Land law

Mwai v Manyara & another [2026] KEELC 7509 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elclc Case E098 of 2026
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
T. Murigi

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Background

By a Notice of Motion dated 11th March 2026, brought under Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A and 63(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 4A Rule 1 and 2 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks the following orders:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Having considered the application, the respective affidavits, and the rival submissions, the sole issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

Paragraph 40 →

Reasoning passage

However, the Defendants acknowledged the Plaintiff’s original allocation. The Plaintiff presented evidence that, if established at trial, would call into question the lawfulness of the repossession and subsequent reallocation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case requiring an explanation from the Defendants.

Paragraph 47 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCLC CASE NO. E098 OF 2026

PHILISTER NJAMBI MWAI …………………………………………. PLAINTIFF

=VERSUS=

NANCY WAMBUI MANYARA.............................................1ST DEFENDANT

THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY ........................................... 2ND DEFENDANT

RULING

1. By a Notice of Motion dated 11th March 2026, brought under Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A and 63(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 4A Rule 1 and 2 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks the following orders:

a. Spent.

b. Spent,

c. That pending the hearing and determination of the suit, the Court be pleased to issue temporary orders of injunction restraining the Defendant/Respondent, by herself, her agents, servants, employees and/or otherwise, from constructing on, disposing of, transferring, trespassing onto, or interfering in any way with the suit property land PLOT NO. D4-420 KAYOLE SITE & SERVICE SCHEME.

d. That the OCS Kayole Police Station to enforce the orders sought.

e. That costs of the application be provided for.

2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the Applicant sworn on even date.

THE APPLICANTS CASE

3. The Applicant averred that on 24th March, 1987, she was allocated Plot No. D4-420, Kayole Site and Service Scheme, by the Housing Development Department under ballot number 5376, pursuant to her application number 14737. She stated that the terms of the offer required her to construct a house using permanent materials within 18 months, following which she would be granted a 50-year sublease running from 1st January, 1987, to 1st January, 2037.

4. She averred that, in accordance with the terms—particularly those requiring payment of monthly service charges and repayment of the material loans—she had diligently paid and continued to pay the monthly loan instalments. She further averred that she had been issued an approved building plan.

5. She averred that in 2003 she began constructing approximately eight rooms, a toilet and a bathroom on the suit plot, but halted construction owing to financial constraints arising from the illness of her father and husband, with the intention of completing the construction once her financial circumstances improved.

6. She stated that, in June 2010, while paying rates at the Dandora City Council offices, she discovered that the plot had been allocated to Kivuva Mutava, although her name remained on the file. She further averred that Council staff advised her to continue paying the rates, which she has done to date. She also averred that she visited the property regularly and that, in 2016, she found the 1st Defendant on the site who informed her that she had purchased the property from Kivuva Mutava and was completing the buildings she had erected, without her knowledge or consent.

7. She stated that she had lodged a complaint with Nairobi City County, which confirmed that the 1st Defendant’s occupation was unlawful because the sale agreement and special power of attorney relied on by the 1st Defendant had been obtained fraudulently. She further stated that she had never sold the plot to the 1st Defendant or signed any sale agreement or power of attorney.

8. She contended that, unless the 1st Defendant was restrained, the suit property could be transferred, resulting in the loss of her entire investment and rendering the suit nugatory. She asserted that her constitutional right to quiet possession and enjoyment of the plot was being violated, that she would suffer irreparable loss, and that the balance of convenience favoured her as the rightful owner. She therefore urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.

THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S CASE

9. The 1st Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit dated 7th March 2026 in opposition to the application.

10. The 1st Respondent did not dispute that, in 1987, the 2nd Defendant allocated Plot No. D4-420 in the Kayole Site and Service Scheme to the Plaintiff. However, she averred that the allocation was subject to terms and conditions that the Plaintiff was required to fulfil before the plot could be transferred to her. She further stated that one condition reserved the Council’s right to commence eviction proceedings if payments remained in arrears for two months.

11. She averred that the Plaintiff fell into arrears of Kshs. 11,338/= and failed to pay despite demand and notice. She further averred that, at a council meeting held on 19th April, 2007, it was resolved that the plot be repossessed and reallocated. She contended that a gazetted decision could be reversed only by degazettement and that she was unaware of any such degazettement. She further averred that the Plaintiff never objected to the gazettement or repossession. She averred that the 2nd Defendant, having followed due procedure, reallocated the plot to Kivuva Mutava.

12. She stated that, on 2nd November 2009, she entered into a sale agreement with Kivuva Mutava to purchase the suit property for Kshs. 450,000/=, which she paid in full and was issued an ownership booklet. She contended that the plot was repossessed and reallocated on an “as is” basis, with only an undeveloped slab on the property, and denied that the Plaintiff had constructed eight rooms, a toilet, and a bathroom.

13. She asserted that the Plaintiff’s own account confirmed that the plot had been allocated to Kivuva Mutava by 2010. She further contended that the Plaintiff had waited sixteen years before commencing these proceedings and had produced no receipts for rates from 2010, whereas she had paid all rates from 2009 to date.

14. She stated that, immediately after the purchase, she demolished the poorly constructed slab and constructed rental units, which she subsequently leased to tenants. She averred that the 2nd Defendant had confirmed her as the lawful owner and that she had paid the fees required to obtain the title.

15. Regarding the County Attorney’s letter relied upon by the Plaintiff, she contended that the sale agreement had been entered into between herself and Kivuva Mutava, who had granted her a power of attorney. She further averred that neither document originated from the 2nd Defendant and, accordingly, the letter had no evidentiary weight. She also stated that W.S. Ogola, the Acting County Solicitor, had authored the letter and approved the documents relating to the transfer of her plot on 6th March 2015. She further stated that a search conducted before the transfer identified Kivuva Mutava as the registered allottee following repossession.

16. She contended that she would be greatly prejudiced if the orders sought were granted, as she was a retiree and the rental income from the units on the property constituted her sole source of income. She asserted that the Plaintiff was using the Court process to frustrate her and sought an order restraining the Plaintiff from entering the property. She alleged that the Plaintiff had been visiting the property to harass the tenants, thereby causing a breach of the peace.

17. She maintained that the Plaintiff had failed to satisfy any of the requirements for the grant of an injunction set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, and urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

THE APPLICANT’S RESPONSE

18. In a further affidavit dated 20th April 2026, the Applicant averred that the sale agreement between the 1st Defendant and Kivuva Mutava was fraudulent because Kivuva Mutava had never owned the suit property. She further averred that the power of attorney relied upon by the 1st Defendant had been fraudulently obtained, as she had never granted a power of attorney to any third party.

19. She stated that the land records identified her as the legal owner of the property and annexed a certificate of lease issued in her name on 16th March, 2026, for the suit property. She averred that she had satisfied the necessary conditions and paid the outstanding rates, thereby warranting the issuance of the certificate of lease. She contended that the 1st Defendant was unlawfully occupying her land to her detriment.

20. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.

THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS

21. The Applicant filed her submissions dated 28th April 2026.

22. On behalf of the Applicant, Counsel identified the following issues for the Court’s determination:

a) Whether the Plaintiff had satisfied the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction; and

b) Who should bear the costs.

23. Counsel relied on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, which sets out the requirements for interlocutory injunctions, Order 40, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and Steven Gee QC’s Commercial Injunctions (6th edition), which explains that injunctions are discretionary remedies granted in accordance with established principles.

24. On whether a prima facie case had been established, Counsel relied on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KLR 125, as cited in Moses C. Muhia Njoroge & 2 others v Jane W. Lesaloi & 5 others [2014] eKLR. Counsel acknowledged that the Plaintiff was allocated the suit plot in 1987, and that the council minutes of 19th April, 2007 relied upon by the 1st Defendant did not list the suit plot among those repossessed and reallocated. Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant produced no title or document proving that Kivuva Mutava ever owned the plot. Counsel further submitted that according to the letter from the Office of the County Attorney, the sale agreement and power of attorney relied upon were fraudulent and did not exist in the land registry. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff complied with the conditions of allocation, paid the rates, and was issued with a certificate of lease for the suit property.

25. On irreparable harm, Counsel relied on Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR) and Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR to submit that irreparable injury is a harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. Relying on Mbuthia v Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & another [1988] KECA 116 (KLR) and Edwin Kamau Muniu v Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd, Counsel submitted that at the interlocutory stage the court is not required to make final findings of fact. Counsel argued that the 1st Defendant’s unlawful occupation of the suit plot for a decade had caused the Plaintiff psychological torture, mental anguish and loss incapable of quantification, and that she would continue to suffer irreparable loss unless an injunction was granted.

26. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.

THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

27. The 1st Respondent filed her submissions dated 8th May 2026.

28. On behalf of the 1st Defendant, Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to satisfy the conditions for the grant of an injunction set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358.

29. On whether a prima facie case had been established, counsel relied on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] eKLR to submit that the Plaintiff had admitted discovering the reallocation to Kivuva Mutava in 2010, but waited sixteen years, until 2026, to file suit, without lodging any formal complaint regarding the repossession and reallocation during that period. Counsel further submitted that the plot had been properly transferred to the 1st Defendant and that, because the Plaintiff was not the owner, no prima facie case had been established.

30. Counsel objected to the certificate of lease annexed to the Plaintiff’s further affidavit, submitting that new evidence could not be introduced by way of a further affidavit because the 1st Defendant had no opportunity to respond. Counsel further submitted that the document was an application for a lease; that it was unsigned and unregistered; and that it was dated 16th March, 2026, after the suit was filed on 11th March, 2026. Counsel argued that the document had been obtained pendente lite, could not create a right where none existed, and was an afterthought intended to manufacture a prima facie case.

31. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff’s assertion that the 1st Defendant had produced no document evidencing Kivuva Mutava’s ownership was misleading, as the 1st Defendant had exhibited the sale agreement and power of attorney, a letter approving the transfer signed by W.S. Ogola, Acting County Solicitor, and a search certificate and beacon certificate identifying Kivuva Mutava as the registered allottee following repossession. Counsel submitted that the County Attorney’s letter dated 10th April, 2025 could not nullify a transfer approved by the same office several years earlier. Counsel further submitted that the assertion that the sale agreement did not originate from the County could not invalidate a private agreement between Kivuva Mutava and the 1st Defendant, which only Kivuva Mutava could repudiate. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had produced no evidence that she had been reinstated as allottee after the repossession.

32. Regarding irreparable injury, Counsel submitted that, in the absence of a right to the land, the Plaintiff could not suffer irreparable injury. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff had not been in possession since 2009; that the developments on the land had been undertaken by the 1st Defendant, who had paid all rates; and that the Plaintiff’s claims of psychological torture and mental anguish were speculative and unsupported by medical or independent evidence.

33. Counsel submitted that granting the injunction would cause irreparable harm to the 1st Defendant, a retiree who had been in possession for more than sixteen years and relied on rental income for her sustenance. Counsel further submitted that, contrary to the Plaintiff’s assertion, the suit plot was listed as number 67 in the council minutes dated 19th April, 2007, and that no subsequent gazette notice had contested or reversed the repossession.

34. Regarding the balance of convenience, Counsel relied on Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR to submit that the Plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating that the inconvenience she would suffer would outweigh the inconvenience the 1st Defendant would experience.

35. Counsel submitted that equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent; that the Plaintiff’s allotment was conditional; that she had taken no steps to oppose the repossession and had made no substantial improvements to the land. Counsel further submitted that, in contrast, the 1st Defendant had been in open, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession since 2009, had developed rental units, had paid all rates, and had paid for the lease to be issued.

36. Counsel submitted that the application is an abuse of the Court process, brought after inordinate and inexcusable delay, and urged the Court to dismiss it with costs to the 1st Defendant.

THE 2ND RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

37. The 2nd Respondent filed its submissions dated 9th June 2026.

38. On behalf of the 2nd Respondent, Counsel submitted that the sole issue for determination was whether the Plaintiff had met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction. Counsel submitted that a temporary injunction is an emergency order intended to prevent irreparable harm pending the determination of the suit. Counsel further submitted that an Applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate irreparable harm not compensable by damages, and, where the Court is in doubt, show that the balance of convenience lies in her favour.

39. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case with a probability of success or demonstrated that she would suffer harm for which damages would be an inadequate remedy. Relying on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs to the 2nd Respondent.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

40. Having considered the application, the respective affidavits, and the rival submissions, the sole issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

41. The principles for the grant of an injunction were laid down in the celebrated case of Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co Ltd 1973 EA 358 as follows:

1) Firstly, the Applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success.

2) Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the Applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable harm which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages.

3) Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on a balance of convenience.

42. The first issue for determination is whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success.

43. In Mrao Ltd vs_First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR, the Court of Appeal defined a prima facie case as follows:

“A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”

44. In the matter at hand, it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff was allocated Plot No. D4 420, Kayole Site and Service Scheme, in 1987. The 1st Defendant contends that the allocation was revoked for non-payment pursuant to a Council resolution dated 19th April 2007, and that the plot was subsequently reallocated to Kivuva Mutava, from whom she purchased it in 2009. The Plaintiff disputes this account.

45. The parties dispute several material questions: whether the suit plot was among the plots repossessed at the Council meeting held on 19th April 2007; whether due process was followed before the repossession; whether Kivuva Mutava held a valid allocation capable of being transferred to the 1st Defendant; and the weight to be accorded to the letter dated 10th April 2025 from the Office of the County Attorney. The Plaintiff annexed a certificate of lease in her name, dated 16th March 2026, to her further affidavit. The 1st Defendant contends that the document was irregularly introduced by way of a further affidavit, is unsigned and unregistered, and was obtained after the suit was filed.

46. These are disputed questions of fact that cannot be resolved on affidavit evidence. They may be determined only at trial, after the evidence has been tested. Accordingly, this Court makes no finding regarding the validity of the repossession, the reallocation, or the certificate of lease.

47. However, the Defendants acknowledged the Plaintiff’s original allocation. The Plaintiff presented evidence that, if established at trial, would call into question the lawfulness of the repossession and subsequent reallocation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case requiring an explanation from the Defendants.

48. On the second limb, the Plaintiff must show that, without an injunction, she will suffer irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. In Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:

“On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima face, the nature and extent of the injury. Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.”

49. In Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] KEELC 2424 (KLR), the Court held that:

 “Irreparable injury means that the injury must be one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages and that the existence of a prima facie case is not itself sufficient. The applicant should further show that irreparable injury will occur to him if the injunction is not granted and there is no other remedy open to him by which he will protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury.”

50. In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property. By her own account, she found the 1st Defendant on the site in 2016 and learned of the reallocation as early as 2010. The 1st Defendant’s uncontroverted evidence is that she has been in possession since 2009, has constructed rental units on the property, and has leased them to tenants. The Plaintiff did not seek relief from the Court until 2026. Accordingly, an injunction would not preserve any possession the Plaintiff enjoyed. Rather, it would disturb a state of affairs that has existed for more than a decade.

51. The Plaintiff’s claim of psychological torture and mental anguish is unsupported by evidence. With respect to her proprietary claim, the value of the suit property and any loss arising from its use or income are quantifiable. Should she succeed at trial, she may be adequately compensated by an award of damages, including mesne profits.

52. It is the Plaintiff’s case that a certificate of lease has now been issued in her name. If so, the 1st Defendant cannot transfer the suit property pending trial. Accordingly, the apprehension that the property may be alienated, thereby rendering the suit nugatory, has not been established.

53. The Plaintiff has accordingly failed to demonstrate that she will suffer irreparable injury that cannot be adequately compensated by an award of damages if the injunction is not granted.

54. The requirements for granting an injunction are sequential. Having determined that the Plaintiff has not satisfied the second requirement, this Court need not consider the balance of convenience.

55. In any event, the balance of convenience does not favour the Plaintiff. The 1st Defendant is in possession, has developed the property, and derives income from it. Granting the orders sought would cause greater inconvenience to the 1st Defendant than declining them would to the Plaintiff, whose rights can be fully addressed at the trial.

56. The 1st Defendant urged the Court to direct the Plaintiff to keep away from the suit property and refrain from harassing her tenants. However, the 1st Defendant did not seek this relief by way of an application before the Court; it was raised only in the replying affidavit and in submissions. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant the relief.

57. In light of the foregoing, I find that the Plaintiff has not met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction. The upshot foregoing is that the application dated 11th March 2026 is without merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF :

The Plaintiff in person

Ms Etole for the 1st Defendant

Cheriyuot for the 2nd Defendant

Vena – Court assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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