Employment law

Makali v County Government of Kiambu [2026] KEELRC 2786 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Cause 333 of 2018
Judgment date
12 October 2026
Judge(s)
Hellen Wasilwa

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS

T NAIROBI

ELRC CAUSE NO. 333 OF 2018

(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)

SAMUEL KIOKO MAKALI……….....…………………………CLAIMANT

VS

COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF KIAMBU.......................RESPONDENT

RULING

1 In opposition to the Statement of Claim dated 1st February 2018, the Respondent raised a preliminary objection dated 18th September 2018 on the following grounds: -

1. THAT, the suit as filed amounts to sub judice.

2. THAT, this honourable court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

3. THAT, the issues being canvassed in this suit are substantially the same between the same parties in Nairobi ELRC Industrial cause No. 1591 of 2014; Samuel Kioko Makali Versus County Government of Kiambu.

4. THAT, the learned Judge Nzioki wa Makau court in Industrial cause No. 1591(Samuel Kioko Makuli Versus County Government of Kiambu) of 2014 through a ruling dated 9th March, 2015 deferred the suit.

5. THAT, this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this application and doing so would amount to blatant violation of the sub judice rule

6. THAT, secondly, the respondent herein has wrongly been sued.

7. THAT, the respondent is established under Article 176(1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

8. THAT, the Respondent does not have legal mandate and or capacity to employ or dismiss the claimant.

9. THAT, under the provisions of part VII of the County Governments Act, 2012 the mandate of appointment of persons to hold office or dismissal is vested to the County Public Service Board which is a body corporate with perpetual succession and seal and with the power to sue and be sued in its own corporate name.

10. THAT, the claimants have sued the wrong party in this cause as the remedies they are seeking cannot lie against the Respondent.

11. THAT, the claimant’s cause is to that extent incompetent, bad in law, fatally defective and otherwise an abuse of the court process.

Respondent’s Submissions

2 By way of background, it submitted that the Claimant had earlier moved the Court in ELRC Cause No. 1591 of 2015, Samuel Kioko Makali v County Government of Kiambu, seeking interim and permanent reliefs for wrongful termination of employment. By a ruling of 9th March 2015, the Court upheld the Respondent's preliminary objection in that suit, observing as follows: -"...in view of the facts that the decision being challenged is a mere interdiction and not dismissal, I will defer this suit until such a time as the court's jurisdiction may be invoked by the claimant in relation to the outcome of the interdiction."

3 The Respondent submitted that the Court thereby deferred the suit and directed the Claimant to follow up the matter with the Public Service Commission.

4 It was further submitted that on 27th March 2015 the Claimant moved the Court in ELRC JR No. 8 of 2015, R v Kiambu County Government & Others, seeking leave to apply for judicial review orders of certiorari and mandamus. Those proceedings were held in abeyance to allow the Public Service Commission to address the matter, and the Commission decided that the Claimant be dismissed from service on account of gross professional misconduct and abuse of office.

5 It is the Respondent's submission that the Claimant ought to have pursued his claim in Cause No. 1591 of 2015 instead of filing a fresh suit.

6 The Respondent identified three issues for determination: whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter; whether the Respondent has been wrongly sued; and whether the Claimant followed the procedure laid down in law and exhausted all avenues before approaching the Court.

7 On the first issue, the Respondent submitted that the objection raises a pure point of law as defined in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors ltd (1969) EA 696, where it was observed that: -"...a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court..."

8 It is the Respondent’s submission that the Court is barred by the doctrines of sub judice and res judicata from entertaining the present suit. On sub judice, it relied on Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides: -"No court shall proceed with the trial of any suit or proceeding in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit or proceeding between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, where such suit or proceeding is pending in the same or any other court having jurisdiction in Kenya to grant the relief claimed."

9 The Respondent further cited Section 7 of the same Act on res judicata.It was submitted that the issues canvassed in this suit are substantially the same, and between the same parties, as those in Cause No. 1591, and that entertaining the suit would amount to a blatant violation of the sub judice rule. The Respondent further argued that the Claimant concealed these material facts and has therefore come to court with unclean hands and is not entitled to the orders sought.

10 On the centrality of jurisdiction, the Respondent relied on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR, where Nyarangi JA stated: -"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. A court of law downs its tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction."

11 On the second issue, the Respondent submitted that it has been wrongly sued. It argued that under Section 59 of the County Governments Act, the mandate to establish and abolish county public offices, appoint persons to those offices and exercise disciplinary control over county public servants is vested in the County Public Service Board, a body corporate with perpetual succession and the power to sue and be sued in its own name. It is the Respondent's submission that the Claimant ought to have sued the Board.

12 In support of this position, the Respondent relied on Tabitha Njambi Chigua & 12 others v County Government of Kiambu[2016] eKLR, where the Court held: -"...it is indeed the County Public Service Board (CPSB) which has the mandate to hire the Claimants or act as prayed by the Claimants. The Claimants have obviously sued the wrong party and I therefore find that the Preliminary Objection has merit and I allow it and dismiss the Claimants case against the Respondents with costs."

13 It further cited Samuel Kipkoech Keter v County Government of Bomet & 3 others [2016] eKLR, where the petition was dismissed on the basis that the petitioners ought to have sued the Bomet County Public Service Board.

14 On the third issue, the Respondent submitted that the Claimant did not exhaust the statutory dispute resolution mechanism before approaching the Court. It relied on Section 77 of the County Governments Act, which provides: -"(1) Any person dissatisfied or affected by a decision made by the County Public Service Board or a person in exercise or purported exercise of disciplinary control against any County Public Officer may appeal to the Public Service Commission... against the decision. (2) The commission shall entertain appeals on any decision relating to employment of a person in a county government including a decision in respect of — ...(c) disciplinary control... (e) retirement and any other removal from service."

15 It further submitted that Section 74 of the Public Service Commission Act provides for the right of appeal to the Commission by a public officer aggrieved by the decision of a person in authority.

16 The Respondent argued that where statute has provided an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, that avenue should be exhausted before a party approaches the Court. It cited the Court of Appeal in Speaker of the National Assembly v Hon. James Njenga Karume, Civil Application No. 92 of 1992, where it was held: -"Where there is clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed..."

17 Further reliance was placed on Alice Mweru Ngai v Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd [2015] eKLR, where the Court held that where the law grants jurisdiction to other organs of Government to handle specific grievances, the Court must respect and uphold the law, and that its involvement would be an unwarranted intrusion into the jurisdiction of the other organ.

18 It was submitted that the Claimant has not exhausted the mechanism under Section 77 of the County Governments Act, nor explained why there was no appeal or review to the Public Service Commission. The Respondent argued that the Court has therefore not been conferred with jurisdiction to hear the matter at first instance.

19 In conclusion, the Respondent submitted that the Claimant has not only sued the wrong party but has also failed to follow the procedures laid out in the County Governments Act and the Public Service Commission Act. It urged that the claim is improper and incurably defective, and that the preliminary objection be upheld and the suit dismissed with costs.

Claimant’s Submissions

20 The Claimant filed written submissions dated 20th June 2019 in opposition to the Preliminary Objection. By way of background, he submitted that he was an employee of the Respondent and was interdicted on 5th September 2014, whereupon he filed an application in ELRC Cause No. 1591 of 2014 challenging the interdiction and seeking to be reinstated.

21 It was submitted that the Respondent raised a preliminary objection in that matter on the grounds that the Court's jurisdiction had been invoked improperly and that the suit was premature, as the Claimant had not been dismissed.

22 The Claimant submitted that by a ruling dated 9th March 2015, the Court (Nzioki wa Makau J.) found that he had not been dismissed but had merely been interdicted, that he could only move the Court after dismissal, and that parties were at liberty to apply. This effectively meant the claim founded on the interdiction was spent.

23 The Claimant further submitted that the Attorney General, by a letter dated 8th November 2016, advised the Respondent that the interdiction and summary dismissal were illegal, but the Respondent, in collusion with the Public Service Commission, confirmed the summary dismissal.

24 He argued that the present suit is for damages arising from unfair and illegal dismissal, whereas the former was an application for reinstatement. It was submitted that the Preliminary Objection is therefore misplaced and intended to prolong the determination of the claim.

25 On whether the claim is sub judice, the Claimant submitted that it is not. He argued that he disclosed at paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim that there is no other suit between the parties except Cause No. 1591 of 2014, which is over a different matter.

26 It was submitted that the earlier application sought reinstatement and was heard and determined, with the Court granting parties leave to apply, while the current claim concerns illegal dismissal and seeks damages. He argued that the Court used the word "defer" to mean that any affected party could move the Court appropriately.

27 On whether the Respondent is the correct party, the Claimant submitted that the question of who is responsible for his dismissal is not an issue for determination at this stage. He argued that a claimant has the right to sue any party he considers necessary and need not sue all of them, and that it is for the Court, and not the Respondent, to determine liability.

28 In this regard, he relied on Order 1 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides: -"No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it."

29 On whether the Preliminary Objection is proper, the Claimant submitted that it does not meet the threshold set in Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, as the grounds are unclear and require evidence to be called to establish them. He cited the holding in that case that: -"A preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion."

30 The Claimant further relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Grace Mwenda Munjuri v Trustees of the Agricultural Society of Kenya [2017] eKLR, where a suit had been struck out on a preliminary objection for failure to cite the officials of the respondent as parties. The Court of Appeal held: -"[16] The overreaching imperative in the administration of justice that guides courts, right from the Constitution to statute law as well as the relevant Rules of Procedure... have shifted and courts tend to disregard matters of technicalities especially where no prejudice is caused to the parties. The courts are nowadays focusing on facilitating a just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of substantive disputes without undue regard to technicalities as set out under Article 159(d) of the Constitution... [17] ...We find that the preliminary objection contained contested matters and was vague as far as the point of law was concerned."

31 He also cited Bashir Haji Abdullahi v Adan Mohammed Noor & 3 Others [2004] eKLR, referred to in the above decision, where the Court of Appeal stated: -"...if a party wishes to raise a Preliminary Objection and files in Court a Notice to that effect... the Preliminary points should be sufficiently particularized and detailed to enable the other side and indeed the court to know exactly the nature of the preliminary points of law to be raised."

32 The Claimant submitted that the other grounds of the objection are repetitive and unclear. Thus, he urged the Court to find that the Preliminary Objection has no merit and to dismiss it with costs.

33 I have examined the averments and submissions of the parties herein. Considering the issue of this case being sub judice, it is true that the claimant filed ELRC 1591/2014. Vide a ruling of this court (Wa Makau J,) on 9/3/2015, the court pointed out that the matter relates to the interdiction of the claimant by the County Secretary and not a dismissal. The court deferred the suit until such a time as the court’s jurisdiction may be invoked by the claimant in relation to the outcome of the interdiction.

34 My understanding of this position taken by Hon. Nzioki wa Makau is that the claim no 1591/2014 was deferred pending the outcome of the interdiction which then led to the claimant’s dismissal. The claimant even appealed the dismissal to the PSC and the PSC confirmed the dismissal.

35 The claimant was thus free to go back to Cause No. 159 of 2014 and proceed with the claim where he had stopped it since file no 1591/2014 was never closed.

36 To this extent, I agree with the respondent that the cause is better presecuted under cause 1591/2014 (with necessary amendments) to avoid duplicating of suits. I therefore allow this preliminary objection and proceed to strike out this claim. There shall be no order of costs.

Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 12th Day of October 2026.

HELLEN WASILWA

JUDGE

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