Land law

Friends of Karura Community Forest Association v Attorney General & 7 others [2026] KEELC 7663 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Petition E035 of 2025
Judgment date
4 November 2026
Judge(s)
J G Kemei

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Background

The Petition is brought under various provisions of the Constitution, namely Articles 10(2), 20, 35, 42, 60(1), 69 and 232(1), the Forest Conservation and Management Act [FCMA] and the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act [EMCA]. It seeks the following orders: -

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Reasoning passage

Regarding the Petition’s precision and specificity, the test in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) [1979] KLR 154, as restated in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR, is whether the Petition sets out, with reasonable precision, the provisions alleged to have been infringed and the manner of infringement, so that the Respondents know the case they must meet. On review, I find that the…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

PETITION NO E035 OF 2025

FRIENDS OF KARURA COMMUNITY

FOREST ASSOCIATION - PETITIONER

VS

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL - 1ST RESPONDENT

THE CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF

ENVIRONMENT, FORESTRY &

CLIMATE CHANGE - 2ND RESPONDENT

KENYA FOREST SERVICE - 3RD RESPONDENT

CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS - 4TH RESPONDENT

AND

LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA - 1ST INTERESTED PARTY

GREENBELT MOVEMENT - 2ND INTERESTED PARTY

NATURAL JUSTICE - 3RD INTERESTED PARTY

KATIBA INSTITUTE - 4TH INTERESTED PARTY

JUDGMENT

1. The Petition is brought under various provisions of the Constitution, namely Articles 10(2), 20, 35, 42, 60(1), 69 and 232(1), the Forest Conservation and Management Act [FCMA] and the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act [EMCA]. It seeks the following orders: -

(a) A declaration that the purported construction of a tarmac road inside Karura Forest Reserve, without conducting qualitative public participation, offends the Petitioner’s as well as the public’s right to a clean and healthy environment managed sustainably as provided under Article 10 of the Constitution.

(b) A declaration that undertaking any infrastructural development within the precincts of a gazetted forest area within the territory of the Republic of Kenya must be preceded by its inclusion in the Forest Management Plan for the said period unless necessitated by great need, which must be recorded in writing by a project proponent and communicated to the public well in advance.

(c) A declaration that the Kenya Forest Service ought to include Community Forest Associations, where they so exist, before deciding to undertake any infrastructural development within a gazetted forest area in line with Article 69 of the Constitution of Kenya.

(d) An order of mandamus compelling the 3rd Respondent, acting through the 4th Respondent or any of its assigns, to immediately cease from any further construction of any intended tarmacking to bitumen standard of any natural trail within Karura Forest to preserve the forest’s natural ecosystem.

(e) A restoration order, at the cost of the 3rd Respondent, of the environment, including removal of any debris, concrete and tarmacked road within the natural trail of Karura Forest, with minimal interference to the environment, within 45 days of the judgment of the Court, and a report filed with the Court on the completion of the same within the said duration.

(f) An order of mandamus compelling the 3rd Respondent, acting through the 4th Respondent, to cancel any tender granted to its assigns for the construction of a tarmac road within Karura Forest, with the costs thereof to be borne by the 3rd and 4th Respondents for knowingly engaging in an outlawed activity.

2. The Petitioner has instituted the Petition in the public interest and in its capacity as a co-manager of Karura Forest Reserve [KFR] and as a champion of participatory forest management recognised under Section2 of the FCMA, the Forest Management Agreement and the Participatory Forest Management Plan.

3. The Petitioner contends that the 3rd and 4th Respondents have constructed a 200-metre tarmac road within the forest [between Gate 15 and the rangers’ village] along a natural trail, without involving or consulting the Joint Management Committee [JMC], where such issues would be discussed, and without any approvals. As Karura Forest is a conservation forest, infrastructure development is minimal.

4. It contended that its attempts to obtain information from the Respondents did not elicit a response and that, despite being a co-manager of the KFR, it was denied access to the road under construction.

5. The Petitioner averred that the existing all-weather surface track is suitable for light-vehicle traffic, even during the rainy season. It further contended that constructing a paved road would be incompatible with preserving the forest in its natural state, which facilitates the gradual seepage of water into aquifers. Paving would also increase surface runoff, thereby degrading the natural habitat. In addition, deep excavation and the noise associated with road construction could threaten fauna and flora.

6. The 3rd and 4th Respondents were also criticised for constructing the road without public participation or an Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA]. Road projects are classified as high-risk activities under the Second Schedule to EMCA and must therefore fully comply with the applicable legal requirements. It was contended that the Petitioner and forest stakeholders were denied the opportunity to express their views or reservations about the project.

7. Further, the Petitioner stated that it built 42 houses at a cost of Kshs. 30 million to relocate rangers from the forest village to the headquarters, enabling the village’s closure and paving the way for reforestation. The relocation is part of the current management plan; therefore, the Petitioner argued, a road to the village serves no purpose.

8. It was contended that the works would irreversibly cause significant environmental harm, including deforestation, loss of biodiversity and increased carbon emissions, in an area with diverse flora and fauna, where the project’s impact has not been assessed.

9. To the extent that the project has no public disclosures in respect of the construction, the tendering process, the rationale, the licences and the road works, it was contended that the road works are illegal and that the Court should reverse them.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Responses dated 13th February 2026

10. The 1st and 2nd Respondents contended that the road project was initially earmarked for Ngong Forest; however, the need to improve the road network at the headquarters and staff residences led to its relocation to Karura.

11. It was admitted that the construction of the road is complete [as at 25th August 2025] and that it stretches 200 metres from the TBT Nursery to the rangers’ village.

12. Although they asserted that the road was constructed in accordance with the law, they acknowledged that no NEMA licence was obtained and that public participation was not undertaken, as it was considered unnecessary because the works involved upgrading an existing road to bitumen standard through levelling, grading and compaction. In addition, no trees were felled and biodiversity was not affected.

13. They further stated that KFS bears exclusive responsibility for managing the Karura infrastructure and that the FCMA does not require consultation with the Petitioner. The upgrade was intended to serve the operational areas surrounding the head office. They also asserted that no constitutional rights were violated and that the suit is an attempt by the Petitioner to circumvent the dispute-resolution mechanism under Section 70 of the FCMA.

14. Finally, they contended that the reliefs sought have been overtaken by events, as the improvements to the existing road have been completed without harming the ecosystem or infringing the right to a clean and healthy environment.

The Petitioner’s Further Affidavit dated 11th April 2026

15. The Petitioner contended that the tarmacked Sectionwas formerly a natural murram trail used by pedestrians and light vehicles, and that it had coexisted with the forest ecosystem for decades.

16. It was explained that, unlike a murram trail, a bitumen road is impermeable, thereby reducing groundwater recharge, increasing surface runoff and accelerating soil erosion across the forest floor.

17. It was contended that the Second Schedule to EMCA classifies road construction as an activity requiring an EIA licence, regardless of its size or location. Neither EMCA nor its Regulations provide an exemption for the road upgrade.

18. The Petitioner stated that the works around the headquarters were not visible from the community engagement zones. It further alleged that KFS deliberately excluded it [and the JMC], despite frequent meetings, from the decision-making process that led to the approval and execution of the project, a practice inconsistent with best practice in environmental governance and the participatory management framework established by law. The Court was urged not to countenance this conduct.

19. The Petitioner maintains that relocating the Special Use Licence [SUL] from Ngong Road Forest to Karura was a significant decision requiring compliance with the FCMA and EMCA, which KFS allegedly failed to observe. Further, the annexure to the addendum is dated 14/5/25, raising concerns that it may have been backdated to legitimise construction that had commenced a year earlier.

20. Relying on the polluter-pays principle, the Petitioner contends that the environmental damage is irreversible and, accordingly, that restoration efforts by KFS cannot be considered unnecessary or unreasonable.

The 2nd Interested Party’s Response

21. In support of the Petition, the 2nd Interested Party contended that reliance on a SUL granted in 2019 in respect of Ngong Forest does not demonstrate compliance with the constitutional requirements applicable to Karura Forest, which is distinct from the Ngong Forest licence. The failure to conduct public participation denies the public the opportunity to make informed decisions. The road’s impacts include soil sealing through bitumen surfacing, altered drainage patterns, increased vehicle access, habitat fragmentation and the gradual transformation of the forest landscape into urbanised infrastructure corridors. Public forests are held in trust for the people of Kenya, and any infrastructural alteration must satisfy the strict constitutional threshold of sustainable development and intergenerational equity in line with Articles 42 and 69 of the Constitution.

The Petitioner’s Submissions

22. Counsel submitted that the 3rd and 4th Respondents have demonstrated an alarming pattern of progressively encroaching on the forest, including a separate incident in which they cleared part of it to establish an NYS staff camp.

23. On whether the construction of the road within Karura Forest violated the Petitioner’s and the public’s right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 42, Counsel answered in the affirmative, submitting that every person is entitled to this right.

24. Counsel further submitted that the assertion that no environmental harm had occurred, in the absence of a proper site assessment and an EIA, carried no weight. Counsel relied on Section 3(5) of the EMCA, which provides that where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, a lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.

25. The Petitioner submitted that constructing a bitumen road in a forested catchment area could cause several environmental harms, including reducing rainfall infiltration into aquifers by replacing permeable natural surfaces with impermeable materials; accelerating surface runoff and thereby contributing to forest-floor erosion; introducing chemical pollutants from petroleum-based materials into the soil and water table; fragmenting wildlife corridors; and generating construction-related noise. The existing road was undoubtedly a murram track, which allows water to percolate, unlike bitumen.

26. Regarding whether the failure to conduct an EIA and to facilitate public participation violated Articles 10, 35 and 69 of the Constitution, EMCA and the FCMA, it was submitted that an EIA licence is a prerequisite for commencing construction under the Second Schedule to EMCA. Counsel relied on Peter K. Waweru v Republic [2006] 1 KLR, in which the Court emphasised that the right to a clean and healthy environment includes procedural rights: the right to information, public participation and independent scientific assessment. Failure to comply with EIA requirements is itself a violation of the constitutional right under Article 42 of the Constitution.

27. The Petitioner relied on Mohamed Ali Baadi & others v Attorney General & 11 others [2018] eKLR, in which the Court held that any project requiring an EIA that proceeds without one is unlawful from inception and is subject to cessation and remediation orders. The Court rejected the argument that a project’s completion precludes the issuance of a remedial order.

28. It was further submitted that Article 69(1)(d) of the Constitution imposes an affirmative duty on the State to promote public participation in the management, protection and conservation of the environment. This duty is particularly significant where the resource in question is a public forest, a public good held in trust for all Kenyans under Article 62 of the Constitution.

29. Further, Section 48 of the FCMA provides that Community Forest Associations [CFAs] shall participate in the management of public forests. It was contended that the Forest Management Agreement between the Petitioner and the Kenya Forest Service is not merely a contract; it is the statutory mechanism for implementing this constitutional obligation. Excluding the Petitioner from decision-making on road construction within the jointly managed forest violated not only the FCMA but also Articles 10(2)(a) and 69(1)(d) of the Constitution.

30. To further buttress the point, Counsel relied on the case of Institute for Social Accountability & another v National Assembly & 4 others [2015] eKLR, in which the High Court, quoting South African jurisprudence, held:

“The international law right to political participation encompasses a general right to participate in the conduct of public affairs and a more specific right to vote and/or be elected into public office. The general right to participate in the conduct of public affairs includes engaging in public debate and dialogue with elected representatives at public hearings. But that is not all; it includes the duty to facilitate public participation in the conduct of public affairs by ensuring that citizens have the necessary information and effective opportunity to exercise the right to political participation.”

31. On whether the project’s exclusion from the Forest Management Plan renders it unlawful, Counsel submitted that Section 47(1) of the FCMA requires every public forest to be managed in accordance with a management plan that complies with the requirements prescribed by the Regulations. Developments not contemplated in the plan require a formal variation process, which is itself subject to public participation. Counsel further submitted that no public participation was undertaken in connection with the variation of the SUL from Ngong Forest to Karura.

32. The Petitioner submits that, although the road has been completed, the Court remains empowered under Article 70 of the Constitution to issue such orders as it deems fit. The Court was referred to Export Processing Zones Authority & 10 others (Suing on their own behalf and on behalf of all residents of Owino-Uhuru Village in Mikindani, Changamwe Area, Mombasa) v National Environment Management Authority & 3 others (Petition E021 of 2023) [2024] KESC 75 (KLR) (6 December 2024), in which the Supreme Court ordered environmental restoration in response to actions that had degraded the environment.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Submissions

33. It was submitted that the Petition does not disclose any violation of the Petitioner’s rights under Articles 10, 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution, that no fresh environmental approval was required for the impugned works, and that the Petition has been overtaken by events.

34. They submitted that the Petitioner and the 3rd Respondent are parties to a 20-year Forest Management Agreement dated 26/4/2021, pursuant to which they manage the forest through, among other measures, the Joint Management Committee established under Clause 14 of the Agreement.

35. Regarding the specificity of the Petition, the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted that the Petitioner failed to identify precisely the specific acts or omissions attributable to them, the specific provision allegedly breached, the nature of the injury sustained, the right allegedly violated, the manner in which the violation occurred and the resulting damage that would entitle the Petitioner to any constitutional remedy. They asserted that the Petition should be dismissed on this ground alone.

36. Regarding whether the road works required a new EIA or further public participation, it was argued that the obligation under Section 58 of EMCA is triggered only when a project falls within the Second Schedule to the Act. They relied on Kenya Railways Corporation & 2 others v Okoiti & 3 others [2023] KESC 38 (KLR), which observed that no licensing authority may grant approval before an EIA has been conducted for a project specified in the Second Schedule to EMCA. Under Regulation 4 of the Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003, no licensing authority shall issue any licence, permit or approval before an EIA licence is issued.

37. Further, it was submitted that the works involved upgrading, compacting and tarring an existing road network, and that, accordingly, the 3rd Respondent was entitled to proceed without undertaking a fresh EIA. The works were carried out pursuant to the SUL dated 27/3/2019 and its addendum dated 27/3/2024, both instruments executed by the 3rd Respondent under the FCMA. Given that the Petitioner’s grievance concerns the inadequacy of environmental screening, the appropriate forum for adjudication is the National Environment Tribunal [NET] under Section 129(1) of EMCA.

38. Regarding whether the Petitioner had established any violation of Articles 10, 42, 69 or 70 of the Constitution, the Respondents submitted that no such violation had been proved. The Petitioner did not rebut the Respondents’ evidence that the works neither interfered with the natural flow of water nor affected biodiversity, and that there was no excavation noise, extension of working hours or harm to protected flora and fauna. They relied on Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & 3 others [2023] KEELC 20682 (KLR), in which a Petitioner invoked the precautionary principle without producing evidence substantiating the alleged harm. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Petitioner had not tendered any evidence that the Respondents had breached the applicable laws, regulations or guidelines.

39. It was submitted that the precautionary principle under Section 2 of EMCA does not relieve a party of the threshold requirement to adduce credible evidence of irreversible harm before the burden shifts to the project proponent. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s assertions remain allegations unsupported by evidence meeting the requisite threshold. The Court was urged to dismiss the Petition, as the Petitioner had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the 1st and 2nd Respondents violated Articles 10, 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution.

40. It was further submitted that the Petition had been overtaken by events, as the suit was filed two days before the project’s completion. The declaratory orders sought in relation to the works, together with the restoration orders requested in the Petition, no longer serve any practical purpose, as there is no construction left to restrain and no prior state of affairs to preserve.

41. Further, it was submitted that prayers (b) to (d) of the Petition are not confined to the works at Karura Forest. They seek a general, forward-looking order requiring the 3rd Respondent to provide Community Forest Associations with advance written notice before undertaking any infrastructural development within any gazetted forest area in the Republic. It was submitted that this constitutes speculative litigation, which is prohibited by the doctrine of ripeness, which requires Courts to address only real, rather than imagined, disputes. In Katiba Institute v Parliament of the Republic of Kenya & another [2023] KEHC 4609 (KLR), the Court, citing Wanjiru Gikonyo & 2 others v National Assembly of Kenya & 4 others [2016] eKLR, held at paragraph 10 that a Court ought not to be asked to determine issues that are not ready for determination, whether under the doctrine of ripeness or the doctrine of avoidance. The Court was urged to decline to grant the orders.

The 3rd and 4th Respondents’ Submissions

42. On whether the Petitioner has proved that the upgrading of the 200-metre road to bitumen standard caused environmental damage and violated the public right to a clean and healthy environment, Counsel stated that there is no evidence to show that Karanja Njoroge is an environmental or forest expert capable of giving expert evidence on the effects of a bitumen road on forests. Further, there is no evidence of the environmental damage alleged by the Petitioner, including adverse effects of the road on fauna and flora. The allegation of a violation of the right to a clean and healthy environment is, therefore, remote. Scientific evidence is a prerequisite to a claim of violation of the right to a clean and healthy environment, as shown by the Supreme Court’s decision in Export Processing Zones Authority & 10 others v NEMA & 3 others [2024] KESC 75 (KLR), where the Court found the violation proved on the strength of reports from the Government Chemist analysing the soil, dust and water around Owino-Uhuru village and indicating hazardous amounts of lead, reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health recommending immediate testing of the residents for lead exposure and removal of the hazardous waste slag, and other technical reports detailing the extent of the lead exposure.

43. Asserting that the Petitioner bears the burden of proof, they referred the Court to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wamwere & 5 others v Attorney General (Petitions 26, 34 and 35 of 2019) (Consolidated) [2023] KESC 3 (KLR), which affirmed that a Petitioner in a constitutional petition bears the burden of proving alleged violations of rights and freedoms to the requisite standard. Consequently, it was contended that the Petitioner has not proved any violation and is therefore not entitled to any relief.

44. On whether an order for the restoration of the environment can issue, they submitted that such an order is an embodiment of the polluter-pays principle provided for under Section 2 of EMCA as follows:-

“… the cost of cleaning up any element of the environment damaged by pollution, compensating victims of pollution, cost of beneficial uses lost as a result of an act of pollution and other costs connected with or incidental to the foregoing is to be borne by the person convicted of pollution under this Act or any other applicable law.”

45. It was further submitted that the Supreme Court in the Owino-Uhuru case (supra) held:-

“166. The polluter pays principle, we reiterate, means that the absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensating victims of pollution but also to covering the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. Remediation of the damaged environment is part of the process of ‘sustainable development’, and as such the polluter is liable to pay the cost to individual sufferers as well as the cost of reversing the damage to the ecology.”

46. It was their submission that, unlike in the Owino-Uhuru case, where harm to the environment from lead poisoning had been proved, the Petitioner in the instant case has not proven any environmental damage from the upgrading of the 200-metre road to bitumen standard to warrant an order for the restoration of the environment.

47. Regarding whether prayers (d) and (f) of the Petition, which seek to compel the cessation of the impugned upgrading and the cancellation of the tender, may be granted, it was submitted that the road upgrading has been completed and that the relevant prayer has accordingly been overtaken by events. With respect to the prayer for a prospective injunction, it was reiterated that such relief cannot be granted in the absence of a pleading. Likewise, the SUL granted to China Road and Bridges Corporation, under which the roads within Karura Forest were upgraded, expired on 26/3/2026. No relief can arise from a non-existent SUL, and the Court is being called upon to issue orders that would be academic at best. The Court was urged to decline the said orders.

48. Regarding whether the Court may issue orders that rewrite the contractual relationship between the 3rd Respondent and the Petitioner, it was acknowledged that the Forest Management Agreement dated 26/4/2021 exists between them. It was submitted that the Court’s role is to give effect to the terms of such agreements, rather than to rewrite it or make declarations that would alter those terms. It was further contended that the Forest Management Agreement does not provide for consultation regarding infrastructure development in Karura Forest. Allowing the prayer would therefore alter the agreement between the parties, and the Court was urged to decline it.

49. The Petitioner has impugned the upgrading of the 200-metre road on the basis that it was not included in the Forest Management Plan for 2021–2026, which was annexed to the supporting affidavit of Mr. Karanja Njoroge as “KN-6” at page 43 of the Petitioner’s bundle. The Petitioner further impugned the road on the basis that it was contained in the 2025 work plan but was not discussed at the Joint Management Committee meeting held on 21/8/2025. The Petitioner has submitted that the project’s exclusion from the Forest Management Plan rendered it unlawful.

50. Regarding whether the 4th Respondent acted within its mandate in approving the upgrading of the 200-metre road to bitumen standard, it was submitted that the Forest Management Plan permits projects to be undertaken outside its scope, provided they are approved by the Chief Conservator of Forests. Reliance was placed on Clause 1.4 of the Plan on implementation.

The 1st and 2nd Interested Parties’ Submissions

51. In support of the Petitioner’s submissions, the Interested Parties added that the Petition meets the constitutional threshold of precision required of a constitutional petition. Relying on Section 58 of EMCA, they submitted that the road works required a fresh EIA as well as public participation.

52. The 2nd Interested Party contended that the impugned road construction and upgrading works within Karura Forest were undertaken in flagrant violation of the Constitution and the statutory framework governing environmental protection. The forest is held in trust for the people of Kenya and future generations. Accordingly, decisions affecting it must strictly adhere to the constitutional principles of sustainable development, transparency, accountability and environmental conservation. The 3rd Respondent has failed to produce an EIA licence, evidence of approval by the relevant agencies, records of stakeholder consultation, reports on public participation or any other documentation demonstrating compliance with the Constitution. Reliance on the SUL is insufficient, as it was issued for Ngong Road Forest, not Karura Forest. Each protected forest is subject to its own ecological and legal considerations, and a licence issued for one cannot be applied to another.

53. The 2nd Interested Party challenged the construction, arguing that it would fragment habitats, alter natural drainage systems, increase vehicular access, seal the soil with bitumen surfacing, disrupt biodiversity and gradually urbanise the protected ecosystem.

54. Regarding public participation, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that no meaningful participation had occurred before the works commenced. The Court was invited to rely on Mui Coal Basin Local Community & 15 others v Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy & 17 others [2015] eKLR for guidance on the meaning of meaningful participation. It was further submitted that the failure to conduct public participation deprived the public of the opportunity to understand the project’s environmental implications, assess its necessity, propose alternative measures, and participate in the management and conservation of the public forest. This omission, it was submitted, undermined the constitutional values of transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, and participatory governance, thereby rendering the decision constitutionally impaired.

55. On whether the project’s completion renders the Petition moot, it was submitted that completion neither renders the Petition moot nor deprives the Court of jurisdiction to determine the constitutional questions raised. The project’s subsequent completion does not validate an otherwise unconstitutional process or remedy any constitutional violation. The Court may grant appropriate relief to enforce constitutional rights and freedoms, including declaratory, restorative and other just and equitable relief.

The 4th Interested Party’s submissions

56. The 4th Interested Party filed written submissions in support of the Petition. The submissions substantially reflected those of the Petitioners and the 1st and 2nd Interested Parties. In particular, the 4th Interested Party submitted that the 3rd and 4th Respondents hold the forest in trust for the people of Kenya. It emphasised the principle of sustainable development, which requires the environment to be developed and protected without either objective being neglected at the expense of the other. It argued that the State had failed by prioritising development over ecological preservation, thereby contravening Articles 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution and the EMCA. The Court was urged to allow the Petition.

Analysis and Determination

57. Having considered the Petition, the rival affidavit evidence and the parties’ written submissions, the issues that present themselves for determination are as follows: -

a. Whether the works required an EIA licence to be obtained as well as public participation.

b. Whether the Petitioner has proven that upgrading the 200-metre road caused any environmental damage and violated the public right to a clean and healthy environment.

c. Whether the road works are unlawful on account that the Petitioner was not involved or consulted.

d. Whether the road project’s exclusion from the management plan renders the works unlawful, and whether KFS was within its mandate to carry out the works outside the plan.

e. Whether the reliefs sought are merited.

58. It is undisputed that the Petitioner and the 3rd Respondent entered into a Forest Management Agreement dated 26/4/21 for the joint participatory management of Karura Forest Reserve for a term of 20 years, subject to renewal. The Management Plan executed by the parties forms the basis of the Agreement and sets out the joint activities to be undertaken by the parties during its term.

59. The Petitioner impugns the construction of a 200-metre road to bitumen standard within Karura Forest, a gazetted and protected public forest, by the 3rd and 4th Respondents without an EIA licence, without public participation, under a licence issued for Ngong Forest and outside the 2021–2026 Management Plan. It contends that environmental harm has resulted and that the right to a clean and healthy environment has been violated.

60. The Respondents maintain that the works were an upgrade of approximately 200 metres between the nursery and the rangers’ village, for which neither an EIA licence nor the involvement of the Petitioner was necessary; that the management of infrastructure is the exclusive responsibility of KFS, which is under no obligation to consult the Petitioner because the Forest Management Agreement does not so provide; and that the road is complete and no trees were felled nor harm befell any flora and fauna in the forest.

61. The Interested Parties supported the Petitioner’s case, arguing that the forest, held in trust by the 3rd Respondent, must be managed sustainably, transparently and accountably, with the Petitioner’s involvement and in compliance with statutory law and the Constitution.

Preliminary matters regarding exhaustion of internal remedies and precision

62. Before addressing the substantive issues, two preliminary objections must be considered, as they bear on whether the Court should entertain the Petition. First, it is argued that the Petitioner should have pursued the mechanism under Section 70 of the FCMA or brought the matter before the NET under Section 129 of the EMCA. Secondly, it is argued that the Petition lacks the precision required of a constitutional petition.

63. Regarding the objection as to whether the Petitioner ought to have exhausted the internal remedies provided for under Section 129 of EMCA, it is to be noted that this Court pronounced itself on this matter on 11/12/2025, when it dismissed a preliminary objection raised on almost similar grounds. For that reason, the issue is not available for adjudication as it is res judicata.

64. Regarding the Petition’s precision and specificity, the test in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) [1979] KLR 154, as restated in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR, is whether the Petition sets out, with reasonable precision, the provisions alleged to have been infringed and the manner of infringement, so that the Respondents know the case they must meet. On review, I find that the Petition identifies the impugned act, namely the bitumen surfacing of a defined 200-metre stretch within Karura Forest. It also identifies the actors as the 3rd and 4th Respondents and the provisions relied upon, namely Articles 10, 35, 42, 69, and 70 of the Constitution, Section 58 of EMCA, and various provisions of the FCMA. It further specifies that the alleged infringement is the absence of an EIA, public participation, and consultation through the JMC. The Respondents addressed each of these matters extensively. Accordingly, I find that the objection fails.

Whether the works required an EIA licence and public participation

65. Article 69(1)(f) of the Constitution obliges the State to establish systems for environmental impact assessment, environmental audit and environmental monitoring. Parliament gave effect to this obligation in Part VI of EMCA.

66. Section 58(1) of EMCA provides that, notwithstanding any approval, permit or licence granted under this Act or any other law in force in Kenya, any person who is a proponent of a project shall, before financing, commencing, proceeding with, carrying out, executing or conducting, or causing to be financed, commenced, proceeded with, carried out, executed or conducted by another person, any undertaking specified in the Second Schedule to this Act, submit a project report to the Authority, in the prescribed form, giving the prescribed information, and the report shall be accompanied by the prescribed fee.

67. Section 58(2) of EMCA further provides that the proponent of any project specified in the Second Schedule shall undertake a full environmental impact assessment study and submit an environmental impact assessment study report to the Authority prior to the Authority issuing any licence: Provided that the Authority may direct that the proponent forego the submission of the environmental impact assessment study report in certain cases.

68. Regulation 4 of the Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003 prohibits the implementation of such a project before the assessment is concluded and approved. It provides that no proponent shall implement a project that is (a) likely to have a negative environmental impact; or (b) for which an environmental impact assessment is required under the Act or these Regulations, unless an environmental impact assessment has been concluded and approved in accordance with these Regulations.

69. The provisions of Section 58 of EMCA are further given effect by the Second Schedule of EMCA, which classifies projects into three major categories, namely low, medium or high risk. Clause (15) of the Second Schedule provides for a fourth category for any other project that poses high environmental risks.

70. Regulation 7 of the Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003 provides that every proponent undertaking a project specified in the Second Schedule of the Act as a low- or medium-risk project shall submit to the Authority a summary project report on the likely environmental effects of the project.

71. It follows from the foregoing provisions of EMCA that NEMA is responsible for screening projects to determine the applicable category and whether a comprehensive project report is required. This categorisation has three consequences. First, the categories determine the depth of the assessment, not whether an assessment is required. Second, every undertaking listed in the Schedule must be submitted to NEMA before it commences. Third, NEMA and not the project proponent, determines whether a project’s impacts are significant enough to warrant a more comprehensive study.

72. The pertinent question is whether the road works constitute an undertaking under the Second Schedule. Among medium-risk projects, the Schedule lists the construction and rehabilitation of roads, including collector and access roads (paragraph 2(2)(a)). Among high-risk projects, it lists activities that are out of character with their surroundings (paragraph 3(1)(a)) and any project located in an environmentally sensitive area (paragraph 3(13)(i)). Even the low-risk category of local roads and facility access roads (paragraph 1(h)) remains within the Schedule and requires a summary project report. On any interpretation, converting a 200-metre murram track within a gazetted forest reserve into a bitumen road constitutes an undertaking specified in the Second Schedule. For present purposes, the responsibility to screen the works and categorise them accordingly remains NEMA's forte.

73. The Respondents’ position is that the works merely upgraded an existing road through levelling, grading, and compaction, and therefore did not require a new or fresh EIA licence. This position is problematic for four reasons. First, the Schedule expressly refers to the rehabilitation of roads, in addition to their construction. In this respect, Parliament did not limit the requirement to new roads. Second, the works did not merely maintain the existing road; they replaced a permeable murram surface with an impermeable bitumen surface. This change in the nature of the surface, constitutes an alteration rather than a mere upgrade. Third, neither EMCA nor its Regulations provide an exemption for upgrades, and, in the circumstances of this case, an exemption from a statutory safeguard giving effect to Article 69(1)(f) of the Constitution cannot be implied. Fourth, the term fresh or new presupposes an earlier assessment, yet no such assessment was produced by KFS for either Karura or Ngong Forest, where the works were originally intended to be carried out.

74. Can the Special Use Licence [SUL] dated 27/3/2019, together with its addendum, fill this gap? Section 2 read together with Section 56(2)(c) of the FCMA defines a SUL as an authorisation to undertake activities that primarily benefit the public in the areas of transport, communication, energy, research, or education. KFS states that it issued a SUL for road works in Ngong Forest and subsequently transferred it, with modifications, to Karura for works at the headquarters and staff houses. The remaining portion was applied to the 200 metres at issue in this suit. The works at the headquarters and staff houses are undisputed.

75. Section 75 of FCMA provides that where a provision of this Act requires a person to conserve or protect the environment, the relevant provisions of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (Cap. 387), shall also apply with respect to the manner in which the conservation or protection shall proceed. (2) No user rights or other licence or permit granted under this Act shall exempt a person from complying with the relevant provisions of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (Cap. 387), or any other written law concerning the conservation and protection of the environment. (3) A user or other related right shall not be granted under this Act where the requirement for a strategic environmental, cultural, economic and social impact assessment licence under the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (Cap. 387), has not been complied with.

76. A reading of Section 58(1) of EMCA alongside Sections 2 and 56 of FCMA makes clear that a SUL authorises the use of forest land. It is not, and cannot serve as, a substitute for an environmental assessment conducted by the authority to which Parliament has assigned that responsibility. Moreover, an environmental appraisal is site-specific. It is therefore doubtful whether any assessment [if any] undertaken in relation to Ngong Forest would be transferable to Karura before Karura’s specific ecological and environmental assessment is completed.

77. The Respondents further contend that no trees were felled and that biodiversity was not affected. While that may be the case, this remains the proponent’s own assessment of the project’s impact. Section 58 of EMCA requires such conclusions to be reached through an independent, documented process before the work commences, rather than asserted by the proponent after its completion. The Supreme Court’s observation in Kenya Railways Corporation & 2 others v Okoiti & 3 others (supra), relied upon by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, that approval may not be granted for a Second Schedule project before an EIA has been conducted, supports the Petitioner, given my finding that the road falls within the Schedule.

78. It is sufficient to note that the Respondents’ own documents support the same conclusion. The Karura Participatory Forest Management Plan 2021–2026, approved by the 4th Respondent on 26/4/2021, records in its discussion of EMCA (Section 4.1.4) that an EIA assessment should be undertaken where proposed activities are deemed to have adverse environmental impacts. Clause 11(b) of the Forest Management Agreement obligates KFS to ensure that all activities and processes undertaken pursuant to the Agreement comply with the relevant laws of Kenya.

79. The duty to promote public participation is not confined to the EMCA. Articles 10(2)(a) and 232(1)(d) recognize public participation as a national value and a principle of public service. Article 69(1)(d) requires the State to encourage public participation in the management, protection, and conservation of the environment. Similarly, Section 4 of the FCMA identifies public participation and community involvement in forest management as guiding principles of that Act.

80. In British American Tobacco Kenya PLC v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others [2019] KESC 15 (KLR), the Supreme Court outlined that meaningful public participation ought to have the following components:

a. clarity of the subject matter for the public to understand;

b. structures and processes (medium of engagement) of participation that are clear and simple;

c. opportunity for balanced influence from the public in general;

d. commitment to the process;

e. inclusive and effective representation;

f. integrity and transparency of the process;

g. capacity to engage on the part of the public, including that the

h. public must be first sensitised on the subject matter.”

81. Accordingly, the project proponent is responsible for facilitating public participation, which must be meaningful rather than illusory. The form, degree, and scope of that participation depend on the circumstances of each case.

82. According to the Management Plan in place, the forest receives nearly 40,000 visitors per month, and its stated policy is to keep the forest as natural as possible, allowing only activities with a very low footprint. The forest is co-managed with a community forest association, whose board represents the surrounding residents’ associations and informal settlements through a JMC that meets regularly. At a minimum, meaningful participation required disclosure of the proposal to the JMC and the forest’s stakeholders, together with an opportunity to comment before a decision was made. The Respondents concede that no public participation took place because it was considered unnecessary. That concession is decisive, as participation that never occurred cannot be assessed against any standard.

83. I therefore find that surfacing the road to bitumen standard constituted an undertaking within the Second Schedule to EMCA. A project report ought to have been submitted to NEMA under Section 58 of EMCA before the works commenced. The works were carried out without that report and without public participation, contrary to Section 58 of EMCA and Articles 10(2)(a), 69(1)(d), and 69(1)(f) of the Constitution.

Whether environmental damage was proved and the right to a clean and healthy environment violated

84. The 3rd and 4th Respondents contend that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation. They submit that the Petitioner adduced no expert evidence, as Mr Karanja Njoroge was not shown to be an environmental expert. They further argue that, unlike in Owino-Uhuru, no scientific reports of harm were submitted in this case to substantiate any harm to the forest attributed to the tarmacked road, and urge the Court not to grant the reliefs sought.

85. Article 42 defines the right to a clean and healthy environment as including the right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations through legislative and other measures, particularly those contemplated in Article 69 of the Constitution. It also includes the right to have obligations relating to the environment fulfilled under Article 70 of the Constitution. Accordingly, this right is not limited to freedom from proven pollution. It encompasses the right to the protective measures contemplated in Article 69, including the environmental impact assessment system set out in Article 69(1)(f). When the State undertakes a scheduled project within a gazetted forest without subjecting it to that system, it denies the protection guaranteed by Article 42(a), regardless of the eventual degree of physical harm. The 3rd and 4th Respondents have admitted that no EIA assessment of the works was conducted and that no licence was procured. This admission further supports the finding of a violation of these provisions, read together with section 58 of EMCA.

86. Article 70(1) of the Constitution also permits a person to approach the Court where a right is likely to be denied or threatened. Article 70(3) of the Constitution provides that an applicant need not demonstrate that any person has incurred a loss or suffered injury, and Section 3(4) of EMCA is to the same effect. Section2.3.5 of the Karura Participatory Forest Management Plan records the following:

“Groundwater is recharged naturally by rain and by rivers. Recharge may be impeded somewhat by human activities including paving, development, or logging. These activities can result in loss of topsoil resulting in reduced water infiltration, enhanced surface runoff and reduction in recharge.”

87. The same Plan describes Karura as a forest traversed by five permanent rivers and wetlands, which contribute to recharging those rivers and the underlying aquifers. It commits the parties to protecting the forest from any high impact development other than forestry activities. The Petitioner’s evidence that a bitumen surface reduces infiltration and increases runoff is precisely the proposition approved by the 3rd and 4th Respondents in the Plan. A party cannot credibly contend that a risk identified in its own management plan requires expert proof before the Court may take it into account.

88. The precautionary principle, which Section 3(5)(f) of EMCA requires this Court to apply, supports the same conclusion. As the Supreme Court explained in the Owino-Uhuru case [supra], drawing on Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, a lack of full scientific certainty is not a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. The scientific evidence that the Respondents claim is missing is precisely what the process under Section 58 of EMCA would have produced. Having bypassed that process, the proponent cannot fault the Petitioner for failing to produce evidence that the process would have generated.

89. That said, the Court acknowledges that the Petitioner pleaded deforestation, biodiversity loss, and increased carbon emissions resulting from the Tarmac road. However, no tree count, survey, or other evidence was presented to establish that trees were felled along this 200-metre stretch or that any species or habitat was actually lost. In this respect, the Court agrees with the 3rd and 4th Respondents that these allegations have not been proved. The evidence establishes a narrower but sufficient case, which is that the works were carried out in a sensitive catchment forest in breach of the protective framework under EMCA. The Respondents’ own management plan recognised this risk, but it was never assessed.

90. On this issue, I find that the Petitioner has established a violation of the right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 42(a), read together with Articles 69(1)(d) and (f), as well as a continuing threat to that right within the meaning of Article 70(1). The Petitioner has not established the specific heads of physical damage pleaded, and the extent of any actual harm remains to be determined. This distinction bears directly on the final reliefs to be determined shortly.

Whether the works are unlawful for want of involvement of the Petitioner

91. The Respondents submit that KFS bears sole responsibility for infrastructure in Karura and that the FCMA imposes no obligation on it to consult the Petitioner. They further submit that the Forest Management Agreement contains no provision requiring consultation on infrastructure; accordingly, the declaration sought would effectively rewrite the parties’ contract.

92. Under Section 8 of the FCMA, KFS is the statutory manager of public forests. A community forest association registered under Section 48 of FCMA participates in the conservation and management of a forest in accordance with an approved management agreement and management plan (Section 49(1)); however, it does not acquire control of the forest. The Agreement authorizes the Association to participate in the conservation and management of the forest (Clause 1(a)) and stipulates that it does not confer exclusive possession of the forest, or any part thereof, on the Association (Clause 19(c)).

93. Further, Clause 12(g) requires the Association, in consultation with the Service, to contract for and supervise the construction of any other necessary infrastructure. Clause 13(d) provides that the Parties shall supervise the tendering process for the maintenance of the fence and gates and the construction of any other necessary infrastructure. Clause 13(e) provides that the Parties shall supervise the maintenance of the fence, gates, offices, and existing infrastructure, as well as the construction of any other necessary infrastructure. Under Clauses 14(c)(v) and (vi), the JMC shall prepare a work plan and budget for the management of Karura Forest and other infrastructure and related activities, and shall be responsible for implementing that work plan. Clause 1.4 of the Management Plan, which forms part of the Agreement pursuant to Clause 2(a), provides that all activities in the forest must be approved by the KFS & FKFCFA Joint Management Committee.

94. Flowing from the foregoing provisions, two observations arise regarding the participatory management framework between the parties. First, the Petitioner, in its capacity as a forest community association, is a co-manager of the forest and has no veto over infrastructure within the forest. Second, holding the Service to these terms does not rewrite the parties’ bargain, as prohibited by National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & another [2001] eKLR. Rather, it gives effect to the bargain as written.

95. The contention that the obligation arises solely from contract must be dispelled. I say so because the Management Agreement is the instrument through which the participation contemplated by Articles 10(2)(a) and 69(1)(d), and sections 4 and 49 of the FCMA, is given effect. Having established this mechanism for community participation in a public forest, the State must use it when deciding on conservation and development, as excluding the community breaches its constitutional duty. The JMC met during the works, including on 21/8/25, but the road works were not presented to it. Nor was there evidence that the Petitioner’s information requests were answered, contrary to Article 35(1)(a), which guarantees the right to information, and Article 232(1)(f), which requires transparency. The Service’s repeated claim that it had no duty to consult is legally incorrect.

96. Regarding this issue, the works are procedurally defective because the Service made the decision without involving the JMC, contrary to clauses 13 and 14 of the Agreement and clause 1.4 of the Plan, and in breach of Articles 10(2)(a) and 69(1)(d) of the Constitution.

Exclusion from the management plan and the mandate of KFS

97. Section 47(1) of the FCMA requires every public forest to be managed in accordance with a management plan that complies with the prescribed requirements. At the time of the works, the Karura Participatory Forest Management Plan 2021–2026, which ran from 26/04/2021 to 25/04/2026, was in force. There is no suggestion that the road was provided for in that Plan. The Respondents instead rely on Clause 1.4 of the Plan, which reads in full:

“The KPFMP shall be implemented by the KFS and FKFCFA guided by a Forest Management Agreement. All activities in the forest must be approved by the KFS & FKFCFA Joint Management Committee. Any development or project outside this plan must be approved by the Chief Conservator of Forests.”

98. The Clause imposes two cumulative requirements: all forest activities require JMC approval, and development outside the Plan also requires the 4th Respondent’s approval. Consistent with the principle of sustainable development, the Court recognises that forest conservation and development are both central considerations. Conservation and development must proceed in accordance with the law and the Constitution. This is reflected in the Plan, which permits both the conservation and development of the forest resource. Under the Plan, KFS may undertake infrastructure projects in Karura, including those required for its headquarters and staff, as recognised in recital (d) of the Agreement, provided that it follows the applicable process. In this case, even if the SUL addendum established the 4th Respondent’s approval, the JMC did not approve the works. Moreover, the FCMA grants authority to approve the Plan to either the JMC or the 4th Respondent; accordingly, Section 58(1) of the EMCA applies in full. In Joseph Leboo & 2 others v Director, Kenya Forest Services & another [2013] eKLR (paras. 38–46), decided under the repealed Forests Act, the Court held that a management plan is central to the lawful management of public forests and that activities falling within Schedule 2 require an environmental assessment. The same reasoning applies under Section 75 of the FCMA.

99. Regarding this issue, I find that the Service had the power to undertake the works only through the procedure set out in Clause 1.4 of the Plan and in compliance with EMCA. Because it bypassed both, the works did not constitute a lawful exercise of its mandate.

Whether the reliefs sought are merited

100. The Respondents contend that the Petition has been overtaken by events because the road has been completed and the SUL expired on 26/3/26. A matter is moot when a decision would have no practical effect on a live controversy between the parties. Even then, the Court retains discretion to decide the matter where the circumstances warrant. In this case, the controversy remains live for several reasons. The road exists, and its effects, whatever they may be, continue. The parties remain bound to one another for the remainder of the twenty-year Agreement, and the question of whether the Service must make infrastructure decisions through the JMC will recur. Article 70(2) empowers this Court to order the restoration of a harmed environment, not merely to prevent harm before it occurs. In Owino-Uhuru, the Supreme Court ordered the clean-up of harm that had occurred long before the matter was brought before the Court. Above all, a public body cannot defeat a challenge to the legality of works by completing them while the challenge is pending; otherwise, the law would reward a fait accompli. The objection therefore fails.

101. The 1st and 2nd Respondents are correct, however, in submitting that prayers (b) and (c), as framed, extend beyond the dispute. They seek declarations binding on every gazetted forest in the Republic. Prayer (b) would also require the Court to establish a procedure, namely, the advance communication to the public of a written record of great need, which is prescribed by neither the Constitution nor the FCMA. Courts determine concrete disputes on the facts before them and not situations that are not before them. Accordingly, I decline to grant prayers (b) and (c) in the form sought. I will instead grant declarations confined to Karura Forest Reserve, setting out the obligations established in this judgment.

102. Prayer (a). The declaration sought is merited. I will reformulate it to reflect the provisions actually violated.

103. Prayer (d). The prayer is cast as an order of mandamus but seeks to prohibit further works in the forest. Articles 23(3) and 70(2)(a) empower the Court to grant appropriate relief to prevent acts harmful to the environment. The conduct proved here justifies a forward-looking order: works were begun under a licence issued for another forest, without notice to the co-manager and without a NEMA licence. The order will not freeze all works in the forest. It will require that any further surfacing of trails or tracks with bitumen or other impermeable material first comply with NEMA's provisions.

104. Prayer (e). The Court will not order the removal of the bitumen within 45 days. The polluter-pays principle in Section 3(5) of EMCA, and the restoration powers in Article 70(2) and Section 3(3)(d) of EMCA, are directed towards restoring the environment as far as practicable. Removing 200 metres of bitumen would require excavation, the use of heavy machinery, and the disposal of debris within the forest. Such removal might do more harm than good. Perhaps less intrusive measures, such as drainage works, permeable verges, or partial removal, might better protect infiltration. That is precisely the question that has not yet been asked, and it would be inappropriate for the Court to answer it without evidence, just as it was inappropriate for the Service to construct the road without an assessment.

105. In my view, the appropriate course is the one expressly contemplated by Section 3(3)(c) of EMCA, which requires that the activity be subjected to an environmental audit in accordance with the Act, followed by restoration as determined by the audit and NEMA. Article 23(3) of the Constitution does not limit the Court to the relief sought by the parties, and the Court may supervise compliance with its orders, as demonstrated in Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 2 others [2021] KESC 34 (KLR) and Owino-Uhuru. The audit must also assess whether a bitumen road to the Rangers’ Village remains necessary, particularly in light of the contemplated relocation of the Rangers’ Village to facilitate closure and reforestation. Any associated costs should be borne by the Service as the proponent. As NEMA is not a party to these proceedings, the orders are directed at the Service, without limiting NEMA’s ability to exercise its statutory powers in relation to the audit.

106. Prayer (f) is unsuccessful. The works have been completed, and the SUL under which they were executed expired on 26/3/26 .

107. Costs are within the Court’s discretion and ordinarily follow the event. However, in constitutional litigation, the Court considers the public interest and the conduct of the parties: Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2014] eKLR. A party that succeeds in vindicating constitutional rights against a State organ should ordinarily recover its costs, lest public-interest litigation be deterred. The Petitioner has been particularly successful against the 3rd Respondent, whose conduct occasioned this litigation. However, since this is public interest litigation, I shall award costs in the sum of Kshs 60,000/- only. The Interested Parties shall bear their own costs.

Final orders for disposal

108. For these reasons, the Petition succeeds in part, and I make the following orders:-

a) It is hereby declared that the upgrading of the approximately 200-metre road between the TBT Nursery and the rangers’ village within the Karura Forest Reserve to the bitumen standard, without first complying with Section 58 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act and without public participation, violated Section 58 of that Act and Articles 10(2)(a), 42 and 69(1)(d) and (f) of the Constitution.

b) A declaration is hereby issued that infrastructural development within the Karura Forest Reserve that is not provided for in the approved management plan for the time being in force may be undertaken only in accordance with the approval procedure prescribed by that plan, which, under Clause 1.4 of the Karura Participatory Forest Management Plan 2021–2026, requires the approval of both the Joint Management Committee and the Chief Conservator of Forests, and in every case subject to compliance with the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act as is necessary.

c) It is hereby declared that, for so long as the Forest Management Agreement dated 26/4/21 subsists, the 3rd Respondent is obliged to involve the Petitioner, through the Joint Management Committee, before deciding to undertake any infrastructural development within the area of the Karura Forest Reserve covered by that Agreement.

d) The 3rd and 4th Respondents, whether acting themselves or through their agents, contractors or licensees, are hereby restrained from surfacing any trail, track or road within Karura Forest Reserve with bitumen or any other impermeable material unless and until the requirements of Section 58 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act are complied with.

e) The 3rd Respondent shall, at its own cost and within ninety (90) days of the date of this judgment, cause an environmental audit of the road referred to in order (a) to be undertaken by a lead expert registered under the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, and shall do so:

(i) at least fourteen (14) days before the audit begins, furnish the Petitioner, through the Joint Management Committee, with the terms of reference of the audit and consider any comments it makes;

(ii) ensure that the audit assesses the road’s effects on infiltration, drainage, surface runoff, soil erosion, flora and fauna; considers whether the road remains necessary; and recommends mitigation or restoration measures, including, if warranted, removal of the bitumen surface and reinstatement of the murram track;

(iii) submit the audit report to the National Environment Management Authority and serve a copy on the Petitioner; and

(iv) implement the measures that the National Environment Management Authority directs, within the time it directs.

f) The 3rd Respondent shall file and serve a report on its compliance with order (e) within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the date of this judgment. Thereafter, the matter shall be mentioned to confirm compliance. The parties have liberty to apply.

g) Prayer (b), and prayers (c) and (f) in the general form sought, are declined.

h) The 3rd Respondent shall pay the Petitioner’s costs of the Petition as stated in paragraph 107 above. All other Parties shall bear their own costs.

109. Orders accordingly

DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.

J G KEMEI

JUDGE

Delivered online in the presence of:

1. Mr. Waweru for the Petitioner

2. N/A for the 1st & 2nd Respondent

3. Ms. Seleke H/B for Mr. Lutta for 3rd & 4th Respondent

4. N/A for the 1st Interested Party

5. Mr. Kinyanjui H/B Mr. Litoro for the 2nd Interested Party

6. N/A for the 3rd Interested Party

7. Ms. Kiprop H/B for Ms. Gathua for the 4th Interested Party

8. CA – Mr. Eglon

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