Land law

Equity Bank Kenya Limited v Chief Land Registrar & 4 others [2026] KEELC 7508 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
T. Murigi

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Background

By a Notice of Motion dated 18th February 2026, brought under Order 40 Rules (1), (2), (3) & (4) and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B, 3A & 63(C) of the Civil Procedure Act, the Plaintiff/ Applicant seeks the following orders:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Having considered the application, the supporting affidavit and the submissions on record, the only issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

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Reasoning passage

On the basis of the material before me, I find that the Plaintiff has demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm if the orders sought are not granted.

Paragraph 32 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCLC E062 OF 2026

EQUITY BANK KENYA LIMITED ………………………………….. PLAINTIFF

=VERSUS=

THE CHIEF LAND REGISTRAR ………………………………. 1ST DEFENDANT

THE DIRECTOR OF SURVEYS ……………………………… 2ND DEFENDANT

THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY NATIONAL TREASURY …... 3RD DEFENDANT

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL …………………………………. 4TH DEFENDANT

THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY GOVERNMENT……………. 5TH DEFENDANT

RULING

1. By a Notice of Motion dated 18th February 2026, brought under Order 40 Rules (1), (2), (3) & (4) and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B, 3A & 63(C) of the Civil Procedure Act, the Plaintiff/ Applicant seeks the following orders:

a. Spent.

b. Spent.

c. That pending the hearing and determination of this suit, a temporary injunction be issued restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants, employees, or any person acting under their authority from entering, trespassing, dumping waste, surveying, leasing, alienating, dealing with, or in any manner interfering with Land Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/6.

d. That the costs of this Application be provided for.

2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of Samuel Wamaitha, the Plaintiff’s Manager Legal Services, sworn on even date.

THE APPLICANTS CASE

3. The deponent averred that the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/6, having acquired the property from the Nairobi City Council, the predecessor of the 5th Defendant, and having been issued a Certificate of Lease on 17th May, 2000.

4. He further averred that, after the Plaintiff discovered on or about 4th April 2025 that its Certificate of Lease was missing despite conducting a diligent search, it promptly initiated the replacement process by obtaining a police abstract, publishing notices of the loss in two national newspapers, and submitting an application for a replacement to the 1st Defendant.

5. He stated that the 1st Defendant’s officers, instead of processing the application, informed the Plaintiff verbally that the suit property no longer existed because it had been amalgamated into Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/36. He further averred that the Plaintiff subsequently conducted an official search, which confirmed that the Plaintiff remained the registered proprietor of Nairobi/Block 86/6.

6. He contended that the alleged amalgamation was undertaken without notice, consent or compensation, and without complying with the compulsory acquisition process. He averred that the survey records show the amalgamation proceeded without County planning approval, as expressly acknowledged in Survey Plan FR No. 566 of 22. He further averred that the Defendants had selectively excluded the neighbouring parcel, Nairobi/Block 86/11, from the amalgamation, thereby demonstrating arbitrariness and illegality.

7. He averred that the 5th Defendant unlawfully entered the suit property and converted it into a public dumpsite, thereby depriving the Plaintiff of quiet possession and use. He further averred that despite receiving a demand notice and a notice of intention to sue, the 1st Defendant failed to rectify the register.

8. He contended that unless the Court intervened, the Defendants would further alter the land and survey records, alienate the land, and permanently prejudice the Plaintiff’s proprietary rights. He further contended that the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss that damages could not adequately compensate. He maintained that the application was made in good faith and was necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit.

9. Though duly served, the Respondents did not file any response to the application.

10. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.

THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS

11. The Applicant filed its submissions dated 15th June 2026.

12. On behalf of the Applicant, Counsel outlined the principles governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction, as established in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358. Counsel further submitted that the three conditions must be applied as separate, distinct, and sequential hurdles, as clarified in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others (Civil Appeal 77 of 2012) [2014] KECA 606 (KLR).

13. Regarding whether a prima facie case had been established, Counsel relied on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] eKLR and Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] KEELC 2424 (KLR). Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had been the registered proprietor of Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/6 since 17th May 2000 as evidenced by the ownership documents. Counsel further contended that the Defendants had, without due process, purported to amalgamate the Plaintiff’s land and caused a parallel title, Nairobi/Block 86/36, to be issued without notice, consent, compensation, or compliance with the compulsory acquisition process. Counsel further submitted that the 5th Defendant had unlawfully converted the suit property into a public dumpsite.

14. Relying on Sections 24 and 26 of the Land Registration Act and the decision in Elijah Makeri Nyangw’ra v Stephen Mungai Njuguna & another [2013] KEELC 161 (KLR), Counsel submitted that a registered proprietor’s title is protected unless it is shown that the title was acquired by fraud or illegality. Counsel further submitted that the Defendants had established no lawful interest in the property and contended that the Plaintiff’s rights under Article 40 of the Constitution had been violated.

15. Regarding irreparable harm, Counsel submitted that, unless restrained, the Defendants would continue to use the suit property as a dumpsite, thereby causing environmental degradation and pollution and permanently altering the land. Relying on Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others (Civil Appeal 77 of 2012) [2014] KECA 606 (KLR), Counsel submitted that damages would not provide adequate compensation for such harm.

16. On the balance of convenience, Counsel relied on Mbuthia v Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & another [1988] KECA 116 (KLR) to submit that granting the injunction would preserve the property and prevent further degradation, whereas denying it would permit continued trespass, cause irreversible damage and render the suit nugatory.

17. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

18. Having considered the application, the supporting affidavit and the submissions on record, the only issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

19. The law governing applications for injunctions is outlined in Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides:

"Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—

a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or

b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit,

the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.”

20. The principles for the grant of an injunction were laid down in the celebrated case of Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co Ltd 1973 EA 358 as follows: -

1) Firstly, the Applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success.

2) Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the Applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable harm which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages.

3) Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on a balance of convenience.

21. The first issue for determination is whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success.

22. In Mrao Ltd vs_First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR, the Court of Appeal defined a prima facie case as follows:

“A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”

23. In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff produced a lease agreement with the Nairobi City Council dated 16th May 2000 in respect of Land Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/6, for a term of 99 years commencing on 22nd August 1985. The Plaintiff also produced an abstract regarding the loss of the title deed for LR No. Nairobi/Block 86/6, together with an official search dated 5th September 2024, which indicated that the Plaintiff remained the registered proprietor of the suit property as at that date.

24. Section 24(a) of the Land Registration Act provides that:

Subject to this Act-

(a) the registration of a person as the proprietor of land shall vest in that person the absolute ownership of that land, together with all the rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant to it.

25. Section 26(1) of the Act provides that:

(1) The certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon registration, or to a purchaser of land upon a transfer or transmission by the proprietor shall be taken by all courts as prima facie evidence that the person named as proprietor of the land is the absolute and indefeasible owner, subject to the encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions contained or endorsed in the certificate, and the title of that proprietor shall not be subject to challenge, except—

(a)on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person is proved to be a party; or

(b)where the certificate of title has been acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme.

26. The Plaintiff’s uncontroverted evidence is that the suit property was amalgamated into Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/36 without notice, consent or compensation. The Plaintiff further averred that the 5th Defendant entered the suit property and converted it into a public dumpsite, and annexed photographs in support.

27. In Edwin Kamau Muniu v Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 2006), the Court held that;

“In an interlocutory application to determine the very issues which will be canvassed at the trial with finality, all the court is entitled at this stage is whether the applicant is entitled to an injunction sought on the usual criteria.’’

28. At the interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to make a final determination on the validity of the amalgamation or the status of Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/36 as these matters are to be determined at trial. Based on the evidence on record, the Plaintiff has demonstrated that it holds registered title to the suit property and that the Defendants have apparently infringed its rights in the property in a manner requiring explanation. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case with a probability of success.

29. Regarding the second limb, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that, in the absence of an injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm for which damages would not provide an adequate remedy. In Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:

“On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima facie, the nature and extent of the injury. Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.”

30. In Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] KEELC 2424 (KLR), the Court held that:

 “Irreparable injury means that the injury must be one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages and that the existence of a prima facie case is not itself sufficient. The applicant should further show that irreparable injury will occur to him if the injunction is not granted and there is no other remedy open to him by which he will protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury.”

31. In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff’s unrebutted evidence establishes that the suit property is being used as a public dumpsite. The continued deposit of waste on the land is likely to degrade it and irreversibly alter its character. Further, the survey records have already been amended to reflect an amalgamation. There is a real risk that the suit property may be alienated or otherwise dealt with before the suit is heard, thereby rendering it nugatory.

32. On the basis of the material before me, I find that the Plaintiff has demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm if the orders sought are not granted.

33. On the balance of convenience, the Court must weigh the hardship the Applicant would bear if the injunction is denied against the hardship the Respondents would bear if the injunction is granted.

34. In Paul Gitonga Wanjiku v Gathuti Tea Factory Company Limited & 2 others [2016] eKLR the Court held that;

“The court in determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted takes into consideration the balance of convenience to the parties and the nature of the injury which the respondent on the one hand would suffer if the injunction was granted and it should ultimately turn out to be right and that which injury the applicant on the other hand might sustain if the injunction was refused and he should ultimately turn out to be right. The burden of proof that the inconvenience which the applicant will suffer if the injunction is refused is greater than that which the respondent will suffer if it is granted lies on the applicant”.

35. The Plaintiff adduced documents establishing, prima facie, that it is the registered proprietor of the suit property. The Defendants, having failed to file a response, have not demonstrated any lawful interest in the suit property or any prejudice they would suffer if the orders sought are granted. Conversely, if the orders are declined, the suit property is likely to continue deteriorating and may be alienated before the parties’ rights are determined.

36. In light of the foregoing, I find that the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction. The upshot of the foregoing is that the application dated 18th February 2026 is merited and is hereby allowed on the following terms:

a. A temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, servants, employees or any person acting under their authority, from entering, trespassing upon, dumping waste on, surveying, leasing, alienating, dealing with or in any manner interfering with Land Title No. Nairobi/Block 86/6, pending the hearing and determination of this suit.

b. The costs of the application shall abide with the outcome of the suit.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Ms Komo for the 5th Defendant

Vena –Court assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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