REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MILIMANI
ELC APPEAL NO. E210 OF 2026
SARAH NYAMBURA T/A THE MILLENIUM BAR .................APPELLANT/APPLICANT
-VERSUS-
MICHAEL IRUNGU ....................................................1ST RESPONDENT/LANDLORD
JACOB MBUTHIA .....................................................2ND RESPONDENT/LANDLORD
ANGELO INOTI ........................................................3RD RESPONDENT/LANDLORD
RULING
The Application
1. Before the Court is the Appellant/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 23rd September 2026, brought pursuant to Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 75 of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Section 15 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Cap. 301.
2. The Applicant principally seeks an order staying the execution and/or enforcement of the Ruling and Orders of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal delivered by Hon. Mike Makori on 2nd September 2026 in Tribunal Case No. E1413 of 2025 pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal. She further seeks orders restraining the Respondents from evicting her, interfering with her possession and quiet enjoyment of the suit premises, levying distress against her property or otherwise interfering with her occupation and business operations, and that the status quo obtaining before delivery of the impugned Ruling be maintained pending the determination of the Appeal.
3. The application is supported by the affidavit sworn by Sarah Nyambura on 23rd September 2026. She deposes that the Tribunal, despite finding that the notice dated 11th November 2025 was invalid and incapable of terminating the controlled tenancy, dismissed her application and granted the Respondents liberty, after thirty days, to levy distress for rent arrears and recover vacant possession of the suit premises without further reference to the Tribunal. She contends that unless the impugned orders are stayed, the Respondents may proceed with distress and eviction before the Appeal is heard and determined.
4. The Applicant further avers that she has occupied the suit premises for approximately six years and operates her business therefrom, and that eviction would occasion disruption of her business, loss of goodwill, customers and business continuity.
5. She disputes the alleged rent arrears of Kshs.280,000/=, maintains that the amount is not owing, and contends that the Appeal raises questions concerning, inter alia, the validity of the termination notice, the alleged rent arrears, non-compliance with previous Tribunal orders and the order permitting recovery of possession. She states that the application was filed without unreasonable delay and expresses willingness to comply with such terms as to security as the Court may impose.
The Respondents’ Response
6. The application is opposed through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Angelo Inoti, the 3rd Respondent, on 6th October 2026. He depones that the application is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court process and that the Memorandum of Appeal does not raise substantial or arguable questions of law.
7. He further depones that although the Tribunal found the tenancy to be a controlled tenancy, that finding did not entitle the Applicant to remain in occupation without payment of rent or while in continuous default.
8. He further depones that the Tribunal was entitled to allow the Respondents to levy distress after the expiry of thirty days and thereafter recover vacant possession on account of the Applicant’s default in rent payment. He states that although the Applicant disputes the earlier figure of Kshs.280,000/=, she was, as at the time of swearing the affidavit, in arrears having failed to pay rent for September and October, and contends that no substantial loss has been demonstrated to warrant stay.
9. The 3rd Respondent also depones that the Applicant has not carried out the developments claimed in the suit premises but has instead neglected the premises, and annexes photographs in support of that assertion. He further states that, in any event, the joint owners of the Millennium Bar were served with notices dated 16th September 2025 and 19th January 2026 requiring removal of an alleged encroachment on a road reserve, and contends that the Applicant ought therefore to vacate and give vacant possession of the premises. He consequently prays that the application be dismissed with costs.
Submissions
10. The Appellant filed written submissions in support of the application and identified four issues for determination, namely whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant stay of execution pending appeal; whether the Appeal raises bona fide and arguable questions; whether the Appellant stands to suffer substantial loss and the Appeal risks being rendered nugatory if execution proceeds; and whether the application was filed without unreasonable delay. The Appellant submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Section 15 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Section 13(4) of the Environment and Land Court Act and Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. She relied on Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417 on the exercise of discretion in applications for stay pending appeal.
11. On substantial loss, the Appellant relied on Kenya Shell Limited Vs Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & Another [1986] KLR 410, James Wangalwa & Another Vs Agnes Naliaka Chesang [2012] eKLR and Paul Robo Vs Dominic Ntongai Kingori [2022] KEELC 1414 (KLR), submitting that eviction before determination of the Appeal would disrupt her business and undermine the efficacy of the Appeal. She further relied on Gitahi & Another Vs Warugongo [1988] KLR on balancing the competing rights of the parties, and submitted that the Respondents’ interests could be protected through continued payment of rent, provision of security and expeditious prosecution of the Appeal.
12. The Respondents, on their part, identified three issues for determination, namely whether there should be a stay of execution of the Tribunal’s ruling pending appeal; whether an interlocutory injunction should issue restraining them from evicting the Appellant or otherwise interfering with her possession and business operations; and who should bear the costs of the application. On stay, they relied on Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules and submitted that the Appellant had not demonstrated substantial loss and remained in rent arrears. They relied on Luxury Leather Kenya Ltd. Vs Yusuf & Others [2026] KEELC 5483 (KLR) in support of the proposition that stay should not issue in favour of a tenant who remains in default of rent.
13. On the prayer for injunction, the Respondents relied on Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, submitting that the Appellant had not established a prima facie case, irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured her. On costs, they relied on Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act and DGM Vs EWG [2021] eKLR, and urged that the application be dismissed with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
16. I have considered the application, the affidavits filed in support of and in opposition thereto, the rival submissions and the authorities relied upon by the parties. The sole issue for determination is whether the Applicant has made out a case for the grant of the orders sought pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal.
17. The jurisdiction of this Court to grant stay of execution pending appeal is governed by Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Order 42 Rule 6(2) provides as follows:
“No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—
a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”
18. The requirements under Order 42 Rule 6(2) are conjunctive. An applicant must demonstrate substantial loss, move the Court without unreasonable delay and satisfy the requirement as to security. In JNG Vs SNN (Family Appeal E156 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 14586 (KLR) (1 October 2026) (Ruling), the Court restated these principles and referred to Butt Vs Rent Restriction Tribunal [1979] KLR 417, James Wangalwa & Another Vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR and Antoine Ndiaye Vs African Virtual University [2015] eKLR.
19. On substantial loss, the impugned ruling granted the Respondents liberty, after thirty days, to levy distress for rent arrears and recover vacant possession of the suit premises without further reference to the Tribunal. The same ruling found that the notice dated 11th November 2025 was not a valid statutory notice capable of terminating the controlled tenancy. The Applicant has challenged, among other matters, the propriety of the order permitting recovery of vacant possession notwithstanding that finding.
20. The Applicant has been in occupation of the suit premises for approximately six years and operates the Millennium Bar therefrom. If the order for recovery of vacant possession is executed before the Appeal is determined, she would be removed from the premises and her business operations therefrom disrupted. The Appeal is therefore not concerned merely with a monetary claim but also with the Applicant’s continued occupation of the premises and the legality of the order authorising the Respondents to recover possession.
21. In James Wangalwa & Another Vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, the Court held that the fact of execution alone does not constitute substantial loss and that an applicant must demonstrate the particular state of affairs that would arise if execution proceeds. In the present case, execution would result in the Applicant losing possession before the appellate Court determines whether the Tribunal was entitled to authorise recovery of that possession. That consequence directly affects the subject matter of the Appeal and, in my view, satisfies the requirement of substantial loss.
22. The Respondents have placed considerable emphasis on the Applicant’s alleged rent default. The Tribunal also considered the Applicant’s failure to comply with an earlier direction relating to payment of Kshs.280,000/=. The Applicant disputes the alleged arrears and has challenged the Tribunal’s treatment of the rental account in the Appeal. The question whether and to what extent rent remains outstanding is one of the matters in controversy and cannot properly be conclusively determined in an interlocutory application for stay. It nevertheless remains relevant in considering whether the Respondents’ interests are sufficiently protected during the pendency of the Appeal.
23. As regards delay, the impugned ruling was delivered on 2nd September 2026, while the present application was filed on 23rd September 2026, approximately twenty-one days later. In the circumstances, I do not consider that period unreasonable. The Applicant therefore satisfied the requirement that an application for stay be made without unreasonable delay.
24. On security, the Applicant has expressly indicated her willingness to comply with such terms as the Court may impose and has proposed continued payment of the monthly rent of Kshs.40,000/= together with provision of reasonable security. Order 42 Rule 6(2)(b) does not require an applicant to have furnished security before approaching the Court; rather, the Court is empowered to order such security as is appropriate for the due performance of any decree or order that may ultimately be binding upon the applicant. I am therefore satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated readiness to comply with the requirement as to security.
25. Having considered the three statutory requirements cumulatively, I find that the Applicant has demonstrated substantial loss, approached the Court without unreasonable delay and shown willingness to furnish security. She has therefore satisfied the threshold for the grant of stay of execution pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
26. The Applicant also seeks orders restraining the Respondents from evicting her, interfering with her possession and quiet enjoyment of the suit premises, levying distress against her property or otherwise interfering with her occupation and business operations, together with an order maintaining the status quo obtaining before delivery of the impugned ruling. The Respondents oppose those prayers and rely on Giella Vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358.
27. Order 42 Rule 6(6) empowers this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to grant a temporary injunction on such terms as it considers just. In the present case, however, the injunctive and status quo prayers arise from the same threatened acts of execution that form the basis of the application for stay. The distress and recovery of vacant possession sought to be restrained are the very consequences authorised by the impugned ruling.
28. Having found that the Applicant has satisfied the threshold for stay of execution, the subject matter of the Appeal is sufficiently preserved by staying the enforcement of the impugned orders. A separate interlocutory injunction in substantially similar terms would therefore be unnecessary. I consequently find that the application succeeds to the extent of the prayer for stay of execution pending appeal.
Final Disposition
29. For the foregoing reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 23rd September 2026 is merited. Accordingly, I make the following orders:
a) There shall be a stay of execution and enforcement of the Ruling and Orders of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal delivered on 2nd September 2026 in Tribunal Case No. E1413 of 2025, pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal.
b) The Applicant shall, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Ruling, deposit Kshs.280,000/= as security in Tribunal Case No. E1413 of 2025, to be held pending the determination of the Appeal or further orders of this Court.
c) The Applicant shall continue paying the monthly rent of Kshs.40,000/= as and when it falls due during the pendency of the Appeal.
d) In default of compliance with either order (b) or (c) above, the stay of execution granted herein shall lapse, and the Respondents shall be at liberty to enforce the impugned Tribunal orders.
e) No separate order of interlocutory injunction shall issue.
f) The costs of the application shall be in the cause.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED via e-mail at NAIROBI on this 4th day of November, 2026.
MOHAMMED N. KULLOW
JUDGE