REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELCOS NO. E025 OF 2023
EPHANTUS GACHOKA KANYI .................................................. PLAINTIFF
-VERSUS-
ISEKA LIMITED.......................................................................DEFENDANT
AND
ELCLC NO. E 096 OF 2026
SUSAN WANJIRU GACHOKA..................................................... PLAINTIFF
-VERSUS-
ISEKA LIMITED..................................................................1ST DEFENDANT
EPHANTUS GACHOKA KANYI .........................................2ND DEFENDANT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 31st March 2026, brought under Sections 1A, 1B & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 11 Rule 3(1)(h) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Plaintiff in ELCOS No. E096 of 2026 seeks the following orders:
a. Spent.
b. That this Honourable Court be pleased to consolidate ELCOS No. E025 of 2023 and ELCLC No. E096 of 2026 and direct that both matters be heard and determined together.
c. That upon consolidation, ELCOS No. EO25 OF 2023 be designated as the lead file.
d. That all further pleadings in the consolidated matters be filed and carried forward under ELCOS No. EO25 OF 2023 or such other lead file as this Honourable Court may direct.
e. That the hearing date already fixed in ELCOS No. EO25 OF 2023 be vacated
and/or directions be issued to facilitate the hearing of the consolidated suit.
f. That the costs of this Application be in the cause.
g. Any other such order this Honourable Court deems fit and just.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the Applicant sworn on even date.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
3. The Applicant averred that, by an application dated 26th May 2025, she sought to be joined as a party to ELCOS No. E025 of 2023, a suit concerning L.R. No. 209/3752, in which she claimed a beneficial interest. She stated that, in a ruling delivered on 31st October 2025, this Court declined her application for joinder and directed her to pursue her claim in a separate suit.
4. She averred that, in compliance with the ruling, she instituted ELCLC No. E096 of 2026 against the same parties, seeking orders regarding her beneficial interest in the suit property.
5. She stated that both suits relate to the same subject matter, namely L.R. No. 209/3752, and arise from the same facts concerning occupation, ownership and competing interests in the property. She averred that the parties to both suits were substantially the same and that the issues for determination were intertwined, raising common questions of law and fact.
6. She contended that separate hearings would result in duplicative proceedings, unnecessary costs, and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting determinations on the same subject matter. She further stated that consolidation would enable the court to adjudicate fully and effectively on all issues in dispute, and that hearing the two suits together would serve the interests of justice and expediency while promoting the efficient use of judicial time.
THE 2ND RESPONDENT’S CASE
7. The 2nd Defendant filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 7th May 2026, opposing the application. The 2nd Defendant contends that the suit is bad in law because it is sub judice in Nairobi ELC OS No. 25 of 2023, constitutes an abuse of the court process, and should be struck out with costs.
8. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
9. The Applicant filed her submissions dated 26th May 2026.
10. On behalf of the Plaintiff, Counsel identified the following issues for the Court's determination:
a) Whether the 2nd Defendant’s preliminary objection should be upheld; and
b) Whether ELCOS No. E025 of 2023 and ELCLC No. E096 of 2026 ought to be consolidated.
11. On the first issue, Counsel relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 and Oraro v Mbaja [2005] eKLR to submit that the objection did not raise a pure point of law. Counsel further submitted that determining whether the suit was sub judice would require the Court to compare the pleadings, parties, causes of action and reliefs in both suits and to consider the effect of the ruling dated 31st October, 2025.
12. Without prejudice, Counsel submitted that the threshold under Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act, as restated in Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General; Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 16 others (Interested Parties) [2020] KESC 54 (KLR), had not been met. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff filed ELCLC No. E096 of 2026 in compliance with this Court’s direction that she ventilate her claim in a separate suit, which direction had not been set aside, and that a party who complies with a court’s direction cannot be said to have abused its process. Counsel contended that the Plaintiff’s claim, founded on constructive trust, proprietary estoppel, long occupation, contribution to repayment of the facility, and improvements to the property, was distinct from the earlier suit and had never been adjudicated. Counsel further submitted that striking it out would infringe her right of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution.
13. On the second issue, counsel relied on Joseph Okoyo v Edwin Dickson Wasuna [2014] eKLR, Korean United Church of Kenya & 3 others v Seng Ha Sang [2014] eKLR, and Law Society of Kenya v Centre for Human Rights and Democracy & 12 others [2014] KESC 29 (KLR), to submit that consolidation would promote the efficient and expeditious resolution of the disputes without prejudicing any party. Counsel argued that both suits concerned L.R. No. 209/3752, involved substantially the same parties, raised interrelated issues of adverse possession and equitable interest, and would rely on overlapping evidence, including the sale agreement dated 27th October, 1998, and the novation agreement dated 7th September, 2000. Counsel contended that separate hearings could result in duplication, unnecessary costs, and conflicting determinations, and that the 2nd Defendant’s concern regarding parallel proceedings would be best addressed through consolidation rather than striking out.
14. Accordingly, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection dated 7th May, 2026 and to allow the application as prayed.
THE DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS
15. The Defendant filed its submissions dated 2nd June 2026.
16. On behalf of the Defendant, Counsel reiterated the contents of the preliminary objection in support of the submissions. Counsel relied on Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) in support of the submissions.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
17. Having considered the notice of motion, the notice of preliminary objection and the submissions on record, the following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether the preliminary objection dated 7th May 2026 is merited.
b. Whether ELCOS No. E025 of 2023 and ELCLC No. E096 of 2026 should be consolidated.
WHETHER THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IS MERITED
18. It is trite that a preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, the Court held that:
“A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.”
19. In Oraro v Mbaja [2005] KEHC 3182 (KLR) the court held that:
“A “preliminary objection”, correctly understood, is now well identified as, and declared to be a point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and in any event, to be proved through the processes of evidence. Any assertion which claims to be a preliminary objection, and yet it bears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication, is not, as a matter of legal principle, a true preliminary objection which the Court should allow to proceed.”
20. The doctrine of sub judice is anchored in Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides as follows:
“No court shall proceed with the trial of any suit or proceeding in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit or proceeding between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, where such suit or proceeding is pending in the same or any other court having jurisdiction in Kenya to grant the relief claimed.”
21. In Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General; Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 16 others (Interested Parties) [2020] KESC 54 (KLR), the Supreme Court restated the elements that must be established for the doctrine to apply:
“A party that seeks to invoke the doctrine of res sub judice must therefore establish that: there is more than one suit over the same subject matter; that one suit was instituted before the other; that both suits are pending before courts of competent jurisdiction and lastly; that the suits are between the same parties or their representatives.”
22. In the matter at hand, it is not in dispute that, by an application dated 26th May 2025, the Plaintiff sought to be joined in ELCOS No. E025 of 2023. In a ruling delivered on 31st October 2025, this Court dismissed the application and directed her to pursue her claim in a separate suit. She subsequently instituted the present suit.
23. The earlier suit concerns a claim brought by Ephantus Gachoka Kanyi against Iseka Limited, seeking adverse possession of L.R. No. 209/3752. In the present suit, the Plaintiff asserts a beneficial interest in the same property based on constructive trust and proprietary estoppel. She avers that she is the 2nd Defendant’s daughter, that she paid monthly instalments to the 1st Defendant to repurchase the property, and that she has occupied and improved it.
24. Although both suits relate to the same property, they raise distinct issues. The earlier suit concerns whether the 1st Defendant acquired title by adverse possession, whereas the present suit concerns whether the Plaintiff holds a beneficial interest arising from her own conduct and contributions. That claim was not before the court in the earlier suit as her application to be joined was declined.
25. The parties to the earlier suit are the 1st and 2nd Defendants herein. The Plaintiff was not a party to that suit. Nothing on record shows that she claims through either of them or litigates under the same title. Although she is the daughter of the 2nd Defendant, her claim does not derive from his asserted possession. It is based on her alleged contributions, occupation and improvements, and is asserted against both him and the 1st Defendant.
26. The second and third elements under Section 6 are therefore not met. The objection must fail on that ground alone.
27. In any event, Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act bars a court from proceeding with the trial of a later suit. Even when the doctrine applies, the appropriate remedy is to stay the later proceedings, not to strike out the suit. Striking out the suit would also deny the Plaintiff a forum in which to pursue the claim that this Court directed her to bring, thereby infringing her right of access to justice.
28. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the preliminary objection is without merit and is hereby dismissed.
WHETHER THE TWO SUITS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED
29. In Law Society of Kenya v Centre for Human Rights and Democracy & 12 others [2014] KESC 29 (KLR), the Supreme Court stated:
“The essence of consolidation is to facilitate the efficient and expeditious disposal of disputes, and to provide a framework for a fair and impartial dispensation of justice to the parties. Consolidation was never meant to confer any undue advantage upon the party that seeks it, nor was it intended to occasion any disadvantage towards the party that opposes it.”
30. In Korean United Church of Kenya & 3 others v Seng Ha Sang [2014] KEHC 7634 (KLR), the court observed that consolidation is intended to save the resources and costs of the parties and the court:
“Consolidation of suits is done under the inherent powers of the Court and for purposes of achieving the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Act that is for expeditious and proportionate disposal of civil disputes. Therefore, the main purpose of consolidation of suits is to save costs, time and effort and to make the conduct of several actions more convenient by treating them as one action. It is also ordered for meeting the ends of justice as it saves the parties from multiplicity of proceedings, delay and expenses.
31. In the case of Ean Kenya Limited versus John Sawers & 4 Others [2007] eKLR, Waweru J stated this on consolidation,
“…the test to be applied is not whether the parties are the same but whether the same or similar questions of law or fact are involved in the suits”.
32. In determining whether to consolidate the suits, the Court considers whether they raise common questions of law or fact, whether the rights or remedies claimed arise from the same transaction or series of transactions, and whether consolidation would prejudice any party.
33. In the matter at hand, both suits concern the same property, L.R. No. 209/3752. They arise from the same facts regarding its occupation and ownership, as well as the competing interests in the property. The parties are substantially the same. Both suits will involve overlapping evidence, including the sale agreement dated 27th October 1998 and the novation agreement dated 7th September 2000, each of which is alleged to have been entered into between the Defendants.
34. If the suits are heard separately, the court would be required to make findings on the same property, documents, and conduct of the same parties in two separate trials. This would create a substantial risk of inconsistent determinations, duplicative proceedings, and unnecessary costs.
35. This Court is mindful that it declined to join the Plaintiff in ELCOS No. E025 of 2023. However, consolidation is distinct from joinder. Each suit retains its separate identity, and each claim will be determined on the basis of its own pleadings. The claims in the two suits will simply be heard together. Accordingly, the direction requiring the Plaintiff to file a separate suit is not undermined by an order directing that the two suits be heard together.
36. The 2nd Defendant has not demonstrated that consolidation of the suits would cause it any prejudice. Its concern regarding parallel proceedings involving the same property is more appropriately addressed through consolidation than by striking out the suits.
37. As the hearing date of 3rd June 2026 has passed, prayer (e) of the application has been overtaken by events.
38. This Court finds that consolidation will facilitate the efficient and expeditious resolution of the dispute concerning L.R. No. 209/3752 without causing prejudice to any party.
39. In the end, I find that the application dated 31st March 2026 is merited and is hereby allowed on the following terms:
a. The preliminary objection dated 7th May 2026 is hereby dismissed.
b. ELCOS No. E025 of 2023 and ELCLC No. E096 of 2026 are hereby consolidated, and shall be heard and determined together.
c. ELCOS No. E025 of 2023 shall be the lead file. All further pleadings and documents in the consolidated suits shall be filed under the lead file.
d. The costs of the application shall be in the cause.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Kipchilat holding brief for Mugo for the Plaintiff in E025 of 2025
Wanjiru holding brief for Ms Suna for the Plaintiff in E096 of 2026