Land law

Ngatho & another v Moki Savings Cooperative Society Ltd & 21 others [2026] KEELC 7283 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
Mbogo C.G.

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Background

Before this court for determination is the chamber summons dated 11th March 2025 (sic), filed by the plaintiffs/applicants, and it is expressed to be brought under Sections 27 and 89 of the Civil Procedure Act, Paragraph 11(4), 49 and Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and Articles 50 and 159 of the Constitution, seeking the following orders:-

Paragraph 1 →

Reasoning passage

Having said the above, it would serve no purpose to determine whether or not there was an error in principle in the decision by the taxing officer. The plaintiffs/applicants failed to file the reference within the time and I find the reasons adduced not plausible. The chamber summons dated 11th March, 2026 lacks merit, and the same is dismissed. Each party to bear its own costs. The plaintiffs/applicants are hereby granted leave to…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCC NO. 745 OF 2001

LILIAN WAIRIMU NGATHO..............................1ST PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT

ELIZABETH MURUNGARI NJOROGE...............2ND PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT

VERSUS

MOKI SAVINGS COOPERATIVE

SOCIETY LTD & 21 OTHERS………….....………DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the chamber summons dated 11th March 2025 (sic), filed by the plaintiffs/applicants, and it is expressed to be brought under Sections 27 and 89 of the Civil Procedure Act, Paragraph 11(4), 49 and Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and Articles 50 and 159 of the Constitution, seeking the following orders:-

1. Spent.

2. The plaintiff be granted leave to file this application to this honorable court against the decision of the honorable court’s taxing officer delivered herein out of time.

3. The leave granted in prayer (2) above do operate as stay of execution of the ruling of the taxing officer delivered herein on 12th November, 2024 and all consequential orders thereto pending the hearing and determination of this application.

4. This honourable court be pleased to set aside the decision of the honourable taxing officer delivered on the 12th of November, 2024 herein and all consequential orders thereto.

5. This honorable court be pleased to re-tax the 2nd & 13th to 22nd defendants bill of costs, 8th to 12th defendants bill of costs and the 3rd to 7th defendants bill of costs herein or in the alternative, this court be pleased to remit the bill of costs, for re-taxation before a different taxing master with appropriate directions thereof.

6. The costs of this application be in the cause.

2. The application is premised on the grounds appearing on its face and further supported by the affidavit of the 2nd plaintiff/applicant sworn on 11th March, 2026. The plaintiffs/applicants deposed that several bills of costs were taxed on 12th November 2024, and that the taxing officer erred in principle in arriving at the amounts awarded. Prior to 16th September, 2021 the matter had been the subject of judgments by Ojwang, J (as he then was) and Nyamweya, J (as she then was), and that no costs had been awarded during that period. The plaintiffs/applicants deposed that the joinder of the 3rd to 22nd defendants/respondents was only allowed on 29th September 2021, and any items relating to proceedings undertaken before their joinder were improperly taxed.

3. The plaintiffs/applicant deposed that the claims by the 19th, 20th and 21st defendants/respondents concerned the balance of the purchase price of the suit property, which claim was declined by the court. Further, that the 19th defendant/respondent did not participate in the proceedings and is since deceased, with no substitution having been undertaken. The plaintiffs/applicant deposed that they objected to the taxation through their advocates’ letter dated 22nd November 2024, but there was no response.

4. According to them, it was not until 6th May 2025 that the taxing officer declared herself functus officio and directed them to move the court appropriately. The plaintiffs/applicants further deposed that the taxing officer subsequently delivered a ruling on 25th July 2025, in which she addressed their earlier objection. They maintained that the delay in approaching the court was occasioned by the failure of the taxing officer to furnish the reasons for the taxation and the subsequent proceedings undertaken in their attempt to challenge the taxation.

5. The plaintiffs/ applicants deposed that the taxed costs, which they place at Kshs.6,581,663/-, are excessive and that payment of the same would cause them substantial prejudice. They further deposed that the intended reference raises arguable issues and that it is in the interests of justice that they be afforded an opportunity to challenge the taxation on its merits.

6. In opposition to thereto, the 2nd and 13th to 22nd defendants/respondents filed the replying affidavit sworn on 4th May, 2026 by the 2nd defendant/respondent. She deposed that on 29th July 2025, the plaintiffs/applicants filed ELC misc. appl. no. E222 of 2025 seeking substantially similar reliefs to those sought in the present application. She also deposed that the said application was heard and dismissed by a ruling delivered on 9th March 2026, for having been instituted outside the substantive suit.

7. According to the 2nd defendant/respondent, the plaintiffs/applicants spent approximately eight months pursuing the earlier application, which was eventually found to be incompetent, irregular and unprocedural. She maintained that the present application has been brought after an inordinate delay of approximately seventeen months from the date of the taxing officer’s decision.

8. She further deposed that the taxing officer’s ruling of 12th November, 2024 contained comprehensive reasons for the taxation of the disputed items and that the letter dated 22nd November, 2024 was not an objection within the meaning of Paragraph 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. She deposed that the plaintiffs/applicants have neither satisfactorily explained the delay nor demonstrated any error of principle warranting interference with the taxation.

9. The 2nd and 13th to 22nd defendants/respondents also filed grounds of opposition dated 27th April 2026, challenging the application on the following grounds: -

1. This application is incompetent and does not meet the threshold for exercise of the court’s discretion in the applicants’ favour to extend time for filing the reference as the inordinate delay was occasioned in large part by the applicants’ own conduct of moving court using the wrong procedure and persisting to urge the application to the end instead of withdrawing it.

2. The delay in filing the reference is inordinate.

3. This honourable court lacks the jurisdiction to grant the orders sought.

4. The application is res judicata.

5. The application is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court and the same should be dismissed with costs to the 2nd and 13th to 22nd defendants.

10. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th defendants/respondents opposed the application through the replying affidavit sworn by Leo Masore Nyang'au, advocate on 7th May, 2026. He deposed that the application was brought after an inordinate and unexplained delay. He further challenged the competence of the application contending among other matters, that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act and the Constitution cited do not provide the appropriate procedure for challenging taxation. Further, that the reference to Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order is misplaced.

11. The learned counsel deposed that the plaintiff’s/applicants’ letter dated 22nd November 2024 did not constitute a notice of objection under Paragraph 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order but rather sought a review of the taxing officer’s decision by the taxing officer herself. He maintained that the plaintiffs/applicants failed to invoke the procedure prescribed by law and that the court ought not to exercise its discretion in their favour.

12. The 3rd to 7th defendants/respondents also filed grounds of opposition dated 7th May 2026, challenging the application on the following grounds:-

1. That the court does not have jurisdiction to extend the time for filing a reference out of time where no objection to taxation was filed in the first place.

2. That the letter which the plaintiffs would want the court to regard as an objection to taxation, was an application to the taxing officer to review her decision on the taxation.

3. That the taxing officer was not obligated to respond to the letter for her to review her decision on taxation even if the letter had been brought to her attention.

4. That the application is muddled up in that one cannot request for leave to file a reference out of time and purport to argue the purported reference in the same application.

5. That where reasons are given or are self-evident on the ruling on taxation, one does not need to request the taxing officer to supply the very same reasons.

6. That there has been inordinate delay in making the application which delay has not been explained.

7. That the application is misconceived, it is a groping in legal darkness and the same is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

8. That reference from decisions on taxation are meant to be simple, straight forward and fast-tracked otherwise they turn out to be an endless circus in litigation which flies in the face of the often-quoted phrase that litigation must come to an end.

13. The 8th to 12th defendants/respondents opposed the application through grounds of opposition dated 28th April 2025 (sic), raising the following grounds:-

1. The application is incompetent.

2. The application is otherwise unmerited.

3. The application is res judicata.

4. The court lacks jurisdiction to grant prayers sought.

14. The plaintiffs/applicants filed a further affidavit sworn by the 2nd plaintiff/applicant on 25th June, 2026. She reiterated that the dismissal of ELC misc. appl. No. E222 of 2025 was on procedural grounds and not on the merits of the intended taxation reference. She maintained that the present application was filed in the substantive suit to cure the procedural defect identified by the court. The plaintiffs/applicants further addressed the issue of the deceased defendants, particularly the 19th and 21st defendants, and the question of substitution. She referred to proceedings pending before the court of appeal and deposed that the dispute over costs ought to be considered against the background of the protracted litigation between the parties.

15. The plaintiffs/applicants deposed that the defendants/respondents have not demonstrated that they would suffer prejudice incapable of being compensated by an award of costs if enlargement of time were granted. They further deposed that the intended reference raises substantial questions concerning the award of instruction fees, the participation of the respective defendants/respondents and the proper application of the Advocates Remuneration Order.

16. The application was canvassed through written submissions. The plaintiffs/applicants filed their written submissions dated 5th October, 2026. The 8th to 12th defendants/respondents filed their written submissions dated 13th August 2026, while the 3rd to 7th defendants/respondents filed their written submissions dated 13th July, 2026. By the time of writing this ruling, the 2nd and 13th to 22nd defendants/respondents had not filed their written submissions. Be that as it may, I have carefully considered the application, the replies thereof and the written submissions. In my view, the issues for determination are as follows: -

i. Whether the application is res judicata.

ii. Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the application.

iii. Whether the plaintiffs/applicants have established sufficient grounds for enlargement of time to challenge the taxing officer’s ruling delivered on 12th November, 2024.

iv. Whether the plaintiffs/applicants have established a proper basis for setting aside the taxing officer’s ruling and remitting the bills of costs for taxation afresh.

v. Who should bear the costs of the application.

17. On whether the instant application is res judicata, Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act bars a court from trying a suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or parties claiming under them, litigating under the same title, where the matter was heard and finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court of appeal has reiterated that the doctrine requires the coexistence of, among other things, identity of the matter directly and substantially in issue, identity of parties or their privies, litigation under the same title, competence of the former court and final determination of the matter. See the case of John & 8 Others v Gikunda [2024] KECA 1221 (KLR).

18. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs/applicants previously filed ELC misc. appl. no. E222 of 2025 seeking substantially similar reliefs to those sought in the instant application. While contending that the suit was dismissed, the same was struck out vide the ruling delivered on 9th March, 2026 for having been instituted as a separate miscellaneous application rather than within the substantive proceedings in which the taxation had arisen.

19. The court did not determine whether the taxing officer had committed any error of principle or whether the plaintiff/applicants are entitled to enlargement of time to file the reference. The distinction is material. An application which is dismissed on account of a procedural defect does not necessarily amount to a final determination of the substantive issues raised therein. The court must examine what was actually determined in the former proceedings rather than merely consider the similarity of the prayers sought. The doctrine of res judicata is therefore inapplicable to the present application.

20. On the second issue, the stated defendants/respondents contend that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application for the reason that the plaintiffs/applicants failed to comply with Paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The jurisdiction of a court is fundamental and must be established before the court proceeds to consider the merits of a dispute. In Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, the court of appeal underscored the principle that a court without jurisdiction cannot proceed to determine a matter. The procedure for challenging the decision of a taxing officer is prescribed under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. Paragraph 11(1) requires a party objecting to taxation to give written notice to the taxing officer within fourteen days, identifying the items to which the objection relates. Paragraph 11(2) provides for the furnishing of reasons and the institution of a reference before a judge. Of particular importance to the present application is Paragraph 11(4), which expressly empowers the court to enlarge the time prescribed under Paragraph 11(1) or 11(2), notwithstanding that the period sought to be enlarged has already expired.

21. It follows therefore that the fact that the plaintiffs/applicants may not have complied with the prescribed timelines does not extinguish the court’s jurisdiction to entertain an application for enlargement of time. Indeed, the purpose of Paragraph 11(4) is to confer discretion upon the court to determine whether departure from the prescribed timelines is justified. In Simon Gitonga Wachira v Augustine Nzioka Kivuvo [2020] KEHC 5996 (KLR), the court held that:-

“Clause 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order states that the court has discretion to extend time for lodging a reference notwithstanding the expiry of 14 days period prescribed for the reference from the taxing master’s decision on costs.”

22. The aforementioned defendants/respondents have also challenged the statutory provisions cited by the plaintiffs/applicants in support of the application. While it is apparent that some of the provisions invoked are not directly applicable to a taxation reference, I do not consider the erroneous citation of statutory provisions, standing alone, to be fatal where the court otherwise possesses the requisite jurisdiction. The applicants have expressly invoked Paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. Thus, the court is properly seized of the question whether enlargement of time should be granted. I consequently find that this court has jurisdiction to entertain that request.

23. The question that follows being the third issue is whether the plaintiffs/applicants have placed sufficient material before the court to warrant the exercise of its discretion in their favour. The principles governing enlargement of time are settled. In Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR), the court held that:-

“Extension of time is not a right of a party. It is an equitable remedy that is only available to a deserving party at the discretion of the court; A party who seeks for extension of time has the burden of laying a basis to the satisfaction of the court Whether the court should exercise the discretion to extend time, is a consideration to be made on a case to case basis; Whether there is a reasonable reason for the delay. The delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the court; Whether there will be any prejudice suffered by the respondents if the extension is granted; Whether the application has been brought without undue delay;…”

24. The taxing officer delivered the impugned ruling on 12th November, 2024. The plaintiffs/applicants contend that they communicated their dissatisfaction through their advocates’ letter dated 22nd November, 2024. From the record, the said letter was filed on 25th November, 2024 which was within fourteen days of the impugned decision. The fact that a letter was written within the prescribed period is, however, not conclusive of compliance with Paragraph 11(1). The court must consider the contents of the letter to determine whether it constituted a notice of objection contemplated under the Advocates Remuneration Order.

25. I have examined the said letter, and I note that it identifies several grievances concerning the taxation, including the instruction fees awarded, the joinder of the defendants and the entitlement of certain defendants to costs. The letter concludes by requesting a thorough review of the taxation by the taxing officer. It does not expressly request the taxing officer to furnish reasons for her decision or notify her that the plaintiffs/applicants intended to file a reference. Whereas the letter conveys dissatisfaction with the taxation, its concluding request was for reconsideration of the decision by the same taxing officer i.e. review.

26. The plaintiffs/applicants further contend that the taxing officer failed to provide reasons for her decision. However, it is not disputed that a reasoned ruling was delivered on 12th November, 2024. They have not demonstrated that the reasons necessary to challenge the material items were absent from that ruling. I am not persuaded that the plaintiffs/applicants were prevented from instituting the appropriate reference solely because the taxing officer did not respond separately to their letter. The obligation to furnish reasons cannot reasonably be invoked to indefinitely suspend the prescribed procedure where the reasons for taxation are already contained in the ruling.

27. There is also the question of delay. The impugned ruling was delivered on 12th November 2024, while the present application was filed on 12th March, 2026. This represents a period of approximately sixteen months from the date of the taxation decision. The plaintiffs/applicants have explained that they initially pursued the matter before the taxing officer and thereafter filed ELCLMISC no. E222 of 2025, which remained pending until its dismissal on 9th March, 2026.

28. It is evident that the plaintiffs/applicants did not remain entirely inactive during the intervening period. They took steps to challenge the taxation, albeit through a procedure that was ultimately found to be incompetent. However, the court must still be satisfied that the delay was sufficiently explained and that the steps undertaken were reasonable in the circumstances.

29. From the record, the plaintiffs/applicants were represented by counsel. They were required to ascertain and comply with the procedure prescribed by the Advocates Remuneration Order. The earlier application in ELCLMISC no. E222 of 2025 was instituted several months after the taxation decision and was pursued to conclusion notwithstanding the procedural defect subsequently identified by the court. The court must therefore consider not only the period during which the earlier application was pending but also the delay preceding its institution and the circumstances that occasioned the adoption of the wrong procedure.

30. Although the plaintiffs/applicants attribute part of the delay to the taxing officer’s failure to respond to their letter, I have already found that the letter primarily sought a review of the taxation and that the original ruling contained reasons for the decision. I am therefore unable to accept the contention that the plaintiffs/applicants were legally prevented from approaching the court through the appropriate procedure.

31. In my view, the plaintiffs/applicants have not explained the inadequate delay in filing the application within the period prescribed. The aforementioned defendants/respondents have obtained certificates arising from the taxation and are entitled to the benefit of the orders made in their favour. While the plaintiffs/applicants are entitled to seek the intervention of the court, the aforementioned defendants/respondents are equally entitled to finality in litigation.

32. Having said the above, it would serve no purpose to determine whether or not there was an error in principle in the decision by the taxing officer. The plaintiffs/applicants failed to file the reference within the time and I find the reasons adduced not plausible. The chamber summons dated 11th March, 2026 lacks merit, and the same is dismissed. Each party to bear its own costs. The plaintiffs/applicants are hereby granted leave to appeal against the ruling in case they are dissatisfied.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED & DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT

THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

HON. MBOGO C.G.

JUDGE

29/10/2026.

In the presence of:-

Mr. Benson Agunga – Court assistant

Mr. Githinji for the Plaintiffs

Ms. Wainaina holding brief for Mr. Karuga for the 8th to 12th Defendants

Mr. Masore Nyang’au for the 3rd to 7th Defendants

Mr. Ongalo for the 2nd, 13th to 22nd Defendants

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