Background
Through a petition dated 9.12.2023, the petitioner seeks;
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
Through a petition dated 9.12.2023, the petitioner seeks;
Paragraph 1 →The next issue for determination is to trace the genesis of L.R. No. 5980/1. According to the Respondents, the subdivision of L.R. No. 5980 was approved by the City Council of Nairobi subject to the mandatory surrender of a portion thereof measuring 7.3 ha for public use and another portion as a road reserve. The petitioner admits that the only surrender related to a road reserve and nothing more.
Paragraph 34 →The Respondents have tendered documentary evidence showing a clear chain of application for development approval, conditions for the approval, acceptance of the conditions, subdivision scheme, consents, and acceptance of the surrender commitments made in 1979 and 1986 by the initial owners of L.R. No. 5980, the city council, and the Commissioner of lands, which processes culminated in the Survey Plan F/R No. 185/71 dated 20th February…
Paragraph 72 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MILIMANI-NAIROBI
ELC PETITION NO. E026 OF 2023
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 22(1),(2) &(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 23,40,47,48 & 50 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA,2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT,2015
BETWEEN
LUCY MUTHONI GITHIRE …………………………….…….. PETITIONER
AND
HON.JOHNSON SAKAJA GOVERNOR OF NAIROBI
COUNTY GOVERNMENT ………………….……………… 1ST RESPONDENT
HON.JAMES NJOROGE MUCHIRI,
DEPUTY GOVERNOR ………………………………..….... 2ND RESPONDENT
NAIROBI COUNTY GOVERNMENT ………………...….. 3RD RESPONDENT
COUNTY SECRETARY & HEAD OF
COUNTY PUBLIC SERVICE ……….……………………….. 4TH RESPONDENT
CEC MEMBER, PLANNING, HOUSING &
URBAN PLANNING …………………………..……….…. 5TH RESPONDENT
CHIEF OFFICER, LANDS DEPARTMENT …………...… 6TH RESPONDENT
CHIEF OFFICER, INSPECTORATE………….……..……. 7TH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
1. Through a petition dated 9.12.2023, the petitioner seeks;
a. A declaration that LR No.28223/33 (LR No.161418), LR No.28223/33 (LR No.161416), original 598013 belongs to her.
a. Conservatory orders staying decisions of the 1st,2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th & 7th respondents dated 12.10.2023 declaring the suit properties situated in Fourways Junction along Kiambu Road, off Northern Bypass as a surrender to the 1st respondent, the notice to vacate and an order directing issuance of enforcement notices and/or eviction therefrom.
b. Declaration that the collective actions of the respondents are an infringement of the petitioners' right to property and fair administrative action, and are therefore null and void ab initio.
c. Permanent injunction restraining the respondents, against evictions, erecting illegal fencing and/or otherwise interfering with the petitioners' quiet possession, use, and enjoyment of the suit properties without express authority, directions and/or orders of this Court.
d. Prohibition restraining the respondents and/or their agents from erecting illegal fencing, evicting, and/or otherwise taking possession of the subject matter in a manner interfering with the petitioners' quiet enjoyment, possession, and use without express authority, directions and/or orders of this Court.
e. Mandatory injunction compelling the respondents to vacate, and/or remove the illegal fence and/or structures erected on the subject matter.
f. Orders of judicial review of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus to stop the respondent from any further illegal action, conduct and/or decision dated 12.10.2023 declaring the petitioner's property as a surrender to the 1st respondent.
g. An order for compensation by the respondents.
h. Damages.
1. The petitioner avers that she is the registered proprietor /owner in occupation, use and enjoyment of the suit properties, having lost her husband, the late Hon.James Karugu, Attorney General, in the year 2022.
2. The petitioner avers that she bought the suit properties from Dr Samuel Mundati Gatabaki & Nancy Wanja Gatabaki through a sale agreement dated 5.11.1993 which land were subdivisions of the original LR No. 5980/3. It is averred that the petitioner subsequently filed HCC No. 2119 of 1995, Lucy Muthoni Githire Mwaura vs Dr Samuel Mundati Gatabaki and HCC No.223 of 2012, Lucy Muthoni Githire vs Suraya Property Group Ltd, Equity Bank and Muga Developers.
3. It is averred that in the said suit the court issued orders for recovery of the properties, possession and occupation, as well as partial discharge of the aforementioned properties by Equity Bank Ltd, which had, jointly with the respondents, illegally and unlawfully mortgaged the aforesaid properties.
4. The petitioner avers that she has since 1993 enjoyed quiet possession of the suit properties until on or about 30.11.2023 and 1.12.2023, when the respondents while accompanied by their agents, employees, staff, city county askaris, police and workmen invaded the property and proceeded to erect and or build an illegal fence and structures around it, thereby blocking access to the petitioner’s premises, causing panic and unlawful interference and commotion, which scared away customers, loss of business, tenants and patrons who were at the suit premises.
5. The petitioner avers that though her staff protested against the unlawful activities and requested explanations on the reasons for the illegal fencing, the respondents, through their agents, proceeded to erect the said illegal fence alleging that they were acting on directions and/or orders from above. The petitioner avers that she has suffered substantial loss and damage to her business.
6. The petitioner avers that she has since learned that the respondents have unilaterally, and without any notice, made a decision and direction that the subject matter herein is a surrender to the county and directed that notice to vacate and enforcement notice be issued.
7. The petitioner terms the aforesaid acts by the respondents arbitrary, illegal, and amounting to deprivation of property and interest therein, unconstitutionally contrary to Article 40 of the Constitution.
8. The petitioner avers that she has applied for, paid for, and been issued with all licenses, approvals and clearance letters and obtained all necessary permits for the properties and businesses.
9. The petitioner avers that, after issuance of the requisite permits and licences, she has been carrying on at the suit properties, which costs her approximately KSh 601,162, including a single business permit dated 22.2.2023, for accommodation, catering, small high standards lodging houses Hotel D.class with over 140 furnished apartments, and land rates clearance notice dated 13.1.2023.
10. Thre petitioner also avers she was issued with clearance certificate dated 3.3.2023, from file preventing department, Hotel Alcohol Drinking Licence issued on 5.4.2023, single business permit for industrial plant, factories, workshops and contractors, carwash dated 6.4.2023, clearance certificate dated 3.3.2023 for portable fire extinguishers, county health services licence dated 17.3.2023 and the copyright and Related Rights licence permit dated 6.3.2023.
11. As a result of the foregoing infringements of her constitutional rights, the petitioner avers that she has suffered loss, injury and damage, including to her business and reputation, and that her constitutional rights to property & fair administrative action have been violated, breached or infringed; hence the reliefs sought.
12. The petition is supported by an affidavit sworn by Lucy Muthoni Githire on 9.12.2023. After rehearshing the contents of the petittion she has attached copies of titles to the suit property, partial discharge of charge, copies of pleadings in the previous suit, memo dated 12.10.2023 conveying arbitral proceedings and the decisions, copies of the certificates, permits & rates clearance, all marked LMM(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) & (16) respectively.
13. The Petition is opposed by the respondents through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Cecilia W. Koigi, the Chief Officer Land, of the 3rd respondent on 25.1.2024. It is deposed that in October 2023, a joint team visited L.R. No. 5980/1, measuring 7.3 Hectares near Fourways Junction Mall, which she describes as a public utility space or land.
14. The 3rd respondent pleads that the public utility space belongs to it and therefore it was statutorily and constitutionally justified to demarcate, secure and fence it with a view to safeguarding the public land from encroachment and/or grabbing.
15. The 3rd respondent’s deponent states that, from inquiry, it emerged that some private entities were claiming ownership of the said public land, had purportedly disputed the otherwise lawful taking possession of the public land by the county government and had equally proceeded to court to challenge the said process of lawful possession, among them the petitioner, who claims to be the registered owner of L.R. No. 28223/33.
16. The deponent deposes that L.R. No. 5980/1 was a resultant subdivision number from L.R. No. 5980 as contained in survey plan F.R. No. 51/33, marked as annexure CWK (5 which previously belonged to Samuel Modaki and Nancy Wanja Gatabaki.
17. The deponent states that the records held by the 3rd respondent indicate that the defunct City Council of Nairobi, vide Minute No. 19 of the meeting held on 13/11/1979, an application had been lodged by the former owners seeking to subdivide the mother title for development purposes.
18. It is deposed that, after approval by the Commissioner of Land, the application for subdivision of L.R. No. 5980 into three plots, No. A, B, and C and a road reserve was allowed by the council, subject to six conditions as per the annexed minutes marked CWK (2), among them a surrender of a portion for public use and a road reserve.
19. It is deposed that, as per the six conditions, the area sought to be reserved for public purpose, in the approval, was to be surrendered to the Government of Kenya free of cost.
20. It is deposed that the approval minute was followed by a subdivision scheme, which the former owners presented, which was duly approved by the County Council, showing subplot (C ) as measuring 7.3 hectares, being the reserved land for public use.
21. The deponent states that pursuant to that approval, the City Engineer, Paul Mbae, wrote to the Commissioner of Land vide letter dated 16/11/1979 conveying the recommendation as per annexure marked C.W.K. (3), which, under condition 4, reiterated the area reserved for clarity and insistence.
22. It is deposed that on 19.2.1980, the Commissioner of Land wrote to the lawyers for Mr. & Mrs Gatabaki confirming the approval and the recommendation by the City Council as per annexure marked C.W.K. 4, reiterating that the area reserved for public purpose be surrendered.
23. The deponent states that Ms Harunani & Associates were authorised by the said lawyer vide a letter dated 8/11/1985 to proceed and complete the subdivision, a copy of which is attached as C.W.K. 5.
24. Following the above, it is deposed that the Commissioner of Lands communicated its final approval of the application vide letter dated 3/12/1985, attached as C.W.K. (6), confirming that the surrendered reserved land was one of the parcels to be hived off.
25. The deponent states that following the above approval, L.R. No. 5980 was subdivided vide survey plan F.R. No. 185/71 dated 20/2/1986 into L.R. No. 5980/1 (7.34 hectares), L.R. No. 5980/2 (5.680 hectares, a road reserve), L.R. No. 5980/3 (43.64 hectares), and L.R. No. 5980/4 (24.28 hectares).
26. The deponent states that L.R. No. 5980/1 was and is clearly the subplot that was set aside for surrender for public purposes, in all the subdivision approvals accorded by the City Council of Nairobi and the Commissioner of Lands, to which the City Council had issued a Subdivision Certificate No. 920 in respect of L.R. No. 5980 for Subplots. A and B as per annexure marked CWK (7), excluding sub-plot ( C) deliberately since it was designated for public purpose.
27. The deponent states that, given the above historical background, the claim for parcel L.R. No. 5980/1 by private entities as private land as opposed to public land, which has resulted in the filing of this petition, is founded on an illegal and fraudulent transaction.
28. The deponent states that these illegal transactions over otherwise public land are based on survey plan F.R. No. 353/71 of 2009, which purported illeglly deal with the land to show that L.R. No. 5980/1 and L.R. No. 5980/3 were amalgamated with another privale land L.R. No. 4508/1, resulting in L.R. No. 28223, which parcel was immediately subdivided into 33 sub-plots (L.R. No. 28223/1 a road reserve,28223/2 to 28223/33), 32.
29. The deponent states that L.R. No. 28223/33, LR No. 126634, which is the subject matter herein, allegedly came from an application for change of user.
30. She says that the subject land was then recorded as L.R. No. 28223/2, through a survey plan F.R. No. 353/71, as per annexure CWK (8) and CWK (9).
31. The deponent states that she has not come across any evidence that the purported change of user, as alleged by the petitioner, underwent a complete process as per the prevailing law, including all planning requirements and approvals.
32. Further, the deponent states that several transactions on and in respect of L.R. No. 5980/1 recorded in survey plan F.R. No. 353/01 and which appear to have taken place almost at the same time defy surveying logic and apparently were an effort to advance and conceal illegalities and fraud in the dealings on the said parcel of land.
33. The deponent says that, arising from the above state of affairs, the National Land Commission, vide letter dated 16.10.2017, wrote to Mr. & Mrs Gatabaki and the other three private entities warning them that L.R. No. 5980/1 is a public utility land that was illegally amalgamated with private land, and giving notice that the National Land Commission was in the process of recovering it in the public interest, as per annexure marked CWK (10).
34. The deponent says that in annexure marked CWK (11), the National Land Commission had also called upon the Chief Land Registrar to restrict L.R. No. 28223.
35. She says that this request was also to affect the resultant parcels from the amalgamation of L.R. No. 5980/1 and L.R. No. 5980/3 with L.R. No. 4508/1.
36. The deponent states that on 30.11.2022, the Director of Surveys, vide letter, wrote to Mr. & Mrs Gatabaki. In the said letter, the deponent states that it narrated the numerous irregular transactions that had taken place over title to L.R. No. 5980, as per annexure marked CWK (11). It is deposed that the letter also referred to another letter of 1/11/2023 by the said Mr and Mrs Gatabaki family, who had categorically said that they were not privy to the alleged illegal and fraudulent dealings over that parcel.
37. The deponent deposes that, in view of the foregoing, the petitioner's allegations that she is a bona fide registered owner of title to LR No. 28223/33 are unsubstantiated, for the said title is defeasible in law.
38. It is deposed by the 3rd respondent that such a title cannot stand the test of the legality of the process by which the purported proproprietor obtained the title and it was registered and attained.
39. The deponent questions the content of para 4 of the petitioner's affidavit on the bona fide purchase concept, insisting that the reservation was apparent to her before, after or at the time of purchasing the land.
40. The deponent, as regards paragraph 52 of the said affidavit, says that the alleged recovery of the land by the petitioner through litigation was inconsequential; otherwise, the issue of surrender for public purpose of the parcel of land was not the subject in the said suit.
41. As to paragraphs 10 & 11 of the affidavit, the deponent states that the surrender of the parcel for public utility was declared legal, procedurally and in line with the Constitution and the law as regards public land.
42. Therefore, the 3rd respondent deposes that the issuance of clearances, certificates, permits, and licenses to the petitioner by the 3rd respondent did not in any way serve as proof of proprietorship or ownership of LR No. 5980/1 in favour of the petitioner.
43. The deponent states that public land is jealously guarded by the Constitution and that the indefeasibility of title is not a sufficient ground to sanction irregularities and illegalities relating to conversion of otherwise public land to private land.
44. The deponent reiterates that LR No. 5980/1 remains public utility land in respect of which the 3rd respondent is entitled and justified to reclaim, possess, and hold as its custodian at all times in the public interest.
45. The 3rd respondent urges the court to traet any other any contrary claim over the subject land should be treated as illegal and fraudulent.
46. This petition was directed to be canvassed by way of written submissions based on affidavit evidence. The petitioner relies on written submissions dated 12.10.2026, isolating six issues for the court's determination.
47. On jurisdiction, it is submitted that this court has jurisdiction to determine the issue of physical invasion of the land by the respondents.
48. It is submitted that the respondnts acted contrary to Articles 40,42,43,47,48,50,62,66,67,68,69,70,71,75 & 261 of the constitution, which are the basis over the issues pleaded in the petition, and issue the remedies sought.
49. The petitioner submits that she lawfully bought and acquired the subject parcel of land, which as per survey plan FR No. 185/71 of 20.2 .1981, was authenticated by Director of Surveys showing that LR No.5980/1 measures 7.34 Ha, LR No. 5980/2 measuring 5.680 Ha, as the only surrendered portion for public use as road whereas LR No. 5980/3 measuring 43.64 Ha, and LR No. 5980/4 measuring 24.28 Ha, were the other portions going by annexures markedLMM (9).
50. It is submitted that on 5.11.1993, the petitioner lawfully purchased the suit properties from Mr and Mrs Gatabaki, which she also recovered as shown in LMM (4) & (6) through a court process.
51. It is submitted that in 2008 and 2009 the City Council of Nairobi approved the Fourways Junction development plan as per approval dated 31.7.2008.
52. It is submitted that the petitioner processed through Pleng (K) Ltd, an application for amalgamation and change of user whose receipts are at pages 14-37.
53. It is submitted that the Director of Survey examined and approved survey plan FR No. 353/71 on 26th March 2009, amalgamating LR No. 5980/1, LR No.5980/3 and 4508/1 into LR No.28223.
54. It is submitted that during the amalgamation process, LR No. R. No. 28223/1 was captured as the only surrendered land for public use as a road, and that LR No. 28223/2, after the change of user application, was issued as LR No. 28223/33 vide deed plan No. 309532 and the grant No. IR No. 126634, with effect from 1/1/2010, as per Annexure 9 appearing on pages 44 to 50.
55. The petitioner submits that a joint survey exercise of LR No. 20/223 was undertaken and, through a report by the Director of Survey dated 22/6/2022, there was a confirmation of the acreage.
56. It is submitted that in the referenced report, there was no discovery or identification of any encroachment of any portion thereof requiring surrender, as per annexure on pages 51 to 55.
57. The petitioner submits that between February and July 2023, the respondents issued to the petitioner rent clearance, single business permits, and liquor licenses as per annexures marked LMM 8 to LMM 16 to the supporting affidavit to undertake business on the same piece of land without any reservations.
58. It is submitted that on October 12, 2023, the respondents, in a purported internal memo, referring to a site report of Four Ways LR No. 5988/1, purported to declare the suit property as surrendered land to the county and issued notices to vacate, as per annexure marked LMM 7.
59. The petitioner submits that on November 30th and 1st December 2023, they erected a fence and blocked access to the suit properties, as per annexure marked LMM 5.
60. The petitioner submits that her chain of documentation is complete, unlike that of the respondents, making her title valid and indefeasible.
61. The petitioner submits that the supplementary affidavit by Mr Gathongo confirms that all the conditions of surrender were met, and that what was surveyed, authenticated and registered as of 28th February 1986.
62. The petitioner submits that her plot was included and captured in survey plan FR No. 195/71, which was approved and authenticated by both the Commissioner of Land and the Director of Surveys.
63. The petitioner submits that the respondents, in their replying affidavit, concede that LR No. 5986/2 is a road reserve, which is what was surrendered for use as a road. Further, it is submitted that the same process was repeated in 2009 and, therefore, two lawful road surrenders exist on the records, of which the suit properties do not form part, making the respondents' theory collapse.
64. The petitioner submits that the custodian of survey records under sections 32 and 33 of the Survey Act has never cancelled or varied the survey plan FR No. 353/71 or FR No. 195/71.
65. The petitioner submits that for the respondents to come 44 years down the line to rely on minutes of the council recommendations for approval only cannot amount to a valid surrender.
66. It is submitted that, in this case, where survey records and administrative minutes conflict, the authenticated survey plan prevails under section 31 of the Survey Act and not a purported illegal fencing.
67. The petitioners submit that a surrender is a formal registrable disposition and, in this case, none exists under section 8 of the Land Registration Act; otherwise, what is registered and gazetted and appears on the registers is only the petitioners' parcel of land.
68. The petitioner submits that an internal memo based on a site visit report dated 12/10/2023, which is relied upon by the respondents in law, cannot rewrite a land register, revoke or invalidate a lawfully issued and registered title, or be used to justify the illegal invasion and notice to vacate.
69. The petitioner submits that under Article 62(1)(c) of the Constitution, public land is defined and, in law, therefore, land does not become public by official wish, administrative fiat or illegal entry and fencing, without or through a lawful process of possession, transfer and surrender.
70. The petitioner submits that what the respondents did was not a lawful constitutional route of taking private land into public land, since no public purpose was declared, no notice was given, no inquiry was held, and no compensation was assessed or paid under the Constitution to justify the respondents' acts.
71. The petitioner submits that the National Land Commission letter dated 16/10/2017 is not a determination of anything other than confirming an inquiry meeting under Section 6 of the National Land Commission Act and a request for a restriction.
72. The petitioner submits that there was no initiated complaint on review of grants and dispositions on land, more so over her title under Section 14 of the National Land Act, which was ever undertaken, completed, or a determination lawfully made for the rectification of the land register made under Sections 79 and 80 of the Land Registration Act or suit filed to impeach the petitioner's valid titles.
73. The petitioner submits that six years of silence, followed by six years of collection of rates for the titles, licensing of business and collection of rates and a purported restriction, which in law is not a transfer of title, does not amount to a surrender or justify the acts of the respondents.
74. The petitioner submits that the allegation that the 2009 transactions were fraudulent, made by the 3rd respondent’s deponent, who is only a land officer and not a surveyor, without any other expert reports supporting the alleged forged documents, fabricated plans, corruption of registry entries, or irregular change of use, does not amount to proof of fraud, which in law must be specifically pleaded and proved.
75. The petitioner submits that no fraud has been proved where she was a party to it before, during and after the time she bought the land, cleared payments in 1993 and litigated over the said land between 1995 and 2012.
76. The petitioner submits that the 3rd respondent’s own conduct of approving the plans for Four-ways junction developments on 13/7/2008, followed by amalgamation and change of user, leading to the approval by the Director of Survey, the preparation and the registration of the survey plan FR No. 353/71 on 26/3/200, Deed plan No. 309532 and grant No. LR 26634 were enough to prove that the respondents' allegations are unfounded.
77. The petitioner submits that, given the prior approvals of her developments by the predecessors of the respondents, the government and its officials cannot now approbate and reprobate after benefiting from their own approval for 15 years, only to discover the invalidity of the process through a memo and a site visit report.
78. The petitioner submits that the respondent's reliance on condition no. (11) in the development approval of 1979 and later in 1986, as per page 38 of Annexure CG1, which is not even particularised, could not amount to surrender; it was never enforced or converted into a surrender, and for 15 years the county or the Director of Survey did not and was not asked to enforce it before the FR No. 353/71 of 26.3.2009 was created.
79. The petitioner submits that the alleged surrender of 7.3 ha was never registered, enforced or acted upon for 15 years and cannot, in 2023, be made a basis or alleged existence of a surrender.
80. The petitioner submits that the cadastral status map at page 55 of C9 (1) only has a minor error correctable under section 31 of the Survey Act between LR No. 28223/33 and LR No. 28223/4, which error could not form a basis to warrant the respondents to fence 4.73 Ha and declare it as surrendered land.
81. The petitioner submits that the decision of 12/10/2023 and the acts of invasion of 30/11/2023 & 1.12.2023 were unconstitutional and contrary to Articles 40(2) and 47 of the Constitution as read together with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act.
82. It is submitted that the site report dated 12/10/2023 fails in every way to meet the requirements of Articles 40 and 47 of the Constitution as to the rights to property and the Fair Administrative Actions Act.
83. The petitioner submits that the document was authored by an unidentified officer; it was never brought to her attention, she was not heard; it continued without substance, with enforcement notices to vacate as the first and only consequence and was implemented by force within a week.
84. The petitioner submits that the primary documents before the court contain nothing as to the alleged unlawful process of acquisition, application for the rectification or revocation of the title, or invocation of the powers of the National Land Commission on review of grants or suit for land recovery.
85. The petitioner submits that where a government that believes a title is defective, it has legal remedies to use,with no room or license to resort to self-help.
86. The petitioner submits that self-help as a means of recovery of alleged surrendered land is not only unconstitutional and undemocratic, but also irregular; otherwise, no state organ may take the law into its own hands.
87. It is submitted that an eviction without due process of law is unconstitutional, as held in Mister Jogesh vs. Kipti Partany Shah and Anor (2017) eKLR and in Java (1958) Limited vs. Mombasa Jua Kali and Anors (2017) eKLR.
88. The petitioner submits that the 3rd respondent alleged request to ascertain and attempt a survey of the land, alleged works and plan to fence off 43.03 hectares of registered land, had interfered severely with her revenue-generating property developed with an apartment, offices and clinics as per annexure marked LMM 5,
89. It is submitted that these acts of the respondents were very arbitrary; she was presented with a fait accompli, in violation of Article 48 of the Constitution and the national values and principles, among them the rule of law and human rights, under Article 10 thereof.
90. The petitioner submits that even assuming without admitting that the respndents had any valid claim on the land which is denied there was still a lawful remedy for the respondents, which they could have invoked under Sections 19 and 80 of the Land Registration Act, Section 14 of the National Land Commission Act, or gone to court to sue for the land, but not to resort to self-help, as the Constitution does not allow one to rectify a land register through a fence before ascertaining the exact location and portion of land allegedly surveyed, as opposed to unlawful and procedural harassment of the petitioner and the disruption of her business.
91. The petitioner submits that the acts of the respondents breached her legitimate expectation, for she relied on the express promise of consistency and legality of her documents unless an overriding public interest, rationalised and committed to the departure, justifies a change. Reliance is placed on Communication Commission of Kenya vs. Royal Media Services (2014) eKLR and KRA vs. Darasa Investments Limited (2018) eKLR 358.
92. The petitioner submits that there existed and continues to exist a legitimate expectation in her favour.
93. It is submitted that the expectation continued as the county government conducted a joint survey exercise with her, allowed and approved an amalgamation, approved development plans, issued her with rates clearance certificates, and collected rates revenue, only later to come and invade and fence the premises.
94. The petitioner submits that no overriding public interest was created between 2017 and 2023 while the respondents remained inactive, and that the legitimate expectation was reinforced by the loss of business, tenants and patrons as per annexure LMM 5.
95. The petitioner, in the circumstances, invokes Article 23(3) of the Constitution of Kenya for grant of appropriate relief due to the respondents' unconstitutional administrative action and for deprivation of property without compliance with Article 40(3) of the Constitution, under which she asks for KSh 10 million.
96. On the response by the respondents, the petitioner submitted that paragraphs 3 to 5 of the replying affidavit, which allege that the portion is a public utility, are not supported by any title, gazettement, or transfer that yields or transfers land to the county government as required by Article 62(1)(c) of the Constitution, and that a survey is not one of the modes of lawful acquisition.
97. As to paragraphs 9 to 21 of the replying affidavit, the petitioner submits that no exhibits have been attached to identify C as LR No. 5981 and to identify LR No. 5982 as the surrender. Nevertheless, the petitioner submits that whatever was done in 1979 was replaced through the county-sanctioned process of approval of amalgamation into LR No. 20223 in 2009, making the respondent's argument illogical.
98. The petitioner submits that the National Land Commission letter of 16/3/2017 and the Director of Survey's letter of 11/2022 were administrative correspondence but not a determination, whose recommendations were never implemented or acted upon.
99. As to paragraphs 32 to 38 of the replying affidavit, the petitioner insists that titles have not been legally impeached, and that Sections 26, 79, and 80 of the Land Registration Act, which would mean that the county could not have knowingly issued permits, licenses, and certificates of clearance or conducted a joint survey to ascertain the petitioner's land or title only to turn around and invalidate it as if it were their land in the first instance.
100. The petitioner submits that between 1995 and 2022 the issue of alleged surrender was not either raised or litigated, and to date there remains no valid surrender deed,otherwose the respondents undertook an unlawful, ultra vires, illegal, and unprocedural exercise of forceful entry, invasion, fencing, and setting apart private land as a surrendered public land.
101. The petitioner submits that while buying the land, she never came across any entry in the land register of any alleged registered surrender instrument, which even the joint survey exercise of 22/6/2022 did not discover, making the respondents' acts illegal.
102. It is submitted that even if there was any valid claim or issue, the respondents, before resorting to self-help, ought to have exhausted internal dispute resolution mechanisms as well as involving other parties, as held in Fanikiwa Limited and others versus Sirikwa Squatters Group (2023) eKLR.
103. The court has carefully gone through the petition, the verifying affidavit, and the written submissions of the parties. The issues calling for the court's determination are:
a) Whether the petition meets the constitutional requirements of a petition;
b) Whether the petitioner has substantiated the alleged breach of constitutional rights and freedoms to be entitled to the remedies sought.
c) Whether the respondents have a valid defence to the petition.
d) What is the order as to costs?
104. A party seeking constitutional redress for breach of constitutional rights and freedoms or the provisions of the Constitution has to meet both the procedural and statutory provisions set out in the Constitution of Kenya (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Enforcement) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, read together with Article 22 and 23 of the Constitution.
1. In Anarita Karimi Njeru vs. Republic (1979) eKLR, the court held that a constitutional petitioner must set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which the petitioner complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.
2. In Mumo Matemu vs. Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance and Others (2013) eKLR, the court emphasised the rule that requires reasonable precision in the framing of issues in a constitutional petition by providing linkage between the petitioner, the provision alleged to be infringed, and the manner in which the provisions are infringed.
3. In Communications Commission of Kenya versus Royal Media Services and Others (2014) eKLR, the court said that although Article 22(1) of the Constitution gives every person the right to institute proceedings claiming that a fundamental right or freedom has been denied, violated, or infringed, a party invoking this article has to show the right alleged to be infringed as well as the basis of his grievance.
4. In Mwakaneno v. Registrar of Titles Mombasa & Another (2026) KECA296 KLR eKLR, the court said that pleading in generalised and broad terms is not enough without distinctly identifying which specific respondent committed the alleged unconstitutional acts and how their conduct resulted in the violation of a specific constitutional article and to whom.
5. The court said that it was not enough to refer to the respondents as acting in concert without differentiating the acts, decisions, or omissions attributed to each respondent. The court said that failure to map out the alleged violation in accordance with identifiable constitutional provisions or the particular actor rendered the petition incompetent.
6. The court said that the lack of specificity obscured the scope and application of the alleged violation on a group of Constitution violating the court's violations. The court cited with approval Gwer and Others v. Kenya Medical Research Institute and Others (2020) KESCs 66 (KLR) eKLR, that the burden of proof lies with the party alleging a constitutional violation.
7. Again, the court cited, with approval, Wamwere & Others v. Attorney General (2023) eKLR, that the petitioner bears the burden to prove an alleged threat or violation of rights and freedoms requested. The standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities.
8. On the doctrine of exhaustion, in Eliud Chege v. Attorney General & Another (2016) eKLR, the court held that the doctrine of exhaustion, where there is an alleged constitutional violation, should not be impeded or stifled in a manner that frustrates the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms.
9. The court said that the availability of an alternative remedy does not necessarily bar an individual from seeking constitutional relief.
10. The court said that the act of seeking constitutional relief is contingent upon the inadequacy of an existing alternative means of redress, and where the said forum is inadequate in addressing the issue, the court is not restrained from providing constitutional relief.
11. The court held that a court should scrutinise the purpose for which a party seeks the relief and determine whether the appropriate forum could grant such relief.
12. In the same vein, the court said that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is anchored on the principle that courts should not entertain constitutional questions where a dispute can be resolved on a narrow statutory or procedural footing. The court said that the purpose is not to deny access to justice, but to ensure that constitutional adjudication remains a matter of last resort, thereby preventing constitutional adjudication in ordinary disputes.
13. In Jovet Kenya Limited v Bavaria N.V., Petition No. E039/2024, the court held that the doctrine of exhaustion entails that litigants should first pursue available statutory or administrative mechanisms before invoking constitutional jurisdiction, the rationale being to respect the recognised statutory dispute resolution framework and, secondly, to prevent a Constitutional Court from becoming a forum of first instance for every grievance, thereby undermining specialised institutional processes.
14. In Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & Others v. Samuel Munga Henry & Others [2015] eKLR, the court held that the doctrine of exhaustion stands unless the alternative forum is shown to be either ineffective, inadequate, or incapable of addressing the constitutional question in issue.
15. Applying the foregoing principles, the question is whether the petitioner has met the requirements of a constitutional petition to be entitled to the reliefs sought. The Petitioner came to this Court claiming that she purchased the suit property in 1993, which later became L.R. No. 28332/32, issued pursuant to Deed Plan No. 309532 and Grant No. L.R. 126634, with effect from 1st January 2010, which parcel she insists was never public land as alleged by the respondents.
16. Further, she pleads that the boundaries and the locality of her land were confirmed via a joint survey exercise by the County Director of Survey dated 22nd June 2022, upon which property the Petitioner has been extensively developing with approvals and has been lawfully operating a business on, duly permitted and licensed to do so by the 3rd respondent.
17. The Petitioner contends that on 30th November 2023 and 1st December 2023, the suit property was invaded, fenced off, and accessto it blocked by the Respondents, acting solely on an alleged internal memo dated 12th October 2023 prepared following an alleged site visit and report, purporting to declare the suit property as surrendered public land, and subsequently issuing an inadequate notice to vacate.
18. The petitioner avers that she was not privy to the alleged visit, deliberations, or decision, and the respondents' acts were against her rights to fair hearing, legitimate expectation and the right to quiet use, occupation and possession of her bona fide obtained title to land.
19. In answer to the Petition, the Respondents filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by the 3rd Respondent, wherein it is deposed that in October 2023, a joint team visited L.R. No. 5959/1 (measuring approximately 7.38 acres near Fourways Junction Mall), which is a public utility space belonging to the County Government, to determine and fence its boundaries with a view to safeguarding it from encroachment or land grabbing.
20. The Respondents depose that it emerged during the exercise that certain private entities, including the Petitioner, were claiming ownership of portions of the land (the Petitioner claiming under L.R. No. 28332/32. The Respondents aver that L.R. No. 5980/1 was a resultant subdivision of L.R. No. 5980, contained in Survey Plan F/R No. 59/33, which initially belonged to Mr and Mrs Gatabaki.
21. The Respondents aver that records held by the 3rd Respondent demonstrate that an application was made for the subdivision of L.R. No. 5980 into three plots, which was approved on the condition that Sub-Plot C be surrendered and reserved for public purposes.
22. It is pleaded that this proposal was accepted by the registered owners, and the subdivision application was approved subject to those specific conditions. Following the conditional approval, a subdivision scheme was approved showing a portion measuring 7.3 hectares reserved for public use.
23. The Respondents maintain that this surrender and reservation were formally accepted by the surrenderors, the Municipal Town Clerk, and the Commissioner of Lands vide letters dated 16th November 1979 and 19th February 1980. Further, the Respondents state that the surrender was given effect through approved subdivisions as per Survey Plan F/R No. 185/71 dated 20th February 1986, creating:
• L.R. No. 5980/1 (measuring 7.34 hectares);
• L.R. No. 5980/2 (measuring 5.620 hectares);A road reserve;
• L.R. No. 5980/3 (measuring 43.64 hectares); and
• L.R. No. 5980/4 (measuring 24.28 hectares).
24. The Respondents state that L.R. No. 5980/1 clearly constitutes the parcel set aside for surrender for public purposes, for which Subdivision Certificate No. 92 (attached as CWK7) was issued, excluding Sub-Plot C. They contend that any subsequent issuance of title deeds over designated public surrender land, including the illegal amalgamation of an unallocated parcel into L.R. No. 28332, which was subsequently subdivided into 33 sub-plots, among them L.R. No. 28332/32, was fraudulent and illegal, making the titles illegally obtained.
25. The Respondents state that there is no evidence of compliance with the physical planning laws on approvals relied upon to validate the change of user for the resultant new titles. The Respondents maintain that L.R. No. 5980/1 remains public utility land under the custody and statutory responsibility of the 3rd Respondent.
26. In a Supplementary Affidavit, the Petitioner denies the alleged irregularities and procedural defects in obtaining her title, stating that no such issues were identified during the joint survey exercise of 22nd June 2022. The Petitioner asserts that no surrender occurred other than L.R. No. 5980/2 set aside as a road reserve, rendering the Respondents' position baseless.
27. The Petitioner deposes that surrender, being a statutory process, must be duly recorded in official land records pursuant to Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Survey Act. She contends that no such surrender is captured in Survey Plan F/R No. 353/71 or F/R No. 185/71.
28. Consequently, the petitioner pleads that the Respondents cannot wait for 44 years to rely on administrative minutes to contradict authenticated survey records and justify an unlawful invasion, fencing, and blockage of access.
29. The cause of action by the petitioner is based on breach of her legally obtained title to land now invaded by the respondents, alleging it is public utility land illegally occupied by her contrary to public interest.
30. From the foregoing, it is evident that the petition is pleaded with precision. The issues raised are constitutional in nature and cannot be addressed in any other forum apart from this court. The constitutional questions pleaded in the petition include whether the title held by the petitioner enjoys constitutional sanction and whether the acts of the respondents were constitutionally compliant.
31. On the right to protection of land, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that the land in the first instance was not alienated or reserved land, as alleged by the respondents. Under Article 62(1) and (2) of the Constitution, public land includes unalienated government land and land in respect of which no individual or community ownership can be established by any legal process or which was public land as of the promulgation of the Constitution.
32. Article 62(2) stipulates that public land shall vest in and be held by a County Government in trust for the people resident in that county.
33. Article 62(4) provides that public land shall not be disposed of or otherwise used except in terms of an Act of Parliament specifying the nature and terms of such disposal or use.
34. The next issue for determination is to trace the genesis of L.R. No. 5980/1. According to the Respondents, the subdivision of L.R. No. 5980 was approved by the City Council of Nairobi subject to the mandatory surrender of a portion thereof measuring 7.3 ha for public use and another portion as a road reserve. The petitioner admits that the only surrender related to a road reserve and nothing more.
35. From the pleadings, it is an admitted fact that the genesis of the petitioner’s title and the interaction with the predecessor of the 3rd respondent was the application made in 1979 for development approval plans. The operative statutory framework covering surrender and development planning prior to the enactment of the Physical Planning Act, 1996 comprised the Town Planning Act and the Land Planning Act (Cap 303), and the Regulations made thereunder.
36. In Kepha Maobe & Others v. Benson Mwangi & Others [2015] eKLR, the court observed that approved development plans provided for public spaces for public utility under Cap 303 and Regulation 11(2)(c) of the Land Planning Regulations. The court affirmed the concept that open spaces designated under an approved development plan carry a binding public purpose.
37. The legal burden of proof lies upon whoever asserts the existence of specific facts to entitle themselves to any legal right, pursuant to Sections 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, and 112 of the Evidence Act. In this petition, the parties are unable to agree on what was surrendered as public utility land and a road reserve. The court must therefore look at what the prevailing law is on surrender and planning, to determine which version of the rival claims is sanctioned by the law, as they trace the root of title.
38. Regulation 10(1) of the Land Planning (Development and Use) Regulations, 1970 defined a "public purpose" as any non-profit-making purpose declared by the Minister, including education, medical, religious, public open spaces, parks, government, and local authority purposes.
39. Regulation 6(3) provided that the Central Authority should not request the surrender of additional land for public purposes if, having regard to the nature and amount of development proposed in the application, the land surrendered represented an appropriate contribution to the total land required for public purposes to serve the area as a whole.
40. The Central Authority was required to disapprove an application for development if the owner surrendered an area for public purposes equal to 20% or more of the area included in the application.
41. Regulation 6(2) provided that land surrendered for public purposes specified under the regulations should be freely surrendered to the Government, subject to the approval of the Minister. The land was required to be made available for public purposes.
42. Further, Regulation 6(2) provided that where it was shown to the satisfaction of the Minister that other more suitable land was required for public purposes, the Minister could, with the consent of the President and in consultation with the Central Authority, specify or dispose of the surrendered land and utilise the proceeds for the purpose of purchasing such other land.
43. The Town Planning Act (Cap 194) was the applicable statute initially. Thereafter, the Land Planning Act (Cap 303) was enacted to address land use control within the 3-mile peri-urban strip and 400 feet from the centre of trunk roads, where development indicated emerging land use patterns. The Act was administered by the Central Authority Committee under the Commissioner of Lands.
44. Regulation 6(3) provided that in respect of land obtained for public purposes before the rules came into force, the Minister could, with the consent of the President, dispose of such land for the purpose of acquiring new land for public purposes.
45. Section 166 of the Local Government Act (Cap 265) empowered local authorities to control the development and use of land within their areas of jurisdiction in the interest of proper and orderly planning. It is the inefficiencies and deficiencies of both the Town Planning Act and the Land Planning Act that led to the enactment of the Physical Planning Act, 1996, which became operational in 1998, and has now been succeeded by the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019.
46. The Physical Planning Act granted autonomy and authority to the Director of Physical Planning to guide land use management, becoming the primary governing statute on land use matters.
47. The Director of Physical Planning (DPP) became the Chief Government Advisor on matters pertaining to land use development, planning, and management, thereby streamlining the ambiguity in land use management that had hitherto occurred due to conflicting powers between the Commissioner of Lands and local authorities under the Local Government Act.
48. The Director of Physical Planning in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement was assigned the role of preparing all physical development plans and approving schemes, functions previously undertaken by the Commissioner of Lands.
49. The Act became operational throughout the country regardless of land tenure jurisdiction on 25th May 1996. Section 2 thereof defined the powers of the DPP.
50. Section 16 related to the requirement for the Physical Planning Department to include open spaces in its plans, and Section 29 defined the mandate of local authorities regarding the use and development of land within their areas of jurisdiction, including the reservation and maintenance of all land designated for open spaces, parks, urban forests, and green zones in accordance with approved physical development plans.
51. The Respondents submit that the land the Petitioner claims to own was duly surrendered for public purposes and, therefore, at the time she purports to have purchased it and later acquired title to the same, it was not available for alienation.
52. The term "public land" formally came into the operational statutory framework with the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, as held in Kiluwa Ltd & Another Vs Business Liaison Co.Ltd (2022) KESC 37 KLR.
53. Article 62 of the Constitution consolidated and vested all public land. Following and upon the commencement of the Constitution, all former unalienated government land and other public land became vested in the National or County Governments.
54. Through allocation, reservation, or purchase, as held in Torino Enterprise & Others v. Attorney General [2023] eKLR, the court affirmed that upon the lease or alienation of unalienated government land (or other land, for that matter) and the subsequent registration of title in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws, such land transitions from public land to private land.
55. The same logic applies to land that is sold, converting its character from public utility or statutory reservation to private ownership.
56. The respondents trace the land to 1979. The petitioner denies that there was any validly registered surrender instrument on the title register. In Mwinyi Hamisi Ali v. Attorney General(1997) EKr, the court said that since the land was governed by the repealed Registration of Title Act, section 44 of the Act required the surrender of the land to be registered to terminate the interest of the lessee. The court held that the registration of such surrender was evidence of surrender.
57. In Chief Land Registrar & Others v. Mwaura & Others [2018] eKLR, the court held that a surrender of government interest or extinguishment of title is different from compulsory acquisition.
58. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7TH Edition, defines surrender as the yield of an estate to the person who has a reversion or remainder to merge the estate into a larger estate.In Fanikiwa Wholesalers Ltd v. Kiambu County Government & Others [2023] KEHC 58 (eKLR), the court stated with approval that a surrender is ineffective unless the landlord consents to accept it, and therefore it is consensual in the full sense of the term.
59. The court observed that the essence of Section 44 of the repealed Registration of Titles Act (Cap 281) was that the endorsement shall be signed by the lessee and the lessor as evidence of acceptance thereof.
60. In this matter, the Petitioner maintains that there was no surrender of 7.3 hectares for public purpose other than for a road reserve, which was confirmed otherwise in the subsequent Survey Plan and is also non-existent on the ground.
61. In Karuri Insetto Ltd v. Aster Holdings Ltd & Others [2019] eKLR, the court held that where parties are competing over proprietary interests in the same piece of land, each must produce authentic documents in support of their claim. This principle was further emphasised in Mwangi Maina & Another v. Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] KECA 94.
62. The respondents have produced all paper trail used to apply for development approval, subdivision, subdivision scheme and the correspondence thereof, followed by deed plans as of 1986, which involved and were consented to by the predecessor in title of the mother title, Mrs and Mrs Gathabaki.
63. The Petitioner on the other hand without calling for any rival evidence to challenge those exhbits terms the minutes of 1979 as incapable of conveying interest in land or affording evidence of a surrender.
64. It is true, as held in County Council of Meru & Others v. Attorney General [2020] eKLR, that minutes alone only express an intention to treat. In this case, however, the Respondents have gone further to produce evidence that the said minutes were followed by an acceptance of the terms and conditions of the approval for subdivision.
65. The Respondents aver that a subdivision scheme was prepared, signed, submitted, and verified by the previous owners of the land, and eventually titles were prepared, namely L.R. No. 5980/1, L.R. No. 5980/2, and L.R. No. 5980/3, which were prepared excluding the 7.3 hectares.
66. On the other hand, the Petitioner contends that the existence of the consent and Survey Plan F/R No. 185/71 dated 20th February 1986 led only to:
• L.R. No. 5980/1 measuring 7.348 hectares;
• L.R. No. 5980/2 measuring 5.620 hectares;
• L.R. No. 5980/3 measuring 43.64 hectares; and
• L.R. No. 5980/4 measuring 24.28 hectares.
67. The Petitioner asserts that the initial acquirer of the land comprised under L.R. No. 5980 had a total acreage of 80.88 hectares under Survey Plan F/R No. 185/71, and that L.R. No. 5980/1 is the portion measuring 7.3 hectares.
68. To counter this, the respondents refer to the letter from the director of survey and a response from the former owners.
69. In a letter by Mr. & Mrs Gatabaki dated 1st November 2023, they dissociated themselves from any dealings over L.R. No. 5980/4 as per annexures marked CWK11, which was in response to a letter by the Director of Surveys dated 30th November 2022.
70. From the rival documents, there is no dispute that L.R. No. 5980/1 was joined with L.R. No. 5980/2 to create the title held by the Petitioner as L.R. No. 28332/32. In a determination marked as CWK10, the National Land Commission (NLC) had requested the Chief Land Registrar to restrict the title held by the Petitioner, declaring it as public land illegally amalgamated with private land, which the Commission was in the process of recovering. In a letter dated 16th October 2017, the National Land Commission wrote to Mr and Mrs Gatambaki and three entities, stating that L.R. No. 5980/1 was public utility land that had been illegally amalgamated into private land.
71. The Respondents in this matter alleged that several transactions in respect of L.R. No. 5980/1, recorded under Survey Plan F/R No. 353/71, had taken place in total defiance of the logic regarding planning and survey laws. They contended that this was a deliberate attempt to advance and conceal illegality and fraud in the dealings with the said parcels of land, which ultimately triggered the intervention of the National Land Commission, the Chief Land Registrar, and the Respondents to secure the public land from encroachment and land grabbing.
72. The Respondents have tendered documentary evidence showing a clear chain of application for development approval, conditions for the approval, acceptance of the conditions, subdivision scheme, consents, and acceptance of the surrender commitments made in 1979 and 1986 by the initial owners of L.R. No. 5980, the city council, and the Commissioner of lands, which processes culminated in the Survey Plan F/R No. 185/71 dated 20th February 1986,preoared in line with the existing laws governing surrender, physical planning, and land development. From the documentation, the court finds that there was a valid surrender of 7.3 ha which was consented to, approved, and perfected. Thereafter, the resultant subdivisions and title deeds were subsequently issued in favour of the third parties and the initial owners. Once L.R. No. 5980/1 was carved out of the larger L.R. No. 5980, it ceased to be private land available for alienation in accordance with the law governing planning and land allocation at the material time.
73. The law is that planning precedes allocation, as held in Nelson Chai & Others v. Pwani University [2014] eKLR. The duty of a trial court when evaluating evidence was addressed in Estate of Hussein Noor Haji & Another v. M.B.K. Abdallah [2022] KESC 35 (KLR) and Ndolo v. Ndolo [1998] eKLR.It is the duty of the trial court to decide whether or not to believe evidence, including expert testimony, and assign reasons either way. Credible, relevant, and direct evidence without any break in the chain of title is key in tracking the root of title.
74. In Dina Management Limited v. County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others [2023] KESC 8 (KLR), the core issue was whether the suit property was designated as an open space, thereby constituting public utility land.
75. The Supreme Court stated that under Section 9 of the repealed Government Lands Act (Cap 280), the Commissioner of Lands could cause a portion of a township not required for a public purpose to be divided into plots suitable for, inter alia, residential purposes and dispose of them in the prescribed manner.
76. However, where no statutory reports had been prepared, no change of user had been approved by the Town Planning Committee and the Director of Physical Planning, and no recommendation had been made to the Commissioner of Lands, the court said that the land remained unalienated public open space and not a plot available for private allocation. In that case, the original grant and deed plans showed that the reservation was explicit.
77. The Supreme Court emphasised that the original grant was specific to the intended use and nature of development, and that the plan had to be drawn and submitted to the Commissioner of Lands for approval. The Court observed that public land is not a "cake for mere chopping up and distribution to favour allottees," but rather a rare commodity ring-fenced by constitutional and statutory provisions and regulations.
78. In this petition the respondents allege illegality and irregularity in the manner public land was alienate as if private land. The law is that once land is reserved for public use, it is no longer available for private use unless there is a lawful conversion.
79. Fraud consists of a deceitful practice or willful device used with the intent to deprive another of their right or to cause them injury, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Edition).
80. In Ruto & Others v. Teso & Others [2016] eKLR, the court cited with approval Kinyanjui Kamau v. George Kamau [2015] eKLR, holding that a party pleading fraud must explicitly plead and strictly prove that the title documents were obtained through fraud or illegality.
81. Similarly, in Board of Trustees NSSF v. Kenya Prison Service & Others [2021] eKLR, where the suit land had been allocated and gazetted as prison land, the court held that once land is designated and gazetted for a public purpose, any subsequent attempt to convert it into private land through subdivision, allocation, and issuance of titles constitutes an absolute nullity; since once gazetted as protected public land, it becomes unavailable for private allocation.
82. As held in CMC Aviation Limited v. Kenya Airports Authority [2001] eKLR, actions taken contrary to express statutory provisions are void ab initio. As of 1986, the d local authorities were governed by Section 144 of the repealed Local Government Act (Cap 265).
83. L.R. No. 5980/1, upon surrender, therefore belonged to the public domain under the custody of the Municipal Council of Nairobi. Therefore, as at the date the Petitioner alleges there was a purported sale agreement in 1993, the vendors, having legally surrendered 7.3 ha, had no land to sell to her. A nullity remains a nullity, as famously articulated in Macfoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169; a party cannot sell what they do not own (nemo dat quod non habet). The vendors had no estate or proprietary interest to sell in L.R. No. 5980/1 or any part thereof.
84. Therefore, any resultant subdivisions purporting to alienate land belonging to the County council under Section 144 of the Local Government Act and Section 3 of the repealed Government Lands Act were an absolute nullity. Regarding the intention of the vendors, a court of law cannot sanction an illegality or be used as an instrument to rubber-stamp an irregularity brought to its attention (See Catholic Diocese of Mombasa v. Justin Nyaga Githinji & 2 Others, Civil Suit No. 1 of 2016).
85. The historical documents upon which the Petitioner claims title fail to establish a valid root of title and have a break in the chain of acquisition. She purports to derive her title from Mr and Mrs Gatabaki, who, in explicit terms in the letter marked CWK11, disowned and dissociated themselves from any dealings over L.R. No. 5980/1 and L.R. No. 5980/4.
86. The Petitioner did not call them as witnesses to disown those letters or to support the alleged indefeasibility of her title. The doctrine of estoppel bars the initial owners who consensually applied in writing for approval to subdivide L.R. No. 5980 in 1979, accepted the terms and conditions, surrendered 7.3 hectares for public utility (and a road reserve), and actively participated in the subdivision scheme to effect the surrender from turning around to sell or dispose of that same 7.3-hectare parcel as if it belonged to them.
87. Equally, the Petitioner cannot derive any valid title out of such surrendered public land or invoke the protection of Article 40(3) of the Constitution (See Mariba Otwere Gichana & 2 Others v. Stephen Munyao Njoka & Another).
88. The doctrine of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice does not protect holders of an illegally acquired title, as held in Florence Wairimu Mugo v. Triple 8 Properties Limited & Others, Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 166 of 2017.
89. The Petitioner has been unable to rebut the consistent documentary evidence produced by the Respondents demonstrating that as of 1986, the suit property was public land.
90. The onus was upon the Petitioner to show that she obtained her title formally, legally, procedurally, and free from encumbrances or illegalities, as held in Kuria v. Land Registrar & Others [2015] eKLR and Monyua Maina v. Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR.
91. Conducting due diligence is paramount for any purchaser of land, as affirmed in Sehmi vs . Tarabana, S.C. Petition no E033 of 2023.
92. A court of law must evaluate facts without resorting to conjecture or speculation. Speculation cannot substitute evidence that was never adduced or which does not arise as an irresistible inference from proven facts. In Kimweri v. Kimweri [2022] eKLR, the court observed that judicial inference can only be drawn where there are objective facts from which to infer other facts.
93. In Kinara & Another v. Njoroge & Others, Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2019, the Court of Appeal outlined the principles governing how courts resolve factual disputes and ascertain material facts. The documentary evidence submitted by the Respondents contains irresistible, credible, cogent, and reliable public records.
94. The said documents demonstrate a clear intention to surrender, the formal acceptance of the surrender, and the final documentation surrendering 7.3 hectares to the City Council of Nairobi (now succeeded by the 3rd Respondent). The Petitioner, in her Supplementary Affidavit, failed to dislodge or rebut this evidence. Consequently, I find that the Petitioner’s title is not protected by law, as it was an instrument acquired through illegalities and unprocedural means.
95. In Afrison Export Import Registered & Another v National Land Commission & Others [2026] KECA 1257 (KLR), the Court cited with approval Mwinyi v. Attorney General & Another [1997] eKLR / [1997] LLR 580 (CAK), holding that the lack of formal registration does not nullify a de facto surrender when a landowner factually yields land to the State in exchange for valid subdivision benefits.
96. Equity prevents the petitioner and her predecessors in title form blowing hot and cold. Having enjoyed highly profitable subdivision allowed by the approval, the predecessor and the successor in title could not reject the correlative obligation to surrender public utility plots and purport to amalgamate public utility plots with private plots to create 33 subplots of which the petitioner cliams an indefeasible title.
97. Standing by since the 1979 surrender without complaining cemented the surrender, as held in Afrison Export ( supra) , since the land had already become public land. In this regard, by virtue of de facto and de jure surrender in 1986, the County Government owned the land.
98. The doctrine of eminent domain, now cemented under article 40 of the constitution, means that the County Government cannot be said to have infringed upon the rights of the petitioner to the extent that it was exercising eminent domain interests. See also County Government of Meru V. M’Mukindia [2024] KECA 1616 (KLR). Public benefits for which public utility plots are acquired must be realized.
99. In Town Council of Awendo v. Nelson O. Onyango & 13 Others; Abdul Malik Mohamed & 178 Others (Interested Parties) [2019] eKLR / SC Petition No. 37 of 2014, the Court reaffirmed the principle that even where land is acquired for a public purpose, that purpose must be sufficiently important and still ongoing to justify the deprivatization of property.
100. The Court said that even if the purpose is spent, contingent upon holding or re-allocation of the land for unrelated use, is unlawful and frustrates the very basis upon which compulsory acquisition was justified. The Court reaffirmed that necessity is not presumed, as the land must be used in a way that directly advances the stated public interest.
101. In Kenya Railways Corporation v. Bilal, S.C. Petition no E023 of 2025, the court reaffirmed that the enforcement of land rights or eviction cannot be executed through self-help or extra-judicial means, and that the procedure for the recovery of public land must follow established statutory and constitutionally compliant frameworks.
102. A court, as indicated above, cannot sanction self-help mechanisms or irregular actions. There exist clear constitutional and statutory mechanisms to evict occupants or recover public land. As was outlined in the National Land Commission’s letters to revoke illegally allocated public land, self-help is not one of them.
103. Given the foregoing, however, I find the petitioner has failed to substantiate that there were constitutional breaches of her rights to the suitland to be entitled to the reliefs sought. The upshot is that the Petition dated 19th June 2023 is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, with no orders as to costs.
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED at MILIMANI, NAIROBI THIS 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026.
….………………..
Hon. Justice C.K. Nzili
JUDGE
In the presence of the ;
Mr .Mutuma for petitioner
Mr.Njoogo for respondent
Court Assistant: Julius
Legal researcher: Bevalyn N.