REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS, NAIROBI
ELC APPEAL NO. E049 OF 2026
ANTHONY NJOROGE KABUGO.............................................1ST APPELLANT/APPLICANT
FIDELIS WAIRIMU GITHU.....................................................2ND APPELLANT/APPLICANT
AMANI CLOSE
RESIDENTS’ WELFARE GROUP...............................................3RD APPELLANT/APPLICANT
-VERSUS-
KIZITO AWUORI JAOKO........................................................................1ST RESPONDENT
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY..............................................................2ND RESPONDENT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 14th May 2026, the Appellants/Applicants moved this Court under Articles 10, 22, 23, 42, 47, 50 and 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Sections 3, 3A and 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Section 130 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act and all other enabling provisions of the law.
2. The Applicants principally sought an order of stay of execution and/or stay of the Judgment and Orders of the National Environment Tribunal delivered in Tribunal Appeal No. 4 of 2025, pending the hearing and determination of the present appeal. They further sought a temporary injunction restraining the 1st Respondent, whether by himself, his servants, agents, contractors, employees or any other persons acting under his instructions, from continuing with construction, development, excavation, occupation, alienation, sale, transfer or in any other manner dealing with the development being undertaken on Land Parcel No. NGONG/NGONG/63424 pending the hearing and determination of the appeal.
3. In addition, the Applicants prayed for such conservatory or preservatory orders as the Court may deem necessary to preserve the subject matter of the appeal pending its determination, together with an order as to the costs of the Application.
4. The Application was premised on the grounds appearing on the face of the Motion and was supported by the affidavit of Anthony Njoroge Kabugo, the 1st Appellant/Applicant, sworn on behalf of the Applicants. The Applicants contended that they had preferred an appeal against the Judgment of the National Environment Tribunal in Tribunal Appeal No. 4 of 2025, which had struck out their appeal on jurisdictional grounds without determining the substantive environmental and constitutional issues raised before it. They maintained that the appeal raised serious and arguable questions concerning the interpretation and application of Sections 129(1) and 129(2) of EMCA, particularly in relation to persons who alleged that they had been excluded from the Environmental Impact Assessment process.
5. It was further their case that, although the Tribunal had earlier acknowledged that participation or non-participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment process was an evidentiary matter requiring factual interrogation, it subsequently classified the dispute as falling under Section 129(1) of EMCA without, in their view, conclusively undertaking that inquiry. The Applicants therefore contended that the appeal was arguable and had high prospects of success.
6. The Applicants further averred that the 1st Respondent had commenced and continued with construction of a multi-storey development on Land Parcel No. NGONG/NGONG/63424 within Amani Close, Ngong. They stated that they were immediate neighbours who had neither been notified nor meaningfully involved in the EIA process, and that continued construction was likely to occasion environmental degradation, invasion of privacy, congestion, pressure on drainage and sewerage infrastructure and alteration of the residential character of the area. They consequently maintained that unless interim injunctive and preservatory relief was granted, substantial construction could be completed before the appeal was determined, thereby rendering the appeal nugatory and occasioning prejudice that could not adequately be compensated by costs.
The Response
7. The Application was opposed by the 1st Respondent through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Kizito Awuori Jaoko. He deponed that the dispute had previously been the subject of proceedings before the Environment and Land Court at Kajiado and thereafter before the National Environment Tribunal. According to him, the Kajiado Court had recognised the existence of the EIA licence and directed that any challenge thereto be pursued through the appropriate statutory mechanism, following which the Applicants filed Tribunal Appeal No. 4 of 2025 challenging the licence.
8. The 1st Respondent further averred that the Tribunal ultimately found that the Applicants’ challenge fell within Section 129(1) of EMCA and had been lodged outside the prescribed statutory period, thereby depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain it. He maintained that the present appeal and Application were therefore an attempt to revive a dispute that had already been determined on jurisdictional grounds. He also contended that the Applicants had moved between the Kajiado ELC, the Tribunal and the present Court over substantially the same dispute, which conduct he characterised as forum shopping and an abuse of the court process.
9. On the merits of the interim relief sought, the 1st Respondent maintained that the development was being undertaken pursuant to the requisite regulatory approvals, including the EIA licence, and that the environmental assessment process had involved public participation. He denied that the Applicants had demonstrated any urgency or irreparable harm warranting the grant of injunctive or preservatory orders and contended that the Application was intended to delay the development and occasion unnecessary prejudice. He accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the Application and to decline any further orders that would, in his view, perpetuate the multiplicity of proceedings.
SUBMISSIONS
10. The Application was disposed of by way of written submissions. On behalf of the Applicants, it was submitted that the issues falling for determination were whether the appeal raises bona fide and arguable questions concerning the interpretation and application of Sections 129(1) and 129(2) of EMCA, including the effect of the Tribunal’s ruling of 4th September 2025; whether a sufficient basis had been established for interim injunctive or preservatory relief; whether the absence of a positive executable order in the Tribunal’s judgment defeated the separate prayer for an injunction or preservation order; and whether the balance of convenience favoured preservation of the subject matter pending determination of the appeal.
11. The Applicants submitted that the appeal raised an arguable question as to whether the Tribunal properly classified their challenge under Section 129(1) of EMCA notwithstanding their contention that they had not participated in the EIA licensing process. They relied on National Environmental Tribunal v Overlook Management Limited & 5 others [2019] KECA 1005 (KLR) and Simba Corporation Limited v Director General, National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) & another [2017] KEELC 310 (KLR) on the distinction between Sections 129(1) and 129(2), while acknowledging the contrary position taken in Mathu, Shah & Ndegwa (suing on behalf of Kyuna Neighbours Association – KNA) & another v National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) & 2 others; Director General, Nairobi Metropolitan Services (Interested Party) [2025] KEELC 663 (KLR). They further relied on Kibos Distillers Limited & 4 others v Benson Ambuti Adega & 3 others [2020] KECA 875 (KLR) and Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR) on jurisdiction.
12. On the threshold for interim relief, they cited Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, as cited in Gem Securities East Africa Limited v Uzima Press Limited, Civil Suit No. 635 of 2005, and Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] eKLR. Their position was that continued construction could materially alter the subject matter of the appeal and occasion harm not adequately compensable by damages; hence, the balance of convenience favoured a proportionate preservatory order. They nevertheless conceded that a conventional stay of the Tribunal’s striking-out order would have limited practical effect and urged the Court to consider the prayers for injunction and preservation independently.
13. The 1st Respondent, on the other hand, identified three principal issues for determination: whether the appeal was competent and whether the Tribunal correctly found that the Applicants’ challenge fell under Section 129(1) of EMCA; whether the Applicants had satisfied the legal threshold for stay, conservatory or injunctive relief pending appeal; and whether, having regard to the Applicants’ conduct and the previous proceedings, the discretionary relief sought was available to them. The 1st Respondent maintained that the substance of the Applicants’ grievance was a challenge to the grant and validity of the EIA licence and therefore fell squarely within Section 129(1), whose statutory sixty-day limitation period had expired.
14. In support of that position, the 1st Respondent relied principally on Mathu, Shah & Ndegwa (suing on behalf of Kyuna Neighbours Association) Vs National Environment Management Authority & 2 Others [2025] KEELC 663 (KLR), Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, City Chemist (Nairobi) v Muriuki [2012] eKLR, Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 and Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Benjoh Amalgamated Limited [1998] eKLR. The 1st Respondent submitted that the Applicants had neither established a prima facie case nor demonstrated substantial or irreparable loss, and that there was in any event no positive executable order capable of being stayed since the Tribunal had merely struck out the appeal. It was further contended that the balance of convenience favoured the 1st Respondent, who had committed substantial resources to a development undertaken pursuant to existing approvals, and that the Applicants’ movement between the Kajiado ELC, the Tribunal and the present Court amounted to forum shopping and an abuse of the court process. The Court was consequently urged to dismiss the Application with costs.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
15. Having considered the Application, the response thereto and the parties’ respective submissions, the Court is of the view that the following two issues arise for determination:
a) Whether the Applicants have met the threshold for grant of stay of execution pending appeal; and
b) Whether the Applicants have met the threshold for grant of temporary injunctive or preservatory relief pending appeal.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
Whether the Applicants have met the threshold for grant of stay of execution pending appeal
16. The jurisdiction of this Court to grant stay of execution pending appeal is governed by Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Order 42 Rule 6(2) provides as follows:“No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—
(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”
17. The three requirements are conjunctive. An applicant must therefore satisfy the Court on substantial loss, absence of unreasonable delay and security. The Court retains a judicial discretion, but that discretion is exercised within the statutory framework. In JNG Vs SNN (Family Appeal E156 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 14586 (KLR) (1 October 2026) (Ruling), the Court restated this position and referred to Butt VsRent Restriction Tribunal [1979] KLR 417, James Wangalwa & Another Vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR and Antoine Ndiaye v African Virtual University [2015] eKLR.
18. The first requirement is that the application be made without unreasonable delay. The impugned judgment of the National Environment Tribunal was delivered on 17th April 2026, while the present Application was filed on 14th May 2026. The period between the two was less than one month. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the Application was filed without unreasonable delay.
19. The next requirement is substantial loss. The Applicants contend that construction on Land Parcel No. NGONG/NGONG/63424 is ongoing and that, unless the Court intervenes, substantial portions of the development may be completed before the appeal is determined. They further contend that the continued development poses risks relating to privacy, drainage, sewerage, congestion, infrastructure and the residential character of Amani Close.
20. Substantial loss under Order 42 Rule 6(2) must, however, arise from the execution or enforcement of the judgment or order sought to be stayed. In James Wangalwa & Another Vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, the Court observed that the mere fact that execution has commenced or is likely to commence does not, without more, constitute substantial loss. The applicant must demonstrate the loss likely to arise from execution and show that such loss would substantially affect the appeal.
21. In the present case, the Tribunal struck out the Applicants’ appeal for want of jurisdiction after finding that the challenge fell within Section 129(1) of EMCA and had been lodged outside the prescribed statutory period. The Tribunal did not direct the 1st Respondent to commence or continue construction on the suit property, nor did it issue any positive order authorising further development. The construction complained of therefore does not arise from execution of the Tribunal’s judgment.
22. It follows that staying the Tribunal’s judgment would not, by itself, stop the construction or avert the environmental and residential prejudice relied upon by the Applicants. The Applicants have consequently not demonstrated substantial loss within the meaning of Order 42 Rule 6(2). Their concern that the development may substantially progress before the appeal is heard is a matter that falls more properly for consideration under the separate prayer for temporary injunction and preservatory relief. Indeed, the Applicants acknowledge in their submissions that the Tribunal’s judgment contains no positive order authorising construction and that a conventional stay of the striking-out order may have limited practical effect.
23. The final requirement is security for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon the Applicants. No security has been offered in the Application or in the supporting affidavit. While the nature and amount of security remain matters for the Court’s discretion, the obligation to address security is one of the express conditions under Order 42 Rule 6(2)(b).
24. In this matter, the absence of any proposed security is compounded by the nature of the Tribunal’s decision. The judgment merely struck out the appeal and did not impose upon the Applicants any positive obligation capable of performance. There is therefore no positive decree or order whose performance would be secured by the stay sought.
25. The position that emerges is that the Application was filed without unreasonable delay, but the Applicants have not demonstrated substantial loss arising from execution of the Tribunal’s judgment and have not satisfied the requirement relating to security. The conditions under Order 42 Rule 6(2) being conjunctive, the Applicants have not met the threshold for grant of stay of execution pending appeal.
Whether the Applicants have met the threshold for grant of temporary injunctive or preservatory relief pending appeal
26. The second issue concerns the prayer for a temporary injunction restraining the 1st Respondent from continuing with construction or development on Land Parcel No. NGONG/NGONG/63424 pending determination of the appeal. The jurisdiction of an appellate court to grant a temporary injunction is provided for under Order 42 Rule 6(6) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which states:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in subrule (1) of this rule, the High Court shall have power in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction on such terms as it thinks just provided the procedure for instituting an appeal from a subordinate court or tribunal has been complied with.”
27. The principles governing the exercise of that jurisdiction have been considered in Madhupaper International Limited Vs Kerr [1985] KLR 840, Venture Capital & Credit Limited Vs Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd, Civil Application No. 349 of 2003 (174 of 2003 UR) and Butt Vs Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417. The power is discretionary and equitable. The Court considers whether the appeal is frivolous or raises a reasonable argument, whether refusal of the injunction would render the appeal nugatory, and whether granting the order would occasion greater hardship than it would prevent. The Court is also guided by the settled principles in Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358.
28. Under Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, an applicant must first establish a prima facie case with a probability of success; secondly, demonstrate that he stands to suffer injury which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages; and where the Court is in doubt, the application is determined on a balance of convenience. In Mrao Ltd. Vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] eKLR, the Court of Appeal explained that a prima facie case includes a genuine and arguable case disclosed by the material placed before the Court.
29. Turning to the first consideration, the appeal challenges the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicants’ appeal fell under Section 129(1) of EMCA and was consequently time-barred. The Applicants contend that their participation or non-participation in the EIA process was material to the proper classification of the appeal under Sections 129(1) and 129(2). Of significance is that, in its ruling of 4th September 2025, the Tribunal had itself found that the question could not at that stage be determined as a pure point of law and required factual interrogation, including whether the Applicants had participated in the licensing process. In its final judgment, however, the Tribunal found that the appeal fell within Section 129(1) and struck it out.
30. The 1st Respondent maintains that the issue is settled by the nature of the decision challenged, namely the grant of the EIA licence, and relies on Mathu, Shah & Ndegwa (suing on behalf of Kyuna Neighbours Association) Vs National Environment Management Authority & 2 Others [2025] KEELC 663 (KLR). That authority is plainly relevant to the appeal. It does not, however, remove the question raised by the Applicants as to the effect of the Tribunal’s earlier ruling and the proper application of Sections 129(1) and 129(2) to the circumstances placed before it. The Court is therefore satisfied that the appeal raises an arguable question and cannot, at this stage, be characterised as frivolous.
31. The next consideration is whether refusal of the injunction would expose the Applicants to injury that cannot adequately be remedied and whether the appeal would thereby be rendered nugatory. The material before the Court shows that construction of the multi-storey development is ongoing. The Applicants contend that continued construction will affect privacy, drainage, sewerage, congestion, infrastructure and the low-density residential character of Amani Close, and that substantial completion of the development before determination of the appeal would make effective relief difficult to achieve.
32. The 1st Respondent, on his part, has placed before the Court material showing that the development is being undertaken pursuant to regulatory approvals, including an EIA licence, and that construction has been ongoing. He has also deponed that substantial financial resources have been committed to the project and that contractual obligations have been entered into with suppliers and workers. The prejudice alleged by both sides is therefore not merely theoretical.
33. The question is which prejudice is capable of adequate redress. Financial loss arising from a temporary interruption of construction is, in its nature, capable of ascertainment. On the other hand, continued construction necessarily changes the physical character of the suit property. If the development substantially progresses or is completed before the appeal is heard, an eventual successful appeal may be rendered of little practical consequence, particularly where the appeal seeks orders that would reopen the Applicants’ challenge to the environmental licensing process. The concern is therefore not merely the existence of ongoing construction, but whether the subject matter will remain capable of effective relief by the time the appeal is determined.
34. This consideration assumes greater significance in an environmental dispute. Articles 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution recognise the right to a clean and healthy environment and the obligation to protect the environment, while Section 13(7) of the Environment and Land Court Act empowers this Court to grant interim preservation orders. Those provisions do not dispense with the requirements for injunctive relief, but they inform the Court’s assessment of the nature of the prejudice alleged where environmental harm is said to arise from a continuing development.
35. On the balance of convenience, the Court has weighed the 1st Respondent’s existing approvals, the stage of construction and the financial commitments already made against the risk that continued construction may substantially alter the subject matter before the appeal is determined. The former is principally financial, while the latter bears directly on the efficacy of the appeal and the ability of the Court to grant meaningful relief should the appeal succeed.
36. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the balance favours preservation of the subject matter pending determination of the appeal. The Applicants have therefore met the threshold for the grant of temporary injunctive and preservatory relief pending appeal.
DISPOSITION
37. The prayer for stay of execution fails for the reasons already stated. The prayer for temporary injunctive and preservatory relief, however, is distinct and has been considered on its own merits under Order 42 Rule 6(6) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
38. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:
a) The prayer for stay of execution of the Judgment and Orders of the National Environment Tribunal in Tribunal Appeal No. 4 of 2025 is declined.
b) Pending the hearing and determination of the appeal, a temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the 1st Respondent, whether by himself, his servants, agents, contractors, employees or any person acting under his instructions, from continuing with construction or further development on Land Parcel No. NGONG/NGONG/63424, Amani Close, Ngong, Kajiado County.
c) The appeal shall be prosecuted expeditiously.
d) Costs of the Application shall abide the outcome of the appeal.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED virtually at NAIROBI on this 2nd day of November, 2026.
MOHAMMED N. KULLOW
JUDGE
Ruling delivered in the presence of: -
N/A for the Appellants/Applicants
Ms. Ochola for the 1st Respondent
Ms. Mwangi Court Assistant