Land law

Republic v Chief Executive Officer, National Irrigation Authority & another; Nyaoke (Ex parte) [2026] KEELC 7529 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Judicial Review Application E052 of 2025
Judgment date
4 November 2026
Judge(s)
Mohammed N. Kullow

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Background

Before the Court for determination is the Ex Parte Applicant’s Chamber Summons dated 13th July 2026 brought pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2022. The application challenges the decision of the Taxing Officer delivered on 8th July 2026 in respect of the Ex Parte Applicant’s Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 5th February 2026, particularly Item 1 on instruction fees and Item 2 on getting-up fees.

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

The sole issue for determination is whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle in taxing Item 1 on instruction fees and Item 2 on getting-up fees.

Paragraph 11 →

Reasoning passage

Consequently, I find that the Ex Parte Applicant has not demonstrated an error of principle in the taxation of Item 1 on instruction fees or Item 2 on getting-up fees. There is therefore no basis upon which this Court can interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer dated 8thJuly 2026.

Paragraph 28 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS, NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO. E052 OF 2025

REPUBLIC ...............................................................................................APPLICANT

-VERSUS-

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
NATIONAL IRRIGATION AUTHORITY
..........................................1ST RESPONDENT

NATIONAL IRRIGATION AUTHORITY ........................................2ND RESPONDENT

AND

PAMELA ATIENO NYAOKE ...................................................EX PARTE APPLICANT

RULING

1. Before the Court for determination is the Ex Parte Applicant’s Chamber Summons dated 13th July 2026 brought pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2022. The application challenges the decision of the Taxing Officer delivered on 8th July 2026 in respect of the Ex Parte Applicant’s Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 5th February 2026, particularly Item 1 on instruction fees and Item 2 on getting-up fees.

2. The Ex Parte Applicant seeks orders that the decision of the Taxing Officer on the said items be set aside and that this Court taxes the two items afresh and allows such sums as are reasonable. In the alternative, the Ex Parte Applicant prays that the Bill of Costs dated 5th February 2026 be remitted for fresh taxation with appropriate directions. The Ex Parte Applicant also seeks the costs of the reference.

3. The application is premised on the grounds that the Taxing Officer erred in principle in the manner in which she assessed the instruction fees and getting-up fees. The Ex Parte Applicant contends that the Taxing Officer failed to take into account the nature and importance of the proceedings, the complexity and novelty of the questions raised, the time and labour expended by counsel, and the volume and importance of the documents prepared and perused. It is further contended that the Taxing Officer failed to properly exercise her discretion under Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order and thereby arrived at an award which was manifestly low.

4. In her Supporting Affidavit, Winnie Awuor Paul depones that the Ex Parte Applicant had instituted judicial review proceedings seeking an order of mandamus against the Respondents and that judgment was delivered on 22nd January 2026 allowing the substantive application with costs. She further depones that, pursuant to the award of costs, the Ex Parte Applicant’s Advocates filed the Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 5th February 2026, which was subsequently taxed by Hon. Judith Omollo at Kshs.92,140/=.

5. The deponent further states that the Ex Parte Applicant, being dissatisfied with the taxation, lodged a Notice of Objection dated 13th July 2026 under Paragraph 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, specifically challenging Item 1 on instruction fees and Item 2 on getting-up fees. She maintains that the Taxing Officer failed to appreciate the public law nature of the proceedings and the work undertaken by counsel, and that the resulting award was disproportionately low and did not adequately compensate the successful litigant for the costs incurred in the proceedings.

6. The Chamber Summons dated 13th July 2026 together with the Court order issued on 22nd July 2026 was served upon the Respondents through their Advocates on record, G & A Advocates LLP, by electronic mail on 22nd July 2026 at about 3.00 p.m., as deponed by Winnie Awuor in the Affidavit of Service sworn on 22nd July 2026. No response to the application was filed by the Respondents. The application was thereafter canvassed by way of written submissions.

Ex Parte Applicant’s Submissions

7. In her written submissions dated 22nd August 2026, the Ex Parte Applicant identified two principal issues for determination, namely whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle in taxing the instruction fees at Kshs.45,000/= and whether she erred in disallowing the getting-up fees claimed under Item 2. On the first issue, counsel submitted that the Taxing Officer failed to properly appreciate the nature and importance of the judicial review proceedings, the public law questions involved, the work undertaken by counsel and the two-stage procedure applicable to judicial review proceedings. It was argued that the prescribed figure under Schedule 6 was only a minimum and that the Taxing Officer retained discretion to enhance the instruction fee. The Ex Parte Applicant therefore urged the Court to allow the claimed instruction fee of Kshs.150,000/=.

8. In support of that position, the Ex Parte Applicant relied principally on Joreth Limited Vs Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, for the proposition that instruction fees are assessed having regard to such matters as the nature and importance of the cause, the interests of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings and any directions by the trial court.

9. Reliance was also placed on Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another Vs Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd. & Another [1972] EA 162 on the principles governing taxation of costs; First American Bank of Kenya Ltd Vs Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64 on the circumstances in which a court may interfere with the decision of a taxing officer; C.N. Kihara & Company Advocates Vs Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation and Republic v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes ex parte Ukwala Supermarket Limited & Another, which were cited as instances where higher instruction fees were upheld in public law proceedings.

10. On getting-up fees, counsel submitted that the Taxing Officer erred in holding that such fees were unavailable merely because the matter proceeded by way of affidavit evidence and written submissions rather than oral testimony. It was contended that counsel was required to prepare the matter for hearing and that the proceedings were sufficiently contested to justify an award under Item 2. In support of that argument, the Ex Parte Applicant relied on C.N. Kihara & Company Advocates Vs Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation, Republic Vs Egerton University Ex Parte Patel Mungai [2020] eKLR and Republic Vs Kenya Civil Aviation Authority & 3 Others, for the proposition that getting-up fees may be recoverable where substantial preparation for hearing has been undertaken notwithstanding that the matter is determined on affidavit evidence and written submissions.

Analysis and Determination

11. The sole issue for determination is whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle in taxing Item 1 on instruction fees and Item 2 on getting-up fees.

12. The legal parameters within which the court can interfere with a taxing master’s decision are well settled. The Court of Appeal in Joreth Ltd Vs Kigano & Associates Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1999 [2002] eKLR was categorical that a judge sitting on a reference against the taxing officer ought not to interfere with the assessment of costs unless the taxing officer had misdirected himself on a matter of principle.

13. Similarly, the Ugandan Supreme Court in Bank of Uganda Vs Banco Arabe Espanol SC Civil Application No. 23 of 1999 (Mulenga JSC) stated: “Save in exceptional cases, a judge does not interfere with the assessment of what the taxing officer considers to be a reasonable fee. This is because it is generally accepted that questions which are solely of quantum of costs are matters with which the taxing officer is particularly fitted to deal, and in which he has more experience than the judge. Consequently, a judge will not alter a fee allowed by the taxing officer, merely because in his opinion he should have allowed a higher or lower amount. Secondly, an exceptional case is where it is shown expressly or by inference that in assessing and arriving at the quantum of the fee allowed, the taxing officer exercised, or applied a wrong principle. In this regard, application of a wrong principle is capable of being inferred from an award of an amount which is manifestly excessive or manifestly low. Thirdly, even if it is shown that the taxing officer erred on principle, the judge should interfere only on being satisfied that the error substantially affected the decision on quantum and that upholding the amount allowed would cause injustice to one of the parties.”

14. More recently, the Apex Court in Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination Board v EG & 5 others (Petition (Application) 16 of 2019) [2023] KESC 102 (KLR) (Civ) (8 December 2023) (Ruling) noted: “A certificate of taxation would be set aside, and a single judge could only interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation if: There was an error of principle committed by the taxing officer. The fee awarded was shown to be manifestly excessive or was so high as to confine access to the court to the wealthy; (and conversely, if the award was so manifestly deficient as to amount to an injustice to one party).The court was satisfied that the successful litigant was entitled to fair reimbursement for the costs he had incurred, (and the award must not be regarded as a punishment of the defeated party but as a recompense to the successful party for the expenses to which he had been subjected by the other party). The award proposed was so far as practicable, consistent with previous awards in similar cases. There was no mathematical formula to be used by the taxing officer to arrive at a precise figure because each case must be considered and decided on its own peculiar circumstances. Although the taxing officer exercised unfettered judicial discretion in matters of taxation that discretion must be exercised judicially, not whimsically. The single judge would normally not interfere with the decision of the taxing officer merely because the judge believed he would have awarded a different figure had he been in the taxing officer’s shoes”

15. Applying those principles to the present case, the first complaint concerns the instruction fee. The Ex Parte Applicant claimed Kshs.150,000/= under Item 1. In her ruling, the Taxing Officer considered Schedule 6(1)(j) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2014 relating to constitutional petitions and prerogative orders.

16. She noted that the judicial review application had been served upon the Respondents but that no response had been filed in opposition thereto, and consequently adopted Kshs.45,000/= as the applicable minimum fee. She then considered the claim for Kshs.150,000/= and found that the matter did not disclose such novelty, complexity or importance as would warrant enhancement beyond the prescribed minimum. She accordingly taxed the instruction fee at Kshs.45,000/=.

17. The Ex Parte Applicant contends that in reaching that conclusion, the Taxing Officer failed to appreciate the nature and importance of the proceedings. It was submitted that the proceedings were not an ordinary monetary claim but concerned enforcement of a statutory duty against a public body through an order of mandamus, and that they implicated public law and constitutional considerations. Counsel further submitted that judicial review proceedings entailed distinct stages under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules and required considerable professional input in preparation of the leave proceedings and the substantive motion.

18. Those are relevant considerations in taxation. However, the question before this Court is not whether the Ex Parte Applicant could reasonably have been awarded a higher instruction fee. It is whether the Taxing Officer failed to take into account a relevant consideration, took into account an irrelevant consideration, proceeded on a wrong principle, or arrived at a figure so manifestly low as to disclose an improper exercise of discretion.

19. A reading of the impugned ruling shows that the Taxing Officer appreciated that the proceedings were judicial review proceedings and identified the applicable provision of the Advocates Remuneration Order. She further considered whether the circumstances of the matter warranted an enhancement of the prescribed minimum and expressly addressed the nature, novelty, complexity and importance of the proceedings before declining to increase the fee. The complaint by the Ex Parte Applicant therefore substantially concerns the weight which the Taxing Officer attached to those factors rather than a failure to consider them altogether.

20. In Joreth Ltd. Vs Kigano & Associates (Supra), the Court of Appeal recognised that in determining instruction fees, regard may be had to the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings and all other relevant circumstances. Those considerations do not, however, dictate a particular figure. They guide the exercise of discretion by the Taxing Officer. A court on reference cannot substitute its own assessment merely because it may have attached greater weight to one or more of those factors.

21. In the present matter, the substantive application sought to compel the Respondents to satisfy a decree for Kshs.50,000/= arising from an earlier matter. The judicial review application was not opposed by way of a response and was ultimately determined on the material placed before the Court by the Ex Parte Applicant. Although the proceedings involved enforcement of a public duty and required counsel to undertake the steps necessary to prosecute the judicial review application, I am not persuaded that the Taxing Officer’s assessment of Kshs.45,000/= was so manifestly low as to permit the inference that she exercised her discretion on a wrong principle. The mere fact that another taxing officer or this Court might have awarded a higher sum is not sufficient to warrant interference.

22. The second complaint concerns the getting-up fee claimed under Item 2. The Ex Parte Applicant claimed Kshs.50,000/=, being one-third of the Kshs.150,000/= claimed as instruction fees. Counsel submitted that the Taxing Officer erred in disallowing the item merely because the matter proceeded by way of affidavit evidence and written submissions. It was argued that the preparation undertaken by counsel in a contested matter was sufficient to justify an award of getting-up fees and reliance was placed, inter alia, on C.N. Kihara & Company Advocates Vs Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation, Republic Vs Egerton University Ex Parte Patel Mungai [2020] eKLR and Republic Vs Kenya Civil Aviation Authority & 3 Others.

23. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides for getting-up fees where a denial of liability is filed or where issues for trial are joined by the pleadings and the case is subsequently confirmed for hearing. The rationale for the fee is to compensate counsel for the additional work involved in preparing a matter for trial.

24. The record in the present case shows that the substantive judicial review application was not opposed by the filing of a response. Indeed, the Taxing Officer expressly recorded that although the application had been served upon the Respondents, no response had been filed and the matter proceeded by way of affidavit evidence and written submissions. There were therefore no contested pleadings by which issues for trial were joined in the manner contemplated under Paragraph 2 of Schedule 6.

25. I have considered the authorities relied upon by the Ex Parte Applicant on getting-up fees. They recognise that the absence of viva voce evidence does not, in every case, automatically disentitle a party to getting-up fees and that the Court must examine the nature of the proceedings and the preparation undertaken. However, the entitlement must still arise within the framework of Paragraph 2 of Schedule 6. The mere preparation and filing of affidavits and written submissions does not, without more, establish that issues for trial had been joined or that the matter had reached the stage contemplated by that provision.

26. In the circumstances of this case, there was no response to the substantive application and therefore no denial of liability or joining of issues by the pleadings. The matter was disposed of on affidavit evidence and written submissions. I therefore find no error of principle in the Taxing Officer’s decision to disallow the getting-up fee.

27. Ultimately, the jurisdiction of this Court on a reference is supervisory and not an invitation to undertake the taxation afresh merely because a dissatisfied party considers that a higher amount ought to have been allowed. The Taxing Officer identified the applicable scale, considered the claim for enhancement, gave reasons for declining to enhance the instruction fee and considered the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted in determining the claim for getting-up fees. I am not satisfied that she took into account an irrelevant factor, omitted a material consideration, applied a wrong principle or arrived at an award so manifestly deficient as to warrant interference by this Court.

28. Consequently, I find that the Ex Parte Applicant has not demonstrated an error of principle in the taxation of Item 1 on instruction fees or Item 2 on getting-up fees. There is therefore no basis upon which this Court can interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer dated 8thJuly 2026.

Final Disposition

29. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Ex Parte Applicant has not established any error of principle warranting interference with the decision of the Taxing Officer delivered on 8th July 2026.

30. Consequently, the Chamber Summons dated 13th July 2026 is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Taxing Officer taxing the Ex Parte Applicant’s Party and Party Bill of Costs at Kshs.92,140/= is upheld.

31. As the Respondents did not file a response to the application, I make no order as to costs.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED via e-mail at NAIROBI on this 4th day of November, 2026.

MOHAMMED N. KULLOW

JUDGE

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