Land law

Osoro & 41 others v Njiru Ageria Development Company Ltd [2026] KEELC 7395 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
2 November 2026
Judge(s)
Mohammed N. Kullow

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Background

Before this Court is the Notice of Motion dated 16th December 2025 brought pursuant to Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 40 Rules 1, 2 and 4 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and all other enabling provisions of the law.

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Decision / orders

Consequently, the application is hereby dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

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Reasoning passage

For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Applicants have not satisfied the conditions for the grant of the orders sought in the Notice of Motion dated 16th December 2025.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS, NAIROBI

ELCLOS E086 OF 2025

COLLINS ODHIAMBO OSORO & 41 OTHERS..............................................APPLICANTS

-VERSUS-

NJIRU AGERIA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED...............................RESPONDENT

RULING

1. Before this Court is the Notice of Motion dated 16th December 2025 brought pursuant to Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 40 Rules 1, 2 and 4 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and all other enabling provisions of the law.

2. The Applicants seek an order of temporary injunction restraining the Respondent, whether by itself, its servants or agents, from evicting, threatening to evict, leasing, selling or in any other manner interfering with the Applicants’ quiet and peaceful occupation, possession and use of L.R. No. 13468 situated in Njiru within Nairobi County, pending the hearing and determination of the suit. They also seek an order directing the Officer Commanding Station, Obama Police Station and the Njiru Sub-County Police Commander to supervise compliance with the orders of the Court, together with costs of the application.

3. The application is supported by an affidavit sworn on behalf of the Applicants. It is deponed that the Applicants have been in open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted occupation and possession of L.R. No. 13468, a parcel of land measuring approximately 73.49 hectares, since the year 2000. They state that they have been residing on the suit property and earning their livelihood therefrom through quarrying activities.

4. The Applicants further depone that their occupation of the suit property has subsisted for a period exceeding twelve years and has been without the consent of the Respondent. They contend that by reason of that occupation, the Respondent’s title to the suit property has been extinguished by operation of law through the doctrine of adverse possession and that they are consequently entitled to be registered as proprietors thereof.

5. It is further deponed that on 10th December 2025, the Respondent issued a verbal notice demanding that the Applicants vacate the suit property, failing which they would be forcibly evicted without any further notice. The Applicants state that it is that threatened eviction which necessitated the filing of the present application.

The Response

5. The application is opposed by the Respondent through the Replying Affidavit sworn by Francis Mwangi Githua, its Chairman and Director. He depones that the Respondent is a public company with a membership of more than 600 persons and is the registered proprietor of L.R. No. 13468, situated in Njiru within Nairobi County.

6. He states that upon payment of the requisite fees, the Respondent’s members were issued with individual title deeds for their respective portions of the land. He further states that the suit property is occupied by bona fide members of the Respondent, save for portions reserved for public amenities including schools, hospitals, a market, sewerage and water ways.

7. The deponent further states that upon assuming leadership of the Respondent, one of his principal responsibilities was to address the presence of persons who had allegedly trespassed onto the suit property. In that regard, the Respondent instituted ELC Case No. 494 of 2017 against persons who had occupied portions of L.R. No. 13468 without authority.

8. He depones that on 10th November 2021, the Court issued a decree allowing the Respondent to evict the occupants and other trespassers from the property, and that the decree was subsequently enforced in 2022. According to him, the Applicants were among the persons evicted during that process, their structures were demolished, and they have not been in occupation of the suit property since then.

9. It is further deponed that, following the eviction, the Respondent secured the property and restored the bona fide members who had been dispossessed of their respective plots. The Respondent therefore disputes the Applicants’ assertion that they have remained in continuous occupation of the suit property for over twelve years. The deponent states that L.R. No. 13468 has in any event been subdivided, individual titles issued to members, and some portions set aside for public purposes. On that basis, he contends that the orders sought are incapable of being implemented as framed and would affect persons who are not parties to these proceedings. He also denies that the Applicants are presently carrying out quarrying activities on the land and maintains that the application is without merit.

Submissions

10. The application was disposed of by way of written submissions. In their written submissions, the Applicants identified the following issues for determination: whether they had established a prima facie case with a probability of success on the main suit; whether they stood to suffer irreparable harm and damage if the orders of injunction were not granted; whether the balance of convenience tilted in their favour; and whether the Court should issue ancillary orders directing police supervision and costs.

11. On the first issue, the Applicants submit that they have established a prima facie case founded on adverse possession. They rely on Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 on the principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctions and Mrao Ltd. Vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd. & 2 others (Civil Appeal 39 of 2002) [2003] KECA 175 (KLR) (7 March 2003) (Judgment) on the meaning of a prima facie case. They further rely on Mtana Lewa Vs Kahindi Ngala Mwagandi [2016] KECA 544 (KLR) on the doctrine of adverse possession. Their submission is that their alleged occupation since the year 2000 has been actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted and without the Respondent’s consent and that the Respondent’s right to recover the land was thereby extinguished upon expiry of twelve years.

12. On irreparable harm, the Applicants rely on Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR and Pius Kipchirchir Kogo Vs Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR for the proposition that the threatened injury must be one incapable of adequate compensation by an award of damages. They submit that eviction would disrupt their families, quarrying businesses and livelihoods and may render the suit nugatory if the property is subsequently transferred to third parties. On the balance of convenience, they rely on Films Rover International [1986] 3 All ER 772 at 780–781 and contend that preservation of the prevailing position carries the lower risk of injustice. They further seek police supervision on the basis that it would secure implementation of the Court’s orders and prevent breaches of the peace.

13. The Respondent, in its written submissions, addresses the application under the following issues: whether the Applicants have established a prima facie case; whether they stand to suffer irreparable harm; where the balance of convenience lies; and whether the prayer for police supervision should be granted. On the question of a prima facie case, the Respondent submits that the Applicants have not shown that they are presently in possession or control of any specific portion of L.R. No. 13468. It argues that the property measures approximately 73.49 hectares, has been subdivided into numerous plots and that title deeds have been issued to bona fide members of the Respondent. It further contends that the Applicants have neither identified the specific titles they claim to occupy nor displaced the Respondent’s evidence that they were evicted from the property in 2022.

14. On irreparable harm, the Respondent submits that the Applicants cannot suffer injury from an eviction which it maintains was already carried out in 2022 and that they have not demonstrated any present threat of harm. On the balance of convenience, it argues that the same tilts against granting the injunction because the Applicants are no longer in occupation and the suit property is presently held by individual registered owners who are not parties to the proceedings. In support of that position, the Respondent relies on Pius Kipchirchir Kogo Vs Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] KEELC 2424 (KLR).

15. On police supervision, the Respondent contends that the prayer is intended to facilitate the Applicants’ re-entry onto the suit property rather than to enforce an existing state of possession and therefore urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

Issue for determination

16. Having considered the application, the affidavits on record, the parties’ respective written submissions and the authorities cited, the issue that arises for determination is:

Whether the Applicants have satisfied the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

Analysis and Determination

17. The principles applicable to an application for a temporary injunction are settled. In Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, the Court set out the three conditions which an applicant must satisfy before an interlocutory injunction may issue. First, the applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant demonstrates that he or she stands to suffer irreparable harm which cannot adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly, where the Court is in doubt, the application is determined on a balance of convenience.

18. The first consideration is therefore whether the Applicants have established a prima facie case with a probability of success. In Mrao Ltd. Vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR, the Court of Appeal defined a prima facie case in the following terms: “A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”

19. The Applicants’ case is founded on adverse possession. They contend that they have been in open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted occupation of L.R. No. 13468 since the year 2000, without the consent of the Respondent, and that their occupation has subsisted for a period exceeding twelve years. On that basis, they argue that the Respondent’s title has been extinguished by operation of law and that their continued possession of the suit property is deserving of protection pending determination of the suit.

20. The Respondent disputes that position. Its case is that the Applicants were among persons who had occupied portions of the suit property without authority and were subsequently evicted in 2022 pursuant to the decree issued in ELC Case No. 494 of 2017. The Respondent further states that following the eviction, the property was secured, subdivided and individual titles issued to its members, some of whom are presently in occupation, while other portions were reserved for public amenities. The Respondent therefore challenges both the alleged continuity of the Applicants’ possession and their assertion that they are presently in occupation of the property.

21. From the material placed before the Court, the parties are therefore in direct conflict on the central question of possession. Whereas the Applicants assert uninterrupted occupation from the year 2000 to date, the Respondent relies on the decree in ELC Case No. 494 of 2017 and the alleged eviction carried out in 2022 to contend that such occupation was interrupted. The Applicants have also not identified, at this stage, the particular portions of L.R. No. 13468 presently occupied by each of them, yet the injunctive relief sought extends to the entire property.

22. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to determine conclusively the very matters that will fall for determination at the trial. In Mbuthia Vs Jimba Credit Corporation Ltd [1988] KLR, the Court held that: “In an application for interlocutory injunctions, the court is not required to make final findings of contested facts and law and the court should only weigh the relative strength of the parties’ cases.”

23. A similar position was taken in Edwin Kamau Muniu Vs Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd, Nairobi HCCC No. 1118 of 2002, where the Court held that: “In an interlocutory application, the court is not required to determine the very issues which will be canvassed at the trial with finality. All the court is entitled at this stage is whether the Applicant is entitled to an injunction sought on the usual criteria.”

24. Applying those principles, the question whether the Applicants acquired rights by adverse possession, whether their possession was continuous for the requisite statutory period, and what legal effect, if any, the alleged eviction in 2022 had upon that possession are matters which ought properly to be determined upon full interrogation of the evidence at the hearing of the suit.

25. In my view, the material before the Court does not sufficiently establish such a right at the prima facie level. The Respondent has placed before the Court material showing that an eviction process was undertaken pursuant to a court decree and that the land has since been subdivided and individual titles issued. Against that evidence, the Applicants have not sufficiently demonstrated their present occupation of identifiable portions of the suit property. A blanket injunction over the entire L.R. No. 13468 would therefore extend beyond the particular interests asserted by the Applicants and may affect persons who are not parties to these proceedings. I am consequently not satisfied that the Applicants have established a prima facie case with a probability of success for purposes of the interlocutory relief sought.

26. The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited Vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others, Civil Appeal No. 77 of 2012, emphasized that the three requirements for grant of an interlocutory injunction are distinct and sequential. The Court stated:

“In an interlocutory injunction application, the applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to;

a) establish his case only at a prima facie level,

b) demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted, and

c) allay any doubts as to (b) by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour.

These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially... If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration.”

27. In light of the finding that the Applicants have not established a prima facie case, the application would ordinarily fail at that stage. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to consider the question of irreparable harm, the Applicants’ position would still encounter difficulty. They contend that they face eviction from their homes and disruption of their quarrying activities and livelihoods.

28. The Respondent, however, maintains that the eviction complained of already occurred in 2022 and that the Applicants are no longer in occupation. In the absence of sufficient evidence demonstrating their present occupation of the suit property, the threatened irreparable injury has not been established to the standard required for the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

29. The same difficulty arises with respect to the balance of convenience. The Applicants urge the Court to preserve the status quo, while the Respondent contends that the prevailing position is that the Applicants are no longer in occupation and that the property is presently held by individual members who have been issued with titles. In those circumstances, granting a blanket injunction over the entire parcel would risk interfering with interests of persons who are not before the Court and may alter, rather than preserve, the prevailing position.

30. I therefore find that the Applicants have not satisfied the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit. It follows that the ancillary prayer seeking police supervision cannot stand independently of the substantive injunctive relief and must equally fail.

Final Disposition

31. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Applicants have not satisfied the conditions for the grant of the orders sought in the Notice of Motion dated 16th December 2025.

32. Consequently, the application is hereby dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED virtually at NAIROBI on this 2nd day of November, 2026.

MOHAMMED N. KULLOW

JUDGE

Ruling delivered in the presence of: -

Mr. Kabue for the Plaintiff/Applicant

Mr. Karwanda for the Defendant/Respondent

Ms. Mwangi Court Assistant

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