REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC OS NO. E023/2020
GOLF RANGE LIMITED…………………………….…………PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
MARION GITAU
AGNES KAGIRA
BEATRICE KANYUU
ROLAND KIOGORA
WANJIRU KIONGO
SYLVIA MUTHONI
LISA MWAKAZI…………………………......................DEFENDANTS
RULING
1. By a Chamber Summons dated 4th November 2025, brought pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, and Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, the Plaintiff seeks the following orders:
a. That this Honourable Court be pleased to set the decision of the Taxing Officer as contained in the ruling dated and delivered on 21st October 2025 with respect to Item No. 1 (Instruction Fees) of the 1st – 7th Defendants’ Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 17th March 2025 aside.
b. That this Honourable Court be pleased to tax Item No. 1 (Instruction Fees) of the 1st – 7th Defendants’ Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 17th March 2025 afresh or, in the alternative, remit the 1st – 7th Defendants’ Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 17th March 2025, for fresh taxation of Item No. 1 (Instruction Fees) before a different Taxing Officer.
c. That the costs of this application be provided for.
2. The summons is supported by the affidavit of Trevor Kanja, a Director of Golf Range Limited, the Plaintiff herein of an even date. He deponed that following the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s suit with costs on 23rd January 2025 on the ground that it was res judicata in view of ELC No. 125 of 2017 (OS), Golf Range Limited v Registered Trustees of the National Olympics Committee & 3 Others, the 1st to 7th Defendants filed a party-and-party bill of costs dated 17th March 2025 and that the Bill comprised 66 items amounting to Kshs. 30,116,015 and was canvassed by way of written submissions.
3. He deposed that by a ruling delivered on 21st October 2025, the Taxing Officer taxed the Bill at Kshs. 2,896,960, of which Kshs. 2,500,000 was awarded as instruction fees under Item No. 1 and that being dissatisfied with that assessment, the Plaintiff issued a notice of objection dated 4th November 2025 within the prescribed period.
4. According to the deponent, the award of Kshs. 2,500,000 as instruction fees was manifestly excessive and indicative of an error of principle. He contended that the suit concerned the same property and subject matter as ELC No. 125 of 2017, in which the Taxing Officer had assessed instruction fees at Kshs. 1,200,000 on 21st March 2023. In his view, the Taxing Officer in the present matter ought to have been guided by that earlier assessment rather than determining the instruction fees afresh.
5. He further stated that, unlike ELC No. 125 of 2017, the present suit did not proceed to full trial but was dismissed at the interlocutory stage for being res judicata. He therefore contended that, under paragraph 1(b) of Schedule 6 to the Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order, 2014, the applicable instruction fees ought to have been assessed at 75% of Kshs. 1,200,000, namely Kshs. 900,000.
6. He averred that, although the Plaintiff raised those matters in its written submissions dated 4th September 2025 and filed on 2nd October 2025, the Taxing Officer neither considered nor addressed them in her ruling. He maintained that by assessing instruction fees at Kshs. 2,500,000 without explaining the departure from the earlier assessment concerning the same subject matter, the Taxing Officer arrived at an unreasonable and disproportionately high figure.
7. Consequently, he believed that sufficient grounds had been established to warrant the Court’s intervention and interference with the Taxing Officer’s decision in the manner sought in the summons.
8. No response was filed to the reference. None of the parties had filed submissions as at 10th August, 2026, the Applicant having been granted 7 days from 21st July, 2026.
9. Having considered the summons, the sole issue for determination is whether the decision of the Taxing Master delivered on the 21st October 2025 in respect to the 1st – 7th Defendants’ Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 17th March 2025, should be set aside.
10. The procedure for the challenge of a taxation decision is provided under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order which provides that:
“(1) Should any party object to the decision of the Taxing officer, he may within fourteen days after the decision give notice in writing to the Taxing Officer of the items of Taxation to which he objects.
(2) The Taxing Officer shall forthwith record and forward to the Objector the reasons for his decision on those items and the Objector may within fourteen days from the receipt of the reasons apply to a Judge by Chamber Summons, which shall be served on all the parties concerned, setting out the grounds of his objection.”
11. The legal parameters within which the court can interfere with a taxing master’s decision are well settled. The Court of Appeal in Joreth Ltd vs Kigano & Associates Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1999 [2002] eKLR was categorical that a judge sitting on a reference against the taxing officer ought not to interfere with the assessment of costs unless the taxing officer had misdirected himself on a matter of principle.
12. Similarly, the Ugandan Supreme Court in Bank of Uganda vs. Banco Arabe Espanol SC Civil Application No. 23 of 1999 (Mulenga JSC) stated as follows:
“Save in exceptional cases, a judge does not interfere with the assessment of what the taxing officer considers to be a reasonable fee. This is because it is generally accepted that questions which are solely of quantum of costs are matters with which the taxing officer is particularly fitted to deal, and in which he has more experience than the judge. Consequently a judge will not alter a fee allowed by the taxing officer, merely because in his opinion he should have allowed a higher or lower amount.
Secondly, an exceptional case is where it is shown expressly or by inference that in assessing and arriving at the quantum of the fee allowed, the taxing officer exercised, or applied a wrong principle. In this regard, application of a wrong principle is capable of being inferred from an award of an amount which is manifestly excessive or manifestly low.
Thirdly, even if it is shown that the taxing officer erred on principle, the judge should interfere only on being satisfied that the error substantially affected the decision on quantum and that upholding the amount allowed would cause injustice to one of the parties.”
13. More recently, the Apex Court in Non- Governmental Organizations Coordination Board vs EG & 5 others (Petition (Application) 16 of 2019) [2023] KESC 102 (KLR) (Civ) (8 December 2023) (Ruling) noted:
“A certificate of taxation would be set aside, and a single judge could only interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation if: There was an error of principle committed by the taxing officer. The fee awarded was shown to be manifestly excessive or was so high as to confine access to the court to the wealthy; (and conversely, if the award was so manifestly deficient as to amount to an injustice to one party).The court was satisfied that the successful litigant was entitled to fair reimbursement for the costs he had incurred, (and the award must not be regarded as a punishment of the defeated party but as a recompense to the successful party for the expenses to which he had been subjected by the other party). The award proposed was so far as practicable, consistent with previous awards in similar cases. There was no mathematical formula to be used by the taxing officer to arrive at a precise figure because each case must be considered and decided on its own peculiar circumstances. Although the taxing officer exercised unfettered judicial discretion in matters of taxation that discretion must be exercised judicially, not whimsically. The single judge would normally not interfere with the decision of the taxing officer merely because the judge believed he would have awarded a different figure had he been in the taxing officer’s shoes”
14. By way of brief background, the Plaintiff instituted this suit vide an originating summons seeking inter-alia a declaration that it is entitled to the parcel known as L.R number 209/15290, Original number L.R No. 209/14151/2(hereinafter the suit property) by way of adverse possession.
15. Vide a notice of preliminary objection, the 1st to 7th Defendants contended that the suit was res judicata, the matters in issue having been heard and finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in ELC No. 125 of 2017. Upon considering the objection, the court, in its determination delivered on 23rd January 2025, upheld the plea of res judicata and dismissed the Originating Summons dated 30th October 2020, with costs of both the suit and the application awarded to the 1st to 7th Defendants. Following the judgment, the Plaintiffs filed a party-to-party bill of costs dated 17th March 2025, which was taxed at Kshs. 2,896,960, which is the subject of the present reference.
16. The Plaintiff’s objection is confined to the assessment of instruction fees. It contends that the award of Kshs. 2,500,000 was manifestly excessive and founded on an error of principle, given that the present suit concerned the same subject matter as ELC No. 125 of 2017, in which instruction fees had previously been assessed at Kshs. 1,200,000.
17. The Plaintiff further argues that, since the present suit was dismissed at the interlocutory stage without proceeding to a full trial, the Taxing Officer ought to have applied paragraph 1(b) of Schedule 6 to the Advocates (Remuneration) Order and assessed the instruction fees at 75% of that amount, namely Kshs. 900,000.
18. It is trite that instruction fees is to be determined from the value of the subject matter of a suit. It is also trite that the value of the subject matter of a suit is to be ascertained from the pleadings, judgment or settlement. It is only where the value of the subject matter cannot be ascertained from the pleadings, judgment or settlement, that the taxing officer has discretion to assess the instruction fees.
19. Speaking to this, the Court of Appeal in Peter Muthoka & Another v Ochieng & 3 others NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 328 of 2017 [2019] eKLR noted as follows:
“It seems to us quite plain that the basis for determining subject matter value for purposes of instruction fees is wholly dependent on the stage at which the fees are being taxed. Where it happens before judgment, it is the pleadings that form the basis for determining subject value. Once judgment has been entered, and for what seems to us to be an obvious reason, recourse will not be had to the pleadings since the judgment does determine conclusively the value of the subject matter as a claim, no matter how pleaded, gets its true value as adjudged by the court.
It is only where the value of the subject matter is neither discernible nor determinable from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement, as the case may be, that the taxing officer is permitted to use his discretion to assess instructions fees in accordance with what he considers just bearing in mind the various elements contained in the provision we are addressing. He does have discretion as to what he considers just but that discretion kicks in only after he has engaged with the proper basis as expressly and mandatorily provided: either the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement. He has no leeway to disregard the statutorily commanded starting point. And we think, with respect, that the starting point can only be one of the three. It is not open to the taxing officer to choose one or the other or to use them in combination, the provision being expressly disjunctive as opposed to conjunctive. It is also mandatory and not permissive.”
20. Guided by the foregoing principles, the court turns to the impugned assessment. Under Item No. 1 of their bill of costs dated 17th March 2025, the 1st to 7th Defendants sought Kshs. 30,000,000 as instruction fees for:
“To taking instructions to oppose the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons dated 30th October 2020, where the Plaintiff was seeking to be declared the owner of the suit property by way of Adverse Possession; and to taking instructions to prosecute a Notice of Preliminary Objection which was up held as a result of which the Plaintiff’s suit dismissed with costs. To taking instructions to oppose the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 30.10.21 seeking injunctive Orders which Application was dismissed with costs. To taking instructions to prosecute the 1-7th Defendant’s Application dated 03.03.21 which Application was partially allowed with costs. Taking into account the value of the suit property, complexity of the matter, the time required, and volumes of documents perused, prepared, filed and served and Court attendances; where the suit was struck out with costs.”
21. In taxing the Bill, the Taxing Officer held as follows:
“The value of the subject matter being LR No 209/15290 is not ascertainable from the pleadings or the Ruling. The Defendants submit that the value of the subject matter is Kshs 920,000,000 in 2023 and has annexed the valuation report. I have not seen anywhere in the pleadings filed or in the final Ruling where the value of the suit property is disclosed/pleaded or adjudged by the Court. Therefore, I reiterate that the value is unascertainable from the pleadings and Judgment, as per the authorities cited above, only the pleadings and judgment/settlement should guide and not a valuation report. Based on the authorities cited above, the taxing officer is entitled to use his discretion to assess such instruction fee as he considers just, taking into account, among other matters, the nature and importance of the cause or matter, the interest of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings, any direction by the trial judge and all other relevant circumstances. According to the Advocates Remuneration Order schedule 6 1 (b), under other matters the minimum costs chargeable is Ksh. 75,000/= for defended and Ksh.45,000/= for undefended. I have considered the nature of the reliefs sought, which is adverse possession. I have no doubt that the same was important to both parties. I have considered that the property was located in Langata area, and as per the valuation report availed, it was of high value, the value considered. I have also considered the labour input in this matter, 2 applications were filed and determined by the Court, and costs of the applications were awarded to the Defendants. I have taken into consideration that the matter did not go to full hearing. I therefore exercise my discretion and assess item 1 at Ksh.2,500,000/= and the balance taxed off.”
22. The Taxing Officer correctly identified the subject matter as L.R. No. 209/15290 (Original L.R. No. 209/14151/2), which the Plaintiff claimed by adverse possession. She also found that its value was not ascertainable from the pleadings, the judgment or a settlement. That finding is not disputed. Since the suit was dismissed on the ground of res judicata without the value of the property being determined, the instruction fees necessarily fell to be assessed through the exercise of judicial discretion.
23. The Plaintiff’s principal contention is that, in exercising that discretion, the Taxing Officer ought to have adopted the sum of Kshs. 1,200,000 awarded as instruction fees in ELC No. 125 of 2017. However, the ruling in that matter did not determine or assign a monetary value to the suit property. The sum of Kshs. 1,200,000 was itself a discretionary assessment of instruction fees based on the circumstances of that suit. It was neither a valuation of the property nor a fixed benchmark binding subsequent taxation proceedings concerning the same property.
24. Each taxation must be determined on the circumstances of the particular proceedings, including the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, the work undertaken by counsel, the stage at which the proceedings concluded and any other relevant factors. The mere fact that the two suits concerned the same property did not make the earlier award automatically applicable to the present Bill.
25. Having considered the Ruling, it is the finding of this court that the Taxing Officer expressly considered the nature and importance of the dispute, the work undertaken by counsel and the fact that the matter did not proceed to a full hearing before assessing Item No. 1 at Kshs. 2,500,000. The fact that the resulting award exceeded the Kshs. 1,200,000 allowed in ELC No. 125 of 2017 does not, without more, establish an error of principle.
26. Further, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Taxing Officer applied an incorrect principle, considered an irrelevant factor or disregarded a relevant consideration. Nor has it shown that the award was so manifestly excessive as to warrant an inference that the discretion was improperly exercised.
27. Accordingly, the court finds no error of principle in the assessment of instruction fees and no basis for interfering with the Taxing Officer’s decision. The Chamber Summons dated 4th November 2025 is therefore dismissed. As the reference was unopposed, there shall be no order as to costs.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 29th day of October, 2026.
O. A. Angote
Judge
In the presence of;
Mr. Wachira for Plaintiff
Mr. Ajulu for Kuria for Defendants
Court Assistant: Tracy