Land law

Gachuhi v Waweru [2026] KEELC 7541 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elcl Civil Appeal E072 of 2025
Judgment date
4 November 2026
Judge(s)
Mohammed N. Kullow

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Background

The Court is called upon to determine the Notice of Motion dated 5th May 2026 by the Respondent/Applicant, brought under Order 42 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and all other enabling provisions of the law, seeking leave to file a cross-appeal out of time and that the costs of the application abide the outcome of the appeal.

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Question before the court

The Appellant/Respondent identified the sole issue for determination as whether the Applicant had established sufficient cause to warrant leave to file the cross-appeal out of time. It was submitted that the Tribunal’s judgment was delivered on 14th March 2025, whereas the present application was filed on 5th May 2026, and that the Applicant had failed to satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. Reliance was placed on…

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Decision / orders

For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Notice of Motion dated 5th May 2026 is merited and I accordingly allow it in the following terms:

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Reasoning passage

Taking all the foregoing factors into account, I am satisfied that this is a proper case for the exercise of the Court's discretion in favour of the Applicant. I therefore find that the Applicant has made out a case for leave to file the intended cross-appeal out of time.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS, NAIROBI

ELCL CIVIL APPEAL NO. E072 OF 2025

KELLEN NJOKI GACHUHI................................................APPELLANT/RESPONDENT

-VERSUS-

JAMES MWANGI WAWERU............................................RESPONDENT/APPLICANT

RULING

1. The Court is called upon to determine the Notice of Motion dated 5th May 2026 by the Respondent/Applicant, brought under Order 42 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and all other enabling provisions of the law, seeking leave to file a cross-appeal out of time and that the costs of the application abide the outcome of the appeal.

2. The grounds upon which the application is premised are set out in the body of the application and the Supporting Affidavit sworn by James Mwangi Waweru. He depones that he partially succeeded before the Tribunal and has since vacated the suit premises despite having undertaken substantial developments whose value, according to him, was not factored into or considered in the judgment. He further states that the Appellant/Landlord had intimated that she would not pursue an appeal against the Tribunal’s judgment, which led him to believe that the issues between the parties had been settled and consequently occasioned the delay in filing the intended cross-appeal.

3. The Applicant further depones that the intended cross-appeal raises arguable grounds which ought to be considered alongside the main appeal. He contends that no prejudice will be occasioned to the Appellant if time is enlarged and accordingly urges the Court to grant him leave to file the cross-appeal out of time.

The Response

4. The application is opposed through the Replying Affidavit sworn by Kellen Njoki Gachuhi. She depones that she never intimated to the Applicant that she intended to withdraw the appeal. She states that a meeting was held on 19th September 2025 between the Applicant and her agent at the Applicant’s request. According to her, her agent understood the purpose of the meeting to be discussion of the Applicant’s payment obligations under the settlement agreement dated 20th June 2025, whose first instalment had fallen due on 10th September 2025. She states that it was during that meeting that the Applicant requested her agent to urge her not to proceed with the appeal, which request was only to be considered if the Applicant honoured the terms of the settlement.

5. She further depones that the Applicant did not honour the settlement agreement and therefore could not rely on the discussions held during the meeting as an explanation for the delay in filing the intended cross-appeal. She further depones that by the time of the meeting, the Tribunal’s judgment had already been delivered several months earlier, approximately six months before the meeting of 19th September 2025, and contends that the statutory period for lodging the intended appeal had already lapsed before the alleged discussions took place.

6. The Appellant further states that on 3rd July 2025, the parties executed a consent under which the Applicant agreed to pay the decretal sum of Kshs.903,668 in four equal instalments of Kshs.225,917, without reservation. She therefore contends that the grounds now sought to be raised in the intended cross-appeal had already been settled between the parties and that reopening them would occasion prejudice to her. She consequently urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

Submissions

7. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions. On behalf of the Applicant, it was submitted that the delay in filing the intended cross-appeal was occasioned by negotiations between the parties following delivery of the Tribunal’s judgment, which led the Applicant to believe that the dispute had been settled. The Applicant maintained that the delay was excusable, that the intended cross-appeal was arguable and that no prejudice would be occasioned to the Appellant if leave were granted. In support of the principles governing extension of time, reliance was placed on County Executive of Kisumu Vs County Government of Kisumu & 8 Others [2017] eKLR, which in turn applied the principles set out in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat Vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR.

8. The Applicant further submitted that although the Civil Procedure Rules do not expressly prescribe timelines for filing a cross-appeal, the Court has power under Order 42 Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Rules to make such orders as ought to have been made notwithstanding that a respondent may not have filed an appeal or cross-appeal. Reliance was placed on Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd. Vs Peter Langi Mwasi [2018] eKLR and Christine Aloo Vs Mary Ouma [2021] eKLR for the proposition that a cross-appeal ought to be filed without undue delay and, at the latest, before directions are given in the main appeal. The Applicant therefore urged the Court to allow the application.

9. The Appellant/Respondent identified the sole issue for determination as whether the Applicant had established sufficient cause to warrant leave to file the cross-appeal out of time. It was submitted that the Tribunal’s judgment was delivered on 14th March 2025, whereas the present application was filed on 5th May 2026, and that the Applicant had failed to satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. Reliance was placed on Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat Vs IEBC & 7 Others [2014] eKLR and County Executive of Kisumu Vs County Government of Kisumu & 8 Others [2017] eKLR on the principles governing extension of time and the requirement that the whole period of delay be satisfactorily explained.

10. The Appellant further submitted that the meeting relied upon by the Applicant was held on 19th September 2025, after the time for lodging the intended cross-appeal had already lapsed, and that the alleged negotiations did not suspend the applicable timelines. It was also contended that the parties had on 3rd July 2025 entered into a consent under which the Applicant agreed to settle the decretal sum of Kshs.903,668, and that the intended cross-appeal sought to reopen matters already compromised by that consent.

11. In that regard, reliance was placed on Wasike Vs Wamboko [1985] KECA 149 (KLR) on the binding effect of consent orders, and Leo Sila Mutiso Vs Rose Hellen Wangari Mwangi, Nairobi Civil Application No. 255 of 1997 on prejudice as a relevant consideration in an application for extension of time. The Appellant urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

Analysis and Determination

11. I have considered the application, the affidavits filed in support of and in opposition thereto, the rival submissions and the authorities relied upon by the parties. The sole issue for determination is whether the Applicant should be granted leave to file a cross-appeal out of time.

Leave to File a Cross-Appeal Out of Time

12. The principles for consideration in an application for extension of time are that the power is discretionary, but the Applicant must satisfy the Court that the delay is not inordinate, the reasons for the delay are plausible, that the intended appeal is arguable and not frivolous and that the opposite party will not be unduly prejudiced by the order being made. See Nicholas Kiptoo Korir Arap Salat Vs Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR.

13. The Court also has power to enlarge time under Order 50 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides as follows: “Power to enlarge time [order 50, rule 6] Where a limited time has been fixed for doing any act or taking any proceedings under these rules, or by summary notice or by order of the court, the court shall have power to enlarge such time upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require, and such enlargement may be ordered although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed: Provided that the costs of any application to extend such time and of any order made thereon shall be borne by the parties making such application, unless the court orders otherwise.”

14. In Aviation Cargo Support Limited v St. Mark Freight Services Limited [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated: “For the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant, the latter must demonstrate to the Court that the delay in lodging the record of appeal is not inordinate and where it is inordinate, the applicant must give plausible explanation to the satisfaction of the Court why it occurred and what steps the applicant took to ensure that it came to Court as soon as was practicable.”

15. In the present case, the Tribunal delivered its judgment on 14th March 2025, while the Applicant filed the present application on 5th May 2026. The Applicant correctly points out that the Civil Procedure Rules do not prescribe a specific period within which a cross-appeal must be lodged. In Christine Aloo Vs Mary Ouma [2021] eKLR, cited by the Applicant, the Court held that: “whereas the timelines for filing of cross-appeal was not provided for in the Civil Procedure Rules, the same ought to be filed without any delay. In the mind of the court, the cross-appeal ought to be filed at least before directions under order 42 rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules have been given in the main appeal.”

16. It follows that the absence of an expressly prescribed period does not entitle a party to lodge a cross-appeal at any time. The relevant consideration is whether the Applicant acted without undue delay and, where there was delay, whether the explanation offered for it is satisfactory.

17. The Applicant attributes the delay to negotiations between the parties. He contends that the Appellant had intimated that she would not proceed with the appeal and that, as a result of the discussions between them, he formed the impression that the matters in dispute had been settled. The Appellant disputes that position and maintains that she never represented to the Applicant that she would withdraw the appeal.

18. The material before the Court shows that on 3rd July 2025, the parties entered into a consent under which the Applicant agreed to pay the decretal sum of Kshs.903,668 in four equal instalments of Kshs.225,917. Thereafter, a meeting was held between the Applicant and the Appellant's agent on 19th September 2025. The Appellant's evidence is that it was at that meeting that the Applicant requested her agent to prevail upon her not to proceed with the appeal and that the request was to be considered if the Applicant honoured the settlement.

19. Although the explanation advanced by the Applicant does not account with precision for every period between delivery of the judgment and the filing of the present application, the material before the Court demonstrates that the parties remained engaged after delivery of the judgment and were attempting to resolve the dispute. The consent of 3rd July 2025 and the subsequent meeting of 19th September 2025 lend some support to the Applicant's contention that there were ongoing engagements between the parties.

20. I am also mindful that the consent of 3rd July 2025 did not expressly provide that the Applicant had abandoned or waived his right to challenge any part of the Tribunal's decision. The effect of that consent upon the substantive rights of the parties is a matter which is more appropriately considered when the main appeal and the intended cross-appeal are determined on their merits.

21. On the arguability of the intended cross-appeal, the Applicant seeks to challenge the Tribunal's finding that he was liable to pay Kshs.903,000, the finding relating to the developments allegedly undertaken on the suit premises and the Tribunal's treatment of the rent statements relied upon by the Appellant. At this stage, the Court is not required to determine whether those grounds will ultimately succeed. It is sufficient to consider whether they are frivolous. I am unable to say, on their face, that the intended grounds are frivolous.

22. Of significance is that the Appellant's appeal and the intended cross-appeal arise from the same judgment and concern related findings on the parties' respective monetary claims. The Appellant challenges the award of Kshs.1,100,000 made in favour of the Applicant and its set-off against the rent arrears, while the Applicant seeks to challenge the finding that a balance remained payable by him and the Tribunal's treatment of the expenditure allegedly incurred on the premises. The matters raised are therefore intertwined and can conveniently be considered together.

23. On prejudice, the Applicant contends that the Appellant will suffer none if the cross-appeal is admitted and heard together with the main appeal. The Appellant, on the other hand, contends that allowing the cross-appeal would prolong the dispute and reopen matters which the parties had addressed through the consent. I am not persuaded that the Appellant would suffer prejudice that cannot be addressed within the appeal. The cross-appeal would be heard together with the already pending appeal, and the Appellant will have an opportunity to respond fully to the grounds raised therein.

24. In the circumstances, although there has been delay in bringing the application and the explanation offered does not account with precision for the entire period, that factor is not, in my view, determinative. Weighed against the absence of a prescribed period for filing a cross-appeal, the arguability of the intended cross-appeal, the fact that it arises from the same judgment presently before the Court, and the absence of demonstrated undue prejudice to the Appellant, the interests of justice favour allowing the parties’ respective grievances to be determined together.

25. Taking all the foregoing factors into account, I am satisfied that this is a proper case for the exercise of the Court's discretion in favour of the Applicant. I therefore find that the Applicant has made out a case for leave to file the intended cross-appeal out of time.

Final Disposition

26. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Notice of Motion dated 5th May 2026 is merited and I accordingly allow it in the following terms:

a) The Applicant is hereby granted leave to file and serve the intended cross-appeal out of time within thirty (30) days from the date hereof.

b) The cross-appeal shall be heard and determined together with the main appeal.

c) The costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED via e-mail at NAIROBI on this 4th day of November, 2026.

MOHAMMED N. KULLOW

JUDGE

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