Background
For determination is a Statement of Claim dated 10th July 2024, where the Claimant seeks the following remedies as against the Respondent:
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Claim succeeded in part. The Court declared the termination substantively and procedurally unfair; awarded five months’ gross salary as compensation, with interest at court rates from judgment until payment; declined residual-contract-period pay; and ordered the Respondent to bear costs. Separate constitutional and breach-of-contract damages were declined.
a) A declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment was substantively and procedurally unfair.
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b) The Claimant is awarded five (5) months' gross salary as compensation for the unfair termination.
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c) The prayer for payment of the residual period of the contractual term is declined.
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Held. No. The Respondent did not sufficiently discharge its burden under sections 43 and 45 regarding the principal allegations relied upon. It did not establish the factual basis for key allegations, including unauthorised disappearance and unsafe working hours; earlier warnings, a prescription error and a performance plan were only background and did not prove the misconduct said to justify the later termination. The termination was substantively unfair.
Ratio. Under sections 43, 45 and 47(5) of the Employment Act, once unfair termination is put in issue, the employer must prove that the reasons genuinely relied on had a factual basis and were valid and fair. It must prove the particular misconduct that led to termination; prior disciplinary history does not automatically establish validity of a later termination.
Issue
i. Whether the Respondent established a valid and fair reason for terminating the Claimant’s employment
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Held
61. In the upshot, I find and hold that the Respondent did not sufficiently discharge its burden under Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act in respect of the principal allegations relied upon for termination of the Claimant’s employment.
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62. Accordingly, I find that the termination was substantively unfair.
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Ratio
48. Section 43 of the Employment Act requires that the employer proves the reason or reasons for termination of an employment contract, while Section 45 demands that the employer establish that the reason was valid and fair. Further, under Section 47(5), the employee initially bears the burden of demonstrating that an unfair termination has occurred, after which the evidential burden of justifying the termination rests upon the employer.
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53. The employer is, however, required to place sufficient evidence before the Court to demonstrate that the alleged misconduct was genuinely relied upon and had a factual basis. In Muthaiga Country Club v Kudheiha Workers [2017] KECA 282 (KLR), the Court of Appeal emphasized that once an employee lays the basis for an allegation of unfair termination, the employer bears the burden of proving the reasons relied upon for termination.
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60. The Court is also unable to treat the earlier warning letter, prescription error and Performance Enhancement Plan as automatically establishing the validity of the later termination. Those matters could constitute relevant background, but they do not relieve the Respondent of proving the particular misconduct for which the Claimant's employment was ultimately terminated.
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Held. No. Although the Claimant received a show-cause letter, responded, attended a hearing and could appeal, she was not supplied before the hearing with the complaints, the 16 May 2021 email, or the relevant rota. She therefore lacked a meaningful opportunity to make an informed defence. The process failed section 41’s minimum requirements, rendering termination procedurally unfair.
Ratio. Section 41 requires a meaningful opportunity to answer disciplinary allegations. This requires sufficient disclosure of the material on which allegations are founded to permit an effective response. A later appeal cannot cure a defective first-instance process where that material was not provided at the disciplinary stage.
Issue
ii. Whether the disciplinary process met the statutory requirements of procedural fairness.
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Held
71. In the premise, I find and hold that the disciplinary process did not satisfy the minimum requirements of Section 41 of the Employment Act, and I accordingly, find the termination of the Claimant’s employment procedurally unfair.
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Ratio
66. It is, however, evident from the evidence before the court that the material evidence relied upon against the Claimant was not supplied to her before the said hearing. RW1 expressly acknowledged that the complaints received against the Claimant were not forwarded to her, so she could prepare her defense.
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67. RW1 further told this court that the 16th May 2021 email was equally not brought to the Claimant’s attention and neither was the relevant rota attached. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui (supra), the Court of Appeal made it clear that the disciplinary hearing is not a mere formal appearance. The employee must have a meaningful opportunity to answer to the allegations, and the material upon which the allegations are founded must be sufficiently disclosed to enable an effective response.
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70. Further, although the Respondent asserts that it gave the Claimant an opportunity to appeal against the decision, an appeal, despite being an important safeguard, cannot retrospectively transform an otherwise defective first instance disciplinary process into a fair one where the employee was not afforded the necessary material to make an informed defence at the disciplinary stage.
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Held. No independent constitutional violations or constitutional damages were established. The evidence established statutory breaches under sections 41, 43 and 45, which give effect to Article 41, but did not support independent findings of discrimination, violation of freedom of expression, or retaliation for raising workplace concerns. Separate constitutional damages were declined.
Ratio. Where the proven wrong is a statutory unfair-termination breach adequately remedied under section 49 of the Employment Act, and no independent constitutional violation or loss is proved, separate constitutional damages are not warranted.
Issue
iii. Whether the Respondent violated the Constitution in terminating the Claimant.
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Held
74. There is also no sufficient evidence before the Court to make independent findings of discrimination under Article 27 or violation of freedom of expression under Article 33.
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75. Further, the Claimant's assertion that she was subjected to disciplinary action because she raised concerns about the working environment has not been sufficiently established as the operative reason for termination.
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76. I therefore decline to make separate constitutional damages awards as the established statutory breach is adequately addressed through the remedies available to the Claimant under Section 49 of the Employment Act.
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Ratio
73. The evidence, however, principally establishes a violation of the statutory protections contained in Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act. Article 41 guarantees fair labour practices, and the statutory scheme gives practical effect to that constitutional guarantee.
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76. I therefore decline to make separate constitutional damages awards as the established statutory breach is adequately addressed through the remedies available to the Claimant under Section 49 of the Employment Act.
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Held. Partly. The Claimant received five months’ gross salary as compensation for unfair termination, assessed in light of approximately three years’ service but also genuine workplace concerns, an earlier warning and the admitted prescription error. Residual-term/anticipatory earnings were declined, as section 49 does not provide them and the contract had a termination clause. Damages for breach of contract were also declined because section 49 compensation was the principal remedy and no separate actionable loss or independent constitutional breach was established. Interest runs at court rates from judgment, and the Respondent bears costs.
Ratio. Section 49 permits compensation for unfair termination up to 12 months’ salary, but not speculative anticipatory earnings for an unexpired contractual term. Where no separate actionable loss or independently established constitutional violation is proved, compensation under section 49 is the appropriate remedy rather than additional contract damages.
Issue
iv. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.
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Held
82. The Claimant served the Respondent for approximately three years. Given the genuine workplace concerns relating to her conduct, and the evidence that she previously received a warning and admitted a prescription error, I find an award of 5 months' salary sufficient compensation for the unfair termination of her employment.
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85. In the final analysis, the Claimant’s Claim succeeds in terms of the following orders: -
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a) A declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment was substantively and procedurally unfair.
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Ratio
77. The Claimant seeks payment equivalent to the residual period of her contract until its lawful determination or expiry. Section 49 of the Employment Act governs compensation for unfair termination, which does not include payment for the unexpired term of the contract.
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78. A prayer for anticipatory earnings is, in my view, speculative, as the law does not entitle an employee to such a relief.
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84. In the absence of evidence establishing a separate actionable loss or an independently established constitutional violation, this prayer is declined.
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
For determination is a Statement of Claim dated 10th July 2024, where the Claimant seeks the following remedies as against the Respondent:
Paragraph 1 →The central issues for my determination are:
Paragraph 47 →In the upshot, I find and hold that the Respondent did not sufficiently discharge its burden under Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act in respect of the principal allegations relied upon for termination of the Claimant’s employment.
Paragraph 61 →Whether the Respondent proved valid and fair reasons for terminating the Claimant; whether the disciplinary process met section 41 procedural-fairness requirements; whether the termination independently violated the Constitution; and whether the Claimant was…
Cynthia Chepkorir Chemonges, a Medical Officer employed for about three years, was terminated after disciplinary proceedings concerning alleged unsafe working hours, incomplete shifts, lateness, absence from duty, professional standards, and patient and staff…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
CAUSE NO. E525 OF 2024
CYNTHIA CHEPKORIR CHEMONGES....................................CLAIMANT
VERSUS
THE NAIROBI HOSPITAL..................................................RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Introduction
1. For determination is a Statement of Claim dated 10th July 2024, where the Claimant seeks the following remedies as against the Respondent:
a) A declaration that the Claimant was wrongfully, unfairly and unlawfully dismissed from her employment;
b) A declaration that the decision to terminate/dismiss the Claimant by the Respondent was opaque, malicious, capricious and contrary to Articles 20, 27, 33(1), 41, 43, 47 and 50(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, hence unconstitutional;
c) A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to compensation equivalent to the residual of her contractual period from the date of dismissal until lawful determination or end of her employment in accordance with her contract of employment;
d) Damages for breaches of the Claimant’s rights and other benefits under her contract of employment, under the Employment Act, and under the Constitution;
e) Costs and interest incidental to this Claim;
2. The Respondent entered an appearance and filed a Response to the Statement of Claim dated 16th September 2024, together with its witness statements and bundle of documents in opposition to the Claimant's claim.
3. Both the Claimant and the Respondent's cases were heard on 24th March 2026. The Claimant testified as CW1 and adopted her witness statement dated 10th July 2024 as her evidence in chief, and produced documents in her list and bundle of documents of even date, which were admitted as exhibits 1-33.
4. Subsequently, the Respondent’s witness (RW1), one Joan Chege, testified on its behalf; she adopted her witness statement dated 9th June 2025 as her evidence in chief, and produced her documents dated 12th June 2025 as exhibits 1-26.
5. The parties subsequently filed their respective written submissions, which the Court has considered alongside the pleadings, oral evidence and documentary evidence.
The Claimant’s Case
6. The Claimant’s case is that she was employed by the Respondent as a Medical Officer for approximately three years and that her employment was terminated following disciplinary proceedings arising principally from allegations concerning her working hours, shift swaps, breaks and alleged unprofessional conduct.
7. The Claimant states that the reasons advanced by the Respondent for terminating her employment were not valid and that the Respondent failed to establish a fair and lawful basis for the termination.
8. The Claimant further maintained that she gave detailed explanations during the disciplinary proceedings and on appeal on the issue raised against her, but that the Respondent failed to properly consider them. She further contends that the allegations were unfounded and that the disciplinary process was motivated by her raising genuine concerns about the working environment.
9. On cross-examination, the Claimant confirmed that she was aware of the allegations leveled against her by the Respondent, and stated that she had seen the Respondent's response and documents, including the complaints relied upon.
10. It is her case that she considered the complaints unmeritorious and stated that she was not aware of any investigation undertaken into them.
11. On the issue of working hours, the Claimant states that she had worked 30 hours continuously, maintaining that there was no contractual cap on the number of hours she could work. She stated that working long hours was not unusual and that, as an intern, she had previously worked as many as 72 hours. She avers that her body was accustomed to long working hours and that some of her colleagues worked even longer hours.
12. On re-examination, the Claimant told the court that no accident had occurred during the periods when she worked for 30 hours.
13. She maintains that the shift swaps were a local arrangement among colleagues and that it was not the practice to inform the supervisor whenever there was a need to swap shifts. She maintains that supervisor permission was not required.
14. The Claimant further states that she was unaware of any complaint by her supervisor concerning her shift swaps and was also unaware of any applicable guidelines requiring prior permission.
15. On the allegation that she disappeared during night shifts, the Claimant denied the allegation and explained that there were health breaks which employees took in turns and that she chose the radiology department as the place to take her breaks because there were no rest areas.
16. She maintained that scheduled breaks were a requirement and did not require permission. She further stated that breaks were also available during day shifts and that, in those circumstances, her immediate supervisor would indicate the break duration by email. She stated that she did not understand why taking breaks had become an issue.
17. The Claimant maintained that she had experienced hostility from nurses and had been singled out because she raised concerns regarding such hostility. She stated further that she had verbally raised the concerns with her supervisor and had also discussed them during a Zoom meeting, although she did not have a written complaint addressed directly to Human Resources. She maintained that the working environment had become hostile.
18. The Claimant further testified that in treating patients, she gave instructions which were not complied with by nurses and that many of the complaints concerning her arose from the wider systemic problems within the Respondent's institution.
19. She states that she was asked to respond to the complaints while she was still in employment, and acknowledged that the issue had been discussed at a meeting held on 5th January 2021, which she attended, but maintained that the concerns discussed related to a systemic problem concerning empathy and putting oneself in another person's position.
20. On further cross-examination, the Claimant acknowledged having received a warning letter concerning an earlier suspension, an alleged failure to display due diligence, a prescription error and inappropriate communication. She admitted that she had prescribed the wrong drug and explained that she had missed a decimal point. She stated that she apologized for the error and that the warning letter was issued after the disciplinary hearing.
21. On re-examination regarding the allegation of unprofessional behaviour, the Claimant stated that she was never specifically told what conduct was said to constitute unprofessional behaviour. She maintained that the alleged conduct was not defined in her contract or in the Respondent's policies and that she did not engage in the conduct said to constitute unprofessional behaviour.
22. The Claimant further stated that her supervisor was not present at the meeting concerning the complaints and that Dr. Robert Ouko, a person whom she worked with, was present. She maintained that the issues raised concerned the wider system and were not matters attributable to her personally, as she was neither an IT staff member nor a nurse. She also stated that she was not required to escort patients.
23. On the issue of customer service, the Claimant testified that she had not received training on customer service and had not been asked to apologize to patients. Regarding the prescription error, she maintained that she admitted the error and apologized, and that the patient did not receive the medicine because the pharmacy corrected the error.
24. The Claimant further maintained that night shift rest was important and that the scheduled rest periods were agreed upon between colleagues. She disputed the allegation that she had disappeared from duty and maintained that the breaks formed part of the working arrangements.
The Claimant’s Submissions
25. It is submitted for the Claimant that her termination was substantively and procedurally unfair. Counsel submitted that the Respondent failed to establish valid reasons for the termination and did not properly investigate or substantiate the allegations made against her.
26. It was further submitted that the Claimant was not afforded adequate opportunity to respond to the material relied upon against her during the disciplinary process. Counsel sought to rely on Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act and Articles 27, 41, 47 and 50 of the Constitution, and the cases of Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] KEELRC 386 (KLR), Pamela Nelima Lutta v Mumias Sugar Company Limited [2017] 577 and Rebecca Ann Maina & 2 Others v Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology [2014] KEELRC 793 (KLR) to support this position.
27. It is the Claimant’s further submission that the termination violated her constitutional rights, and urged the Court to award the reliefs pleaded, including compensation and damages.
The Respondent’s case
28. The Respondent’s case is that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was lawful, fair and justified.
29. It vehemently denied the allegations of unfair termination and pleaded that the Claimant was subjected to a fair disciplinary process in accordance with the Employment Act, 2007 and the principles of natural justice.
30. It states that the Claimant was issued with a show cause letter, given an opportunity to respond, subjected to a disciplinary hearing and thereafter afforded a right of appeal.
31. The Respondent states further that the termination was for misconduct, including unsafe working hours, incomplete shifts, lateness, failure to meet professional standards, breach of its Code of Conduct, and conduct which endangered patients and staff.
32. RW1 testified that the Claimant had previously been issued with a first warning letter following an incident where she failed to demonstrate due diligence and urgency towards patients.
33. RW1 further told the court that the Claimant was subsequently issued with a show cause letter concerning a prescription error and inappropriate communication, following which the Claimant admitted the prescription error and apologized.
34. The Respondent avers that the Claimant was placed on a Performance Enhancement Plan, which she completed in February 2020.
35. The Respondent further sought to rely on complaints received from patients and staff in 2021 concerning the Claimant's conduct, including complaints regarding her interaction with patients, delays in attending to patients, disappearance from the department during shifts, and concerns regarding her clinical practice.
36. RW1 further explained that the Respondent considered working beyond prescribed hours to constitute unsafe working. She stated that the Respondent's maximum working period was twelve hours per shift and that employees were entitled to a one-hour lunch break and a fifteen-minute tea break. She testified that working beyond the prescribed hours exposed the hospital and patients to risks.
37. RW1 testified that the Claimant was attending to a patient when a call from Dr Kagia was brought to her and that she had reported the patient's condition to her supervisor although she did not subsequently call Dr Kagia back.
38. RW1 testified that she learned of the allegation that the Claimant disappeared from duty from Dr Aisha's statement. She confirmed, however, that no investigation had been carried out to establish why the Claimant went to the radiology department.
39. RW1 further acknowledged that the issue of rest rooms had arisen in discussions and that recommendations had been made although she could not confirm whether those recommendations were implemented. She also could not confirm whether the Claimant completed the Performance Enhancement Plan.
40. RW1 further testified that the Claimant was present at the meeting of 22nd July 2019 when Dr Aisha made her presentation, but could not confirm that the Claimant and Dr Aisha were in the same room or that the Claimant had been furnished with the presentations of Dr Moseti and Dr Aisha before the disciplinary hearing.
41. She confirmed that the complaints were not forwarded to the Claimant although she maintained that they were brought to her attention during meetings. She also confirmed that an email dated 16th May 2021 had not been brought to the Claimant's attention and that she had not attached the relevant rota.
42. On the allegation of unprofessional conduct, RW1 maintained that the Respondent had received complaints from patients, nurses and supervisors and that these demonstrated a lack of confidence in the Claimant's services.
43. She further maintained that the show cause letter contained the allegations, although the evidence relied upon was not attached.
44. RW1 also testified that information contained in doctors' files could be shared during handover as work-related information. She stated that disciplinary action had taken into account the Claimant's mental health issues, and that counseling had been recommended.
45. In re-examination, RW1 maintained that the Claimant did not appeal against the first warning letter, and had not requested the investigation reports relating to the allegations against her. She further maintained that the Claimant did not contest that aggrieved patients had made complaints.
46. The Respondent prays that the Claimant’s claim be dismissed with costs.
Analysis and Determination
47. The central issues for my determination are:
i. Whether the Respondent established a valid and fair reason for terminating the Claimant’s employment
ii. Whether the disciplinary process met the statutory requirements of procedural fairness.
iii. Whether the Respondent violated the Constitution in terminating the Claimant.
iv. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.
Whether the Respondent established a valid and fair reason for terminating the Claimant’s employment
48. Section 43 of the Employment Act requires that the employer proves the reason or reasons for termination of an employment contract, while Section 45 demands that the employer establish that the reason was valid and fair. Further, under Section 47(5), the employee initially bears the burden of demonstrating that an unfair termination has occurred, after which the evidential burden of justifying the termination rests upon the employer.
49. In Pius Machafu Isindu v Lavington Security Guards Limited [2017] KECA 225 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that the employer must prove the reasons for termination under Section 43, demonstrate their validity and fairness under Section 45, and justify the grounds under Section 47(5).
50. The Respondent's position is that it terminated the Claimant’s employment on account of misconduct, including working unsafe hours, incomplete shifts, lateness, alleged disappearance from duty, failure to meet professional standards, breach of the Code of Conduct and conduct said to endanger patients and staff.
51. There is no dispute that some of the concerns had previously been raised against the Claimant before the disciplinary process. She acknowledged, for example, that she had made a prescription error and had apologized for it. She also acknowledged having received an earlier warning letter. It is also evident that the Respondent relied on complaints from patients, nurses and supervisors concerning the Claimant's conduct.
52. Section 43(2) of the Employment Act provides that the reason for termination consists of matters that the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time of termination and which caused it to terminate the employee. It is further settled that the Court should not substitute its own view for the employer's, merely because it might have reached a different conclusion.
53. The employer is, however, required to place sufficient evidence before the Court to demonstrate that the alleged misconduct was genuinely relied upon and had a factual basis. In Muthaiga Country Club v Kudheiha Workers [2017] KECA 282 (KLR), the Court of Appeal emphasized that once an employee lays the basis for an allegation of unfair termination, the employer bears the burden of proving the reasons relied upon for termination.
54. RW1, in her testimony before court, acknowledged that no investigation was carried out to establish why the Claimant went to the radiology department. She also confirmed that the issue concerning restrooms had previously arisen and recommendations had been made, but she could not confirm whether the resolutions were implemented, and could similarly not confirm whether the Claimant had completed the Performance Enhancement Plan.
55. Further, the Respondent’s witness did not confirm that the Claimant had been furnished with the relevant presentations before the disciplinary hearing, or that the complaints relied upon were forwarded to her.
56. The evidence before the Court further confirmed that an email dated 16th May 2021 was not brought to the Claimant's attention, and the relevant rota was also not attached.
57. These, in my view, are not merely technical defects. They concern the evidential foundation upon which the disciplinary allegations were based. The allegation that the Claimant disappeared from duty was based, according to RW1, upon Dr Aisha's statement, yet RW1 conceded that there was no investigation into why the Claimant had gone to the radiology department. The Claimant's explanation was that she had gone there to take a health break because there were no appropriate rest facilities.
58. Similarly, the Respondent’s position that the Claimant working beyond the prescribed hours constituted unsafe working hours was rebutted by the Claimant's evidence that there was no contractual cap on the hours she could work, and that working long hours was an established practice.
59. The Respondent therefore needed to establish not merely that it regarded the conduct as unsafe, but that the applicable working-hour requirement existed, that the Claimant breached it, and that the breach was one of the matters which genuinely and fairly justified termination.
60. The Court is also unable to treat the earlier warning letter, prescription error and Performance Enhancement Plan as automatically establishing the validity of the later termination. Those matters could constitute relevant background, but they do not relieve the Respondent of proving the particular misconduct for which the Claimant's employment was ultimately terminated.
61. In the upshot, I find and hold that the Respondent did not sufficiently discharge its burden under Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act in respect of the principal allegations relied upon for termination of the Claimant’s employment.
62. Accordingly, I find that the termination was substantively unfair.
Whether the disciplinary process met the statutory requirements of procedural fairness
63. Section 41 of the Employment Act establishes the minimum procedural safeguards applicable where termination is contemplated on account of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity.
64. The Court of Appeal gave authoritative guidance in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR), identifying four essential elements that satisfy the tenets of fair procedure as: -
a) the employee must be informed, in a language he or she understands, of the grounds upon which termination is contemplated;
b) the employee must be informed of the reason for which termination is being considered;
c) the employee is entitled to have another employee of his or her choice present; and
d) the employer must hear and consider the representations made by the employee and the chosen representative.
65. The Respondent herein maintains that the Claimant was issued with a show-cause letter, that she responded to it, attended a disciplinary hearing and was upon her termination afforded an opportunity to appeal. Ordinarily, this chronology of events would constitute important evidence of compliance with Section 41.
66. It is, however, evident from the evidence before the court that the material evidence relied upon against the Claimant was not supplied to her before the said hearing. RW1 expressly acknowledged that the complaints received against the Claimant were not forwarded to her, so she could prepare her defense.
67. RW1 further told this court that the 16th May 2021 email was equally not brought to the Claimant’s attention and neither was the relevant rota attached. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui (supra), the Court of Appeal made it clear that the disciplinary hearing is not a mere formal appearance. The employee must have a meaningful opportunity to answer to the allegations, and the material upon which the allegations are founded must be sufficiently disclosed to enable an effective response.
68. Further, in Nderitu v Chase Bank (K) Limited (In Receivership) & 2 Others [2023] KEELRC 3180 (KLR), the Court reiterated that an employee must have an adequate opportunity to prepare and defend himself or herself against the charges and that the employer must hear and consider the employee's representations.
69. The Claimant was, per the evidence adduced, aware in general terms of the allegations made against her, but such awareness is not necessarily equivalent to being given a fair opportunity to answer them. The Respondent's own witness confirmed that it did not supply the Claimant with the critical material for the trial.
70. Further, although the Respondent asserts that it gave the Claimant an opportunity to appeal against the decision, an appeal, despite being an important safeguard, cannot retrospectively transform an otherwise defective first instance disciplinary process into a fair one where the employee was not afforded the necessary material to make an informed defence at the disciplinary stage.
71. In the premise, I find and hold that the disciplinary process did not satisfy the minimum requirements of Section 41 of the Employment Act, and I accordingly, find the termination of the Claimant’s employment procedurally unfair.
Whether the Respondent violated the Constitution in terminating the Claimant.
72. The Claimant’s assertion is that the Respondent, in terminating her services, violated Articles 20, 27, 33, 41, 43, 47 and 50(1) of the Constitution.
73. The evidence, however, principally establishes a violation of the statutory protections contained in Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act. Article 41 guarantees fair labour practices, and the statutory scheme gives practical effect to that constitutional guarantee.
74. There is also no sufficient evidence before the Court to make independent findings of discrimination under Article 27 or violation of freedom of expression under Article 33.
75. Further, the Claimant's assertion that she was subjected to disciplinary action because she raised concerns about the working environment has not been sufficiently established as the operative reason for termination.
76. I therefore decline to make separate constitutional damages awards as the established statutory breach is adequately addressed through the remedies available to the Claimant under Section 49 of the Employment Act.
Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought
Compensation for the residual contract period
77. The Claimant seeks payment equivalent to the residual period of her contract until its lawful determination or expiry. Section 49 of the Employment Act governs compensation for unfair termination, which does not include payment for the unexpired term of the contract.
78. A prayer for anticipatory earnings is, in my view, speculative, as the law does not entitle an employee to such a relief.
79. Further, considering that the Claimant’s contract carried a termination clause, there was no guarantee that she would have served the Respondent to the end of her contract if not for the termination.
80. This claim is therefore devoid of merit, and it fails.
Compensation for unfair termination
81. Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act empowers the Court to award compensation for unfair termination of employment limited to 12 months' salary.
82. The Claimant served the Respondent for approximately three years. Given the genuine workplace concerns relating to her conduct, and the evidence that she previously received a warning and admitted a prescription error, I find an award of 5 months' salary sufficient compensation for the unfair termination of her employment.
Damages for breach of contract
83. On the prayer for damages for breach of contract, the principal statutory remedy for unfair termination is compensation under Section 49.
84. In the absence of evidence establishing a separate actionable loss or an independently established constitutional violation, this prayer is declined.
85. In the final analysis, the Claimant’s Claim succeeds in terms of the following orders: -
a) A declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment was substantively and procedurally unfair.
b) The Claimant is awarded five (5) months' gross salary as compensation for the unfair termination.
c) The prayer for payment of the residual period of the contractual term is declined.
d) Interest on (b) above shall accrue at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.
e) The Respondent shall bear the costs of the claim.
86. Orders accordingly.
SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED BY VIDEO-LINK AND IN COURT AT NAIROBI THIS 8TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
C. N. BAARI
JUDGE
Appearance:
Ms. Nkonge present for the Claimant
Ms. Ochieng h/b for Mr. Kamotho for the Respondent
Ms. Esther S -C/A