REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELCLMISC NO. E284 OF 2024
BILLY AMENDI & COMPANY ADVOCATES….…ADVOCATE/RESPONDENT
VERSUS
KEMRI STAFF RETIREMENT
BENEFIT SCHEME…….................……………………………CLIENT/APPLICANT
RULING
1. Before this court for determination is the notice of motion dated 11th March, 2026 and the notice of preliminary objection dated 26th March, 2026 respectively. The notice of motion dated 11th March, 2026 is filed by the client/applicant, and it is expressed to be brought under Rule 11(3) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, Order 40 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution seeking the following orders:-
1. Spent.
2. That pending the inter-partes hearing and determination of this application, there be a temporary stay of execution of the taxed costs in Nrb ELC Misc. App no. EP E004 of 2023.
3. That pending the hearing and determination of this application, there be a temporary stay of execution of the taxed costs in Nrb ELC Misc. App no. EP E004 of 2023.
4. That pending the hearing and determination of court of appeal civil appeal no. E998 of 2025, there be a stay of execution and/or any consequential enforcement steps founded on the taxed costs in Nrb ELC Misc App No. EP E004 of 2023.
5. That the applicant be granted leave to appeal to the court of appeal against the ruling and order of this honourable court delivered on 17th September, 2025 in ELC Misc. No. E284 of 2024, pursuant to Rule 11(3) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order.
6. That time to seek leave under Rule 11(3) be enlarged, and the leave granted in prayer (5) above do operate to regularize the applicant’s appeal already lodged as court of appeal civil appeal No. 998 of 2025 and/or such further orders be made as are necessary to meet the ends of justice.
7. That costs of this application be in the cause.
2. The application is premised on the grounds appearing on its face and supported by the affidavit of Judy I. Nyagah, the trust secretary of the client/applicant, sworn on even date. The client/applicant deposed that being dissatisfied with the ruling delivered by this court on 17th September 2025, they lodged a notice of appeal dated 30th September 2025, and subsequently instituted civil appeal no. E998 of 2025 before the court of appeal on 11th November, 2025. The client/applicant deposed that the ruling of 17th September, 2025 was delivered in the absence of the parties and their advocates, thereby denying it an opportunity to seek leave to appeal contemporaneously with the delivery of the ruling.
3. The client/applicant further deposed that on 16th October 2025, it filed an application before the court of appeal seeking stay of execution pending the determination of the appeal, and during the proceedings before the appellate court on 4th March 2026, the issue of leave under Paragraph 11(3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order was raised. According to the client/applicant, the failure to seek leave before instituting the appeal was an inadvertent oversight by its advocates, and maintained that upon the omission being brought to its attention, it moved this court expeditiously through the present application to regularize its position and preserve its intended right of appeal.
4. It is also the client/applicant’s case that the intended appeal raises arguable issues concerning the value of the subject matter adopted for purposes of taxation, the treatment of documents allegedly obtained after taxation, and whether the taxing officer and this court correctly applied the principles governing the assessment of advocate-client costs. The client/applicant further deposed that the advocate/respondent has commenced steps towards execution of the taxed costs and that unless the court intervenes, the intended appeal may be rendered nugatory. Further, that the respondent will not suffer prejudice incapable of being compensated by costs if the orders sought are granted.
5. In opposition thereto, the advocate/respondent filed the replying affidavit sworn by Billy Amugune Amendi on 27th March, 2026. He deposed that the client/applicant instituted civil appeal no. E998 of 2025 without obtaining the mandatory leave contemplated under Paragraph 11(3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The advocate/respondent maintained that the requirement for leave is substantive and that this court cannot retrospectively validate an appeal which was instituted without complying with the applicable legal provisions. He further contends that the applicant has a pending application before the Court of Appeal seeking similar orders for stay of execution, thereby rendering the present application sub judice and an abuse of the court process.
6. The advocate/respondent further challenged the competence of the supporting affidavit, contending that the deponent has not sufficiently disclosed the sources of information concerning certain matters, particularly the alleged mistake by counsel and the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the ruling. While disputing the assertion that the intended appeal is arguable, the advocate/respondent deposed that the complaints concerning the value of the subject matter and the production of additional documents were adequately addressed in the taxation proceedings and the subsequent ruling of this court.
7. The advocate/respondent additionally filed the notice of preliminary objection dated 26th March 2026, challenging the competence of the application on grounds including the mandatory requirement for leave under Paragraph 11(3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, the doctrine of sub judice, the alleged duplication of proceedings before this court and the court of appeal, and abuse of the court process. The client/respondent’s stated that the client/applicant cannot seek to regularize an appeal after instituting it contrary to the express provisions of the law. Further, that any questions concerning the competency of the appeal ought to be addressed by the appellate court which is already seized of the matter.
8. The advocate/respondent filed a further affidavit sworn on 23rd April, 2026. He deposed that he was served with the application and the orders of this court on 19th March 2026, and that he filed his response and preliminary objection within the timelines stipulated by the court. He further deposed that the client/applicant failed to file and serve its supplementary affidavit and submissions within the fourteen days prescribed by the court’s directions of 13th March, 2026.
9. In response, the client/applicant filed a further affidavit sworn by Judy I. Nyagah on 28th April, 2026. The client/applicant reiterated that the primary object of the notice of motion is to obtain leave in order to regularize the appellate process. She deposed that the proceedings before this court are distinct from those instituted before the court of appeal because the present application seeks leave of the judge who determined the taxation reference, as expressly required under Paragraph 11(3). The client/applicant further explained that the omission to seek leave was inadvertent and urged the court to exercise its discretion in its favour rather than deny it an opportunity to pursue the intended appeal on account of an error committed by counsel.
10. The client/applicant also addressed the advocate/respondent’s contention that the application is sub judice. It was deposed that the relief concerning leave to appeal was not the subject of determination before the court of appeal and that the present application was necessary to comply with the express requirements of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The client/applicant expressed its willingness to comply with reasonable conditions on security that the court may impose.
11. The client/applicant filed the supplementary affidavit sworn on 29th June 2026, and deposed that following further consideration of the procedural requirements governing appeals arising from taxation references, it withdrew the proceedings previously instituted before the court of appeal. It was deposed that in view of the withdrawal, the client/applicant no longer pursues the prayer seeking to regularize the withdrawn appeal, but instead seeks leave to appeal, enlargement of time where necessary, and appropriate protective orders to preserve the subject matter pending the intended appellate proceedings. The client/applicant deposed that the withdrawal of the proceedings before the appellate court effectively disposes of the respondent’s objection founded on sub judice and duplication of proceedings, as there is no longer an appeal or application for stay pending before that court.
12. Both the application and the preliminary objection were canvassed through written submissions. The client/applicant filed written submissions dated 29th June, 2026. The advocate/respondent filed written submissions dated 23rd April, 2026. I have carefully considered the application, the notice of preliminary objection and the written submissions. In my view, the issue for determination is whether the notice of preliminary objection and the application have merit.
13. The principles governing preliminary objections are settled. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, the court of appeal explained that a preliminary objection consists of a pure point of law which arises from the pleadings and which, if successfully argued, may dispose of the suit. Further, a preliminary objection must proceed on the assumption that the facts pleaded by the opposing party are correct. It cannot properly be raised where facts must be ascertained or where the court is called upon to exercise judicial discretion.
14. Similarly, in Oraro v Mbaja [2005] 1 KLR 141, Ojwang J. (as he then was) emphasized that a preliminary objection cannot properly be founded on disputed factual matters requiring evidential examination. The advocate/respondent preliminary objection raises, among other matters, the applicability of Paragraph 11(3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, the competency of the appeal previously instituted before the court of appeal and the doctrine of sub judice. To the extent that these grounds concern the jurisdiction of this court and the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, they are capable of determination as preliminary points of law.
15. However, the grounds challenging the arguability of the intended appeal, the sufficiency of the explanation for the omission to seek leave, the alleged mistake of counsel and the client/applicant’s conduct necessarily invite the court to examine the evidence and exercise judicial discretion. Such matters do not, strictly speaking, constitute pure points of law capable of disposing of the application through a preliminary objection. Bearing in mind that civil appeal no. E998 of 2025 was withdrawn on 6th May 2026, I find that the advocate/respondent’s preliminary objection, insofar as it is founded on the doctrine of sub judice and the existence of parallel proceedings, has been overtaken by events. The remaining grounds concerning the exercise of discretion are more appropriately considered in determining the application.
16. I now turn to the issue of whether this court has jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal from its decision rendered on 17th September, 2025. Paragraph 11(3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides as follows:-
“Any person aggrieved by the decision of the judge upon any objection referred to such judge under subparagraph (2) may, with the leave of the judge but not otherwise, appeal to the court of appeal.”
17. The wording of this provision is clear. An appeal against a decision of a judge upon a taxation reference under Paragraph 11(2) does not lie as of right. Leave of the judge is a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of that right of appeal. The provision expressly contemplates that the application for leave is to be determined by the judge whose decision is sought to be challenged. It is therefore incorrect to suggest that the mere institution of appellate proceedings automatically divests the judge of the power to consider an application for leave under Paragraph 11(3). The advocate/respondent’s argument that the court of appeal ought to determine all questions concerning leave overlooks the express statutory requirement that leave be obtained from the judge who determined the reference. I am satisfied that this court has jurisdiction under Paragraph 11(3) to consider that request. The advocate/respondent’s argument that the court is entirely divested of discretion merely because an appeal had previously been filed is therefore untenable.
18. The question that follows is whether the client/applicant has established sufficient grounds for the exercise of this discretion in its favour. In determining whether to grant leave to appeal, the court must consider whether the intended appeal raises a bona fide question deserving consideration by the appellate court, the explanation for any delay and the interests of justice, having regard to the circumstances of the case. The ruling sought to be challenged was delivered on 17th September, 2025. The client/applicant filed the notice of appeal dated 30th September, 2025. However, it did so without first obtaining leave under Paragraph 11(3). The explanation is that the omission arose from an oversight by its advocates. It further maintained that the ruling was delivered in the absence of the parties and their advocates, thereby denying it an opportunity to seek leave immediately.
19. The advocate/respondent disputed the explanation and argued that the client/applicant’s advocates were aware of the decision and the applicable procedural requirements. From the record, the client/applicant was represented by counsel and was ideally required to comply with the statutory provisions governing appeals from decisions on taxation references. On the date of delivery of the ruling, none of the parties were present in court. I note that the client/applicant manifested its intention to challenge the ruling 13 days after its delivery by lodging a notice of appeal. Thereafter, it pursued appellate proceedings until the omission concerning leave was raised during proceedings before the court of appeal on 4th March, 2026. The present application was filed on 12th March, 2026, approximately eight days after the issue was raised. In my view, the applicant acted promptly upon becoming aware of the procedural omission. The delay between the delivery of the ruling and the filing of the present application is undoubtedly substantial. However, the client’s/applicant’s conduct during this period demonstrates that it had not abandoned its intention to challenge the decision. Rather, it had pursued the challenge through an appellate process which was subsequently found to have commenced without obtaining the requisite leave.
20. While the mistake of counsel does not automatically entitle a litigant to favourable exercise of discretion, the court is required to consider the nature of the mistake, the conduct of the litigant, the delay occasioned and the prejudice likely to arise. I note that the client/applicant has not merely sought to retrospectively validate an incompetent appeal. It has withdrawn the appeal and now seeks to comply with the requirement for leave before instituting fresh appellate proceedings. The withdrawal of the appeal demonstrates an attempt to correct the procedural position rather than persist in proceedings instituted contrary to the prescribed procedure.
21. I have also considered the client/applicant’s contention that the intended appeal raises arguable questions concerning the value of the subject matter adopted in assessing instruction fees and the treatment of records allegedly obtained after taxation. The advocate/respondent contends that these issues were adequately considered by the taxing officer and this court, and that the intended appeal is without merit. At this stage, this court is not sitting on appeal against its own ruling. Neither is it required to determine whether the intended appeal will ultimately succeed. The client/applicant has identified among other issues, a dispute concerning the adoption of Kshs.252,000,000 as the value of the subject matter as opposed to Kshs.217,000,000, and the effect of that valuation on the instruction fees awarded. It has also raised questions concerning the treatment of material allegedly obtained after taxation and whether the relevant principles governing interference with the taxing officer’s discretion were correctly applied. In my view, the intended appeal has not been shown to be frivolous.
22. On filing of pleadings without the court’s directions, although parties are required to comply with the orders and directions of the court, the appropriate consequence of non-compliance must be determined in light of the circumstances, including the nature of the default and any prejudice occasioned. In this case, the supplementary affidavit introduces a material development directly bearing upon the client’s/respondent’s preliminary objection. This court cannot ignore the order of the court of appeal confirming withdrawal merely because it was brought to its attention through a subsequently filed affidavit. I am not persuaded that the alleged delay in filing the subsequent affidavits, without a demonstrated prejudice incapable of being addressed by appropriate orders, warrants the dismissal of the application.
23. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the dispute, the explanation for the procedural omission, the client/applicant’s conduct following the delivery of the ruling, the subsequent withdrawal of the appellate proceedings and the identifiable questions raised in the intended appeal, I am satisfied that a proper basis has been laid for the exercise of discretion under Paragraph 11(3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order.
24. I further note that the client/applicant sought stay of execution pending the hearing and determination of civil appeal no. E998 of 2025. The civil appeal was withdrawn vide the orders made on 6th May, 2026. The same cannot be considered in the instant applicant.
25. From the above, the notice of motion dated 11th March, 2026 partially succeeds, and I grant the following orders:
i. The client/applicant is hereby granted leave to appeal to the court of appeal against the ruling and order of this court delivered on 17th September, 2025 in ELC Misc. No. E284 of 2024, pursuant to Rule 11(3) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order.
ii. A temporary stay of execution is hereby granted arising from Nairobi ELCEP Misc No. E004 of 2023 for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this ruling, to enable the client/applicant approach the court of appeal for appropriate relief.
iii. The notice of preliminary objection dated 26th March, 2026 lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
iv. Each party to bear its own costs.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED & DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT
THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
HON. MBOGO C.G.
JUDGE
29/10/2026.
In the presence of:-
Mr. Benson Agunga – Court assistant
Ms. Khamala for the Advocate/Respondent
No appearance for the Client/Applicant