Land law

Ouko & another (Suing as the administrators of the Estate of John Gilbert Ouko - Deceased) v Blue Lime Ltd & 3 others [2026] KEELC 7425 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc L Case E159 of 2024
Judgment date
4 November 2026
Judge(s)
Christine Ochieng

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Background

The Plaintiffs commenced this suit vide the plaint dated 17th April 2024 where they sought for judgement against the Defendants jointly and severally for:

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Question before the court

Having considered the pleadings herein, testimonies of the witnesses, exhibits and rivalling submissions, the following are the issues for determination:

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Reasoning passage

Further, the Supreme Court has determined that it is the application for renewal of Lease that ignites a legitimate expectation. The question the Court will therefore look into is whether the persons making the alleged applications for extension of the impugned Lease on behalf of the deceased’s estate had capacity to do so, considering that he was never registered as a proprietor. Since the Commissioner of Lands acknowledged the…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC L CASE NO. E159 OF 2024

EMMANUEL OTIENO OUKO and

PHILLIP ODONGO OUKO

Suing as the Administrators of the Estate of

JOHN GILBERT OUKO (DECEASED) ........................ PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

BLUE LIME LIMITED ...………………………….……. 1ST DEFENDANT

CHIEF LAND REGISTRAR …………………………... 2ND DEFENDANT

MINISTRY OF LANDS, PUBLIC WORKS,

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ….….. 3RD DEFENDANT

NATIONAL LAND COMMISSION ……………….… 4TH DEFENDANT

JUDGEMENT

1. The Plaintiffs commenced this suit vide the plaint dated 17th April 2024 where they sought for judgement against the Defendants jointly and severally for:

a) A declaration that the title over LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) registered in the name of the 1st Defendant herein was obtained fraudulently, illegally and/or through a corrupt scheme and is, therefore, null and void.

b) A mandatory injunction directing the 2nd Defendant herein to rectify the Land Register by cancelling the title registered in favour of the 1st Defendant as the proprietor over LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669).

c) A Permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant by themselves, their agents, servants, officers personal representatives and/or assigns or persons working for or under them or any other person whatsoever from encroaching, trespassing alienating, dividing, transferring, selling, charging, developing or in whatever way and whichever manner and way dealing with or in any manner interfering with the Plaintiff's right of occupation, possession and or use of all the piece of land situate in the City of Nairobi in Nairobi Area District containing by measurement Nought decimal nought five eight five hectares (0.0585) or thereabouts and being LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) as delineated on Land Survey Plan Number 39088.

d) A declaration that the continued registration of the property known as LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) in the name of Mr & Mrs Chhagan Lal from the year 1975 when the entire purchase price was paid was by way of constructive and/or implied trust in favour of John Gilbert Ouko (deceased).

e) A Declaration be issued to declare that the Plaintiff had a pre-emptive right and legitimate expectation to the extension and renewal of the lease for the suit property.

f) An order of Declaration, declaring that the property known as LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) belongs to the Plaintiff.

g) A mandatory injunction directing the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants to issue a duplicate title and process the extension of lease over the suit property LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) in favour of the Plaintiff.

h) A declaration that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff's right to property as protected under Article 40 of the Constitution in failing to extend the lease and irregularly, illegally and through a corrupt scheme registering the same in the name of the 1st Defendant.

i) A declaration that the 2nd Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s right to legitimate expectation in failing to

issue an extension of lease and/or affording the Plaintiff the first right of refusal.

j) General damages for illegal and fraudulent transfer of the Plaintiff’s property and violation of the Plaintiff’s right to property and legitimate expectation.

k) Costs of this suit.

l) Interest on (j) and (k) above from the date of judgment until payment in full.

Response

2. The 1st Defendant filed a Defence and Counterclaim. It denied allegations levelled against it in the plaint and averred that the Plaintiffs have conceded that neither the deceased nor any beneficiary of his estate was registered as the owner of the suit property as at the time the Lease expired in 2003. It sought that the Plaintiff’s suit be dismissed with costs and judgement be entered in its favour in terms of its Counterclaim as follows:

a) A declaration that the 1st Defendant, Blue Lime Limited acquired valid interest over property known as LR No. 209/22669 (original no. 209/2389/59) (the suit property), is lawfully registered as the proprietor thereof and is entitled to absolute ownership, possession and occupation of the same to the exclusion of the Plaintiff.

b) A permanent injunction be issued restraining and/or prohibiting the Plaintiff whether by himself, agents, representative and or servants or otherwise howsoever acting from trespassing, occupying, remaining upon, charging, leasing, disposing of, or in any manner howsoever dealing or interfering with the 1st Defendant’s rights as to ownership, quiet and peaceful possession and utilization of property known as LR No. 209/22669 (original no. 209/2389/59) (the suit property), which order should be enforced by the Officer Commanding Station Pangani Police Station or any other nearest police station.

c) A permanent injunction be issued restraining and /or prohibiting the Plaintiff whether by himself, agents, representative and or servants or otherwise howsoever acting from entering upon, remaining upon, occupying or in any manner howsoever interfering with the 1st Defendant, Blue Lime Limited’s ownership, occupation, quite possession and utilization of the property known as LR No. 209/22669 (original no. 209/2389/58) (the suit property), in default, an eviction order do issue and which order should be enforced by the Officer Commanding Station, Pangani Police station or any other nearby Police Station.

d) General damages for trespass and infringement of property rights.

e) Costs of the suit.

f) General damages for trespass and infringement of property rights.

g) Costs of the suit.

3. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs’ claim through their Statement of defence dated 14th May 2024, in which they denied allegations levelled against them in toto.

4. The 4th Defendant also filed a statement of defence denying allegations levelled against it. It urged the Court to find that there is no reasonable cause of action against it and that it is not liable to pay the costs of this suit.

5. In response to the 1st Defendant’s defence, the Plaintiff filed a reply to Defence and sought to rely on the doctrine of equity that deems that which ought to be done as done and contended that ownership of the suit property was transferred to the deceased when the purchase price was paid in full and that it was at all times thereafter held in trust for him. They reiterated that the suit property never reverted to the Government as they had applied for extension of the Lease thus any allocation to any other person was done irregularly and illegally and is liable for cancellation.

Evidence of the Plaintiff

6. The 2nd Plaintiff testified as PW1, adopting the 1st Plaintiff’s witness statement. He testified that about 1973, the deceased, whose estate he co-administers, purchased LR 209/22669 (originally No. 209/2389 /58 from Mr. and Mrs. Chagan Lal for Kshs.85,000/= . However, the transfer of the suit property could not be registered in his name on account of loss of the original certificate of title thus in order to protect his title in the intervening period, the deceased registered a caveat against the property on 4th January 1975, claiming a purchaser’s interest.

7. It was his testimony that the deceased and his children have been in actual possession and occupation of the suit property since the time of purchase. Further, that an application was made to the Commissioner of Lands for the issuance of a provisional certificate of title about 15th January 1986 but before transfer of the suit property could be completed, the deceased passed away on 10th May 1994. He pointed out that the Nairobi City Council (as it then was), wrote to its advocates on 7th December 1994, instructing it to withdraw RMCC No. 185 of 1994 on ground that that it had been instituted against Mr. and Mrs. Chagan Lal who were holding the suit property yet they were holding it in trust for the deceased, whom it had identified as the owner as he had paid the full purchase price and had executed the transfer in respect of the suit property.

8. He pointed out that the title to the suit property was a leasehold of sixty (69) years from 1934 to 2003 and that in 1996, one of the deceased’ wives, Siprose Taabu Ouko applied to the Commissioner of Lands for its extension, adding that a similar application was made dated 25th April 2000. He pointed out that the Nairobi City Council (as it then was), in its Town Planning Committee Meeting of 10th March 1996 recommended the approval of extension of the Lease to the suit property with no conditions, a decision communicated to the Commissioner of Lands through correspondence dated 11th September 1996.

9. He averred that having taken all reasonable steps to have the Lease extended prior to its expiry and received positive responses, from the relevant authorities, the Plaintiffs continued with occupation, developments and remittance of land rates and rent with the legitimate expectation that the impugned Lease would be extended. However, while still waiting for the 2nd Defendant’s formal communication concerning its extension about 28th September 2022, they were ambushed by strangers who purported to be inspecting the suit property in readiness for eviction pursuant to an alleged interlocutory judgement issued in CM ELC E098 OF 2022 Blue Lime Limited v Yusuf Hassan and James Owino and which was subsequently set aside and finally withdrawn.

10. He confirmed that on perusal of the aforementioned Court file, it unearthed that a title had allegedly been issued to the 1st Defendant on 8th February 2022 for a term of ninety nine (99) years from 1st August 2019 and contended that it was acquired fraudulently, illegally and through a corrupt scheme as it was issued when they had an approved extension of Lease from Nairobi City Council and in violation of their first right of refusal over the extension of the Lease. He contended that even if the impugned Lease reverted to the Government, the process of allocation of public land was not adhered to in the alleged allocation to the 1st Defendant. Further, that while the original title is delineated on Land Survey Plan Number 39088, the alleged title to the 1st Defendant is delineated on land survey Plan number 456103.

11. He produced the Plaintiffs’ list and bundle of documents dated 17th April 2024 as Exhibits No.1-23 and Ad colligenda bona dated 27th September 1994 as P. Exhibit 24.

12. In cross-examination, PW1 confirmed that there is no title before Court in the name of the deceased. Further, he did not have a copy of the sale agreement between the deceased and Mr. and Mrs. Chagan Lal but he had a transfer in that respect. He also confirmed that he made an application for Letters of Administration in 1995, a year after the deceased passed away and they were issued with Ad Colligenda and a Grant in 2017. He reiterated that they made an application for extension of Lease on 25th April 2000, which was to expire in 2003, and that there is no document from the Commissioner extending the impugned Lease. He pointed out that Entry 26 of the title to the suit land indicates; “prohibitory orders issued in suit 188 of 1996”, inhibiting dealings on the suit land, but he was not aware whether it was lifted.

13. Upon re-examination, PW1 insisted that they made an application for extension of Lease dated 25th April 2000 as administrators of the deceased’s estate and that it was acknowledged vide acknowledgement dated 30th May 2000. With regard to the inhibition entered as entry no. 26 on the Lease, which speaks to suit 188 of 1996, he was categorical that pursuant to the letter at page 84 of the Plaintiff’s bundle, it was confirmed that the deceased had cleared rates.

Evidence of the 1st Defendant

14. DW2 was Mahat Shire Kadiye, a director of the 1st Defendant. He testified that the suit property is lawfully registered in the name of the 1st Defendant, pursuant to an allocation. Further, that the 1st Defendant had sued for trespass vide CMCC E098 of 2022 Blue Lime Limited b James Owino & another but later withdrew the case after it became apparent that it was an ownership dispute.

15. He contended that the Plaintiffs have conceded that the deceased has never been registered to the suit property and has never been declared owner through any legal proceedings. He points out that Letters of Administration to his estate were issued in 2017 and confirmed in 2018 thus his alleged representatives had no capacity to apply for extension of the impugned Lease which expired in 2003, adding that the Plaintiffs fraudulently listed the suit property as part of the deceased’s assets in 2017, while fully aware that he was not registered as owner.

16. He claimed that upon allocation of the suit property to the 1st Defendant, it was resurveyed and assigned Deed Plan number 456103 LR 209/22669 and a certificate of title was processed in its favour, thus it is the lawful registered and rateable owner deserving of the legal protection under Article 40 of the Constitution.

17. In cross-examination, DW2 stated that he applied for allocation of the suit property to the Commissioner of Lands on 18th August 2009, he was issued with an allotment letter on 4th March 2011, and complied with conditions thereon, including paying Kshs.307,250/= as Stand Premium on 30th March 2011 through a cheque, though he admitted that there is no evidence he paid Change of User charges of Kshs.5,000/=. It was his testimony that the property was then resurveyed, following which he executed the Lease Agreement and was subsequently issued with title on 8th February 2022. He further testified that from 2011 to 2024, he did not pay land rent and there is no evidence to that effect but on 21st June 2024, he paid arrears and penalties fees of Kshs.38,200/= yet in his title, annual rent is Kshs.38,200/=.

18. He confirmed that the suit property had structures and admitted that he is not aware of the process of allocation of government land and conceded that prior to allocation, he did not participate in a public auction. He also confirmed that as per entry no. 2, of the Lease his title has been cancelled under Section 79(2) of the Land Registration Act.

19. In re-examination, he claimed that he had not been given notice of cancellation of his title and that he was never asked to surrender it. He also reiterated that he paid rent arrears penalties in 2024.

Evidence of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants

20. George Gitonga, a Land Registrar, testified as DW1. He produced the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ list and bundle of documents dated 30th May 2025 as D Exhibits 1-20.

21. In cross-examination, he stated that the said exhibits show a history of

the title to the suit property. He confirmed that there was no application for extension of Lease by the 1st Defendant whose Lease was registered in 2022 but it was issued in 2019. Further, that as per entry No. 2, the 1st Defendant’s title was canceled thus it should not be having it or counterclaiming for it. He also confirmed that entry no. 23 of the title is a caveat by the deceased claiming a purchaser’s interest, which was not lifted, and that that he is not aware of the deceased’s peremptory rights of extension.

22. In re-examination, he confirmed that the 1st Defendant did not return its title after cancellation vide entry no. 2.

23. Parties thereafter filed written submissions.

Submissions

24. The Plaintiffs submit that Mr. and Mrs. Chhagan Lal held the suit property in constructive trust for their deceased father, who took possession and developed it. Further, that following his death in 1994, the administrators of his estate applied for extension of the Lease before its expiry in 2003, which application was acknowledged by the Commissioner of Lands but was never determined thus they acquired a legitimate expectation that the Lease would be renewed or that reasons would be given for declining the application.

25. The Plaintiffs further submit that the subsequent allocation and registration of the suit property in favour of the 1st Defendant was fraudulent, as it was undertaken despite the pending Lease extension application and without following the mandatory procedure for allocation of public land, including public auction and Gazette advertisement under Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the repealed Government Lands Act.

26. They pointed out that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants subsequently cancelled the 1st Defendant's title, which cancellation was not challenged through a Counterclaim. They urge the Court to award them Kshs.100 million in general damages for violation of their right to property and legitimate expectation.

27. To buttress their averments, they relied on the following decisions: Willy Kimutai Kitilit v Michael Kibet [2015] KEELC 478 (KLR); Maina & 87 Others v Kagiri [2014] KECA 880 (KLR); William Kipsoi Sigei v Kipkoech Arusei & Another [2019] KECA 446 (KLR); Sehmi & Another v Tarabana Company Limited & 5 Others [2025] KESC 21 (KLR); Tenai v Sidhu & 5 Others [2025] KECA 105 (KLR); Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others [2014] eKLR; Attorney General v Zinj Ltd [2021] KESC 23 (KLR) and Southfork Investment Limited v Esquire Investments Limited & Others.

28. On its part, the 1st Defendant submits that the alleged vendors of the suit property could convey no more than their unexpired leasehold term to the deceased and that even if the alleged 1973 sale and payment created a constructive trust, the subject of the said trust was the vendors’ finite leasehold interest such that when it expired in 2003, the reversion fell to the government. Further, that the long delay in completing the transaction is equally telling, and equity cannot reward a half a century of failure to perfect title at the expense of a latter registered Lease.

29. On whether the Plaintiffs proved an enforceable legitimate expectation or pre-emptive rights, it submits that the deceased never became the registered proprietor of the suit property and that no authority made an express promise of renewal. It also argues that the Plaintiffs had no locus to apply for extension of the impugned Lease as they had not been confirmed administrators of the deceased’s estate, capable of asserting a transmissible interest. It argues that legitimate expectation guarantees lawful consideration, fairness, communication and reasons, it does not dictate the substantive result, thus pre-emptive rights ought not be treated as automatic conversion of public leaseholds into absolute proprietorships.

30. The 1st Defendant also relies on the case of Sila Nkatah Muthee v Alphonce Mwnagemu Munga & others & another [2016] KECA 577 to submit that a Limited Grant Ad Colligenda Bona does not enlarge the estates assets and that a Grant confirmed in 2018 could not travel backwards through time, recreate a Lease extinguished in 2003, or confer upon the administrators the status of registered Lessee.

31. With regard to its Counterclaim, it submits that it demonstrated the root of its title vide a paper trail that runs from application, approval, allotment, acceptance, payment, survey, planning approval, Lease and registration. Further, on the attack on its title on the basis that due procedure provided at sections 12 to 14 of the repealed Governments Land Act was flouted, it urges the Court to be slow to nullify a registered government Lease on an abstract procedural assertion where the state defended the process.

32. On the contention that its title stands extinguished because the copy in the 2nd and 3rd defendants' bundle bears a cancellation notation, it submits that Section 79(2) of the Land Registration Act does not license arbitrary destruction of title and that the alleged cancellation occurred during the pendency of the suit. It also points out that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ final submissions maintain that he was procedurally issued with title.

33. On the damages sought by the Plaintiffs for alleged constitutional violations, it submits that the Plaintiff did not prove liability against. It also urges the Court to award it general damages of kshs.65 million for trespass.

34. To buttress its averments, it relied on the following decisions; Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others [2023] KESC 30 (KLR); Funzi Island Development Limited & 2 Others v County Council of Kwale & 2 Others [2014] KECA 882 (KLR) and Attorney General v Zinj Limited [2021] KESC 23 (KLR).

35. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs cannot establish legal ownership based solely on payment of the purchase price and long occupation. Further, that the deceased is guilty of laches as his prolonged failure to complete a 1974 purchase upto his death in 1994 casts doubt on the assertion that he acquired a perfected proprietary interest in the suit property. They insist that the Plaintiffs claim is also defeated by the maxim that equity aids the vigilant. They further argue that the deceased’s estate had no enforceable right to renewal of the impugned Lease, as the deceased was never the registered proprietor, and could not in his own right, exercise the rights attaching to the registered leasehold interest, including the right to seek its extension or renewal. They argue that the distinction between an alleged beneficial interest arising from a sale transaction and the registered leasehold interest is material.

36. They also submit that the Plaintiffs did not identify a clear or unambiguous promise made by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants that the impugned Lease would be extended in favour of the deceased or his estate and that their alleged pre-emptive right or right of refusal is unsupported by evidence as the deceased was never registered proprietor of a leasehold interest.

37. They further contend that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove fraud, illegality or procedural impropriety in the allocation and registration of the suit property in favour of the 1st Defendant and maintain that its allocation followed the requisite process, commencing with the application dated 11th May 2009, approval on 18th August 2009, allotment letter dated 14th March 2011, payment of the stipulated charges, survey and eventual issuance and registration of a 99-year Lease on 8th February 2022. They also submit that no fraudulent conduct has been demonstrated against them.

38. To buttress their averments, they relied on the following decisions: Communications Commission of Kenya & 4 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 7 Others [2014] eKLR, and Vijay Morjaria v Nansingh Madhusingh Darbar & Another [2000] eKLR.

Analysis and Determination

39. Having considered the pleadings herein, testimonies of the witnesses, exhibits and rivalling submissions, the following are the issues for determination:

• Whether the deceased acquired a beneficial interest in the suit property under a constructive/implied trust and whether the interest survived the expiry of the Lease.

• Whether the Plaintiffs established a legitimate expectation and pre-emptive right to the extension or renewal of the Lease.

• Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for alleged violation of their constitutional rights.

• Whether the 1st Defendant is entitled to the suit property and whether it is entitled to damages for trespass.

40. The Plaintiffs’ case is that the deceased purchased LR No. 209/22669 from Mr. and Mrs. Chagan Lal in 1973, paid the full purchase price and took possession, but the transfer was never registered though he registered a caveat on 4th January 1975, claiming a purchaser’s interest. They contend that the deceased passed away in 1994 before he could be registered to the suit property and before expiry of the impugned Lease in 2003. They claim that they made applications for extension of Lease in February 1996 and on 25th April, 2000 but while awaiting a response, they learnt that the suit property was registered to the 1st Defendant. They insist that the said registration was fraudulent.

41. The 1st Defendant maintains that it lawfully acquired the suit property through allocation in 2011 and subsequent registration of a ninety-nine (99) year Lease in 2022 after the initial Lease had expired.

42. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants argue that the deceased never acquired a registrable interest capable of renewal and that his alleged beneficial interest did not survive the expiry of the Lease in 2003. They maintain that the Plaintiffs had neither a legitimate expectation nor a pre-emptive right to renewal.

43. On the first issue, the Plaintiffs contend that the vendors of the suit property, Mr. and Mrs. Chagan Lal, held it in constructive trust for the deceased. PW1 produced the Transfer Document between Mr. and Mrs. Chaganlal and the deceased John Gilbert Ouko. The transfer includes deceased representatives, heirs and assigns. Further, the vendors confirmed receipt of the purchase price of Kshs. 85,000/=.

44. In the case of Kazungu Fondo Shutu & another v Japhet Noti Charo & another [2021] KECA 592 (KLR), the Court of Appeal expounded on the manner in which a trust is to be proved as follows;

“The concept of trust must however be proved. This Court in the case of Mumo v Makau [2002] 1EA.170, held that “trust is a question of fact to be proved by evidence…..” See also Kanyi Muthiora v Maritha Nyokabi Muthiora, Nairobi Court of Appeal No. 19 of 1982.29. In Juletabi African Adventure Limited & another v Christopher Michael Lockley [2017] eKLR, this Court dealt with the issue of trust at length. The Court made reference to Twalib Hatayan Twalib Hatayan & Anor v Said Saggar Ahmed Al-Heidy & Others [2015] eKLR and re-stated the law on trusts as follows: -“According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition; a trust is defined as “1.The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another holds legal title; a property interest held by one person (trustee) at the request of another (settlor) for the benefit of a third party (beneficiary).”Under the Trustee Act, “… the expressions 'trust” and “trustee” extend to implied and constructive trust, and cases where the trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust property…” In the absence of an express trust, we have trusts created by operation of the law. These fall within two categories; constructive and resulting trusts. Given that the two are closely interlinked, it is perhaps pertinent to look at each of them in relation to the matter at hand. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by the court against one who has acquired property by wrongdoing. … It arises where the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained. If the circumstances of the case are such as would demand that equity treats the legal owner as a trustee, the law will impose a trust. A constructive trust will thus automatically arise where a person who is already a trustee takes advantage of his position for his own benefit (see Halsbury’s Laws of England supra at para 1453). As earlier stated, with constructive trusts, proof of parties’ intention is immaterial; for the trust will nonetheless be imposed by the law for the benefit of the settlor. Imposition of a constructive trust is thus meant to guard against unjust enrichment. …A resulting trust is a remedy imposed by equity where property is transferred under circumstances which suggest that the transferor did not intend to confer a beneficial interest upon the transferee ...This trust may arise either upon the unexpressed but presumed intention of the settlor or upon his informally expressed intention. (See Snell’s Equity 29th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell p.175). Therefore, unlike constructive trusts where unknown intentions maybe left unexplored, with resulting trusts, courts will readily look at the circumstances of the case and presume or infer the transferor’s intention. Most importantly, the general rule here is that a resulting trust will automatically arise in favour of the person who advances the purchase money. Whether or not the property is registered in his name or that of another, is immaterial (see Snell’s Equity at p.177) (supra).” Emphasis Mine

45. Courts have had to invoke the equitable doctrine of implied or constructive trust to uphold a land sale transaction. In such a case, the purchaser must have paid the purchase price in full and thereby acquired an equitable interest in the suit property. To this end, the Court of Appeal stated as follows in William Kipsoi Sigei v Kipkoech Arusei & another [2019] KECA 446 (KLR):

“Taking into account the Macharia Mwangi Maina decision and the Willy Kimutai Kitilit decision alongside the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the fact that the appellant herein, received the full purchase price for the property, allowed the 1st respondent to take possession, and for a period of at least fourteen years, let him remain on the property undisturbed, a constructive trust had been created. We agree with the English decision Yaxley v Gotts & Another, (2000) Ch 162, where it was held that an oral agreement for sale of property, created an interest in the property even though void and unenforceable as a contract; but the oral agreement was still enforceable on the basis of a constructive trust or proprietary estoppel.”

46. From the Transfer Document between the deceased and Mr. and Mrs. Chagan Lal, the vendors confirm receipt of the purchase price, hence it was immaterial whether there was a sale agreement or not. PW1 confirmed they took possession of the suit property upon purchase and the deceased family is still thereon. DW1 also admitted that there were structures on the suit property which could demonstrate the Plaintiffs’ long occupation. In Sehmi & another v Tarabana Company Ltd & 5 others [2025] KESC 21 (KLR), the Supreme Court opined that:

“80. Can the appellants be considered as having acquired an equitable interest in the land by virtue of their continued stay upon the same? We think not, since through effluxion of time, and reversion to the Government, the lease had become extinguished for all purposes. No equitable interest over the land could survive such extinction. Whatever remained in favour of the appellants over the land, could at worst be regarded as “a tenancy at will” or at best “a mere equity.”

47. Since the Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the deceased who had even lodged a caveat on suit property claiming purchaser’s interest on 4th January, 1975, noting that the deceased had paid the full purchase price, but was unable to get a transfer effected in his favour, since the original certificate of title was missing as per the correspondence produced by PW1, in my view the deceased had already acquired a beneficial interest in the suit property under a constructive/implied trust and the Plaintiffs being his beneficiaries, have indeed demonstrated the existence of a beneficial interest in the deceased's favour.

48. The question we now need to ponder is whether the beneficial interest can survive after the expiry of the Lease in 2003. PW1 claimed they applied for extension of Lease in February 1996 and on 25th April 2000 as administrators of the deceased estate, before its expiry. I note the Plaintiffs produced various correspondence including a letter dated the 6th February, 1996 from the deceased’s widow Tabu Ouko Ogalo seeking extension of Lease and one letter dated the 25th April, 2000 still seeking the extension of the Lease over suit property. Vide a letter dated the 30th May, 2000, the Commissioner of Lands acknowledged receipt of the application for extension of Lease, intimated that the matter was receiving attention and they would revert to the deceased family. It is worthnoting that the Plaintiffs continued to pay rates and rent to the Nairobi City Council (Nairobi County) as they awaited the extension of Lease. Further, as at 9th June, 2008, the Nairobi City Council still sent rate demand notices to the vendor Chhanganlal & Another to pay rates.

49. DW2 who was a witness for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, confirmed that there was a caveat over the suit property which was not lifted. The Defendants have argued that the Plaintiffs could not have applied for extension of Lease without Letters of Administration Intestate. However, I note the Plaintiffs produced an Ad Colligenda Bona issued on 27th September, 1995 as well as Letters of administration issued in 2017 and confirmed in 2018. Even if the deceased was never registered as owner of suit property, in my view since he took possession of suit property prior to his demise, remained thereon and left the beneficiaries thereon, there was an element of continuing constructive trust created. The Defendants have also argued that the Plaintiffs could not have applied for extension of Lease since the deceased did not have a title to the suit property. From the exhibits produced, there is an application for issuance of a provisional certificate of title to the deceased, including a statutory declaration dated 15th January 1986, confirming loss of original certificate of title. Further, the lawyers for the vendors and purchasers exchanged various correspondence confirming the deceased purchased the suit property. There are also payment of rates and electricity bills by the deceased family. PW1 in his testimony explained that the Nairobi City Council (as it then was), in its Town Planning Committee Meeting of 10th March 1996 recommended the approval of extension of the Lease to the suit property with no conditions, a decision communicated to the Commissioner of Lands through correspondence dated 11th September 1996.

50. In another correspondence from Nairobi City Council dated the 7th December, 1994 addressed to the law firm of messrs Kembi & Muhia Advocates, the Chief Counsel, stated that they had documentary evidence to prove sale of suit the property from Mr. & Mrs. Chagarlal to the deceased, whose property was being administered by his widows. The Plaintiffs have argued that the failure to communicate a decision on the application, coupled with their continued occupation and payment of rates and rent, created a legitimate expectation that the Lease would be renewed. The 1st to 3rd Defendants dispute this contention, arguing that the deceased was never the registered proprietor of the leasehold interest and that no clear representation was made to him or his estate guaranteeing extension of the Lease.

51. The Court of Appeal in the case of Justice Kalpana H. Rawal v Judicial Service Commission & 3 others [2016] eKLR, held as follows on the legitimate expectation principle:

“… legitimate expectation involves a representation that must be one which it was competent and lawful for the decision-maker to make without which the reliance cannot be legitimate. Other important aspects of the doctrine is that the law does not protect every expectation save only those which are legitimate (South African Veterinary Council v. Szymanski 2003 ZASCA 11); clear statutory words override any contrary expectation, however founded (R. v. DPP ex parte Kebilene and Republic v. Nairobi City County & Another, ex parte Wainaina Kigathi Mungai, HC. JR. Misc. C. No 356 of 2013; the representation must be one which the decision-maker can competently and lawfully make without which the reliance cannot be legitimate (Hauptfleisch v. Caledon Divisional Council (1963) (4) SA 53); legitimate expectation does not arise when it is made ultra vires the decision-maker’s powers (Rowland v. Environment Agency (2003) EWCA Civ. 1885; and a public authority which has made a representation which it has no power to make is not precluded from asserting the correct position which is within its power to make (Republic v. Kenya Revenue Authority, ex parte Aberdare Freight Services Ltd [2004] 2 KLR 530).”

52. Further, the Supreme Court has determined that it is the application for renewal of Lease that ignites a legitimate expectation. The question the Court will therefore look into is whether the persons making the alleged applications for extension of the impugned Lease on behalf of the deceased’s estate had capacity to do so, considering that he was never registered as a proprietor. Since the Commissioner of Lands acknowledged the application for extension of Lease, the Nairobi City Council recommended the extension of Lease, and the Plaintiffs were on the suit property, noting that the caveat was still registered on the suit property and there was no indication that the suit property was converted to public land, even if the land reverted to the government, I find that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are estopped from reneging on their acknowledgement. Further, they have not explained why despite acknowledgement, they never communicated the outcome of application for extension of Lease but proceeded to issue a Lease to the 1st Defendant instead.

53. The Supreme Court stated as follows in Sehmi & another v Tarabana Company Ltd & 5 others [2025] KESC 21 (KLR) (Supra):

“77. More often than not, public leases contain an option for renewal. However, such renewal must be activated by an application by the lessee to the government agency having authority to renew the lease. It follows therefore that where the lessee makes an application for renewal of his/her lease, his/her application would be considered either way and that, the applicant would be furnished with reasons should the application be declined. It would also be expected that the application would be clear and unambiguous. It is the application for renewal that ignites the legitimate expectation, given the fact that it is addressed to an authority that has the competence to renew the lease….85.…..Is the doctrine of legitimate expectation applicable to the application for renewal of lease by the appellants? To this question, it is our finding that indeed, in view of this court’s decision in Communication Commission of Kenya (supra), the claim by the appellants to the effect that, they had a legitimate expectation that the Commissioner of Lands would grant an extension of the lease, is not without merit…. 87. Given the chronology of events leading up to the inexplicable allotment of the land to the 2nd respondent, it is only logical to conclude that the appellants had a legitimate expectation that their lease would be extended. Such an expectation was not only reasonable, but was expressed to a competent authority, …Otherwise, what is a court of law to make of a situation where, a lessee applies for extension of his lease, the same is not responded to, he continues in occupation while paying the applicable rent and rates for years on end, then out of the blue, the property in question is allocated to a different person?” ….

“88. Did the appellants acquire pre-emptive rights over all other prospective applicants by virtue of such legitimate expectation? In our view, not necessarily, as to so hold, would make it nigh impossible for other bona fide applicants to acquire leasehold property over public land. By ousting the authority of the Commissioner of Lands (currently the National Land Commission), pre-emptive rights would have the undesired potential to convert leases over public land into absolute proprietorships.”

54. From my analysis above, while associating myself with the decisions quoted, I opine that there was an element of legitimate expectation created and hence the deceased’s family had preemptive rights which could not be affected by the expired Lease. In my view, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had no capacity to issue an extension of Lease to the 1st Defendant since the estate of the deceased had acquired pre-emptive rights over all other Applicants, as they applied for renewal/extension of the impugned Lease before it expired in 2003, before the promulgation of the 2020 Constitution and when the Governments Lands Act was still applicable.

55. It emerged during the hearing that the 1st Defendant’s title had been cancelled. However, I note the 2nd and 3rd Defendants made a u-turn in their submissions and claimed that the 1st Defendant’s title was lawful which as a Court I would disregard, I note the record at the Lands Office speaks for itself.

56. The Plaintiffs seek Kshs.100 million in general damages, from the 2nd to 4th Defendants for the alleged violation of their right to property as protected under Article 40 of the Constitution and trespass. In Attorney General v Zinj Ltd [2021] KESC 23 (KLR), the Supreme Court stated:

“….the quantum of damages to be awarded, depends on the nature of the right that is proven to have been violated, the extent of the violation, and the gravity of the injury caused.”

57. Since the Plaintiffs are on suit property, I opine that except for the pending application for extension of Lease, they have not demonstrated how the award of Kshs. 100 million as general damages was arrived at. It is not enough to throw figures at the Court, but it is pertinent for parties to demonstrate how their rights were violated. In the foregoing, I will decline to award the amount of Kshs. 100 million as general damages.

58. The 1st Defendants seek a declaration to be confirmed as owner of the suit property. From the evidence on record, the 1st Defendant did not adhere to the proper legal processes envisaged in the Government Land Act (repealed) to acquire the suit property. DW1 claimed they were allocated the suit property, which was first resurveyed, Deed Plan was issued, they paid Stand Premium and thereafter were issued with a Lease. It is worthnoting that despite claiming they were allotted the suit property in 2011, they only paid for rent and rates in 2024. DW1’s argument that arrears were paid does not make sense as the amount presented to Court as paid was only for one year. DW1 further confirmed they have never taken possession of the suit property. As per the testimony of DW2, he informed Court that as per the records held at the Lands Office, the 1st Defendant’s certificate of title was cancelled.

59. In the case of Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others (Petition 8 (E010) of 2021) [2023] KESC 30 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (21 April 2023) (Judgment), the Supreme held;

“Indeed, the title or lease is an end product of a process. If the process that was followed prior to issuance of the title did not comply with the law, then such a title cannot be held as indefeasible. The first allocation having been irregularly obtained, HE Daniel Arap Moi had no valid legal interest which he could pass to Bawazir & Co [1993] Ltd, who in turn could pass to the appellant.”

60. In the foregoing, while associating myself with the decisions cited, noting that there was a pending caveat on the suit property and pending application for extension of Lease which the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ had not dealt with, I find that the root of the 1st Defendant’s title presented certain challenges and I cannot declare the said title as absolute.

61. On whether the 1st Defendant is entitled to damages for trespass in the sum of Kshs.65 million. The 1st Defendant bears the burden of proving that it had a lawful right to possession of the suit property and that the Plaintiffs unlawfully entered or remained thereon. The Court of Appeal stated as follows in Wanyeki v Bhudiya & another [2023] KECA 614 (KLR):

“It is trite law that trespass to land is actionable per se. Once it is proved the appellant is under no duty to prove that he suffered any specific damage or loss. In other words, where trespass is proved as in this case, the affected party such as the appellant need not prove that he suffered any damage or loss as a result so as to be awarded damages. The court under the circumstances is bound to award damages depending on the facts of each case. See Simiyu v Sinino [1985] eKLR.”

62. Since the Plaintiffs had been on the suit property before the new alleged Lease was issued to the 1st Defendant, had beneficial interest over the said property and were awaiting for feedback on their application for extension of the Lease, I opine that the Plaintiffs did not trespass on the suit property hence the 1st Defendant is not entitled to award of general damages as sought.

63. In the foregoing, I find that the Plaintiffs have proved their case on a balance of probability and will enter judgement in their favour. I however find that the 1st Defendant has not proved its claim as per the Counterclaim and will proceed to dismiss it. I will proceed to make the following final Orders:

a. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the title over LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) registered in the name of the 1st Defendant herein was obtained fraudulently, illegally and/or through a corrupt scheme and is, therefore, null and void.

b. A mandatory injunction be and is hereby issued directing the 2nd Defendant herein to rectify the Land Register by cancelling the title registered in favour of the 1st Defendant as the proprietor over LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669).

c. A Permanent injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the 1st Defendant by themselves, their agents, servants, officers personal representatives and/or assigns or persons working for or under them or any other person whatsoever from encroaching, trespassing alienating, dividing, transferring, selling, charging, developing or in whatever way and whichever manner and way dealing with or in any manner interfering with the Plaintiff's right of occupation, possession and or use of all the piece of land situate in the City of Nairobi in Nairobi Area District containing by measurement Nought decimal nought five eight five hectares (0.0585) or thereabouts and being LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) as delineated on Land Survey Plan Number 39088.

d. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the continued registration of the property known as LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) in the name of Mr & Mrs Chhagan Lal from the year 1975 when the entire purchase price was paid was by way of constructive and/or implied trust in favour of John Gilbert Ouko (deceased).

e. A Declaration be and is hereby issued to declare that the Plaintiff had a pre-emptive right and legitimate expectation to the extension and renewal of the Lease for the suit property.

f. An order of Declaration, be and is hereby issued declaring that the property known as LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) belongs to the Plaintiff.

g. A mandatory injunction be and is hereby issued directing the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants to issue a duplicate title and process the extension of Lease over the suit property LR 209/2389/58 (also known as LR 209/22669) in favour of the Plaintiff.

h. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff's right to property as protected under Article 40 of the Constitution in failing to extend the Lease and irregularly, illegally and through a corrupt scheme registering the same in the name of the 1st Defendant.

i. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the 2nd Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s right to legitimate expectation in failing to issue an extension of lease and/or affording the Plaintiff the first right of refusal.

j. Costs of this suit is awarded to the Plaintiffs to be borne by 2nd -4th Defendants.

DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

CHRISTINE OCHIENG

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Wakwaya for Plaintiff

Adier for 1st Defendant

Nyawira for 2nd – 4th Defendants

Court Assistant: Joan

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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