent filed a supplementary affidavit dated 31st July, 2026. He deponed that the Applicant's further affidavit is without merit and reiterated that the application is incompetent, misconceived and an abuse of the court process. According to him, there is no executable order nor a valid decree on the court record capable of supporting the eviction orders sought, rendering the application premature and legally untenable.
17. He further deponed that the Applicant had, in his further affidavit, admitted that upon visiting the suit premises he found that the Respondent had already relocated from the suit property to another plot, a fact also reflected in the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. Nai 159 of 2017 (UR 124/2017). In light of that admission, he contended that the prayer seeking his eviction from the suit property is misleading, misconceived, and made in bad faith.
18. Mr. Muturi denied the allegation that he had clandestinely re-entered and occupied any part of the suit property, describing it as false, unsupported by evidence, and a mere afterthought intended to bolster an otherwise untenable application. He averred that the area allegedly reoccupied lay immediately adjacent to the Applicant's apartment, which had been constructed while he was still in occupation, making it inconceivable that any such re-entry could have occurred without the Applicant's knowledge.
19. The Respondent further deponed that the official map signed by the Applicant's own witness from the Kayole Spring Valley Settlement Scheme showed that the developments associated with the suit property extended beyond its boundaries into plot no. 674. He further asserted that the structure referred to by the Applicant as a "car wash" is in fact situated on plot no. 673 and not plot no. 675.
20. It is the Respondent’s case that the official Survey of Kenya map confirmed that the current location of the car wash lies along Kangundo Road within plot no. 381, also referenced as Nairobi Block 190/2267–2268, as reflected in the Nairobi City County business permit. He further relied on the Survey of Kenya map to demonstrate the correspondence between the settlement scheme plot numbers and the registered title numbers, contending that the mapping evidence exposed material inconsistencies and misrepresentations in the Applicant's assertions regarding the location and occupation of plot no. 675.
21. Although this court had observed in its judgment that, at most, only a strip measuring between six and thirty metres may have been delimited, he averred, the Applicant had nevertheless undertaken developments within the river reserve contrary to planning, environmental and land use laws. He also alleged that the Applicant had breached the conditions of the allotment by carrying out developments beyond the boundaries of plot no. 675 and without the requisite approvals, despite the allotment requiring compliance with approved plans, beacon certification and development strictly within the plot boundaries.
Submissions
22. The Applicant’s counsel filed submissions on 16th July, 2026. Counsel submitted that the Respondent's replying affidavit dated 4th May 2026, and the subsequent notice of intention to act in person dated 14th May 2026, are incompetent for failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
23. Reliance was placed on Florence Hare Mkaha vs Pwani Tawakal Mini Coach & Another [2014] eKLR and Julieta Marigu Njagi vs Virginia Njoki Mwangi & Another [2022] eKLR for the proposition that compliance with Order 9 Rule 9 is mandatory and cannot be cured under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution.
24. On the merits of the application, Counsel submitted that the Respondent had persistently disobeyed the court's judgment of 20th November 2025, which declared the Applicant the lawful owner of plot no. 675, permanently restrained the Respondent from entering or occupying the property, and awarded him damages for trespass. Whereas he had initially vacated, counsel stated, the Respondent secretly moved back to the property.
25. Counsel further argued that the Respondent's renewed assertion that the disputed area constitutes riparian land is an attempt to relitigate issues that had been fully considered and conclusively determined in the judgment. Counsel maintained that the evidence at trial established that plot number 675 and plot number 381 lie on opposite sides of a stream, and that the Respondent continued to occupy the Applicant's side in violation of the permanent injunction.
26. It was therefore submitted that unless the eviction orders sought were granted, the Applicant would continue to be deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property despite having successfully litigated the matter to finality.
27. The Respondent filed submissions on 31st July, 2026. He submitted that the Applicant’s objection to his replying affidavit overlooks the broader constitutional framework governing the administration of justice. He argued that Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules was intended primarily to regulate representation after judgment and to protect advocates from being removed from the record without notice, particularly where issues of costs arise and that it was not designed to operate as a procedural weapon to determine substantive land disputes without affording one party a hearing.
28. The Respondent submitted that the authorities relied upon by the Applicant were distinguishable, as they concerned advocates who came on record after judgment without complying with Order 9 Rule 9, unlike the present case where the Respondent personally filed the affidavit before subsequently regularizing his position.
29. It was argued that a breach of Order 9 Rule 9 does not automatically warrant striking out a pleading, and the court was urged to prioritize substantive justice over procedural technicalities in accordance with Articles 48, 50, and 159 of the Constitution. Cited in support were Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat vs IEBC & 7 Others [2014] eKLR and Stephen Mwangi Kimote vs Murata Sacco Society Ltd [2018] eKLR.
30. Further, it was submitted that under Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, the Applicant bore the burden of proving that the Respondent was in occupation of plot number 675, that the structures sought to be demolished were situated on that plot, that he had re-entered the property after judgment, and that the eviction sought fell within the terms of the decree.
31. It was argued that the Applicant had failed to produce any survey report, beacon certificate, or other technical evidence to support those allegations. In contrast, the Respondent had tendered official Survey of Kenya maps, County records, business permits, and other documentary evidence showing that the disputed structures were located on plot number 381 and adjoining plots.
32. Counsel therefore contended that the Applicant had failed to rebut that evidence and was improperly inviting the court to grant eviction on the basis of bare assertions. Reliance in this regard was placed on Palace Investment Ltd vs Geoffrey Kariuki Mwenda & Another [2015] eKLR.
Analysis and Determination
33. Having considered the Motion, responses and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are:
i. Whether the Respondent’s replying affidavit is fatally defective?
ii. Whether eviction orders should issue against the Respondent?
I. Whether the Respondent’s replying affidavit is fatally defective?
34. At the outset, the Applicant contends that the Respondent's replying affidavit dated 4th May 2026, is incompetent and fatally defective for having been filed by the Respondent in person despite the fact that he was, at the material time, represented by advocates on record.
35. It is further argued that following the delivery of judgment, the Respondent could only act in person upon obtaining leave of the court or filing a consent with his outgoing advocates in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
36. The Applicant further submits that the subsequent notice of intention to act in person, filed on 14th May 2026, after the replying affidavit had already been filed, could not retrospectively cure the defect, and therefore both documents ought to be struck out.
37. The law governing change of advocates after judgment is found in Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides as follows:
“When there is a change of Advocate, or when a party decides to act in person having previously engaged an Advocate, after judgment has been passed, such change or intention to act in person shall not be effected without an order of the Court—
(a) upon an application with notice to all the parties;or
(b) upon a consent filed between the outgoing Advocate and the proposed incoming Advocate or party intending to act in person as the case may be.”
38. Order 9, Rule 10 provides:
“An application under rule 9 may be combined with other prayers provided the question of change of Advocate or party intending to act in person shall be determined first.”
39. A reading of the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules makes it mandatory that for any change of advocates after judgment has been entered to be affected, there must be an order of the court upon application with notice to all parties or upon a consent filed between the outgoing advocate and the proposed incoming advocate.
40. The reasoning behind the provision was well articulated in the case of S. K. Tarwadi v Veronica Muehlmann [2019] eKLR where the judge observed as follows:
“…In my view, the essence of the Order 9 Rule 9 of the CPR was to protect advocates from the mischievous clients who will wait until a judgment is delivered and then sack the advocate and either replace him….”
41. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Respondent filed the replying affidavit in person while his previous advocates were still on record. It is equally not disputed that shortly thereafter he filed a notice of intention to act in person. Although that course did not strictly comply with the procedure prescribed under Order 9 Rule 9, the court must determine whether the non-compliance is of such a nature as to render the replying affidavit a nullity.
42. The court is not persuaded that it does. To begin with, the Applicant has not demonstrated any prejudice suffered as a result of the procedural lapse. The issues raised in the replying affidavit have been fully answered through the Applicant's further affidavit and both parties have extensively addressed the court by way of written submissions.
43. As observed by the Court of Appeal in Tobias M. Wafubwa vs Ben Butali [2017] eKLR:
“We would go further to add that, provided that where the failure to comply with the rule 9 did not undermine the jurisdiction of the court, or affect the core of the dispute in question, or prejudice either of the parties in any way as to lead to a miscarriage of justice, then, Article 159 of the Constitution and the overriding principles could be called upon to aid the court to dispense substantive justice through just, efficient and timely disposal of proceedings. A similar approach was invoked in the case of Boniface Kiragu Waweru vs James K. Mulinge [2015] eKLR where in addressing the issue of non-compliance with order 9 rule 9 this Court observed thus;“All in all we are not persuaded that non-compliance with Order III rule 9A of the Civil Procedure Rules was meant to make the following proceedings incompetent or a nullity, efficacious as the provision was meant to be. Indeed, all times, the set procedures ought to be followed or complied with. However, we find that non-compliance, in the present matter, did not go to the root of the proceedings. The non-compliance we may say, was procedural and not fundamental. It did not cause prejudice to the appellant at all…”… In declining to dismiss the appeal on account of a procedural technicality, we are satisfied that the learned judge did not in any way misdirected herself.”
44. In the circumstances of this case, striking out the Respondent's replying affidavit would serve no useful purpose other than to deny the court the benefit of hearing both parties on the substantive issues in dispute. The procedural irregularity complained of is curable and does not go to the root of the proceedings.
45. Accordingly, the court declines the Applicant's invitation to strike out the Respondent's replying affidavit. The court will therefore proceed to determine the application on its merits.
46. The Applicant's case is that notwithstanding the judgment of 20th November 2025, and the Respondent's earlier compliance with the interlocutory mandatory injunction issued in 2017, the Respondent subsequently re-entered a portion of plot no. 675, erected an illegal structure thereon and resumed operating a car wash.
47. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he fully vacated the suit property in 2017 and has never re-entered it. His case is that the car wash currently complained of is situated on plot no. 381, or alternatively plot no. 673, adjacent to the suit property, and not on plot no. 675.
48. There is no dispute that this court, in its judgment delivered on 20th November 2025, conclusively determined that the Applicant is the lawful owner of plot no. 675, rejected the Respondent's contention that the suit property constituted riparian land, and granted a permanent injunction restraining the Respondent from entering, occupying or otherwise interfering with the Applicant's quiet possession of the suit property. Those findings remain binding upon the parties and cannot be reopened in these execution proceedings.
49. It is equally undisputed that the Respondent vacated the suit property pursuant to the interlocutory mandatory injunction issued in 2017. This fact was acknowledged by both parties, noted by the Court of Appeal, and reaffirmed by this court in its judgment, wherein it observed:
“135-In the instant case, the Defendant's unlawful occupation extended from 2015, when the Plaintiff acquired ownership, to 2017, when he was compelled to vacate by an order of the Court.”
50. The only question before this court, therefore, is whether the Applicant has proved that the Respondent subsequently re-entered the suit property warranting the issuance of eviction orders against him.
51. Under Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving that alleged re-entry rests squarely upon the Applicant. While the Applicant has annexed photographs which he asserts depict the Respondent's intrusion onto the suit property, those photographs, standing alone, do not establish the precise location of the structures or demonstrate that they lie within the boundaries of plot no. 675. They are not accompanied by any survey report, beacon certificate, or other technical evidence identifying the structures in relation to the suit property.
52. On the other hand, the Respondent has consistently maintained that the structures complained of are situated within his plot 381 and has in that regard adduced inter-alia, a Nairobi City County Business Permit indicating that the current location of the said car wash lies along Kangundo Road within Plot No. 381, also referenced as Nairobi Block 190/2267-2268, Matopeni/Spring Valley, Embakasi Central.
53. Although the decree permanently restrains the Respondent from interfering with plot no. 675, the court cannot order eviction unless it is satisfied, on cogent evidence, that the Respondent is presently in occupation of that parcel in breach of the decree. Where the location of the alleged encroachment is itself contested, the court must exercise caution before granting the drastic remedy of eviction.
54. In the present case, the court is not satisfied that the Applicant has discharged the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent has re-entered and is presently occupying plot no. 675 contrary to the judgment of this court. In the absence of cogent evidence identifying the exact location of the alleged intrusion, the court cannot grant orders for eviction or demolition.
55. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion dated 21st April 2026, is unmerited and is hereby dismissed with costs.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 29th day of October, 2026.
O. A. Angote
Judge
In the presence of;
Ms Wanjira holding brief for Kariuki for Applicant
Mr. Waweru – the Defendant
Court Assistant: Tracy