Employment law

Sana Industries Ltd v Maina [2026] KEELRC 2814 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E296 of 2025
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

Appeal partially allowed. The findings that the Respondent's engagement converted to a term contract and that termination was unfair were affirmed. Compensation was reduced from Kshs. 179,630 to Kshs. 48,990; the December 2024 salary award was set aside and dismissed; notice pay and leave pay were affirmed. The decretal sum, excluding interest and costs, is Kshs. 99,613 less sums paid or recovered; interest runs at court rates from 25 August 2025. The certificate-of-service and half trial costs orders remain, while each party bears its own appeal costs.

Supporting judgment passages

(ii) The finding that the Respondent's casual engagement was converted into a term contract of service by operation of Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007, and the finding that his termination from employment was unfair are both affirmed.

Passage 85 →

(vi) The total affirmed decretal sum, exclusive of interest and costs is Kshs. 99,613.00, less any amount already paid or recovered in execution.

Passage 89 →

(x) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

Passage 93 →
Issue 1Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's casual engagement had converted into a term contract of service.

Held. No. The trial court correctly found that the engagement had converted into a term contract by operation of section 37. The Appellant's fortnightly payment arrangement did not meet the statutory definition of casual employment; its records also showed bank payment, statutory deductions and union check-off. It failed to produce the employment and attendance records needed to establish intermittent casual engagement.

Ratio. A casual employee must be paid at the end of each day and engaged for no longer than 24 hours at a time. Where the employer does not produce the required written employment particulars and records, it bears the burden of proving or disproving the alleged terms. Monthly-paid employment falls under section 37 conversion and section 35(1)(c).

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's casual engagement had converted into a term contract of service.

Passage 37 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

The trial court was right to adopt and apply that decision. The authority relied upon by the Appellant cautions against a mechanical reading of Section 37, but it does not permit an employer who has kept no records at all to assert casual status by bare averment and then invite the court to visit the consequences of its own statutory default upon the employee. Ground 1 fails.

Passage 48 →

(ii) The finding that the Respondent's casual engagement was converted into a term contract of service by operation of Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007, and the finding that his termination from employment was unfair are both affirmed.

Passage 85 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

The 1st issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's casual engagement had converted into a term contract of service. Section 2 of the Act defines a casual employee as one the terms of whose engagement provide for his payment at the end of each day and who is not engaged for a longer period than twenty-four hours at a time. Two elements are indispensable; payment at the end of each day, and an engagement not exceeding twenty-four hours at a time.

Passage 41 →

Section 10(7) of the Act provides that where an employer fails to produce a written contract or the particulars prescribed under Section 10(1), the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment lies on the employer. Section 74 obliges the employer to keep a written record of all its employees. The Appellant, being the custodian of those records, was obliged to prove that the Respondent was engaged intermittently. It did not do so.

Passage 46 →

The consequence follows from Section 37(1) of the Act and the point is settled by binding authority. In Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) the Court of Appeal declared that Section 37 applied to the employment of the respondents in that matter, to the effect that their casual employment was converted into a contract of service where wages are paid monthly and to which Section 35(1)(c) applies.

Passage 47 →
Issue 2Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent's employment was unfair.

Held. No. The unfair-termination finding was affirmed, although partly on different reasons. The court found that the Appellant had a valid and fair substantive reason—its genuine, reasonable belief that the Respondent was intoxicated at work—but it did not prove that the disciplinary notice reached him. The hearing proceeded in his absence and dismissal was communicated by text, so the procedure was unfair. Grounds challenging unfair termination failed; the complaint that the trial court omitted relevant evidence succeeded only to the limited extent of the valid-reason finding.

Ratio. Sections 41 and 47(5) require the employer to prove procedural fairness as well as a substantive reason. For misconduct dismissal, the employee must be informed of the contemplated reason and afforded the prescribed opportunity to respond. The requirements in section 45(2) are conjunctive: a valid reason does not cure a procedurally unfair dismissal.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent's employment was unfair.

Passage 38 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

DW2 stated that he telephoned the Respondent, that the Respondent collected the letters and declined to sign, and that he reported the refusal to management. That evidence was uncorroborated by any record of the call or contemporaneous note of the refusal, and he conceded in cross-examination that the Respondent was not informed of any right of appeal. The hearing proceeded in the Respondent's absence and the decision was conveyed by text message some eight days later. The trial court concluded that although the letters were produced in court, there was nothing to confirm that they were ever served upon or received by the Respondent. On a re-evaluation of the record this court reaches the same conclusion.

Passage 57 →

The trial court made no reference whatever to this material, and to that limited extent ground 8 has substance. Re-evaluating the evidence for myself, I find that the Appellant did hold a genuine belief, on grounds that were not unreasonable, that the Respondent had been intoxicated at the workplace in mid-December, 2024. The reason for the termination was therefore valid and fair within Sections 43(2) and 45(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Act. That finding does not save the termination. Section 45(2)(b) and (c) are conjunctive. An employer who holds a good reason but denies the employee the process the statute prescribes still terminates unfairly.

Passage 61 →

The Appellant failed on procedure and failed comprehensively. The finding of the trial court that the termination was unfair is affirmed, though for reasons which differ in part from those it gave. Grounds 2 and 3 fail. Ground 8 succeeds only to the limited extent set out above.

Passage 62 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

Turning to procedure, Section 41 of the Act obliges an employer, before terminating on grounds of misconduct, to explain to the employee in a language he understands the reason for which termination is being considered, in the presence of a fellow employee or a shop floor union representative of the employee's choice, and to hear and consider any representations made. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held those elements to be mandatory. Section 47(5) places on the employer the burden of proving both the substantive reason and procedural fairness.

Passage 55 →

A disciplinary process conducted without proof that the employee was ever told to attend it is not a fair procedure within Section 41. The Appellant compounded the default by conveying the dismissal by short message service rather than by any formal instrument and by taking no step(s) to notify the Ruiru Labour Officer of the desertion it now relies upon.

Passage 58 →

The trial court made no reference whatever to this material, and to that limited extent ground 8 has substance. Re-evaluating the evidence for myself, I find that the Appellant did hold a genuine belief, on grounds that were not unreasonable, that the Respondent had been intoxicated at the workplace in mid-December, 2024. The reason for the termination was therefore valid and fair within Sections 43(2) and 45(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Act. That finding does not save the termination. Section 45(2)(b) and (c) are conjunctive. An employer who holds a good reason but denies the employee the process the statute prescribes still terminates unfairly.

Passage 61 →
Issue 3Whether the trial court erred in the awards made in favour of the Respondent.

Held. Partly. The eleven-month compensation award was set aside because the trial court did not explain its section 49(4) assessment; it was substituted with three months' gross salary, Kshs. 48,990, considering long service and total procedural failure against the valid reason and the Respondent's contributory misconduct. Notice pay of Kshs. 16,330 and leave pay of Kshs. 34,293 were affirmed. The December 2024 salary award of Kshs. 16,330 was set aside because he had been paid for work done through 15 December and did not work the balance. The salary quantum, certificate of service, interest, and half trial costs remained undisturbed.

Ratio. Compensation under section 49(4) is discretionary but must be exercised judicially on stated factors, including the circumstances of dismissal, service length, comparable-employment prospects, and employee contribution. A converted monthly engagement attracts 28 days' notice or pay in lieu under sections 35(1)(c) and 36. Wages are payable for work done, while the employer bears the statutory obligation to keep leave records.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

3. Whether the trial court erred in the awards made in favour of the Respondent.

Passage 39 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

The court finds greater assistance and corroboration in the authority of Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal, upon a like finding of conversion and unlawful termination, awarded compensation equivalent to three months' salary alongside notice pay and payment in lieu of leave. Weighing the matters in Section 49(4), I consider an award equivalent to three months' gross salary, being Kshs. 48,990.00, to meet the justice of this case. The award of Kshs. 179,630.00 is set aside and substituted accordingly.

Passage 69 →

As to the balance of the month, it is common ground that he did not attend work from about 14th December, 2024 and Section 17(1) of the Act ties the obligation to pay wages to work done. He was paid for the part of December 2024 that he worked and did not work the balance. The award of Kshs. 16,330.00 cannot stand and is set aside. Ground 7 succeeds.

Passage 74 →

Its submission that the Respondent ought to have produced a leave form inverts the statutory burden. A leave record is a document the employer is required by law to keep and which the employee has no means of compelling. The limitation of the award to three years was correct and the award is affirmed. The order for a certificate of service under Section 51 of the Act, the order for interest, and the order for half costs of the proceedings in the trial court are all undisturbed. No distinct ground of appeal was taken against them, and the costs order was a proper exercise of discretion upon a claim which succeeded only in part. Ground 4, in so far as it goes beyond ground 5, adds nothing and fails.

Passage 76 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

The trial court identified not a single factor it had weighed, did not explain why eleven months out of a statutory ceiling of twelve was appropriate, and made no finding at all on the extent to which the Respondent's own conduct contributed to his dismissal. That was a matter squarely before it on the Appellant's evidence. An award of compensation is discretionary, but the discretion is judicial and must be exercised on stated grounds. Ground 5 succeeds.

Passage 65 →

On notice pay, once the engagement is deemed to be one where wages are paid monthly, Section 35(1)(c) entitles either party to terminate upon twenty-eight days' written notice and Section 36 permits payment in lieu. No notice was given. The award of Kshs. 16,330/= is correct in principle and is affirmed. Ground 6 fails.

Passage 71 →

On payment in lieu of leave, the trial court awarded Kshs. 34,293.00 being twenty-one leave days a year limited to the three years preceding the filing of the suit. Section 28 of the Act confers the entitlement and Section 74 obliges the employer to keep the records. The Appellant produced none.

Passage 75 →
Issue 4Who bears the costs of this appeal.

Held. Each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal because the appeal succeeded only in part.

Ratio. Costs were determined in the court's discretion under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act; partial success justified no appeal-costs award to either party.

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Issue

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4. Who bears the costs of this appeal.

Paragraph 4 →

Held

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(x) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

Passage 93 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

On the 4th issue for determination, and in the exercise of the discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, the appeal having succeeded only in part, each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

Passage 77 →
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Case at a glance

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Background

THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent's employment had converted to permanent despite evidence showing that the Respondent never worked continuously.

Paragraph 1 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

The Employment and Labour Relations Court considered whether the respondent’s alleged casual employment had converted by operation of section 37 of the Employment Act; whether his termination was unfair; whether the trial court’s compensation, notice,…

Material facts

Sana Industries maintained that Maina was a casual worker paid Kshs. 650 daily, fortnightly, and that he absconded after an alleged workplace intoxication incident. Maina relied on NSSF remittances from August 2019 to November 2024. The employer’s payroll…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E296 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

SANA INDUSTRIES LIMITED………………………...........………………APPELLANT

VERSUS

REAGAN OMONDI MAINA……………………………............…………RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 28th August, 2025. It arises from a judgment and Decree delivered on 25th August, 2025 in Ruiru CMELRC No. E036 of 2025.

The trial court found that the Respondent's casual engagement had been converted into a term contract of service by operation of law, and that his termination from employment by the Appellant was unfair. It awarded him as follows;

Compensation for unfair termination (eleven months) Kshs. 179,630.00

One month's salary in lieu of notice Kshs. 16,330.00

Unpaid salary for December 2024 Kshs. 16,330.00

Payment in lieu of leave not taken Kshs. 34,293.00

Total Kshs. 246,583.00

The trial court further awarded half costs and interest, and directed that a certificate of service do issue to the Respondents. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the present appeal, which comes out as follows;

1. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent's employment had converted to permanent despite evidence showing that the Respondent never worked continuously.

2. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent's employment was unlawfully terminated despite the Appellant having demonstrated that it made all reasonable effort to submit the Respondent to the disciplinary process after the Respondent absconded duty.

3. THAT the Honourable trial magistrate erred in failing to find that the Respondent absconded duty, which then entitled the Appellant to terminate his employment.

4. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in awarding excessive damages when the Respondent in fact absconded duty, hence abetting his own dismissal from employment.

5. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in failing to give a reasoned justification of how she arrived at 11 months' salary of Kshs. 179,630/= as damages for unfair termination.

6. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in awarding one month's salary in lieu of notice despite evidence showing that the claimant had absconded duty.

7. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in awarding December 2024 salary of Kshs. 16,330/= despite having made a finding that the Respondent was never at work for that month.

8. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law by failing to consider the Appellant's evidence presented in court.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

1. This Honourable Court allows this appeal.

2. The Judgment of Hon. Diana Orago delivered on 25th August 2025 be set aside and in its place the awards be dismissed.

3. The costs of the appeal as well as the costs of the lower court be awarded to the Appellant.

The parties opted to canvass this appeal by way of written submissions and further chose to highlight these. This was done on 20th April, 2026 at 1137 hours.

It is the Appellant's case and submission that the Respondent was engaged on casual terms at a consolidated daily wage of Kshs. 650.00 payable fortnightly, as corroborated by the payroll at page 42 of the Record of Appeal. Such an engagement, it says, falls within the definition of casual employment in Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007. It relies on Rashid Odhiambo Allogoh & 245 others v Haco Industries Limited [2015] KECA 376 (KLR) and contends that the burden of proving continuity lay upon the Respondent, which burden he did not discharge.

It further submits that the Respondent was found intoxicated at the workplace on 14th December, 2024 contrary to company policy. The incident was reported at Wataalam Police Post and an OB number obtained, and that he was issued with a notice to show cause, a return to work notice and an invitation to a disciplinary hearing convened for 6th January, 2025 which he failed to attend. Its position, maintained throughout, is that the Respondent thereafter absconded duty within the meaning of Section 44(4)(a) and (c) of the Act and was never terminated on 10th January, 2025 as alleged.

On the issue of awards, the Appellant submits that the compensation was arrived at without reasoned justification and upon a monthly salary which the Respondent never proved; that the December 2024 salary was not earned, Section 17 of the Act tying wages to work actually done; and that the leave award was made in the absence of any leave form. It seeks to buttress its case on the authority of Komu v Sana Industries Limited (Appeal E107 of 2023) [2025] KEELRC 75 (KLR), a decision of this court involving the Appellant itself, in which zero compensation was held appropriate. It prays that the Judgment be set aside in its entirety.

It is the Respondent's case and submission that the trial court did not err in any respect. He submits that Section 37 of the Act operates by force of law, and relies on Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR). He points to his National Social Security Fund statement at page 19 of the Record of Appeal, which shows contributions remitted by the Appellant as his employer on a monthly footing between August, 2019 and November, 2024. Had he truly been a casual labourer, he says, the obligation to account for his own daily contributions would have rested upon him.

On the validity of the termination, he submits that there was no proof of service of any notice upon him, no proof of any refusal of service, no warning letters and no notification of the alleged desertion to the Ruiru Labour Officer. The Appellant, he says, demonstrated no tangible effort to trace him.

On the reliefs, he submits that notice pay and compensation follow from the finding of conversion, and that the burden of producing proof of payment and of leave taken lay upon the Appellant as custodian of the employment records. He prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties, the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's casual engagement had converted into a term contract of service.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent's employment was unfair.

3. Whether the trial court erred in the awards made in favour of the Respondent.

4. Who bears the costs of this appeal.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's casual engagement had converted into a term contract of service. Section 2 of the Act defines a casual employee as one the terms of whose engagement provide for his payment at the end of each day and who is not engaged for a longer period than twenty-four hours at a time. Two elements are indispensable; payment at the end of each day, and an engagement not exceeding twenty-four hours at a time.

The Appellant's own case fails on the first of them. It pleaded, testified and submitted that the Respondent was paid a consolidated daily wage payable fortnightly. A wage payable fortnightly is not a wage payable at the end of each day. The Appellant cannot describe the engagement in terms that place it outside the statutory definition and at the same time claim the shelter of that definition.

The documentary record points the same way. The payroll at page 42 of the Record of Appeal, upon which the Appellant itself relies, is an Equity Bank payment list for the period 1st to 15th December, 2024. It records the Respondent's bank account number, identity card number, KRA personal identification number, NSSF number and SHIF number, and shows deductions for NHIF, NSSF and union dues, leaving a net pay of Kshs. 7,850.00

A person paid through the bank, enrolled in the statutory schemes and subject to a union check-off is not a labourer engaged and paid off afresh at the close of each day. The check-off is telling. DW1 testified that the establishment is unionised and DW2 was the union shop steward. A check-off deduction is consistent only with membership of a unionisable establishment.

The Respondent's NSSF statement at page 19 of the Record of Appeal shows contributions remitted by the Appellant as employer on a monthly footing between August, 2019 and November, 2024. Its authenticity was not challenged at the trial and is not challenged before me. Against all this the Appellant produced no engagement record, no muster roll and no attendance register touching the period from 2013. The attendance and security records in its bundle commence only in December, 2024.

Section 10(7) of the Act provides that where an employer fails to produce a written contract or the particulars prescribed under Section 10(1), the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment lies on the employer. Section 74 obliges the employer to keep a written record of all its employees. The Appellant, being the custodian of those records, was obliged to prove that the Respondent was engaged intermittently. It did not do so.

The consequence follows from Section 37(1) of the Act and the point is settled by binding authority. In Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) the Court of Appeal declared that Section 37 applied to the employment of the respondents in that matter, to the effect that their casual employment was converted into a contract of service where wages are paid monthly and to which Section 35(1)(c) applies.

The trial court was right to adopt and apply that decision. The authority relied upon by the Appellant cautions against a mechanical reading of Section 37, but it does not permit an employer who has kept no records at all to assert casual status by bare averment and then invite the court to visit the consequences of its own statutory default upon the employee. Ground 1 fails.

The 2nd issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent's employment was unfair. Tthere is a difficulty running through the Appellant's case which is fatal to grounds 2, 3 and 6. The Appellant's pleaded case, its evidence and its submissions before me are that the Respondent was never terminated at all, that he absconded duty, and that the abscondment is what brought the relationship to an end. Yet its own bundle, at pages 30 to 32 of the Record of Appeal, contains screenshots of a message thread in which, on 14th January, 2025 at 3.54 p.m., the following was sent to the Respondent;

"This serves as a formal notice that we must terminate your employment with Sana Industries, effective immediately, on January 14, 2025. This decision comes after your failure to come for a disciplinary hearing scheduled on January 6, 2025 following the incident on December 17, 2024 during which you were found to have taken an illegal substance while on duty, resulting in erratic behavior, violating company policy And Section 44(4)(b) of the Employment Act, 2007 … Due to your continued non-compliance with company policies, we have no choice but to take this action."

That message is the Appellant's own document and it establishes three matters.

First, the Appellant did terminate the Respondent's employment, and did so expressly in writing and with immediate effect. The assertion that there was no termination is contradicted by the Appellant's evidence and this is rejected by this court.

Secondly, the stated ground of termination was misconduct under Section 44(4)(b) of the Act and not desertion under Section 44(4)(a) or (c). The Appellant cannot advance on appeal a characterisation of the dismissal which it did not adopt at the time.

Thirdly, the message gives the date of the incident as 17th December 2024, whereas the notice of disciplinary hearing dated 19th December, 2024 at page 33 of the Record of Appeal, the Memorandum of Response and the submissions all give it as 14th December, 2024. That inconsistency in the Appellant's own record is not trivial in a matter where the fairness of the process is the very question in issue.

Turning to procedure, Section 41 of the Act obliges an employer, before terminating on grounds of misconduct, to explain to the employee in a language he understands the reason for which termination is being considered, in the presence of a fellow employee or a shop floor union representative of the employee's choice, and to hear and consider any representations made. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held those elements to be mandatory. Section 47(5) places on the employer the burden of proving both the substantive reason and procedural fairness.

The Appellant produced a notice of disciplinary hearing dated 19th December 2024 convening a hearing for 6th January, 2025 minutes said to have been recorded on that date, an OB report, security records and a witness statement. What it did not produce was any proof that the notice ever reached the Respondent. There is no signed acknowledgement, no dispatch record and no postal record.

DW2 stated that he telephoned the Respondent, that the Respondent collected the letters and declined to sign, and that he reported the refusal to management. That evidence was uncorroborated by any record of the call or contemporaneous note of the refusal, and he conceded in cross-examination that the Respondent was not informed of any right of appeal. The hearing proceeded in the Respondent's absence and the decision was conveyed by text message some eight days later. The trial court concluded that although the letters were produced in court, there was nothing to confirm that they were ever served upon or received by the Respondent. On a re-evaluation of the record this court reaches the same conclusion.

A disciplinary process conducted without proof that the employee was ever told to attend it is not a fair procedure within Section 41. The Appellant compounded the default by conveying the dismissal by short message service rather than by any formal instrument and by taking no step(s) to notify the Ruiru Labour Officer of the desertion it now relies upon.

In fairness to the Appellant, its evidence on the existence of a reason was not empty. DW1 gave direct evidence of the incident, an OB number was obtained, and a witness statement dated 14th December, 2024 was produced.

More significantly, the very message thread upon which the Appellant relies contains an incoming message dated 22nd January, 2025 in which the Respondent stated, in Kiswahili, that he knew he had erred, asked for forgiveness and lamented that he was now without work. He denied that message on oath and denied that the number was his, but offered no explanation for how a message in those terms came to sit in the same thread as the termination notice he himself relies on.

The trial court made no reference whatever to this material, and to that limited extent ground 8 has substance. Re-evaluating the evidence for myself, I find that the Appellant did hold a genuine belief, on grounds that were not unreasonable, that the Respondent had been intoxicated at the workplace in mid-December, 2024. The reason for the termination was therefore valid and fair within Sections 43(2) and 45(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Act. That finding does not save the termination. Section 45(2)(b) and (c) are conjunctive. An employer who holds a good reason but denies the employee the process the statute prescribes still terminates unfairly.

The Appellant failed on procedure and failed comprehensively. The finding of the trial court that the termination was unfair is affirmed, though for reasons which differ in part from those it gave. Grounds 2 and 3 fail. Ground 8 succeeds only to the limited extent set out above.

The 3rd issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in the awards made in favour of the Respondent. This court takes the awards in turn.

On compensation, the trial court awarded the equivalent of eleven months' salary. Its entire reasoning was that the claimant was entitled to compensation under that head and that in arriving at the figure the court had considered the provisions of Section 49(4) of the Act. Section 49(4) sets out thirteen matters to which a court is to have regard, among them the circumstances of the termination including the extent to which the employee caused or contributed to it, the length of service, and the opportunity available to the employee for securing comparable employment. A recitation of the subsection is not a consideration of it.

The trial court identified not a single factor it had weighed, did not explain why eleven months out of a statutory ceiling of twelve was appropriate, and made no finding at all on the extent to which the Respondent's own conduct contributed to his dismissal. That was a matter squarely before it on the Appellant's evidence. An award of compensation is discretionary, but the discretion is judicial and must be exercised on stated grounds. Ground 5 succeeds.

It falls on this court to exercise that discretion afresh. In the Respondent's favour are his eleven years of service, the absence of any severance or terminal dues, and the fact that the failure of process was not a technical slip but a wholesale disregard of Section 41.

Against him is my finding that a valid and fair reason existed, that the conduct in question is serious in an industrial setting where machinery is in use, and that his message of 22nd January, 2025 amounts to an acknowledgement of fault. His own conduct therefore contributed to the termination within Section 49(4)(c) and (f).

The Appellant urges me to follow Komu v Sana Industries Limited (Appeal E107 of 2023) [2025] KEELRC 75 (KLR), in which this court awarded no compensation at all and held that notice pay sufficed to answer the procedural unfairness. This court declines to take this route. In that matter the employer's procedural default was partial. Here it was total, there being no proof that the Respondent was ever notified of the case against him or of the hearing convened to determine it. A nil award in such a case would leave Section 41 without practical sanction.

The court finds greater assistance and corroboration in the authority of Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal, upon a like finding of conversion and unlawful termination, awarded compensation equivalent to three months' salary alongside notice pay and payment in lieu of leave. Weighing the matters in Section 49(4), I consider an award equivalent to three months' gross salary, being Kshs. 48,990.00, to meet the justice of this case. The award of Kshs. 179,630.00 is set aside and substituted accordingly.

On the Appellant's complaint that the monthly salary of Kshs. 16,330.00 was unproved, the Appellant is the custodian of the payroll and produced only a single fortnightly bank list showing a net payment of Kshs. 7,850.00 for a half month. That figure is broadly consistent with the pleaded salary rather than destructive of it. The finding on quantum of salary is not disturbed.

On notice pay, once the engagement is deemed to be one where wages are paid monthly, Section 35(1)(c) entitles either party to terminate upon twenty-eight days' written notice and Section 36 permits payment in lieu. No notice was given. The award of Kshs. 16,330/= is correct in principle and is affirmed. Ground 6 fails.

On the December, 2024 salary, there is no reasoning at all supporting the award. It appears nowhere in the body of the trial court's judgment and surfaces for the first time in the final disposition.

On the merits, the Equity Bank payment list at page 42 of the Record of Appeal, stamped by the Appellant on 15th December, 2024 evidences payment to the Respondent for the period 1st to 15th December, 2024. The Respondent's answer at the trial was a bare denial. He produced no bank statement, though he confirmed that he was paid through the bank and that he had not availed his statements.

As to the balance of the month, it is common ground that he did not attend work from about 14th December, 2024 and Section 17(1) of the Act ties the obligation to pay wages to work done. He was paid for the part of December 2024 that he worked and did not work the balance. The award of Kshs. 16,330.00 cannot stand and is set aside. Ground 7 succeeds.

On payment in lieu of leave, the trial court awarded Kshs. 34,293.00 being twenty-one leave days a year limited to the three years preceding the filing of the suit. Section 28 of the Act confers the entitlement and Section 74 obliges the employer to keep the records. The Appellant produced none.

Its submission that the Respondent ought to have produced a leave form inverts the statutory burden. A leave record is a document the employer is required by law to keep and which the employee has no means of compelling. The limitation of the award to three years was correct and the award is affirmed. The order for a certificate of service under Section 51 of the Act, the order for interest, and the order for half costs of the proceedings in the trial court are all undisturbed. No distinct ground of appeal was taken against them, and the costs order was a proper exercise of discretion upon a claim which succeeded only in part. Ground 4, in so far as it goes beyond ground 5, adds nothing and fails.

On the 4th issue for determination, and in the exercise of the discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, the appeal having succeeded only in part, each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

The revised decretal sum is computed as follows;

Three (3) months compensation for unfair termination of employment …..Kshs. 48,990.00

One (1) month's salary in lieu of notice……………………………………Kshs. 16,330.00

Payment in lieu of leave not taken………………………………………...Kshs. 34,293.00

Total of award……………………………………………………..………Kshs. 99,613.00

I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The Judgment and Decree delivered on 25th August, 2025 in Ruiru CMELRC No. E036 of 2025 is varied to the extent set out below.

(ii) The finding that the Respondent's casual engagement was converted into a term contract of service by operation of Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007, and the finding that his termination from employment was unfair are both affirmed.

(iii) The award of Kshs. 179,630.00 as compensation for unfair termination is set aside and substituted with an award of Kshs. 48,990.00, being the equivalent of three months' gross salary.

(iv) The award of Kshs. 16,330.00 as unpaid salary for the month of December, 2024 is set aside and that claim is dismissed.

(v) The awards of Kshs. 16,330.00 as one month's salary in lieu of notice and Kshs. 34,293.00 as payment in lieu of leave not taken are affirmed.

(vi) The total affirmed decretal sum, exclusive of interest and costs is Kshs. 99,613.00, less any amount already paid or recovered in execution.

(vii) Interest on the award at (vi) above at court rates from 25th August, 2025, the date of the trial court’s judgment until payment in full.

(viii) The order for the issuance of a certificate of service to the Respondent remains undisturbed.

(ix) The order for half costs of the proceedings in the trial court is affirmed.

(x) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Rodgers Aminga instructed by Eredi Mulama & Company Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Miss Gikenyi instructed by Adoli & Company Advocates LLP for the Respondent.

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