REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT MILIMANI
ELC NO E020 OF 2025
DIAMOND JUBILEE LIMITED - PLAINTIFF
VS
NORTHERN BLOCK RESIDENTS LTD - 1ST RESPONDENT
ROSSLYN HEIGHTS LTD - 2ND RESPONDENT
OLCANI RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION - 3RD RESPONDENT
ROSSLYN ALLIANCE RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION - 4TH RESPONDENT
ROSSLYN LONE TREE RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION - 5TH RESPONDENT
RULING
(In respect of the Plaintiff’s motion dated 11/12/25; the Defendants' Preliminary Objection dated 30/12/2025 and motion dated 15/6/26)
The Plaintiff/Applicants' Notice of motion dated 11/12/25
1. The application is brought (Under Order 40 Rule 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010; Order 51 Rule 1; Section 13(7) of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011; Articles 40, 47 and 50 of the Constitution; Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act; Sections 57–68 of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act; the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA); and all other enabling provisions of the law and seeks order that pending the hearing and determination of this suit, an interlocutory injunction be issued restraining the Respondents, their directors, officials or officers, members and agents, jointly and severally, from:
a) obstructing, interfering with, hindering or attempting to halt the Applicant's ongoing construction on L.R. No. 30516/27;
b) issuing, circulating or publishing any threats, notices or directives purporting to require cessation or suspension of the works;
c) entering upon, blocking, or otherwise interfering with the Applicant's construction site, contractors, consultants, workers, materials, or operations;
d) engaging in any conduct designed or reasonably expected to intimidate, disrupt or unlawfully influence the continuation of the Applicant's lawful development.
2. The application is based on the grounds set out on the face of it and on the supporting affidavit of Ali Akbarali, the director of the Plaintiff, in which he deposed as follows;
a. The Plaintiff is the registered owner and developer of the project on LR No 30516/27 [suit land], situated along Red Hill Road within Nairobi County.
b. Despite obtaining all the necessary statutory approvals, including the Development permissions and a valid Licence, the Defendants have embarked on a sustained unlawful campaign to obstruct and interfere with the project by issuing misleading letters purporting to stop the project, circulating false and unsubstantiated allegations, and misrepresenting facts to regulators and third parties.
c. The defendants' actions are selective in view of the lack of objection to a larger, significant development in the neighbourhood, namely Enaki.
d. Unless stopped, the Respondents' actions pose a risk of dispute over the project, financial losses, and delay in completion of the project, as well as safety concerns and reputational and contractual harm to the applicant.
e. The applicant has established a prima facie case with a high likelihood of success, stands to suffer irreparable harm if not protected, and that the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the lawful development.
3. In opposing the application, the Defendants raised a Preliminary Objection on grounds that;
a. The entire suit constitutes a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and an abuse of the judicial process.
b. The Plaint and the Application disclose no reasonable cause of action against the Defendants.
c. Equity cannot be invoked to restrain the public from petitioning public authorities regarding the legality of a development.
4. In opposing the Plaintiffs' application dated 11/12/25, Victor Gitobu swore the affidavit on 4/3/26 on behalf of the Defendants, stating as follows;
a. The development permission held by the applicant is invalid because the purported public participation on 3/07/2024, 25/07/2024, and 9/10/2024 took place after the permission was approved on 28/03/2025. Public participation conducted after the development permission has been issued is defective and cannot be relied upon to obtain a valid development permission.
b. The subject land is located in Zone 13K. At the time the change-of-use approval was purportedly granted, the Nairobi City County [NCC] had not gazetted a development control policy applicable to Zone 13K, as required by law. Accordingly, the approval was granted in the absence of an applicable policy and lacked the legal foundation required under Physical and Land Use Planning Act [PLUPA].
c. The Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] licence was issued on the basis of a flawed assessment relating to a different parcel of land, namely L.R. No. 1/494, located on Wood Avenue, Kilimani (see page 30 of the said Report). The suit land is situated in Red Hill and is entirely distinct from the parcel assessed. An EIA licence based on a report assessing a different property cannot constitute valid authorisation for the development of the suit property.
d. Under Zone 13K, the maximum permitted Plot Ratio (PR) is 50%, and the maximum Ground Coverage (GC) is 25%. The Suit Property comprises 0.8094 hectares. The proposed development exceeds the permitted Plot Ratio for Zone 13K by approximately fourfold, constituting a fundamental non-compliance that would alter the character of both the development and the neighbourhood.
e. The deponent stated that participants objected to traffic management, zoning, waste management, and water discharge, issues still unresolved. That since public participation was inadequate, the NCC Chief Officer ordered further consultations. The deponent avers that the process was neither meaningful nor effective in securing community acceptance of the proposed development.
f. He stated that the defendants' actions in raising objections to the development with the statutory bodies and the project proponent were within their rights under section 129 of EMCA, section 87 of PLUPA, and articles 33, 37, and 42 of the Constitution. He further stated that none of the communications contained deliberately false, reckless, or malicious statements. He avowed that the defendants have never entered the suit land, physically confronted anyone, or interfered with construction activities there. In a letter dated 18/9/2024, the proponent was issued with a conditional suspension requiring it to convene a consultative meeting with residents and submit a traffic impact assessment to address outstanding issues relating to efficient disposal and river protection. The letter warned that the project would remain suspended until all issues were resolved. In response, the proponent convened a meeting on 9/10/24. To date, neither NCC nor the project proponent has confirmed that the issues have been addressed; accordingly, they remain unresolved. Contrary to the proponent's allegation that public participation was conducted, the defendant states that the minutes of the three meetings demonstrate non-compliance, unresolved objections, and an inadequate process.
g. The deponent further stated that, although the Plaintiff instituted the suit while the defendants' complaints to the NEMA and NCC regulatory bodies were intended to suppress the statutory processes, those complaints did not, in themselves, constitute an abuse of the judicial process.
h. Regarding the allegation of selective objections, the deponent states that the defendants are unaware of the circumstances surrounding the approval of the ENAKi development and are therefore unable to comment on its compliance status. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the development was non-compliant, any such non-compliance cannot serve as a benchmark for assessing the development at issue. Accordingly, the allegation of selective objection is denied.
i. With respect to irreparable harm, the deponent states that any financial harm suffered by the applicants, including delays, contractual penalties, and reputational damage, was not caused by the defendants but arose from the applicants' own failure to comply with the applicable statutory provisions when they chose to commence development without following due process of law.
j. It was further averred that granting the Plaintiffs’ requested orders would infringe the defendants’ constitutional rights under Articles 33, 37, and 42 of the Constitution of Kenya, as recognised under PLUPA and EMCA. Affected residents would be silenced and prevented from bringing their concerns to the attention of the authorities responsible for preventing unlawful development and environmental harm. NEMA, the NCC, and KURA would be deprived of information necessary to fulfil their statutory duties. This would prejudice the public interest and the wider community, rather than merely the defendants' private interests. Unless addressed, the concerns raised regarding the development will adversely affect local residents.
k. Granting an injunction on the terms sought by the Applicant would not preserve the status quo; rather, it would fundamentally alter it. It would silence the Defendants, halt ongoing regulatory complaints before their resolution, and deprive this Honourable Court of the benefit of the resulting regulatory findings when determining the main suit. The balance of justice clearly favours maintaining the status quo until the full hearing.
l. The harm that the Defendants and the public would suffer if the injunction were granted could not be adequately compensated by damages. Once suppressed, constitutional rights cannot be sufficiently remedied by a subsequent award of damages. Accordingly, the balance of convenience strongly favours the Defendants.
m. In conclusion, the Court was asked to dismiss the application and maintain the status quo pending the full hearing of the suit.
The Defendants' application dated 15/6/26
5. This motion seeks the following orders;
a. Pending the hearing and determination of this suit, an order of interlocutory injunction be issued restraining the Plaintiff/Respondent, its agents, employees, servants, contractors or any person acting through it from undertaking, continuing or resuming any construction, excavation, building, development or site preparation activities on LR No. 30516/27, Redhill Road, Rosslyn, Nairobi.
b. The Officer Commanding Station, Gigiri Police Station, be directed to forthwith enforce National Construction Authority closure order reference SN-163513 dated 17/5/2026 by preventing any further works or movement of personnel, machinery or material at LR No. 30516/27, Redhill Road, Rosslyn, Nairobi until further order of this Court.
c. The Defendants/Applicants be granted leave to amend their Defence to incorporate a Counterclaim in the terms of the draft annexed hereto as Annexure A.
d. The costs of this application be in the cause.
6. The grounds upon which the application is premised are outlined in the application as well as in the affidavit sworn by Victor Gitobu on 15/6/26 where he deponed as follows;
a. The subject property is located in Zone 13K, which permits only single-dwelling use and requires a minimum plot ratio of 50%, limits ground coverage to a maximum of 25%, and requires a minimum plot area of 0.2 hectares. The Plaintiff proposes a multi-residential development on the property that exceeds the plot ratio and ground coverage permitted in Zone 13K.
b. The development permission PLUPA -BPM -004313-N, dated 27/3/24, and the change-of-use approval PLUPA COU-001676-N, dated 28/3/24, were issued before the public participation sessions held on 3/7/24, 25/7/24, and 9/10/24. That the EIA licence NEMA/EIA/PSL/39423, dated 8/5/25, was issued after the public participation sessions.
c. The EIA study report identifies the property as LR No. 1/494, off Wood Avenue, Kilimani, rather than LR No. 30516/27, Red Hill Road, Rosslyn as shown in the planning opinion report dated 16/4/2026.
d. NCA issued a closure order, reference SN-163515, on 17/5/26, halting the development.
e. In a letter dated 3/06/2026, the Defendant called for the excavation and construction works at the development to cease. The Defendant stated that no development work had taken place before May 2026, explaining why the Defendants did not apply for an injunction before that date, as there was no work to restrain. The works have continued, as evidenced by photographs taken on 8th and 9th June 2026.
f. He urged the Court to grant the injunction because: (a) Prima facie case: Documented grounds challenge the regulatory approvals: public participation (PP) occurred after approval; EIA licence concerns another property; and the development breaches Zone 13K limits on plot ratio, ground coverage, and building typology. The NCA has also taken enforcement action. (b) Irreparable harm: Excavation would permanently alter the Property, and substantial foundation work could not be undone by Court order. Neighbouring residents’ harm could not be adequately compensated with damages. (c) Infrastructure: Mr Adolwa's Report records traffic of 1,600 vehicles per hour against a 750-vehicle capacity, an additional daily water demand of 47,200 litres on an already deficient network, and no trunk sewer connection. (d) Balance of convenience: If granted and the Plaintiff ultimately succeeded, the only loss would be construction time, which loss is quantifiable. If refused and the Defendants ultimately succeeded, the harm would be permanent and unquantifiable.
g. On leave to amend the defence, the deponent states that it is necessary to incorporate a counterclaim seeking declarations that the approvals PLUPA-BPM-0044313-N, PLUPA-COU-001676N, and NEMA /EIA/PSL/39423 are null and void, and a permanent injunction against development on the property without valid regulatory approvals.
7. In a further affidavit sworn by Ali Akbarali on 10/7/26 in response to Victor Gitobu’s Supporting Affidavit of 15/6/26, he impugned Gitobu's affidavit on the basis that it raises extraneous arguments, legal opinions, statutory interpretations, and extensive case law rather than setting out facts relevant to the Defendants' case. He further states that a deponent’s role is to present factual evidence to the Court, not to act as counsel by canvassing case law, pleadings, and legal tests, or by rendering judicial verdicts. He urged the Court to strike out the affidavit as fatally incompetent.
8. Further, he stated that, contrary to the Plaintiffs' assertions that the NCA had issued a stop order, he averred that, on 9/6/26, the NCA issued the Plaintiffs a quality assurance certificate and, on 3/7/26, a certificate of compliance valid until 3/7/28, thereby authorising the continuation of the building works.
9. On 24/7/26, in a supplementary affidavit responding to Ali Akabarali’s affidavit dated 10/7/26, Victor Gitobu stated that, according to Ali’s affidavit, the works carried out between 25/5/26 and 3/7/26 progressed from the commencement of mass excavations on 25/5/26 through to 3/7/26, while the defendants' challenge to the development was pending before the Court. He added that the registration certificates issued by the NCA relate to bulk earthworks and do not include the full project registration application or an NCA certificate that, on its face, registers the complete residential and commercial development. Furthermore, some of the documentation refers to plot numbers other than those of the suit land. The defendant averred that DJL-6 does not include the full report, its revision history, or NEMA’s technical review file, which are necessary for meaningful interpretation.
10. The affidavit sworn by Ali Akbarali on 25/8/26 responds to the new matters raised in the affidavit sworn by Gitobus on 24/7/26, concerning the identity of the property, the scope of the NCA documentation, the planning character of the locality, public participation, and the defendants’ subsequent conduct.
11. He stated that, according to the planning report prepared by planner Mr Gichuru, Plot No. Nbi/Block/229/531 is the property formerly known as LR 30516/27 and is therefore the same parcel of land. He further stated that its previous use was for hotel purposes and was not limited to single-dwelling residential use. He added that the NCA had issued a further certificate of compliance to the contractor dated 21/8/26 in respect of enabling works on LR No. 30516/27. Accordingly, no material has been disclosed indicating that the NCA has issued any direction requiring the cessation of the approved development.
12. With respect to public participation, the deponent states that an earlier statutory notification process was undertaken for the change-of-use application, including the issuance of public notices before the application was determined, in addition to the three stakeholder meetings previously mentioned. The Deponent urged the Court to consider these measures collectively rather than in isolation or as an after-the-fact public relations exercise.
13. In relation to the planning of the area, the deponent maintains that the planning specifications for the proposed project are consistent with those of the mixed-use developments in the area and that the project should not be considered in isolation. Nor should the entire locality be treated as a uniformly low-density, single-dwelling residential area. The deponent urged the Court to consider the spatial relationship between the respective developments and residents' associations, as well as the pattern of objections, when assessing the bona fides of the defendant's opposition to the proposed development. The deponent clarified that no Court orders halting the development had been issued and that the defendant's gazette dated 7/7/26, which states that construction is continuing despite Court orders, is misleading the public and constitutes conduct that goes beyond raising objections to the development. The Court was urged to grant protective orders in favour of the Plaintiff and to restrain the defendant from falsely representing that the Plaintiff is constructing in breach of Court orders, and from unlawfully obstructing the development.
The written submissions
14. The parties have filed written submissions, which I have read and considered in the Ruling. I thank the respective counsel for their insights and diligence.
Analysis and determination
15. Having considered the applications and the rival affidavits and the written submissions, the key issues for determination are;
a. Whether the preliminary objection is merited.
b. Whether leave should be granted to the Defendants to amend their defence
c. Whether the application for temporary injunction in favour of the Defendants is merited.
d. Whether the application for temporary injunction in favour of the Plaintiff is merited.
e. Who meets the Costs of the applications?
The preliminary objection
16. The objection is in three parts: the suit is a SLAPP; the suit discloses no cause of action; and, thirdly, that equity cannot be used as a shield to prevent the public from petitioning public bodies about the legality of development.
17. Before addressing the objection, it is appropriate to define a SLAPP: SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. A SLAPP is litigation improperly used to suppress public participation in matters of public interest. Its pressure may arise from legal expenses, threatened damages, restrictive injunctions, repeated applications, or the personal targeting of those involved. Its practical success may lie in deterring opposition rather than obtaining a favourable judgment. The cause of action need not be defamation. Claims framed in contract, property, or economic interference may also suppress public participation. Their aim is to drain the resources of those exercising their rights to participate in civil advocacy, whistleblowing, and public-interest issues and community matters, thereby forcing them to withdraw from the suit or advocacy.
18. In Kenya, suits seeking to restrict constitutional rights, abuse the Court's process, or undermine its authority are addressed through the Court's inherent powers and constitutional safeguards. Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act empowers Courts to strike out suits that constitute an abuse of the Court's process. Articles 33, 37, 42, and 69 of the Constitution protect freedom of expression and petition, the right to a clean and healthy environment, and each individual’s duty to cooperate with state organs in protecting the environment. These provisions safeguard citizens and other individuals against SLAPP suits.
19. Turning to the issue of whether the objection is merited, the starting point is to evaluate what constitutes a preliminary objection. In the case of Hassan Ali Joho & Another -Vs- Suleiman Said Shabal & 2 Others SCK Petition No. 12013[2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court restated the definition in the case Mukhisa Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd vs West End Distributors Ltd (1969) E.A where the Court of Appeal said that:
“…a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration … a preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.”
20. In the present case, the Plaintiff's case is that, despite obtaining all the relevant approvals for the development, the defendants' conduct in persistently raising objections, continuing false claims, circulating letters, and purporting to issue letters stopping the construction, selectively targeting the project, is malicious, discriminatory, and actuated by improper motives. The defendants, on the other hand, have insisted that they are residents of the area directly in the path of the project, hence are likely to be affected, and are exercising their right to air their views under public participation by writing letters to the NEMA and NCC to inquire about or challenge the project.
21. From the above set of facts, it is clear that there are no admitted facts. For the Court to examine the Defendant's motive, it would need to inquire into the facts underlying the conduct impugned by the Plaintiffs. The preliminary objection is therefore fact-dependent; hence, it is not a pure point of law. On that basis, it is hereby rejected.
Leave to amend defence
22. The Civil Procedure Rules Order 8 Rule 3 gives the Court discretion to allow the amendments of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just and in such manner as it may direct.
23. Under Order 8 Rule 5(1) the Court could on its own motion Order or on application of a party Order any document to be amended in such manner as to such terms as to costs or otherwise as are just. This may be done for purposes of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.
24. In the case of Eastern Bakery vs Castellino 1958 EA 461 the Court held;
“amendments to pleadings sought before the hearing should be freely allowed if they are made without injustice to the other side, and there is no prejudice if the other side can be compensated by costs. But there is no power to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another….”
25. Further the Court of Appeal in Central Kenya Ltd. Vs. Trust Bank Ltd (2000) 2 EA 365 said;
“a party would be allowed to make such amendments of pleadings as was necessary for determining the real issue in controversy or avoiding a multiplicity of suits provided (1) there has been no undue delay, (2) no new inconsistent cause of action was introduced, (3) no vested interest or accrued legal right was affected and (4) the amendment could be allowed without injustice to the other side”.
26. The Defendant has filed a draft defence which seeks to include a counterclaim to inter alia quash the licences issued to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff did not challenge the application; therefore, as it stands, it is not opposed. The Court finds that, for it to determine all the issues in controversy between the parties, it is met to allow the application. I will make appropriate orders in the end.
Whether the application for temporary injunction in favour of the Defendants is merited
27. The guiding principles for the grant of orders of temporary injunction are that the Plaintiff has to satisfy the triple requirements; to a), establish its case only at a prima facie level, b), demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted and c), allay any doubts as to b, by showing that the balance of convenience is in its favour. See Giella v Cassman Brown (1973) EA 358.
28. The standard of proving a prima facie case was set out by the Court of Appeal in the case of Mrao Ltd Vs. First American Bank of Kenya Ltd (2003) eKLR as follows;
“The party on whom the burden of proving a prima facie case lies must show a clear and unmistakable right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be restrained, the invasion of the right has to be material and substantive and there must be an urgent necessity to prevent the irreparable damage that may result from the invasion. We reiterate that, in considering whether a prima facie case has been established, the Court does not hold a mini trial and must not closely examine the merits of the case. All the Court must see is that, on its face, the person applying for an injunction has a right that has been, or is threatened with, violation. Positions of the parties are not to be proved in such a manner as to give a final decision in discharging a prima facie case. The Plaintiff need not establish title. It is enough if he shows that he has a fair and bona fide question to raise as to the existence of the right he alleges. The standard of proof of that prima facie case is on a balance or, as otherwise put, on a preponderance of probabilities. This means no more than that the Court takes the view that on the face of it the Applicant’s case is more likely than not to ultimately succeed.”
29. Additionally, in Stek Cosmetics Limited v. Family Bank Limited & Another [2020] eKLR, it was held that the Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case in its favour. The Applicants must show that the Respondents have violated, or are likely to violate, their rights, thereby shifting the burden to the Respondents to explain or rebut the Applicants' claim.
30. On a prima facie basis, the defendants have admitted writing letters addressed to the Plaintiff to halt all site movement, excavation and construction activities on LR No 30517/27. It is also on record that the defendants have questioned the validity of the development and change of use approvals on the basis that they were issued before any public participation meetings took place. To the extent public participation was not conducted before the approvals were obtained, they view the approvals as invalid.
31. The Plaintiff has urged the Court to consider the historical change of use for the property from a single residential dwelling to a hotel and later to the current mixed commercial use.
32. In the case of British American Tobacco Kenya PLC v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others [2019] KESC 15 (KLR), the Court was emphatic that public participation must be real, purposive and meaningful. Parties who are likely to be on the path of the project and affected must be given reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to influence the decision.
33. The state is obliged to encourage public participation in the management and protection and conservation of the environment under Article 69(1) (d) of the Constitution.
34. Section 58(7) and (8) of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act requires a person applying for development permission to notify the public and invite objections for consideration by the County Executive Committee Member. Regulation 15(2)(g) of the 2021 General Development Permission and Control Regulations requires a change of user or densification application to be accompanied by a nationwide newspaper notice published for at least fourteen consecutive days before submission. Regulation 15(2)(h) also requires an on-site notice for change or extension of user.
35. The EMCA Act provides two levels of public participation: the project proponent must undertake public participation under Regulation 17 by seeking views on the EIA study report. The second tier is NEMA’s public participation upon receipt of the EIA study report. This emphasises the statutory underpinning of public participation.
36. In this case, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff published notices or carried out public participation before the issuance of the development and change of use licences. Neither NCC nor NEMA has responded to the defendant's letters seeking clarification on the same.
37. The Defendant has raised additional issues challenging the licences, including the plot ratio, water and sewerage capacity, traffic congestion, and the protection of the river. In my view, these issues are contentious and best determined at the hearing. The report’s reference to a different parcel in Kilimani Woodvale goes to the root of the EIA licence. If the assessment was indeed based on land in Kilimani, it cannot be said to have been accurately relied upon in support of a licence for a project in RedHill. The two parcels are expected to fall within significantly different zones and, therefore, to have different planning needs. In my view, this calls for an explanation from the Plaintiff. In all the circumstances, I find that the Defendant has established a prima facie case.
38. Regarding irreparable harm, the Plaintiff has pleaded financial loss; however, no evidence was adduced in support. That said, any financial loss, in my view, is compensable, and therefore no irreparable loss has been established.
39. On the balance of convenience, further development is likely to alter the dispute’s substratum. The NCA certification concerns the Bulkworks-stage development. If the Plaintiffs succeed, they will have suffered delay, compensable through damages. But if the injunction is refused, the project proceeds, and the Defendants later succeed, the land will be irreversibly altered, with environmental effects. The Court finds the balance of convenience favours the Defendants. The lower-risk course is to maintain the status quo as of this ruling.
40. In the end the application is allowed.
Whether the application for temporary injunction in favour of the Plaintiff is merited.
41. The Plaintiffs seek to restrain the defendants from entering the site, obstructing project works, or otherwise disrupting lawful development. They allege that the defendants issued and circulated threats demanding changes to the project. The Plaintiffs maintain that their development and EIA permits are valid. The defendants contend that the licences are constitutionally and statutorily defective and seek to have them quashed.
42. Has the Plaintiff established a prima facie case? The Defendants deny any physical interference with the project. They maintain that their letters sought explanations regarding how the licences were obtained. They contend that, as project-affected persons, they are entitled to responses to their lawful inquiries from the project promoter and the licensing bodies. From the record, it is clear that the licences were obtained before legal notices were issued and before public participation, as required by PLUPA; that no objections were raised after the licences were issued; that the EIA report contained a material defect regarding the land on which the assessment was carried out; and that, despite the Plaintiffs' submission that the project was modified to remove certain aspects, the NEMA licence has not been amended. Zoning issues are protracted, as evidenced by the parties' respective expert reports. Accordingly, this issue is highly contested and requires further inquiry. In the absence of a cogent explanation for the gaps identified in the acquisition of the licences, at least at prima facie level, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case.
43. As previously stated, the Plaintiffs' claim concerns financial losses and contractual delay penalties, both of which are quantifiable and compensable by damages. Accordingly, the harm is not irreparable. By contrast, irreversible environmental and neighbourhood harm would be irreparable.
44. In conclusion, the balance of convenience favours the public interest and the defendant. I find that granting the injunction would silence the defendants before the regulatory and licensing bodies have responded to their queries. In my view, the existing status quo orders favour preserving the subject matter of the dispute, enabling the parties to pursue their cases to a final determination.
45. In the end the application is unmerited.
46. Final orders for disposal
a. The preliminary objection is unmerited. It is dismissed.
b. Leave to amend their defence and to serve the same is hereby granted to the defendants within the next 10 days. Upon service, the Plaintiffs may file their respective pleadings within the next 14 days.
c. The Notice of Motion dated 11/12/25 is unmeritorious. It is dismissed.
d. The Notice of Motion dated 15/6/26 is allowed in terms of Prayer No. a), with the status quo maintained as of the date of this Ruling. For the avoidance of doubt, all construction, excavation, and other works are hereby halted. The status quo shall remain in effect for not more than 120 days, during which the parties are directed to expedite the hearing of the suit to its conclusion.
e. Each party to meet their own costs.
47. Orders accordingly
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.
J. G. KEMEI
JUDGE
Delivered Online in the presence of:
1. Ms. Kioko H/B for Mr. Kagimu for Plaintiff
2. Mr. Gatemi H/B for Mr. Onsare for the Defendants
3. CA- Mr Oglen