REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC CASE NO. E397 0F 2025
HABATULLA INVESTMENT LIMITED …………………………..1ST PLAINTIFF
HEBATULLAH PROPERTIES LIMITED…………………………. 2ND PLAINTIFF
=VERSUS=
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT
NGARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL ……………………………….….DEFENDANT
AND
ERDEMANN PROPERTY LIMITED …………………….INTERESTED PARTY
RULING
1. The Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 29th September 2025 on the grounds that the Plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata as its subject matter has been the subject of previous litigation that has been heard and determined in Board of Management Ngara Girls High School & another v Erdemann Property Limited & another; Ministry of Education (Interested Party) [2025] KEELC 5478 (KLR) and in the Consent Judgment dated 13th September 2012 in Nairobi High Court Civil Case No. 346 of 2005, The Board of Governors Ngara Girls High School v Hebatullah Investments Limited & another.
2. The Defendant relied on Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & another v Muiri Coffee Estate Limited & 3 others [2016] KESC 6 (KLR), in which the Supreme Court explained that the doctrine affords a litigant only one opportunity to ventilate a claim and serves to bring finality to litigation. The Defendant also relied on ET v Attorney General & Another [2012] eKLR, as cited with approval by the Supreme Court, to assert that a litigant cannot circumvent the doctrine by introducing new parties or causes of action in a subsequent suit.
3. The Defendant contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 11th August 2025, on the basis that the issue of res judicata goes to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Defendant relied on Phoenix of E.A. Assurance Company Limited v S.M. Thiga t/a Newspaper Service [2019] eKLR, In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] KESC 1 (KLR), and Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] KLR 1, to assert that jurisdiction is everything and that without it, the Court must down its tools.
4. The Defendant contended that the application is an abuse of the Court’s process. The Defendant relied on Muchanga Investments Limited v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Limited & 2 others [2009] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that a party is entitled to a hearing only where there is something to hear and that judicial time ought not to be squandered. Further reliance was placed on Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police & others [1982] AC 529, to emphasize the Court’s inherent power to prevent misuse of its procedure.
5. The Preliminary Objection was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE INTERESTED PARTY’S SUBMISSIONS
6. The Interested Party filed its submissions dated 14th May 2026.
7. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs are the sole registered and beneficial owners of L.R. No. 209/20566 (I.R. No. 141429), and that their title is protected under Article 40 of the Constitution as read with Section 26 of the Land Registration Act. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiffs subdivided the property into two portions measuring 0.4910 Ha and 0.9483 Ha and leased the 0.4910 Ha portion to the Interested Party.
8. Counsel submitted that the Defendant’s interference with the Interested Party’s possession led the Interested Party to issue a demand and a notice of intention to sue the Plaintiffs for breach of the agreement to lease dated 1st October 2024, which in turn prompted the Plaintiffs to file this suit. Counsel further submitted that no dispute on the same subject had previously arisen between the parties, or those claiming under them, and that no competent Court had determined it on its merits.
9. Relying on Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 others [2010] KECA 346 (KLR), which cited Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210, Counsel submitted that justice should not be shackled by procedural rules.
10. Counsel relied on Oraro v Mbaja [2005] 1 KLR 141, Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, as discussed in Attorney General of Kenya v Independent Medico Legal Unit (EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2011), and Ahmed Noorani & another v Rajendra Ratilal Sanghani [2020] eKLR, to submit that a valid preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law, free from contested facts. Counsel argued that whether the dispute had previously arisen between the same parties and whether it had been determined on its merits were questions of fact. Counsel further argued that resolving those questions would require evidence concerning the previous suits, the decisions made, and the parties involved. Counsel therefore submitted that the Preliminary Objection was incurably defective.
11. Counsel submitted that the Defendant had failed to demonstrate that the threshold for res judicata had been met, as evidence could not properly be adduced by way of a preliminary objection. Relying on Diana Katumbi Kiio v Reuben Musyoki Muli [2018] eKLR, which adopted Lord Diplock’s definition of a cause of action in Letang v Cooper [1964] 2 All ER 929, and on Fahim Twaha v Timamy Abdalla & 2 others [2015] eKLR, Counsel submitted that a cause of action is a factual situation that must be assessed on its own merits.
12. Counsel relied on Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai & 5 others [2017] eKLR, as cited in Leina Konchellah v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others; Jubilee Party of Kenya (Interested Party) [2019] eKLR, to submit on the five conjunctive elements of res judicata. Counsel further relied on George Mike Wanjohi v Steven Kariuki & 2 others [2014] eKLR to submit that a previous decision applies only where the material facts are the same. It was contended that the Defendant had failed to demonstrate any similarity in the material facts, and that none of the five elements had been established.
13. Counsel submitted that the public interest and access to justice required that the Defendant’s conduct be examined on its merits. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Preliminary Objection with costs.
THE PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSIONS
14. The Plaintiffs filed their submissions dated 2nd December 2025. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, Counsel submitted that for a plea of res judicata to succeed, the cause of action and the relief claimed must have been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit.
15. Counsel submitted that in Environment and Land Petition No. E066 of 2024, Board of Management Ngara Girls High School & another v Erdemann Property Limited, Attorney General & Ministry of Education (Interested Party the parties were not the same, the subject matter was also distinct, and the orders sought were constitutional in nature. Counsel further submitted that the present suit concerned L.R. No. 209/20566 (I.R. No. 141429) measuring 0.419, registered in the Plaintiffs’ names and leased to the Interested Party, while the Petition concerned L.R. No. 209/136/239/R. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff was not a party to the Petition, in which the Petitioner claimed ownership of L.R. No. 209/136/239/R, a parcel previously owned by the Plaintiff and subdivided. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff in this suit was seeking an injunction restraining the Defendant from interfering with its occupation of L.R. No. 209/20566, and a declaration that L.R. No. 209/136/239/R does not exist.
16. Counsel further submitted that the consent annexed by the Defendant involved parties who were not parties to this suit, and that the Defendant ought to have disclosed the claim in that suit to enable the court to determine whether the issues and cause of action were the same.
17. Counsel submitted that in HCCC No. 346 of 2005, The Board of Governors Ngara Girls High School v Bishop Joshua Mulinge, Pastor Morrison Kareith (of God’s House of Miracles) & Habatulla Investment Limited, the consent relied upon was a consent order, not a consent decree. Counsel argued that the consent did not show whether it had been complied with or whether it settled the suit, that the parties were not the same, and that no judgment had been placed before the court from which the issues could be ascertained. Counsel asserted that dismissal of the suit on that material would infringe the Plaintiffs’ rights under Articles 27(1) and 50(1) of the Constitution.
18. Regarding jurisdiction, Counsel contended that res judicata does not divest a court of its jurisdiction. Counsel argued that the court merely declines to exercise its jurisdiction when it is satisfied that the same parties, suing in the same capacity, seek to relitigate an issue previously adjudicated.
19. Regarding abuse of the Court process, Counsel asserted that the application raises pertinent issues that have not been determined in any suit between the same parties. Counsel relied on the South African decision cited as Beinosi v Wiley 1973 SA 721 (SCA) at 734F to G, to submit that abuse of process depends on the circumstances of each case and arises where Court procedures are used for purposes extraneous to the pursuit of truth. Counsel contended that the Plaintiffs were protecting their property and should not be shut out from justice.
20. Counsel relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, Nitin Properties Ltd v Jagjit Singh Kalsi & another [1995] eKLR, and Henry Wanyama Khaemba v Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd & another [2014] eKLR, which cited with approval Oraro v Mbaja [2005] eKLR to submit on the threshold for preliminary objections. Counsel argued that the objection was not founded on a pure point of law, as the issues raised required the presentation and examination of evidence.
21. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Preliminary Objection with costs and to direct that the Notice of Motion dated 11th August 2025 and the suit proceed to hearing and determination.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
22. Having considered the preliminary objection and the rival submissions, the sole issue that arises for determination is whether this suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata
23. The law on preliminary objections is well settled. A preliminary objection must be based on a pure point of law. In Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Company Ltd Vs West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696, Law JA stated as follows:
“So far as I’m aware, a preliminary objection consists of point of law which have been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point, may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation or submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”
24. Further on Sir Charlse Newbold JA stated;
“The first matter relates to the increasing practice of raising points which should be argued in the normal manner, quite improperly by way of preliminary objection. A preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct.it cannot be raised if any fact had to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion. The improper raising of points by way of preliminary objection does nothing but unnecessarily increase costs and, on occasion, confuse the issue. The improper practice should stop.”
25. In Oraro Vs Mbaja 2005 eKLR Ojwang J (as he then was) described it as follows;
“I think the principle is abundantly clear. “A Preliminary Objection” correctly understood is now well identified as, and declared to be a point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and in any event, to be proved through the process of evidence. An assertion which claims to be a Preliminary Objection and yet it hears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication is not, as a matter of legal principle, a true Preliminary Objection which the Court should allow to proceed.”
26. For a preliminary objection to be valid, it must be on a point of law and must be founded on facts that are not in dispute. It should not be proved through facts or evidence or deal with disputed facts.
27. A plea of res judicata is a point of law, and may properly be raised by way of preliminary objection. The question, therefore, is whether the plea of res judicata can be determined on the material before this court.
28. The Defendant contended that the plea of res judicata divests this court of jurisdiction. In Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] KLR 1, the Court of Appeal held that:
“A question of jurisdiction ought to be raised at the earliest opportunity and the court seized of the matter was then obliged to decide the issue right away on the material before it. Jurisdiction was everything. Without it, a court had no power to make one more step. Where a court had no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downed tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it held the opinion that it was without jurisdiction.”
29. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows:
“No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court.”
30. In Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & another v Muiri Coffee Estate Limited & 3 others [2016] KESC 6 (KLR), the Supreme Court stated:
“Res judicata is a doctrine of substantive law, its essence being that once the legal rights of parties have been judicially determined, such edict stands as a conclusive statement as to those rights... The doctrine of res judicata, in effect, allows a litigant only one bite at the cherry.”
31. In Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai & 5 others (Civil Appeal 105 of 2017) [2017] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that the following elements must be satisfied for the bar of res judicata to be upheld:
“a) The suit or issue was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit.
b) That former suit was between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim.
c) Those parties were litigating under the same title.
d) The issue was heard and finally determined in the former suit.
e) The court that formerly heard and determined the issue was competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue is raised.”
32. Regarding the first element, whether the parties are the same, in ELC Petition No. E066 of 2024, the Petitioners are the Board of Management Ngara Girls High School and Loise Ndovu Mwathe Erdemann Property Limited, with the Attorney General as Respondent and the Ministry of Education as an Interested Party. The Plaintiffs herein were not parties to the Petition.
33. The subject matter of the Petition was L.R. No. 209/136/239/R, in which the Board of Management of Ngara Girls High School alleged trespass, violation of the rights to property, fair administrative action and a clean and healthy environment arising from Erdemann’s continued occupation after the expiry of a lease dated 10th June 2020. Erdemann contended that L.R. No. 209/136/239/R did not exist. It contended that the land it occupied was Plot C, excised from L.R. No. 209/20566, and that it belonged to Hebatullah Investment Limited and Hebatullah Properties Limited.
34. In its judgment, the Court relied on the consent order in HCCC No. 346 of 2005 and held that the school was not an idler on the land. It held that Erdemann, having entered the land with the school’s permission under an undisputed lease, could not challenge the school’s locus at the tail end of its disengagement. The Court found that trespass had been proven. The Court issued a permanent injunction restraining Erdemann from remaining on the suit land, ordered the removal of its structures within sixty days, and awarded damages.
35. The Petition therefore determined the issue of possession of the land occupied by Erdemann, as between the Board of Management of Ngara Girls High School and Erdemann Ltd. It did not determine the proprietary claim the Plaintiffs now advance in respect of L.R. No. 209/20566, since the Plaintiffs were not before the Court.
36. The Plaintiffs do not claim under the Interested Party. The elements of identity of parties and of title are therefore not established on the face of the record in respect of the Petition.
37. With respect to Nairobi HCCC No. 346 of 2005, the parties were the Board of Governors, Ngara Girls High School, as the Plaintiff, Bishop Joshua Mulinge and Pastor Morrison Kareithi (of God’s House of Miracles) as the 1st Defendant and Hebatullah Investments Limited as the 2nd Defendant.
38. The consent order recorded that the CommissionER of Land do cancel the title known as L.R No. 209/11372, registered in the name of Ngara Girls High School. It also recorded that L.R. No. 209/136/239R, owned by Habatullah Investments Limited and Hebatullah Properties Limited, would be resurveyed and new titles issued as follows: a portion of approximately 1.6 Ha (4.0 acres) to be transferred as a gift to Ngara Girls High School and consolidated with L.R. No. 209/6915; a portion of approximately 2.302 Ha to be transferred to God’s House of Miracles; and the remainder to be retransferred to Hebatullah Investments Limited and Hebatullah Properties Limited. Those two companies were given liberty to apply for further orders or directions in effecting the consent.
39. Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ submission, Hebatullah Investments Limited was a 2nd Defendant to that suit, and Hebatullah Properties Limited was named in the consent as a co-owner of the parcel. The question of ownership and apportionment of L.R. No. 209/136/239R, as between the school and the Plaintiffs, was therefore directly and substantially in issue in that suit, and was settled by consent.
40. The Defendant must still demonstrate that the matter directly and substantially in issue in this suit is the matter settled by the consent. That cannot be determined on the evidence before this Court because the measurement of the land is contested, with the consent order apportioned approximately 1.6 Ha to the school, the Plaintiffs and the Interested Party now aver an intended donation of 0.9483 Ha; no relation has as yet been shown between L.R No. 209/20566 and the portions in the consent with the Plaintiffs retaining 0.4910 Ha out of L.R. No. 209/20566 and whether Plot C falls within the portion donated to the school or within the remainder retransferred to the Plaintiffs.
41. These are questions of fact. They call for survey evidence, the deed plans, the resurvey contemplated by the consent and the correspondence on the excision. They cannot be resolved on the assumption that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs are correct.
42. The plea of res judicata, whether founded on the Petition or on HCCC No. 346 of 2005, therefore cannot be determined without the ascertainment of disputed facts. It does not meet the threshold in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd.
43. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 29th September 2025 is without merit and is hereby dismissed. Costs shall abide with the outcome of the suit.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Mutinda for the Plaintiffs
Allan Kamau for the Defendant
Gisemba for the Interested Party
Vena– Court assistant