Land law

Cedars Restaurant Ltd v Soi & 2 others [2026] KEELC 7165 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

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Background

Vide the Notice of Motion dated 29th April, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) & (d), and Order 1 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants seek the following reliefs:

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Question before the court

There is also the issue of the relationship between the orders issued in this suit and those issued in ELC Petition No. E010 of 2026, which the parties have addressed at length. However, that relationship was considered in this court’s ruling dated 9th July 2026. That issue having already been addressed, the court will confine its determination to the outstanding grounds upon which the Defendants seek to strike out the suit.

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Decision / orders

In the end, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 29th April, 2026to be unmerited. The same is dismissed with costs.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

MILIMANI LAW COURTS

ELC EPCC NO E010 OF 2026

THE CEDARS RESTAURANT LIMITED…………………PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

HILLARY SOI……………………………………………….1st DEFENDANT

FOREST LANE RESIDENTS LIMITED……………2nd DEFENDANT

SAMORA SIKALIEH (Sued as the Chairman of Karen & Langata District Association (KLDA)………………………....3rd DEFENDANT

RULING

Background

1. Vide the Notice of Motion dated 29th April, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) & (d), and Order 1 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants seek the following reliefs:

a) The Plaintiffs suit commenced by way of a plaint and accompanying notice of motion application both dated 13th March, 2026 be struck out in its entirety as against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants for failing to disclose any reasonable cause of action in trespass over a public road reserve rendering the suit an egregious abuse of the court process.

b) The Plaintiff’s suit commenced by way of a plaint and accompanying notice of motion application both dated 13th March 2026, be struck out for being fatally premature and offending the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies espoused under Section 19 of the County Outdoor Advertizing Control Act, Cap 276.

c) Spent-The Honourable Court be pleased to take judicial notice of, and give paramount effect to, the specific prohibitory and injunctive orders issued by the ELC(Hon Lady Justice Kemei) on 14th April, 2026 in ELC Petition no EPPET/E010 of 2026: Samora Sikalieh (suing as the Chairperson of Karen and Langata District Association(KLDA) vs Mohamed Isahakia & 4 Others, and to issue a consequential declaration that the said prohibitory and injunctive orders, which explicitly bar construction, renovation, or commercial operations on L.R No 10126/6, supersede and eclipse any possessory protections previously granted herein.

d) Costs of this application be borne by the Respondents.

2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Samora Sikalieh of an even date. He deponed that he is the Chairperson of Karen Langata District Association, as well as a resident of Karen having lived in its locality since he was born and aware of the history of the neighborhood. It was deposed that KLDA is a residential association within Karen-Langata areas in Nairobi County. It is also a stakeholder in all proposed developments which requires public participation in approvals and obtaining permits from lawful authorities.

3. He explained that the Plaintiff’s suit is fundamentally flawed as the commercial signage which forms the sole basis of the alleged trespass was erected on a public road reserve and not on the Plaintiff’s private title; that the land in issue is a public utility vested in the National Land Commission and managed by the Nairobi City County and that the Plaintiff as such, cannot claim a right of exclusive possession over it and has as such no locus standi to maintain an action for trespass.

4. He further stated that the records confirm that the purported change of user for L.R. No. 10126/6 was granted to a third party, Mohamed Isahakia, rather than the Plaintiff. He maintained that the Plaintiff could not rely on a third party’s approval and that, without an independent and valid change of user, its commercial activities on the residential plot were a nullity.

5. The Chairperson of Karen Langata District Association added that the legality of the change of user is the subject of a substantive constitutional challenge in ELC Petition E010 of 2026, which also raises allegations of failure to undertake public participation as directed by Nairobi City County and breach of the Karen Local Physical Development Plan.

6. According to Mr. Sikalieh, the validity of the Plaintiff’s commercial presence is currently sub judice and the present suit a strategic abuse of process. Crucially, the Plaintiff is using the suit to bypass prohibitory and injunctive orders issued on 14th April, 2026. Upon issuance of the orders, the same was dispatched to the Plaintiffs which was acknowledged on 17th April, 2026. On 21st April, 2026, their counsel issued a formal request to the OCS Karen to enforce the directive.

7. He explained that noting the Plaintiffs’ attempts to hide behind a status quo order from a separate suit to justify continued construction, their counsel issued them with a comprehensive cease and desist demand and warned on the imminent institution of contempt proceedings and that they further exhausted all administrative avenues to halt the illegalities by formally petitioning the NEMA and NCA detailing the Plaintiff’s aggressive fast tracking of construction activities late into the night in violation of the EMCA (Noise and Excessive Vibration Pollution) (Control) Regulations, 2009.

8. In response, Wellington Omodho, a director of the Plaintiff, swore a replying affidavit dated 10th May, 2026. He deponed that the Applicants are forum shopping, contending that instead of responding to the proceedings in this suit, they instituted ELC Petition No. E010 of 2026 against, among others, the Nairobi City County planning authorities and obtained orders without disclosing or seeking to set aside the subsisting orders issued in this matter.

9. In his view, that course of action resulted in conflicting orders. He maintained that the petition is intended to frustrate the Plaintiff’s establishment of Cedars Restaurant and stated that the Plaintiff has moved the court seized of the petition to set aside the subsequent orders.

10. According to Mr. Omodho, the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of Nairobi Block No. A37/58, formerly L.R. No. 10126/6, and holds a valid certificate of title thereto; that upon acquiring the property, the Plaintiff, with the assistance of the previous owner, commenced the process of obtaining a change of user from residential to commercial for purposes of establishing a family restaurant; that the requisite procedures were followed and that the Plaintiff only approached the court after the Defendants began interfering with its lawful use and refurbishment of the property.

11. On the change-of-user process, he reiterated that Nairobi City County followed the prescribed procedure, including facilitating public participation through advertisement of the proposed change of user in newspapers of wide circulation.

12. He stated that neighbouring property owners were afforded an opportunity to raise objections and pointed out that the immediately adjoining property, on which Karen Blixen Restaurant operates, had raised no objection. According to him, the views of other neighbouring residents were considered by the County before the approval was granted, and there is therefore no factual or legal basis for the Defendants’ challenge to the Plaintiff’s development.

13. He disputed the contention that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ status as stakeholders entitle them to obstruct the Plaintiff’s use of its property. In his view, their role cannot extend to frustrating the lawful development and utilisation of private property. The Plaintiff’s director further maintained that the issues raised in ELC Petition No. E010 of 2026 are closely connected with those arising in the present proceedings and that the two matters ought therefore to be consolidated or heard together to avoid inconsistent determinations.

14. As regards the nature of the dispute in the present suit, he denied that it was confined to activities occurring on a road reserve or shared area. He stated that the Plaintiff’s complaint extends to unauthorized ingress and egress by members of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants into the suit property, together with acts of trespass, harassment and threats within the premises intended to house the restaurant. He therefore maintained that the characterization of the dispute as one relating merely to a road reserve was inaccurate.

15. The Plaintiff’s/Respondent’s Director further contended that the Plaintiff’s ownership of the suit property is not disputed and that, as the registered proprietor, it is entitled to seek protection against alleged acts of trespass and threats directed at its property, servants and agents. He maintained that the Plaintiff has obtained lawful licenses to remodel the existing structures into a family restaurant and therefore had the requisite locus standi to institute the proceedings.

16. He characterized the subsequent challenge to those licenses as an afterthought, asserting that the Defendants had previously had an opportunity to raise their objections before the relevant planning authorities. He further distinguished the planning dispute from the Plaintiff’s claim in trespass, contending that a common-law claim for trespass cannot be determined by the County’s administrative and planning organs.

17. With respect to ELC Petition No. E010 of 2026, he maintained that the petition had proceeded without service upon key departments of the Nairobi City County Government and that those parties were consequently absent when the application for conservatory orders was heard. He contended that this circumstance required interrogation and reinforced the need for the present suit and the petition to be heard together or consolidated.

18. The Plaintiff’s Director also disputed the contention that the present suit was sub judice by reason of the petition. According to him, if the doctrine of sub judice arose at all, it is the subsequent proceedings in ELC Petition No. E010 of 2026 that implicated it, given the issues already pending before this court. He maintained that the Defendants’ decision to institute the petition rather than pursue their objections within the existing proceedings had created the procedural difficulties then confronting the parties.

19. He denied that the Plaintiff or its agents had at any time disobeyed any court order maintaining that the controversy arose from the filing of the petition and was compounded by correspondence from a court administrator which had initially suggested that the orders issued in the present suit had been varied, but was subsequently retracted with an apology. This further exacerbated the confusion.

20. He maintained that the orders issued by this court remained valid and in force, having neither been set aside nor otherwise discharged, and contended that the Defendants could not simultaneously maintain that those orders had ceased to operate while seeking their discharge in the present Application.

Submissions

21. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants filed submissions dated 10th July 2026. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff obtained interim orders without disclosing that the signboard stood on a public road reserve, residents opposed the proposed commercial use, and the approvals were issued to other persons. Further, that the Plaintiff wrongly portrayed the 1st Defendant, a County officer conducting a signage compliance inspection, as an impostor.

22. According to counsel, the Plaintiff had not identified any officer, member or agent of the 2nd or 3rd Defendant who entered the suit property, nor specified when any such entry occurred.

23. On the injunction, counsel relied on Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd(1973) E A 358 and submitted that the Plaintiff had established neither a prima facie case nor a risk of irreparable harm and that the alleged damage to a signboard and disruption to the restaurant business were, in counsel’s view, capable of monetary assessment. Counsel characterised the interim orders as having been used to shield the Plaintiff’s commercial activities from scrutiny while the residents challenged the change of user and the development’s effects on their neighbourhood.

24. Counsel also submitted that the suit disclosed no reasonable cause of action in trespass arising from the signboard; that the signboard was erected on a public road reserve, over which the Plaintiff has no right to exclusive possession and that trespass protects possession and cannot be founded on alleged interference with land outside the Plaintiff’s property.

25. Counsel additionally questioned the Plaintiff’s reliance on the planning approvals noting that the change of user approval was issued to Mohamed Abdi, while the renovation permit was issued to Mohamed Isahakia and expressly stated that it was not transferable. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff had not shown how it acquired the benefit of those approvals upon purchasing the property, or that it had complied with the conditions attached to them.

26. On exhaustion, counsel submitted that the substance of the signage grievance concerned enforcement under the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act and that the Plaintiff was therefore required to pursue the procedure under Section 19 of that Act before approaching the court. Counsel relied on Speaker of the National Assembly vs James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR, and Geoffrey Muthiga Kabiru & 2 others vs Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 others [2015] eKLR, in support of that objection.

27. Finally, the Applicants submitted that the Plaintiff had used the interim orders for a purpose beyond protection against trespass, namely to impede the residents’ objections to the restaurant development. Relying on Muchanga Investments Limited vs Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd & 2 others [2009] eKLR, counsel urged the court to prevent an abuse of its process.

Analysis and Determination

28. Having considered the Motion, response and submissions, the sole issue that arises for determination is whether the present suit and accompanying Motion should be struck out.

29. The power of the Court to strike out pleadings is granted under Order 2 Rule 15(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides as follows:

“(1) At any stage of the proceedings the court may order to be struck out or amended any pleading on the ground that:

a. it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence in law; or

b. it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

c. it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

d. it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, and may order the suit to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.”

30. As the Court of Appeal stated in Blue Shield Insurance Company Ltd vs Joseph Mboya Oguttu (2009) eKLR:

“The principles guiding the Court when considering such an application which seeks striking out of a pleading are now well settled. Madan J.A. (as he then was) in his judgment in the case of D.T. Dobie and Company (Kenya) Ltd vs Muchina (1982) KLR 1 discussed the issue at length and although what was before him was an application under Order 6 rule 13 (1) which was seeking striking out of a plaint on grounds that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the defendant, he nonetheless dealt with broad principles which in effect covered all other aspects where striking out a pleading or part of a pleading is sought. It was held in that case inter alia as follows:- “The power to strike out should be exercised after the Court has considered all facts, but it must not embark on the merits of the case itself as this is solely reserved for the trial Judge. On an application to strike out pleadings, no opinion should be expressed as this would prejudice fair trial and would restrict the freedom of the trial Judge in disposing the case.” We too would not express our opinion on certain aspects of the matter before us. In that judgment, the learned Judge quoted Dankwerts L.J in the case of Cail Zeiss Stiftung vs Ranjuer & Keeler Ltd and others (No.3) (1970) ChD 506, where the Lord Justice said: - “The power to strike out any pleading or any part of a pleading under this rule is not mandatory but permissive and confers a discretionary jurisdiction to be exercised having regard to the quality and all the circumstances relating to the offending pleading.” We may add that like Madan J.A, said, the power to strike out a pleading which ends in driving a party from the judgment seat should be used very sparingly and only in cases where the pleading is shown to be clearly untenable.”

31. The Defendants’ plea for striking out rests on three principal grounds. First, they contend that the suit is premature and offends the doctrine of exhaustion because the Plaintiff did not pursue alternative dispute resolution mechanism under Section 19 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act before instituting proceedings.

32. Secondly, they maintain that the Plaint discloses no reasonable cause of action against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants because the alleged interference concerns a signboard erected on a public road reserve over which the Plaintiff cannot claim exclusive possession. They further assert that the Plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for trespass based on a change of user granted to another party.

33. There is also the issue of the relationship between the orders issued in this suit and those issued in ELC Petition No. E010 of 2026, which the parties have addressed at length. However, that relationship was considered in this court’s ruling dated 9th July 2026. That issue having already been addressed, the court will confine its determination to the outstanding grounds upon which the Defendants seek to strike out the suit.

34. Beginning with the plea of exhaustion, this is a principle that requires courts to refrain from entertaining matters which can be properly resolved through an existing statutory framework. In Speaker of the National Assembly vs Njenga Karume [2008] 1 KLR 425, the court held that where there exists a clear procedure for redress under statute, that procedure ought to be followed. The Court of Appeal restated this principle in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others vs Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 others [2015] eKLR, thus:

“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside Courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts is invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews…The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts.”

35. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants contention in this regard is founded on Section 19 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act, Cap 276. The same under the head, dispute resolution provides as follows:

“(1)The National government, a county government or any other person who is a party to a dispute arising under this Act shall take reasonable measures to resolve the dispute by alternative dispute resolution before resorting to judicial proceedings.(2)A party is considered to have taken reasonable measures to resolve a dispute by alternative dispute resolution if such a party—(a)notifies the other party of the issues that are in dispute and offering to settle them;(b)responds appropriately to a notification under paragraph (a);(c)provides relevant information and documents to the other party to enable that party understand the issues and determine the best approach to take in responding to the issues; or(d)where an alternative dispute resolution mechanism is agreed to —(i)collaborates with the other party in determining the person to facilitate resolution of the dispute; and(ii)attends the alternative dispute resolution process.”

36. The rationale underpinning Section 19 is to afford parties an opportunity to resolve disputes arising under the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act through alternative dispute resolution before invoking the court’s intervention. Unlike provisions establishing a specialised tribunal, the section requires parties to take reasonable measures towards resolving their dispute.

37. It does not require the conclusion of a formal mediation process or the attainment of a settlement. Its application therefore depends upon the nature of the dispute and the steps taken before proceedings were instituted.

38. By way of brief background, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Defendants’ conduct constitutes trespass upon Plot No. A37/58, formerly L.R. No. 10126/6, a permanent injunction restraining them from entering the premises, harassing its occupants, destroying fixtures or otherwise interfering with its quiet possession and enjoyment, together with damages for trespass, harassment and interference. It seeks vide the impugned Motion temporary injunctive reliefs restraining any interference with its property pending determination of the suit.

39. The Plaintiff’s case is that it acquired the suit property in 2023 and subsequently obtained approvals for change of user and refurbishment of the existing premises for purposes of establishing a family restaurant. It alleges that, on 6th March 2026, the 1st Defendant, acting on the instructions of the other Defendants, unlawfully entered the property and pulled down its signboard. It further alleges that agents of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants repeatedly entered the premises without permission, demanded production of approvals and threatened its staff and directors with further damage and injury.

40. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their part, contend that the disputed signboard stood on a public road reserve outside the Plaintiff’s property and that the 1st Defendant attended in his capacity as a County officer undertaking a signage compliance inspection. They accordingly characterise the dispute as one concerning outdoor advertising which ought to have been subjected to the procedure prescribed under Section 19 before proceedings were commenced.

41. The court has considered these competing positions. To begin with, a dispute concerning the regulation or enforcement of outdoor advertising would ordinarily attract the requirements of Section 19. The Plaintiff’s cause of action, however, is not confined to the removal of the signboard or the exercise of regulatory powers over its display.

42. The Plaintiff’s cause of action also encompasses allegations of repeated unauthorised entry onto private land, threats against its occupants, destruction of property and interference with its possession. These complaints cannot be reduced to a signage dispute merely because the removal of a signboard forms part of the events giving rise to the suit.

43. Equally, the reliefs sought are directed at protecting the Plaintiff’s alleged possessory rights and obtaining redress for the Defendants’ alleged conduct. The objection founded on the doctrine of exhaustion is therefore not sustained.

44. Turning to the assertion concerning derivative rights, the Defendants contend that the change-of-user approval was issued to Mohamed Abdi, while the renovation permit was issued to Mohamed Isahakia and expressly stated that it was not transferable. They argue that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated how it acquired the benefit of those approvals.

45. The Plaintiff’s ownership of the suit property is, however, not disputed. What the Plaintiff is seeking is protection against alleged trespass arising from its proprietary and possessory interest in the land, rather than from the change-of-user approval. The question whether it may lawfully rely upon an approval issued in the name of a third party is distinct from its entitlement to bring a claim against persons alleged to have entered its property without lawful authority. This too fails.

46. The contention that the Plaint discloses no reasonable cause of action because the signboard stood on a public road reserve fares no better. Whether the signboard stood within the titled property or on a road reserve, whether the 1st Defendant acted pursuant to lawful County authority, and whether the other alleged entries occurred are disputed matters requiring determination upon evidence.

47. Further, the alleged location of the signboard on a road reserve does not dispose of the independently pleaded entries into the Plaintiff’s premises. Resolving those allegations would require examination of the property’s boundaries, the acts complained of and the authority under which they were undertaken, an exercise extending beyond the limited inquiry permitted under Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules. The court must one that discloses no reasonable cause of action in law.

48. In the end, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 29th April, 2026to be unmerited. The same is dismissed with costs.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 29th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Mr. Mutungi for 2nd and 3rd Defendant

Ms Bosire and Dr. Ekuru for Plaintiff

Court Assistant: Tracy

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