REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO. E561 OF 2024
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)
CHRISTINE NDUTA MBUGUA.........………………………..CLAIMANT
VS
SAVANNAH BRANDS COMPANY LIMITED...............RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
1 The Claimant instituted filed this claim vide a Statement of Claim dated 5th July 2024, seeking the following reliefs:
a. A declaration that the Claimants termination was unfair and unlawful.
b. Kshs. 2,641,464/= being the equivalent of twelve (12) month’s gross salary for unfair and unlawful termination.
c. General Damages for violation of the Claimant’s right to fair labour practices under article 41 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.
d. Interest on item (c) – (e) above
e. Costs of the Suit.
Claimant's Case
2 The Claimant avers that she was employed by the Respondent with effect from 4th March 2024 as a Trade Marketing Manager on a permanent basis, earning a gross salary of Kshs. 220,122 comprising a salary of Kshs. 150,000, a monthly car allowance of Kshs. 67,122 and an airtime allowance of Kshs. 3,000.
3 She states that under the terms of her employment she was to serve a probationary period of the first three (3) months, and confirmation was subject to satisfactory assessment in her performance review.
4 The Claimant avers that she was issued with a Job Description setting out her role, which included trade marketing strategy, channel segmentation and category development, sales tools, brand visibility and execution, budget and tracking, and relationship building.
5 It is the Claimant's case that her employment was governed by the Respondent's Employee Handbook, but the handbook was never provided to her at any point during her employment.
6 The Claimant states that on 16th April 2024 she received informal feedback about her performance, during which her KPIs (North Stars) were established in collaboration with her supervisor. She avers that this review was subject to a formal performance appraisal at the ninety-day mark of her probationary period.
7 She avers that she continued to meet the expectations set by the KPIs pending the formal appraisal. However, on 7th May 2024 she was abruptly terminated through a letter of the same date, which cited poor performance as the reason for her dismissal.
8 The Claimant contends that before her termination she was invited to a two-month performance assessment, but she was instead ambushed and served with a termination letter without any justifiable cause, in violation of Section 41 of the Employment Act.
9 She asserts that her termination was without justifiable reason and that the decision to terminate her had already been made without conducting the performance appraisal required by law. Further, she was not given an opportunity to be heard, and that her termination was therefore unfair, wrongful and unlawful.
10 It is the Claimant's case that the Respondent's conduct throughout her employment was biased, discriminatory, malicious and in violation of the law.
11 She avers that the Respondent failed to provide reasonable time to assess her performance, failed to perform a formal and participatory evaluation, and disregarded procedural fairness.
12 She further avers that it failed to gather all relevant information before taking adverse action, failed to share and/or follow its policies and procedure as well as the law, and failed to conduct a disciplinary hearing before terminating her employment.
13 The Claimant avers that following her termination, the Respondent, through her supervisor, informed her and announced to the entire organization on 8th May 2024 that she had resigned. This further demonstrates the Respondent's malice and its predetermined decision to terminate her employment without justifiable reason.
14 She states that she protested her summary termination by a letter dated 11th May 2024, and that the Respondent's reply disregarded the issues she raised. It is her case that this demonstrates that her termination was unjustified and did not comply with the Employment Act.
15 The Claimant avers that she cleared with the Respondent and was offered terminal dues amounting to Kshs. 289,628.07, which included an ex-gratia payment. She states that, being aggrieved by the treatment she received and the sudden loss of her employment, she declined the ex-gratia payment and instead received Kshs. 161,743 as her terminal dues.
16 She avers that a demand and notice of intention to sue was issued to the Respondent.
Respondent’s Case
17 In opposition to the claim, the Respondent filed a Memorandum of Reply dated 7th August 2024, in which it denies the allegations set out in the Statement of Claim and prays that the Claimant's suit be dismissed with costs.
18 The Respondent admits the Claimant's terms of engagement and her job description to the extent that they are consistent with her contract of employment dated 1st February 2024, which was to commence on 4th March 2024.
19 The Respondent avers that pursuant to Clause 3 of the contract, the Claimant's employment was on probationary terms and her confirmation was strictly subject to satisfactory performance assessment based on periodic performance review, obtaining satisfactory references and completion of all required employment documentation.
20 It denies in toto the Claimant's averment that the Employee Handbook was never provided to her.
21 The Respondent states that the Claimant was subjected to both formal and informal periodic performance reviews from the inception of her probation contract, through one-on-one reviews with her supervisor, and was consistently evaluated throughout her probationary period.
22 It denies that the Claimant's probationary period was subject to a formal performance review at the ninety-day mark. The performance review was conducted at all stages of the probation period and was not restricted to a specific time.
23 The Respondent further avers that by executing the contract, the Claimant accepted to be bound by its terms, including termination of the probation contract upon issuance of seven (7) days' notice or payment of equivalent salary in lieu of notice. It is the Respondent's case that this presupposed that the performance review would be conducted at any time and not necessarily at the tail end of the probation period.
24 The Respondent denies that the Claimant continued to meet the expectations of her KPIs and avers that her performance evaluation exposed considerable lapses and gaps that rendered her confirmation untenable.
25 It contends that evaluation of the Claimant's performance was its sole preserve and discretion in the exercise of its managerial prerogative, and that the Claimant cannot impose her own terms or expectations upon the employer. It avers that the termination of her probation contract was solely premised on her dwindling performance as per the periodic reviews.
26 The Respondent asserts that the termination on account of performance fell squarely within Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 as read together with Clause 17.1 of the Employment Contract, which terms the Claimant accepted upon execution.
27 It avers that it retained every right to evaluate the Claimant's performance at any time during the probation period, and reserved the right to terminate the probation contract upon establishing unsatisfactory or poor performance.
28 It is the Respondent's case that her failure to satisfy the performance standards expected constituted justifiable grounds to terminate the contract.
29 The Respondent denies all the particulars of malice and illegality and avers that it conducted itself within the four corners of the Employment Contract.
30 The Respondent maintains that the Claimant's services were terminated in accordance with Section 42 of the Employment Act, 2007, which provision has never been repealed and still exists as part of Kenyan law.
31 It is the Respondent's position that although the law on probationary contracts does not envisage issuance of a show cause letter and a disciplinary hearing before termination, the Claimant was granted sufficient opportunity through the formal and informal in-person performance reviews, where her feedback was considered and she was given ample time to improve. It contends that she cannot therefore assert that she was not heard or that her representations were not considered.
32 The Respondent denies that the termination was in any way premeditated and avers that the Claimant was issued with a termination letter on 7th May 2024 after performance reviews and assessments established gaps in her performance.
33 It further denies that the Claimant was summarily terminated and reiterates that her probationary contract was terminated in accordance with the employment contract on account of unsatisfactory performance.
34 The Respondent states that the Claimant was paid her terminal dues in accordance with the final dues computation shared vide a letter dated 23rd May 2024, comprising salary for days worked in May, leave days and seven (7) days' salary in lieu of notice, in the sum of Kshs. 161,747.73.
Evidence in Court
35 The Claimant, Christine Nduta Mbugua, testified as CW1. She adopted her witness statement dated 5th July 2024 as her evidence in chief and produced the documents in her list of documents of the same date as Exhibits 1 to 10.
36 Counsel for the Respondent objected to Document No. 6, a WhatsApp screenshot, on the ground that it was not accompanied by a certificate of electronic evidence. Counsel for the Claimant responded that the matter had gone through pre-trial, that the Respondent had notice of the evidence and had not objected to the document. The Court directed that the purpose of pre-trial is to confirm the documents to be produced, and that the matter having gone through pre-trial, the Respondent's only recourse was to submit on the quality of the said document. The documents were produced accordingly.
37 On cross-examination, CW1 testified that she was employed on 4th March 2024 and was placed on probation for three months, with confirmation subject to satisfactory performance. She stated that her performance was not assessed and that she received no feedback from her line manager, Kelvin Kuria Kimani.
38 Referred to the email of 18th April 2024 from her line manager at page 17 of her documents, she stated that he was not providing feedback on her performance and that the email was a catch-up on her first 45 days. She maintained that she had no meeting with her line manager on her performance on 16th April 2024. She however confirmed that in the said email he informed her that there were gaps in her performance, that her end- to start was not to expectation and that stakeholder engagement needed some work, and that some deliverables were communicated to her.
39 She further confirmed that at paragraph 2.5 of her Statement of Claim she states that she received feedback from her supervisor. She testified that an appraisal was to be done at the ninetieth-day mark.
40 CW1 testified that the probation could be ended under Clause 17.1 of the contract, but that she did not know whether a notice was to be issued. She testified that she was invited by email to a two-month performance review to be held on Tuesday 7th May 2024, by which time she had served about two months.
41 She testified that it was indicated she was to have a chat with her line manager on that day, and that this is the day she received the notice terminating her probation contract.
42 She confirmed that the termination was on account of poor performance and that the letter states she was given seven days' notice. She maintained that she had received no feedback from her line manager, that no performance assessment was done, and that she was ambushed with the termination letter.
43 CW1 further testified that on 8th May 2024 her supervisor announced to the organization that she had resigned. She stated that she did not resign and that the communication was not factual. She confirmed that she wrote to the Respondent on 11th May 2024 after the termination, and acknowledged that the gross sales value was not achieved.
44 It was her testimony that her termination was malicious, as she was not accorded reasonable time for her performance to be assessed, and that the Respondent had no evidence to back the allegation of poor performance. She confirmed that she was paid her final dues, including seven days' notice pay, and maintained that her rights under the Constitution were violated.
45 On re-examination, CW1 stated that she was caught unawares and was not given any notice. She testified that at the end of the meeting of 7th May 2024 she was given a termination letter and asked to write a resignation letter.
46 It is CW1’s testimony that she never gave an assessment of her performance in writing and had only one catch-up meeting after she joined the company, on the 16th, during which she did not know what the assessment was all about. She maintained that there was no performance review as envisaged under Clause 3.2 of her contract, and that on 7th May 2024 she was not given an opportunity to speak.
47 The Respondent called one witness, Joyce Kamau (RW1), its Human Resource Manager, who testified that she joined the Respondent on 10th February 2025. She adopted the witness statement dated 7th August 2024 and produced the documents in the Respondent's list of documents of the same date, together with the further list of documents dated 19th September 2025, as Exhibits 1 to 8. She stated that she never had any interaction with the Claimant.
48 On cross-examination, RW1 testified that she did not personally conduct any appraisal on the Claimant. She confirmed that the Claimant was on probation for three months and that, as per her contract, confirmation was subject to a satisfactory review of her performance.
49 She admitted that there was no formal performance review report and that she had no other report on the Claimant's performance. She stated that the probation was to end on 4th June 2024 and that the Claimant was terminated a month earlier.
50 RW1 testified that as per her witness statement there was only one review, at the end of April, and that there are no minutes of that meeting. She further confirmed that no notice to show cause was issued after the meeting.
51 Referred to the email exchange of 18th April 2024 in the Respondent's further list of documents, she stated that targets were set therein, which were the expectations set for the Claimant for the next two months. She admitted that she had no assessment of those deliverables. She further stated that the email from Kelvin Kuria at the top of the same page was sent on 16th May 2024, after the Claimant had been terminated.
52 RW1 testified that she did not know what happened on 7th May 2024. She stated that it was to be a review meeting but that is when the Claimant was terminated, and that there is no record of what happened that day.
53 On the exit interview referred to in her witness statement, she stated that she did not know when it was done. She confirmed that the record of the interview (Document No. 4 in the Respondent's bundle) was sent on 21st May 2024 and that this was not a disciplinary hearing. She further confirmed that in the transcript, when asked about her performance review, the Claimant complained about that review, and that by then a decision had already been made and the Claimant terminated.
54 On re-examination, RW1 stated that an exit interview is conducted between Human Resource and the employee, and that the line manager was not in the interview. She confirmed that a decision to terminate had already been made by then.
55 She stated that there was no complaint about the mode of review in respect of the meeting of 16th April 2024. On the email of 18th May 2024 in the further list of documents, she stated that it was not addressed to the Claimant, and that she did not know Kennedy Ngugi.
Claimants’ Submissions
56 The Claimant submitted on three issues: whether the Claimant was entitled to the protections of Section 41 of the Employment Act; whether the Claimant’s termination was unfair and unlawful; whether the Claimant's rights to fair labour practices pursuant to Article 41 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 were violated; whether the Claimant is entitled to the prayers sought.
57 On the first issue, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent's reliance on Section 42(1) of the Employment Act, which excludes probationary contracts from the application of Section 41, is misplaced. She argued that the provision can no longer be relied upon to exclude the procedural safeguards under Section 41, as it was declared unconstitutional by a three-Judge bench of this Court in Kibuchi & 6 others v Mount Kenya University; Attorney General (Interested Party) [2021] KEELRC 2310 (KLR), where the Court held as follows: -"59. To this extent therefore, we find and hold that Section 42(1) insofar as it excludes an employee holding a probationary contract from the provisions of Section 41 of the Employment Act, is inconsistent with Articles 41 and 47 of the Constitution hence null and void."
58 It was submitted that this position has since been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Red Lands Roses Ltd v Mugo [2025] KECA 96 (KLR), which confirmed that Section 42(1), having been declared unconstitutional, cannot be relied upon to exclude the procedural safeguards afforded to employees under Section 41.
59 The Claimant argued that by 7th May 2024, when her employment was terminated, it was settled law that employees serving under probationary contracts were entitled to the procedural protections of the Employment Act. It is her submission that the Respondent was therefore under a legal obligation to establish a valid and fair reason for termination and to accord her a fair hearing, notwithstanding that she was serving under a probationary contract.
60 On the second issue, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent bears the statutory burden of demonstrating both that there existed a valid and fair reason for the termination and that the procedure adopted complied with Section 41 of the Employment Act. She argued that reliance on Section 42 does not relieve the Respondent of the obligation to justify the reason for termination, a burden which rests exclusively upon the employer pursuant to Sections 43, 45 and 47(5) of the Employment Act.
61 It is the Claimant's submission that the Respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence of her alleged poor performance. She argued that performance management is a structured and formal process that must be supported by proper documentation, including clearly defined targets agreed between employer and employee, objective evaluation criteria, regular assessments, and evidence of support, guidance or corrective measures, so as to afford the employee a fair and reasonable opportunity to improve.
62 In this regard, the Claimant drew the Court's attention to the evidence at the hearing. She testified that the KPIs, referred to as "North Stars", were only agreed upon with her supervisor on 16th April 2024, and that her employment was terminated before she was afforded a reasonable opportunity to work towards and be assessed against them. She further testified that she attended the meeting of 7th May 2024 understanding it to be a performance review, and was not informed beforehand that its purpose was to consider the termination of her employment.
63 She submitted that the Respondent's sole witness, its Human Resource Manager, joined the Respondent after the Claimant had left and had no personal knowledge of the events leading to the termination. It was submitted that on cross-examination the witness confirmed that there was no evidence of a formal performance appraisal having been conducted, that the Claimant was not subjected to any hearing prior to termination, and that the exit interview notes relied upon by the Respondent were prepared after the decision to terminate had already been made and communicated to her.
64 In support of her argument that allegations of poor performance cannot be vague, generalised or unsupported, the Claimant relied on Ulo v Nash Financial Services Limited [2026] KEELRC 1274 (KLR), where the Court held as follows: - "47. The Respondent's position is that it terminated the Claimant's services on account of poor performance. Poor performance is no doubt a ground for termination or even dismissal, but only if both substantive justification and procedural fairness are proven. 48. The Respondent did not produce any documentary evidence to show that the Claimant's work was ever appraised or evaluated so as to arrive at a conclusion of poor performance...50. Poor performance cannot, in my view, be vague, it must be tied to clear targets and evaluation tools."
65 The Claimant submitted that she was invited to what was described as a performance management meeting which, instead of engaging in any genuine performance improvement process, culminated in her termination. She argued that this sequence of events demonstrates that the Respondent neither initiated nor undertook a bona fide performance management process aimed at identifying performance gaps, setting improvement targets or giving her an opportunity to improve.
66 It is her submission that the decision to terminate was predetermined, and that the allegation of poor performance was merely a pretext to justify a decision that had already been made.
67 On the third issue, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent violated her right to fair labour practices under Article 41 of the Constitution by luring and recruiting her from secure employment with another employer, only to terminate her employment shortly thereafter without affording her a fair and reasonable opportunity to demonstrate her capabilities.
68 She argued that having actively recruited her from another employer, the Respondent was under a duty to act fairly and in good faith. It was submitted that her unceremonious termination, at a meeting presented as a performance management meeting, was arbitrary, unfair and inconsistent with the constitutional obligation to treat employees fairly and with dignity.
69 On the reliefs sought, the Claimant urged the Court to find that her termination during probation was unfair and unlawful for want of both a valid and justifiable reason and a fair procedure. She submitted that she did not contribute in any way to her termination and that, taking into account the Respondent's conduct, the manner of termination and the violation of her statutory and constitutional rights, this is a proper case for an award of the maximum compensation of twelve (12) months' gross salary.
70 She further prayed for an award of constitutional damages for the violation of her right to fair labour practices, together with the other reliefs sought in the statement of claim, costs of the suit and interest. In conclusion, the Claimant urged the Court to allow the claim as prayed with costs.
Respondent’s Submissions
71 The Respondent filed written submissions dated 1st July 2026. As a preliminary issue, it submitted that during the hearing it objected to the production of the WhatsApp screenshots marked as Documents 5 and 6 in the Claimant's List of Documents, whereupon the Court directed parties to address the objection in their submissions.
72 It was submitted that the said documents are inadmissible under Section 65(1) as read with Section 106B of the Evidence Act, as they were not supported by a Certificate of Electronic Evidence. The Respondent relied on Ogembo v Yongo [2024] KEHC 15763 (KLR), where the Court held as follows: - "It is evidently clear that electronic documents must be accompanied by a certificate in terms of section 106B(4) of the Evidence Act for them to be deemed admissible. There is no other way out... I reiterate that the certificate of electronic evidence is a mandatory requirement in the absence of which the WhatsApp messages cannot be admitted as evidence." The Respondent accordingly urged the Court to expunge the said screenshots from the record.
73 On the substance of the claim, the Respondent identified two issues for determination: whether the Claimant's termination from employment was unfair, and whether she is entitled to the reliefs sought.
74 On the first issue, the Respondent submitted that under Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, a termination is fair where the reason informing it is valid and fair. It argued that the import of Section 43 as read together with Section 47(5) is that the Claimant must first lay a basis that the termination was unfair, whereupon the burden shifts to the employer to justify the grounds for termination.
75 On substantive justification, the Respondent submitted that the Claimant confirmed on cross-examination that she was employed on a three-month probation contract and that her confirmation was subject to a satisfactory performance assessment by her line manager.
76 It was submitted that her KPIs were communicated to her by email dated 12th March 2024, which set out her performance expectations as delivery of topline GSV business targets, trade execution, financial excellence in trade marketing, and 360 execution of brand-led campaigns.
77 The Respondent further submitted that by email dated 16th April 2024, the Claimant was given feedback on her performance during the first 45 days. The feedback noted gaps on delivery, including a missed accrual of over Kshs. 700,000 in promotion financial management tracking, end-to-end management of tasks that was not as per expectation, and stakeholder management that needed work. By the same email, the Respondent communicated the deliverables expected of her for the balance of April and May.
78 It was argued that although the Claimant disputed on cross-examination that her performance had ever been assessed, the email exchanges show that she was evaluated by her line manager. The Respondent submitted that the Claimant herself concedes at paragraph 2.5 of her Statement of Claim that she received informal feedback on her performance on 16th April 2024, which is in itself an admission that a performance assessment took place.
79 The Respondent further submitted that in her letter dated 11th May 2024, written after the termination, the Claimant admitted that she did not achieve GSV as per her established KPIs and that 360-brand execution could not be achieved, and proceeded to give reasons. It is the Respondent's submission that this amounts to an admission that she did not attain her KPIs.
80 On the Claimant's contention that her performance was to be evaluated only at the ninety-day mark, the Respondent argued that the same has no basis. It submitted that the probation contract was for ninety days and expressly provided for termination where she failed to attain the expected standards. It would therefore be impractical for evaluation to be done only at the end of that period while the employer was at the same time expected to issue the termination notice and comply with the procedural steps required by law.
81 It is the Respondent’s submission that such an interpretation would result in an absurdity, as any evaluation at the end of the probation period would inevitably overshoot it.
82 The Respondent submitted that it therefore had a valid reason to terminate the probation contract on the basis of the Claimant's poor performance. It argued that in analyzing the reasons for termination, the Court ought not to sit on appeal over the employer's decision, but should examine whether the reasons were matters the employer genuinely believed to exist within the meaning of Section 43(2) of the Employment Act.
83 In this regard, reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] eKLR, which cited with approval Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 16(1B) para 642 as follows: -"...In adjudicating on the reasonableness of the employer's conduct, an employment tribunal must not simply substitute its own views for those of the employer and decide whether it would have dismissed on those facts; it must make a wider inquiry to determine whether a reasonable employer could have decided to dismiss on those facts... If the dismissal falls within the band, the dismissal is fair; but if the dismissal falls outside the band, it is unfair."
84 The Respondent further relied on Gichimu t/a George Grassland Academy v Ngure [2026] KEELRC 606 (KLR), where the Court stated: -"Under Section 43 of the Employment Act, Employers are required to have reason or reasons, they genuinely believe to exist, at the time of termination, which justifies termination. There is no other or higher standard than this."
85 It was submitted that given the Claimant's performance evaluation, which demonstrated her inability to attain her KPIs and which she expressly conceded, the Respondent had a reasonable and justifiable basis to terminate the probation contract.
86 On procedural fairness, the Respondent conceded the findings in Kibuchi & 6 others v Mount Kenya University; Attorney General (Interested Party) [2021] KEELRC 2310 (KLR) on the constitutionality of Section 42 of the Employment Act and the legal consequences of that decision on the procedure applicable to termination of probation contracts. It submitted, however, that despite having been declared unconstitutional, the provisions remain in the statute book and are yet to be amended or deleted by Parliament.
87 On that basis, the Respondent conceded that no show cause letter was issued to the Claimant and that no disciplinary hearing was conducted prior to her termination, although it conducted an exit interview with her as reflected in the minutes produced as its Exhibit 4.
88 On the reliefs sought, the Respondent submitted that although it had substantive justification to terminate the probation contract, in view of the procedural defects conceded, the Court should exercise its discretion under Section 49 of the Employment Act and consider awarding the Claimant one month's salary as compensation.
89 It argued that the Claimant has not provided any justification for the maximum award of twelve months' salary in her pleadings, evidence or submissions. It was submitted that her employment was considerably short, running from 4th March 2024 to 7th May 2024, a period of two months and three days.
90 It was further submitted that upon termination she was paid terminal dues of Kshs. 161,747.73, comprising salary for days worked in May, leave days and seven days' salary in lieu of notice.
91 In support of an award of one month's salary, the Respondent relied on Ooko v Avacare Kenya Limited [2023] KEELRC 3282 (KLR) and Happiness Nyabonyi Maingo v Shreeji Chemicals Limited [2020] KEELRC 207 (KLR), where similar awards were made. It further relied on Muga v CCI Kenya Limited [2025] KEELRC 2980 (KLR), where the Court held: -"...it is not lost to the court that she was still under probation when her services were terminated. Whilst she is entitled to compensation for unfair termination of her contract, the fact that the contract was terminated during its probationary term militates against a high award as proposed by her."
92 On the claim for general damages under Article 41 of the Constitution, the Respondent submitted that the mere failure by an employer to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the Employment Act does not, without more, elevate the complaint into a constitutional breach. It argued that other than the termination of her probation contract, the Claimant has not demonstrated any distinct constitutional violation, nor shown that the remedies under Section 49 of the Employment Act are inadequate to vindicate her rights.
93 To buttress this position, the Respondent cited Teresa Carlo Omondi v Transparency International- Kenya [2017] KEELRC 1624 (KLR), where the Court held: -"The Claimant has not established what injury or violation, outside the termination of her contract, and non-renewal of that contract, she sustained to warrant general damages separately... While the Court finds the Respondent acted unfairly and unlawfully, the Claimant did not demonstrate that the remedies granted under legislation are insufficient in redressing the violation, so as to require the Court to look outside the Employment Act 2007, and the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act."
94 The Respondent accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the prayer for constitutional damages and to determine the claim in the manner submitted, with each party bearing its own costs.
95 I have considered all the evidence and submissions of the parties herein. The claimant had been employed by the respondents on 4th March 2024 and she was to be on probation for a period of 3 months. Before the three months period ended, she was terminated abruptly on 7th May 2024 after serving barely 2 months.
96 The letter terminating her services is dated 7/5/2024 and it gave her 7 days’ notice for termination. The letter averred that her performance was wanting. The termination cites none performance as the reason for termination but there is no indication that the claimant was subjected to any disciplinary hearing on this account as envisaged under section 41 of the Employment Act 2007 which states as follows:
41. (1). Subject to section 42 (1), an employer shall, before terminating the employment of an employee, on the grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity explain to the employee, in a language the employee understands, the reason for which the employer is considering termination and the employee shall be entitled to have another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice present during this explanation.
97 Under the law, it is envisaged that if an employer is considering termination on account of performance a proper disciplinary hearing should be conducted which in the claimants case didn’t happen.
98 The respondents have averred that they terminated under section 42 of the Employment Act and as per the contract. Section 42 of the Employment Act 2007 was however declared unconstitutional. In Monica Munira Kibuch & 6 others vs Mount Kenay University to the extent that it strips probationary employees of fair labour practices and fair administrative action guaranteed by articles 41 and 47 of the constitution.
99 Whereas section 42 remain in the text of the Employment Act 2007, no employer can terminate an employee even if on probation without following due process. In the case of the claimant the respondent terminated the claimant without due process and therefore the termination was unfair and unjustified as provided for under section 45(2) of the employment at 2007 which states as follows:
(2) A termination of employment by an
employer is unfair if the employer fails to prove―
(a) that the reason for the termination
is valid;
(b) that the reason for the termination is a fair reason―
(i) related to the employees conduct, capacity or compatibility; or
(ii) based on the operational requirements of the employer; and
(c) that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure
100 Having found that the claimant was terminated without any hearing and without establishing she was not performing, I find for her and award her as follows
(1) 7 days salary in lieu of notice = 7/30x 220,122= Kshs 51,361/-
(2) Due to the action that subjected the claimant to an abrupt termination before even settling in and without due process, I find 7 months salary as compensation for the unfair termination adequate = 7x220,122 = Kshs 1,540,854/-.
TOTAL = Kshs 1,592,215 less statutory deductions.
(3) The respondents to pay the claimant costs of this case and interest at court rates with effect from the date of this judgment.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 12th Day of October 2026.
HELLEN WASILWA
JUDGE