Land law

Jabir (Suing on behalf of Muungano Riyatha Madrasatil Islamia Committee) & another v Registered Trustees of the Kenya Muslim Charitable Society & 7 others [2026] KEELC 7217 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The motion to strike out Accram Jasho’s affidavit was dismissed with costs. The court granted preservatory temporary relief: the existing occupation, use and condition of L.R. No. 36/VII/120 must be maintained pending determination of the consolidated suits or further order; neither party may evict current occupants, introduce occupants, alter rental arrangements, structurally alter, alienate or encumber the property. Police were directed to assist compliance, and costs of the July 2025 injunction motion abide the suit’s outcome.

Supporting judgment passages

a) The Notice of Motion dated 2nd March 2026 is dismissed with costs.

Passage 135 →

b) The existing occupation, use and condition of L.R. No. 36/VII/120 (I.R. No. 5159) shall be preserved. Neither party shall evict the current occupants, introduce new occupants, alter existing rental arrangements, undertake structural changes or alienate or encumber the property pending determination of the consolidated suits or further orders of this court.

Passage 136 →

d) The costs of the Motion dated 7th July, 2025 shall abide the outcome of the suit.

Passage 138 →
Issue 1Whether the affidavit of Mr Accram Jasho should be struck out?

Held. No. The affidavit was not incompetent merely because Jasho was not a party or trustee. It was filed by the Respondent as evidence, disclosed his personal knowledge arising from occupation of the property, and addressed matters directly in issue. The Applicant neither identified specific offending statements nor showed that any were scandalous, irrelevant or oppressive. The motion to strike it out was dismissed with costs.

Ratio. A non-party does not become a litigant merely by swearing an affidavit. Subject to affidavit-evidence rules, a person with relevant personal knowledge may provide evidence through an affidavit relied on by a party. Under Order 19 Rule 6, striking out requires scandalous, irrelevant, or oppressive matter; a general assertion and mere dispute over credibility or weight are insufficient.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

i. Whether the affidavit of Mr Accram Jasho should be struck out?

Passage 87 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

69. The fact that the Applicant disputes Mr Jasho’s account does not render the affidavit scandalous or irrelevant. It merely raises questions as to the credibility and weight of his evidence, which fall to be considered alongside the other evidence on record. In the circumstances, the court finds no sufficient basis for striking out the affidavit sworn by Mr Accram Jasho on 16th September 2025.

Paragraph 69 →

a) The Notice of Motion dated 2nd March 2026 is dismissed with costs.

Passage 135 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

59. The latter does not become a litigant merely by swearing an affidavit. Subject to the rules governing admissibility of affidavit evidence, a person possessing relevant knowledge may place that evidence before the court through an affidavit relied upon by a party.

Paragraph 59 →

68. These matters bear directly on the competing accounts concerning the ownership, occupation and control of the suit property and cannot therefore be said to be scandalous, irrelevant or oppressive within the meaning of Order 19 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Paragraph 68 →
Issue 2Whether the Applicant is entitled to the temporary injunctive orders sought?

Held. Yes, in preservatory form. The Applicant established a prima facie case by showing an arguable beneficial interest, including longstanding property-related documentation and a substantial trial question over whether the person recorded as dying in 1973 was the former registered proprietor who purportedly transferred the property in 1999. Alteration or alienation before trial could affect the dispute’s substratum and damages might be inadequate. The balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo. The court ordered preservation of the property’s existing occupation, use and condition, prohibiting either party from evictions, new occupants, altered rental arrangements, structural changes, alienation or encumbrance pending determination of the consolidated suits or further order. Costs of this motion abide the suit’s outcome.

Ratio. Temporary injunctions require sequential satisfaction of a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and, if necessary, balance of convenience. Where competing proprietary claims remain for trial and changing the existing position or introducing third-party interests could affect the substratum of the dispute, preservation of the status quo is appropriate.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

ii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to the temporary injunctive orders sought?

Passage 88 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

87. At this stage, the court finds that the Applicant has placed before it sufficient material to demonstrate an arguable beneficial interest in the suit property and has thus established a prima facie case.

Paragraph 87 →

92. If the existing position were substantially altered, or the property alienated or dealt with in a manner introducing third-party interests before the competing proprietary claims are determined, the substratum of the dispute would be affected. In the circumstances, damages would not necessarily afford an adequate remedy should the Applicant ultimately succeed. The court is therefore satisfied that the second limb has been met.

Paragraph 92 →

b) The existing occupation, use and condition of L.R. No. 36/VII/120 (I.R. No. 5159) shall be preserved. Neither party shall evict the current occupants, introduce new occupants, alter existing rental arrangements, undertake structural changes or alienate or encumber the property pending determination of the consolidated suits or further orders of this court.

Passage 136 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

71. In determining whether a plea for injunction is merited, the court must have regard to the well-settled principles enunciated in Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate that irreparable injury would result if the injunction is not granted, and where the court is in doubt, the matter is to be determined on a balance of convenience.

Paragraph 71 →

72. These requirements must be satisfied sequentially. As affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the establishment of a prima facie case, proof of irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience are distinct and logical hurdles, each of which must be satisfied before the court can grant interlocutory injunctive relief.

Paragraph 72 →

94. In those circumstances, permitting either party to substantially alter the prevailing position would risk determining, in practical terms, matters which remain contested. The balance of convenience therefore favours preservation of the existing state of affairs pending the determination of the consolidated suits.

Paragraph 94 →
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Case at a glance

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Background

Before this court for determination are the Plaintiff’s/Applicant’s Motions dated 7th July, 2025 and 2nd March, 2026. In the Notice of Motion dated 7th July, 2025 brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 3A and 63 (c) and (e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 40 Rules 1,2 and 3 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010, it seeks the following reliefs:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Conversely, the Respondent's assertion that they are different persons is also a matter requiring proof. That issue goes directly to the Applicant's allegation that the 1999 transfer could not lawfully have been executed by the former proprietor and is therefore a substantial question for trial.

Paragraph 86 →

Reasoning passage

The fact that the Applicant disputes Mr Jasho’s account does not render the affidavit scandalous or irrelevant. It merely raises questions as to the credibility and weight of his evidence, which fall to be considered alongside the other evidence on record. In the circumstances, the court finds no sufficient basis for striking out the affidavit sworn by Mr Accram Jasho on 16th September 2025.

Paragraph 69 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether Accram Jasho’s affidavit of 16 September 2025 should be struck out because he was not a party or trustee, and whether the applicant had met the threshold for temporary injunctive relief over L.R. No. 36/VII/120 (I.R. No. 5159).

Material facts

The applicant claimed that Mahomed Ahmed gifted it the suit property around 1970 for Islamic charitable purposes; although transfer was not completed before his alleged death in 1973, it said it occupied, developed and managed the property from 1976. It…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC NO. E325 OF 2025

KHALFAN JABIR (Suing on behalf of

MUNGANO RIYATHA

MADRASATIL ISLAMIA COMMITTEE……….…….....PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE

KENYA MUSLIM CHARITABLE SOCIETY……..….DEFENDANT

AND

ADMINISTRATOR TO THE

ESTATE OF MOHAMED AHMED……….....INTERESTED PARTY

AS CONSOLIDATED WITH ELC E271 OF 2025

OMAR KASSIM ABIKAR, DABAR ABDI MAALIM and

HASSAN ISAAK ALI (Suing as trustees of KENYA MUSLIM CHARITABLE SOCIETY) ….…...........PLAINTIFFS/APPLICANT

VERSUS

ALI OMARI ONYANDO…….....1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

KHADIJA JUMA KAIM (Being the

Administrator of the Estate of the late

AMINA JUMA KAIM)……..…..2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

MOHAMMED GULAM ….….…3RD DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

JAMAL HAMISI …….….…........4THDEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

BILLHADHIR

YAHYA HUSSEIN..……………..5TH DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

MOHAMUD ALI………………....6TH DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

RULING

Background

1. Before this court for determination are the Plaintiff’s/Applicant’s Motions dated 7th July, 2025 and 2nd March, 2026. In the Notice of Motion dated 7th July, 2025 brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 3A and 63 (c) and (e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 40 Rules 1,2 and 3 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010, it seeks the following reliefs:

i. That this Honourable Court do issue an order directing that the status quo be maintained such that there be no further changes to the development, proprietorship and occupation of property Land Reference Number 36/VII/120 (I.R NO. 5159) pending the hearing and final determination of the suit herein.

ii. That this Honourable Court do issue an injunction restraining the Respondent by itself, its servants, agents and/or employees from harassing, intimidating and/or in any manner howsoever from interfering and/or interrupting without lawful cause the Applicant's quiet possession and enjoyment of the property Land Reference Number 36/VII/120 (I.R NO. 5159) pending the inter partes hearing and determination of the suit herein.

iii. That this Honourable Court do issue an injunction restraining the Respondent by itself, its servants, agents and/or employees from trespassing, alienating, charging, transferring, selling or in other way interfering with property Land Reference Number 36/VII/120 (I.R NO. 5159) pending the inter partes hearing and determination of the suit herein.

iv. That the Officer Commanding Station California Police Station do enforce these orders.

v. That Costs in this application be awarded to the Applicant.

2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Khalfan Jabir, the Chairperson of the Applicant, who deponed that he is well conversant with the facts of the suit and duly authorised to swear the affidavit on the Applicant’s behalf. He stated that the Applicant is a charitable organisation which primarily operates madrassas and Islamic religious educational centres and is the beneficial owner of all that parcel of land known as Land Reference No. 36/VII/120 (I.R. No. 5159), situated in Nairobi County.

3. According to him, the Applicant’s interest in the suit property arose from a gift made to it by the Interested Party, Mohamed Ahmed, sometime in 1970. The Interested Party, however, died on 28th March 1973, before the transfer could be effected.

4. He deponed that, prior to gifting the property to the Applicant, the Interested Party operated a charitable organisation under the banner of the Arab Association, whose operations he decided to scale down around 1970 and that the Interested Party thereafter approached the Applicant’s then officials and informed them that he had resolved to donate the suit property to the Applicant as a charitable gift for the benefit of Islamic religious activities. The gift was informed by the fact that both the Applicant and the Interested Party’s Arab Association pursued substantially similar objectives centred on Islamic religious activities.

5. According to Mr. Jabir, following the gift, he applied for and obtained the requisite development approvals, constructed on the suit property and took occupation of the premises sometime in October 1976 and that the Applicant thereafter assumed responsibility for payment of all statutory dues payable to the then City Council of Nairobi, as well as utility bills relating to the property, which payments it contends further demonstrated and solidified its possession and occupation.

6. He averred that the Applicant operated a madrassa at a nearby mosque and utilised the suit property as sleeping accommodation for its students and as residential accommodation for its teachers; that sometime in the late 1990s, the Applicant ceased using the property as a dormitory for madrassa students, following which the entire building was occupied by its teachers and other less privileged Muslims and that the Applicant’s religious scholars occupied the apartments allocated to them in consideration for rent, as evinced by the sample rent record books.

7. According to the deponent, the initial tenants were subsequently succeeded by members of their families, who took over the apartments or rented spaces upon their vacation. Rent was thereafter no longer demanded from those occupants after it was established that they were unable to meet the rental payments, and that they were permitted to remain on the property on humanitarian and Islamic charitable grounds.

8. In June 2025, the deponent averred, a dispute arose when the Applicant learnt that the Respondent was in the process of evicting the tenants from the suit property. Upon making inquiries, he discovered that the Respondent had processed a fraudulent title to the suit property and was asserting that it had been the registered owner thereof since 2002.

9. It was deposed that the Applicant learnt that the Respondent had, in ELC Civil Suit No. 305 of 2019, relied upon the impugned title and represented to the court that it was the owner of the suit property. He maintained that searches conducted at the Lands and County registries during periods when the Respondent claims to have owned the property continued to indicate that the Interested Party was the registered owner.

10. The Applicant further alleges that the Respondent gravely misled the court in ELC Civil Suit No. 305 of 2019 by asserting that its trustees had met and that the Interested Party had gifted the suit property to it sometime in 1999, yet the Interested Party had died more than twenty-five years earlier, on 28th March 1973 as evinced by the death certificate.

11. He maintained that the Applicant’s assignees, tenants and/or representatives have occupied and utilised the suit property peacefully and uninterruptedly since 1976, including through the construction of buildings thereon.

12. He further deponed that the Respondent’s trustees have since forced their way onto the suit premises in the company of unidentified persons and demanded rent from the existing occupants as consideration for their continued occupation and/or use of the property. Upon further inquiry by the Applicant’s officials, the Respondent’s trustees allegedly produced what the Applicant describes as a fictitious and fraudulent title deed and installed security personnel on the suit premises, while threatening dire consequences should the property not be vacated in favour of the Respondent.

13. The deponent stated that these developments prompted the Applicant to undertake due diligence concerning the suit property; that following tedious, relentless and ultimately unsuccessful inquiries into the property records, the Applicant discovered that the physical records or file relating to the suit property could not be traced at the Lands Registry and that the Applicant is therefore apprehensive that there is an illegal, fraudulent, malicious and unprocedural attempt by the Respondent to dispossess it of the suit property.

14. The deponent averred that the Respondent intends to evict the Applicant notwithstanding its continued occupation of the property through its assignees. He expressed apprehension that, unless the court intervenes, the alleged processing and reliance on a fraudulent title, harassment of the occupants and interference with the Applicant’s quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the property would continue to its detriment.

15. Vide a response dated 15th September 2025, Omar Kassim Abikar, a trustee and the Executive Director of the Defendant/Respondent opposed the application, contending that both the application and the suit have been brought in bad faith, constitute an abuse of the court process and are founded upon falsehoods and deliberate misrepresentations intended to obtain unjustified orders from the court.

16. By way of background, he stated that the Respondent is a charitable non-governmental organisation engaged in charitable activities, including orphan support and education programmes across the country. According to him, the suit property was previously registered in the name of Mahomed Ahmed, as trustee of the Arab Association, a charitable organisation which funded and operated a madrassa in Pumwani, Nairobi, during the 1960s and 1970s and that Mahomed Ahmed was the manager of the madrassa and constructed a building comprising six one-bedroom apartments on the suit property.

17. He averred that on or about August 1999, the Arab Association, through Mahomed Ahmed, informed the Respondent’s officials that the Association was no longer operational and wished to transfer the suit property to the Respondent as a gift, the Respondent having objectives similar to those of the Arab Association and the property was subsequently transferred to the Respondent on 13th October 1999, from which date the trustees of the Respondent became its registered proprietors.

18. As regards occupation of the property, he stated that at the time of the transfer, Mahomed Ahmed disclosed that several needy families were residing there. Although the families had previously paid rent, the Arab Association had waived their rent on humanitarian grounds and had informed them of the transfer of the property.

19. The Trustee and Executive Director of the Defendant/Respondent deposed that in December 1999, the Respondent’s officials, together with Mahomed Ahmed, met representatives of the occupying families led by Gulam Abdullahi to discuss their continued occupation; that the families sought a continuation of the rent waiver on account of their financial circumstances, lack of alternative accommodation and inability to pay rent and that the Respondent, in keeping with its charitable objectives, agreed to continue the waiver.

20. He further stated that during the December 1999 meeting, representatives of the families voluntarily proposed that, since they were not paying rent, they would instead meet the rates payable on the property; that the Respondent accepted that arrangement, which he stated was consistent with the arrangement that had existed under the previous owner and that when the defunct City Council of Nairobi subsequently demanded rate arrears of Kshs. 45,103.50 by a letter dated 4th June 2008, he wrote to the occupants on 17th October 2008, reminding them of their obligation to settle the rates. He stated that the occupants subsequently paid the arrears.

21. According to the deponent, from 2017, the Respondent on several occasions informed the occupants of its intention to take possession of the property, renovate it and thereafter rent it out to generate income in support of its charitable programmes, but the occupants did not accede to those requests.

22. When the discussions failed to yield an agreement, it was deposed, the Respondent, through its advocates, issued a notice dated 3rd July 2019, requiring the occupants either to pay rent or vacate the property. Thereafter, three of the six families occupying the property, namely Ali Omar Onyando, Mohamed Gulam and the late Amina Juma Kaim, instituted ELC No. 305 of 2019, Ali Omar Onyando and 3 Others vs Kenya Muslim Charitable Society, claiming ownership of the suit property by adverse possession.

23. He stated that on 25th February 2025, Justice A.Y. Koross delivered judgment in ELC No. 305 of 2019 in favour of the Respondent, finding that the Plaintiffs therein had failed to satisfy the threshold for adverse possession.

24. Following delivery of that judgment, he and Ahmed Hussein, on behalf of the Respondent, met representatives of the six families residing on the property on 14th April 2025 and 14th May 2025, when the families agreed to vacate the property and that when they failed to do so, the Respondent instituted ELC E271 of 2025, Omar Kassim Abikar and 2 Others vs Ali Omar Oyando & Others.

25. It was deposed by the Respondent’s Trustee and Executive Director that following the institution of ELC E271 of 2025, and discussions with some of the occupants who had indicated their willingness to vacate, the Respondent’s advocates issued a letter dated 26th June 2025, informing the occupants that private security guards would be deployed to the premises.

26. He contended that although the Applicant’s officials had become indirectly involved in the dispute and were encouraging the occupants not to vacate, the Applicant had neither been in possession of, nor asserted ownership over the property prior to the deployment of the Respondent’s private guards on 1st July 2025.

27. He further stated that the Applicant had never sought to be joined in the adverse possession proceedings despite being fully aware of them. On that basis, he characterised the present proceedings as a retaliatory action by the occupants following the dismissal of their adverse possession claim, intended to frustrate the Respondent’s efforts to repossess the property.

28. The deponent further contended that the Applicant’s account of how it allegedly acquired ownership of the suit property mirrors, almost verbatim, the Respondent’s pleadings and position in ELC No. 305 of 2019. In his view, this demonstrates that the Applicant is being used as a proxy by the unsuccessful parties in that suit to re-litigate matters already determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.

29. Turning specifically to the Applicant’s claim that Mahomed Ahmed died on 28th March 1973, the deponent disputed the allegation as false and misleading. He stated that the death certificate annexed by the Applicant as KJ2 bears the name Mohamed Ahmed Nusleh, whereas the previous registered proprietor identified in the title was Mahomed Ahmed. He therefore contended that the names referred to two different persons and further observed that the Applicant had not produced any material explaining how it had obtained the death certificate relied upon.

30. He similarly denied the allegation that the suit property had been gifted to the Applicant in 1970, contending that it was unsupported by evidence. He questioned why, if such a gift had been made, the Applicant had failed to procure transfer of the property between 1970 and 1973, during the period when the person whom the Applicant alleges to have been the donor was still alive. He further maintained that the Applicant had never asserted ownership of the suit property prior to the institution of the present suit.

31. The deponent also denied the Applicant’s allegations of fraud in the acquisition and processing of the Respondent’s title, describing them as lacking specificity and maintaining that the Respondent had lawfully acquired the property from the previous registered proprietor. He equally disputed the assertion that the initial tenants or occupants resided on the property with the Applicant’s consent and acknowledgement, contending that, had that been the position, the occupants would have proceeded against the Applicant rather than the Respondent in ELC No. 305 of 2019.

32. Regarding payment of rates, he stated that, to the best of his knowledge, it was the occupants of the suit property, rather than the Applicant, who had paid rates to the defunct Nairobi City Council and subsequently to Nairobi County pursuant to the arrangement arising from the waiver of rent by the previous registered owner.

33. According to him, this continued until 2019, when the occupants instituted ELC No. 305 of 2019 claiming adverse possession. Upon their default in payment, the Respondent took over responsibility for the rates and has since continued making those payments.

34. He further denied the Applicant’s assertion that it had constructed the building on the property, notwithstanding the certificate of occupation relied upon. He contended that it was illogical that a person who was not the registered proprietor could have been issued with a certificate of occupation or development approval and reiterated that the building had been constructed by the previous proprietor, the Arab Association.

35. As regards the Applicant’s evidence that it had at one time collected rent from the occupants, the deponent stated that the Arab Association had appointed Maalim Said as its agent to collect rent on its behalf. The deponent alleged that Maalim Said misappropriated rent collected from the tenants and failed to remit it to the Arab Association, resulting in a falling-out between him and the Association.

36. He further stated that, even after parting ways with the Arab Association, Maalim Said continued collecting rent without its authority until the tenants declined to make further payments, following which he issued distress-for-rent letters to them.

37. Finally, on the advice of his advocates, the deponent contended that the Applicant had failed to establish any legal or evidential basis for the grant of injunctive relief. He stated that the Applicant had not produced any title or other ownership document demonstrating that it was either the registered or beneficial owner of the suit property and was itself not in actual occupation of the property. He further alleged that the Applicant had deliberately framed its pleadings vaguely so as to conceal that the persons described as its tenants were the same persons who had unsuccessfully litigated the adverse possession claim in ELC No. 305 of 2019.

38. In contrast, he maintained that the Respondent had placed sufficient evidence before the court to demonstrate its ownership and that, absent evidence to the contrary, its title constituted prima facie evidence of ownership.

39. The Respondent also relied on the affidavit of Accram Jasho sworn on the 16th September 2025. Mr. Accram Jasho stated that he was a former tenant of the suit property, having taken occupation in 1974, when he paid monthly rent of Kshs. 600 to Mahomed Ahmed, whom he identified as the trustee of the Arab Association.

40. He averred that the building was already in existence when he took occupation and that its ground floor was then used as a hostel for madrassa students. Following the closure of the madrassa in the early 1980s, the rooms were let to other tenants. He further stated that Mahomed Ahmed gradually waived the tenants’ rent on humanitarian grounds.

41. The deponent disputed the Applicant’s assertion that Mahomed Ahmed died on 28th March 1973, stating that the person named in the death certificate was different from the trustee with whom he had dealt after that date. He stated that he moved out in 1992, leaving members of his family in occupation, and that their occupation continued with the knowledge and consent of Mahomed Ahmed and, following the transfer in 1999, the Respondent.

42. Upon the transfer of the property to the Respondent in 1999, he stated, there were discussions between the tenants and the Respondent regarding payment of rents which was later abandoned by the Respondent on humanitarian ground. He maintained that throughout the period of his residence and that of his family, their occupation of the premises was always with the knowledge and consent of the lawful owner, first the Arab Association through its Trustee Mahomed Ahmed, and later the Respondent.

43. He stated that, sometime in 2017, the Respondent began engaging the occupants with a view to recovering possession of the property for renovation and use in its charitable programmes. When those discussions failed to produce an agreement, the Respondent’s advocates issued a letter dated 3rd July 2019, requiring the occupants either to pay rent or vacate the property.

44. Consequently, some of the occupants instituted ELC Case No. 305 of 2019, Ali Omar Onyando and 3 Others v Kenya Muslim Charitable Society, claiming ownership of the property by adverse possession. Although he filed a witness statement in those proceedings, he was not permitted to testify because he had remained in the courtroom while other witnesses gave evidence.

45. Regarding the Applicant’s alleged collection of rent, he averred that the Arab Association had appointed Maalim Said0 who was also an official of the Applicant, to collect rent on its behalf. He alleged that Maalim Said failed to remit rent collected, leading to a disagreement with the Association.

46. According to Mr. Jasho, Maalim Said thereafter attempted to collect rent without the Association’s authority and issued distress letters when the tenants refused to pay him. Mr Jasho maintained that, throughout his occupation, he dealt only with Mahomed Ahmed and later the Respondent in relation to the property, and had no dealings with the Applicant as its alleged owner.

47. In the Notice of Motion dated 2nd July, 2026, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks the following reliefs:

i. THAT the affidavit sworn by Accram Jasho dated 16th September 2025 be struck out from this suit.

ii. THAT costs of this Application be awarded to the Plaintiff/Applicant.

48. In support of the Motion is the affidavit of Khalfan Jabir, of an even date. He stated that the Defendants/Respondents filed and served an affidavit sworn by Accram Jasho, dated 16th September 2025, in response to the Applicant’s Motion of 7th July 2025. He contended that Mr Accram Jasho lacks locus standi to respond to the application, as he is neither a party to the suit nor a trustee of the Respondent entity.

49. He further deponed, on the advice of counsel, that the impugned affidavit is in breach of Order 19 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and that its contents are irrelevant and scandalous and do not assist the court in determining the matters raised in the aforesaid Motion. He consequently urged the court to strike out the impugned affidavit and grant the appropriate consequential orders, including costs.

50. The parties filed submissions and authorities in respect of the two applications which I have considered.

Analysis and Determination

51. Having considered the Motions, responses and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are:

i. Whether the affidavit of Mr Accram Jasho should be struck out?

ii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to the temporary injunctive orders sought?

52. By the Motion dated 2nd March 2026, the Applicant seeks to strike out the affidavit sworn by Mr Accram Jasho on 16th September 2025. It argues that Mr Jasho is neither a party to the suit nor a trustee of the Respondent and lacks standing to respond to its application for injunction.

53. It also describes the affidavit as scandalous and irrelevant under Order 19 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The Respondent maintains that Mr Jasho is a former occupant with personal knowledge of the history of the suit property and that his status as a non-party does not bar him from giving evidence.

54. Beginning with the aspect of locus standi, Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, defines the same as the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum. In Alfred Njau and Others v City Council of Nairobi (1982) KAR 229, the court explained that the expression concerns a person's right to appear and be heard in proceedings. The Court of Appeal in Kihanya & 4 Others v Gichuri & Another [2024] KECA 852 (KLR) emphasized the necessity of a sufficient and direct interest to institute or maintain a suit.

55. It is undisputed that Mr Accram Jasho is not a named party in these proceedings. The question is whether his affidavit is incompetent on account of this fact. Order 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules governs affidavits. Under Order 19 Rule 3(1), an affidavit must be confined to facts within the deponent's personal knowledge, save that in interlocutory proceedings, statements based on information and belief may be admitted where their sources and grounds are disclosed.

56. Rules 1 and 2 provide for the reception of affidavit evidence and the attendance of a deponent for cross-examination, while Rule 6 empowers the court to strike out scandalous, irrelevant or oppressive matter.

57. In Bore vs Chebet (Environment & Land Case 221 of 2014) [2022] KEELC 15062 (KLR), the court considering the question of whether an affidavit sworn by a non-party was fatal to the Motion noted thus:

“The most pertinent provisions of law and practice relating to affidavits is that the deponent must at all times depone to matters within his knowledge, or where he relies on information and belief, the sources and grounds thereof respectively. In Rossage vs Rossage and Others [1960] 1 ALL ER 660 the court held that where the orders sought were to decide the rights of the parties, hearsay evidence would be inadmissible. The affidavit in support of such an application would then face greater scrutiny to avert the sneaking in of any hearsay evidence. I think that the mere fact that an affidavit is sworn by a non-party is not fatal to an interlocutory application as long as he has authority of a party to the suit to swear to matters that are within his knowledge and he is able to prove them. To that extent I agree with the submissions of the applicant when she cites Order 19 Rule 3(1) and the case of Obonyo Walter Oneya & another Vs. Jacquiline Anyango Ogude [2018] eKLR where it was observed as follows by the court:'In any case there is no law that provides that only co-litigants can swear affidavits in a matter. In my view, any person with information relevant to an action and who is duly authorized can swear an affidavit in the action.”

58. Indeed, there is a material distinction between a non-party who purports, without authority, to assume the conduct of proceedings or exercise procedural rights belonging to a litigant, and a person who merely supplies evidence relevant to matters in controversy between the parties.

59. The latter does not become a litigant merely by swearing an affidavit. Subject to the rules governing admissibility of affidavit evidence, a person possessing relevant knowledge may place that evidence before the court through an affidavit relied upon by a party.

60. In this case, Mr Jasho’s affidavit was filed by the Respondent in opposition to the Applicant's motion and constitutes evidence which the Respondent seeks to rely upon in resisting that application. More importantly, the affidavit discloses the basis of Mr Jasho’s knowledge of the matters to which he has deponed, namely, his occupation of the suit property.

61. The authorities relied upon by the Applicant do not lead to a different conclusion. In Moijo Mataiya Ole Keiwua vs Chief Justice of Kenya & 6 Others [2008] KECA 168 (KLR), the two impugned affidavits had been filed independently by persons who were neither parties to the proceedings nor had sought leave to participate therein. They had further been prepared by an advocate who was not on record and were purportedly filed in support of an affidavit which had not even been sworn at the time.

62. On the other hand, in Mutoro vs Mudavadi & 4 Others; United Democratic Alliance (Interested Party) [2026] KEHC 426 (KLR), the difficulty arose from a non-party purporting to place before the court the substantive response of the litigants without demonstrating the authority to do so. Similarly, David Gichiri & 3 Others vs Emmah Kerubo Sese [2021] KEHC 7144 (KLR) concerned an officer of an insurer seeking to support an application brought in the names of the insured parties on the basis of a right of subrogation which had not accrued.

63. Ultimately, the objection framed in terms of Mr Jasho's alleged lack of locus standi, cannot succeed.

64. There remains the Applicant's contention that the affidavit is scandalous and irrelevant and should therefore be struck out under Order 19 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. That Rule empowers the court to strike out from an affidavit any matter which is scandalous, irrelevant or oppressive.

65. According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edition, the word “scandalous” is derived from the word “scandal” which means “an action or event regarded as morally or legally wrong and causing general public outrage.” The word frivolous is defined as something not having any serious purpose or value whereas vexatious is something causing annoyance or worry and in law refers to an action brought without sufficient grounds for winning, purely to cause annoyance to the defendant.

66. In the present case, the Applicant has made a general assertion that Mr Jasho's affidavit is scandalous and irrelevant but has not identified the particular statements or allegations said to offend Order 19 Rule 6, nor demonstrated the respect in which they are scandalous, irrelevant or oppressive.

67. Nonetheless, upon considering the contents of the affidavit, the court is unable to agree with the Applicant. Mr Jasho’s affidavit principally addresses matters directly in issue between the parties, including the historical occupation of the suit property, the person from whom the occupants allegedly derived their right of occupation, the existence and development of the building, the collection and subsequent waiver of rent, the Applicant’s alleged involvement in the property, and the circumstances preceding the earlier adverse possession proceedings.

68. These matters bear directly on the competing accounts concerning the ownership, occupation and control of the suit property and cannot therefore be said to be scandalous, irrelevant or oppressive within the meaning of Order 19 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

69. The fact that the Applicant disputes Mr Jasho’s account does not render the affidavit scandalous or irrelevant. It merely raises questions as to the credibility and weight of his evidence, which fall to be considered alongside the other evidence on record. In the circumstances, the court finds no sufficient basis for striking out the affidavit sworn by Mr Accram Jasho on 16th September 2025.

70. Moving next to the Applicants’ plea, the grant of temporary interlocutory injunctions is governed by Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The provision empowers the court to issue a temporary injunction where it is demonstrated, by affidavit or otherwise, that the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated, or where a defendant threatens to dispose of property in circumstances that may obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may ultimately be issued.

71. In determining whether a plea for injunction is merited, the court must have regard to the well-settled principles enunciated in Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate that irreparable injury would result if the injunction is not granted, and where the court is in doubt, the matter is to be determined on a balance of convenience.

72. These requirements must be satisfied sequentially. As affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the establishment of a prima facie case, proof of irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience are distinct and logical hurdles, each of which must be satisfied before the court can grant interlocutory injunctive relief.

73. Beginning with a prima facie case, as cited by the parties the same was succinctly defined in Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others  [2003] eKLR thus:

“...So, what is a prima facie case? I would say that in civil cases it is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”

74. By way of brief background, the Applicant instituted this suit seeking inter-alia, a declaration that the Applicant is the absolute owner of the suit property, permanent injunctive orders restraining the Respondent from any interference with the same, a declaration that the transfer of the suit property to the Respondent was illegal, irregular and fraudulent and cancellation thereof.

75. The Applicant claims that Mahomed Ahmed, who was running the Arab Association gifted it the suit property around 1970 but died on 28th March, 1973 before a transfer could be registered. It nevertheless took up possession of the property which it utilized initially as a sleeping area and thereafter residential houses for its teacher who paid rent and other under-privileged Muslims.

76. Vide ELC E271 of 2025, the Respondents herein, the Plaintiffs there seek inter-alia, a declaration that, in their capacity as Trustees of Kenya Muslim Charitable Society, they are the lawful registered proprietors of Land Reference Number 36/120/VII. On that basis, they seek orders evicting the Applicants and/or all other persons occupying the property under their instructions or authority, and compelling them to forthwith hand over possession.

77. They further seek a permanent injunction restraining the Applicants and all persons acting under their instructions or authority from trespassing upon, encroaching on, entering, occupying, selling, developing, disposing of, leasing, transferring, subletting, charging or otherwise interfering with the Plaintiffs’ quiet possession and ownership of the property situated in Eastleigh, Nairobi County.

78. The Respondent maintains that it lawfully acquired the suit property by way of a gift from Mahomed Ahmed, who held the property as trustee of the Arab Association. According to the Respondent, the Arab Association had ceased its operations and, owing to the similarity of the organisations’ charitable objectives, Mahomed Ahmed transferred the property to the Respondent in 1999. It further maintains that the occupants were already residing on the property at the time of the transfer and that their continued occupation thereafter was with its knowledge and permission, initially on the basis of a waiver of rent on humanitarian grounds.

79. It disputes the Applicant’s central premise that Mahomed Ahmed, the former registered proprietor, had died in 1973, contending that the death certificate relied upon relates to a different person named Mohamed Ahmed Nusleh.

80. It equally disputes the alleged earlier gift to the Applicant, its claim to have constructed the building and its assertion that the occupants derived their occupation from or remained under the control of the Applicant.

81. The court has considered the evidence in this regard. The Respondent has produced a copy of the register which shows that the suit property was originally registered in the name of Mahomed Ahmed(Arab) in his capacity as trustee of the Arab Association, and subsequently records a transfer to Omar Kassim Abikar, Dabar Abdi Maalim and Hassan Issak Ali, as trustees of the Kenya Muslim Charitable Society of Kenya, by way of gift under Presentation No. 1446 on 13th October 1999.

82. It is trite that registration confers upon the registered proprietor the rights attendant to title, subject, of course, to the statutory grounds upon which title may ultimately be challenged. The Applicant, admittedly does not have any instrument by which the alleged gift made to it in or about 1970 was perfected. Its claim is expressly one of a beneficial interest arising from the alleged gift, followed by its asserted occupation, development and management of the property.

83. The Applicant has in this regard placed before the court documentation including historical utility records such as water and electricity accounts in the name of Mungano Riyatha Islamia/Mungano Riyatha Madrasat Islamia relating to L.R. No. 36/VII/120. There are also records produced by both parties, relating to payment of rates although a number of them remained in the name of Mohamed Ahmed. These documents lend some objective support to the Applicant's assertion that its relationship with the property is longstanding.

84. A further matter requiring careful consideration is the Applicant's challenge to the 1999 transfer. Its case rests substantially upon the proposition that the person who could have made that gift had already died in 1973. The death certificate produced by the Applicant records the death on 28th March 1973 of a person named Mohamed Ahmed Nusleh, aged 72. The Respondent disputes that this was the same person as Mahomed Ahmed, the registered proprietor and trustee of the Arab Association. However, this contention is un-supported at this stage.

85. The court cannot, at this interlocutory stage, determine that question merely from the similarity or difference between the names appearing in the respective documents. Establishing whether Mohamed Ahmed Nusleh and Mahomed Ahmed were one and the same person will require evidence capable of connecting the death certificate to the registered proprietor.

86. Conversely, the Respondent's assertion that they are different persons is also a matter requiring proof. That issue goes directly to the Applicant's allegation that the 1999 transfer could not lawfully have been executed by the former proprietor and is therefore a substantial question for trial.

87. At this stage, the court finds that the Applicant has placed before it sufficient material to demonstrate an arguable beneficial interest in the suit property and has thus established a prima facie case.

88. Having found that the Applicant has established a prima facie case, the court must next consider whether the threatened injury is one which can adequately be compensated by an award of damages.

89. The Applicant contends that the Respondent has entered the suit property, deployed security personnel, demanded rent from the occupants and threatened their eviction. It further alleges that the Respondent has attended the property with prospective purchasers and intends to deal with it before the Applicant’s asserted beneficial interest is determined.

90. The apprehension of interference is not entirely speculative. The Respondent acknowledges that it has taken steps to recover possession of the property and states that, upon obtaining possession, it intends to renovate the premises and rent them out in furtherance of its charitable activities.

91. The property is presently occupied by tenants, although each party advances a different account as to the basis upon which those tenants occupy the premises and under whom they hold. Those competing claims need not be determined at this interlocutory stage. What is material is that the Applicant asserts an interest in the property itself and challenges the Respondent’s title, while the Respondent has admittedly taken steps towards recovering possession and dealing with the property for its own purposes.

92. If the existing position were substantially altered, or the property alienated or dealt with in a manner introducing third-party interests before the competing proprietary claims are determined, the substratum of the dispute would be affected. In the circumstances, damages would not necessarily afford an adequate remedy should the Applicant ultimately succeed. The court is therefore satisfied that the second limb has been met.

93. On the balance of convenience, the Respondent is the registered proprietor and asserts its entitlement to recover possession, renovate the premises and rent them out. The Applicant, on the other hand, has demonstrated an arguable beneficial interest in the property which remains to be determined. The premises are presently occupied by tenants, with each party asserting a different basis for their occupation.

94. In those circumstances, permitting either party to substantially alter the prevailing position would risk determining, in practical terms, matters which remain contested. The balance of convenience therefore favours preservation of the existing state of affairs pending the determination of the consolidated suits.

95. In the end, the court directs as follows:

a) The Notice of Motion dated 2nd March 2026 is dismissed with costs.

b) The existing occupation, use and condition of L.R. No. 36/VII/120 (I.R. No. 5159) shall be preserved. Neither party shall evict the current occupants, introduce new occupants, alter existing rental arrangements, undertake structural changes or alienate or encumber the property pending determination of the consolidated suits or further orders of this court.

c) The Officer Commanding Station, California Police Station, shall assist in ensuring compliance with these orders and maintaining peace at the suit property.

d) The costs of the Motion dated 7th July, 2025 shall abide the outcome of the suit.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 29th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Ms Amuka holding brief for Mr. Mohamed for Respondent

Mr. Ondari for Plaintiff

Court Assistant: Tracy

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