Background
THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent’s employment had converted to permanent despite evidence showing that the Respondent never worked continuously.
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Appeal partially allowed only as to the August 2024 salary: the Kshs. 16,410 award for that item was set aside. The remainder of the trial judgment was upheld, including compensation, notice pay and untaken leave, producing a revised total award of Kshs. 214,971 plus interest at court rates from the trial judgment to payment. Each party was to bear its own appeal costs; the trial court’s half-costs order was not disturbed.
(i) The award of Kshs. 16,410.00 being salary for August, 2024 salary is set aside.
Passage 45 →
(ii) Save as to the variation in Order (i) above, the judgment and Decree of the trial court delivered on 25th August, 2025 in MC. ELRC E035 of 2025 is upheld.
Passage 46 →
Total of Award…………………………………………………Kshs. 214,971.00
Passage 51 →
Held. No. The conversion finding was affirmed. The Respondent’s engagement continued from about September 2013 to August 2024, and the employer produced neither a written casual-engagement contract nor employment records to rebut continuous service. The court clarified that conversion does not make employment permanent and pensionable; it deems the contract monthly paid, terminable on notice under section 35(1)(c), with the applicable terms and conditions under section 37(3).
Ratio. Under section 37, a casual engagement meeting the statutory duration/work criteria is deemed monthly-paid employment; the employer’s label is not decisive. Where the employer produces no written contract or employment particulars, section 10(7) places on it the burden to prove or disprove the alleged employment term.
Issue
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent’s casual employment converted to a term contract of service under Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007.
Passage 30 →
Held
The Appellant relies on Rashid Odhiambo Allogoh & 245 others v Haco Industries Ltd [2015] eKLR for the proposition that non-daily payment, standing alone, does not convert a casual engagement and submits that the burden of proving continuity rests on the employee. That authority is correct as far as it goes, but it does not assist the Appellant here: the aggregate period of engagement is undisputedly measured in years rather than weeks, and the Appellant’s own account of the Respondent’s daily wage is itself inconsistent, variously pleaded at Kshs. 650.00, Kshs. 670.00 and in the Respondent’s own cross-examination evidence, Kshs. 720.00 a state of the record that undermines rather than supports the case for a genuinely casual engagement. The court would clarify that Section 37 does not convert a casual engagement into permanent and pensionable employment; it deems the contract to be one in which wages are paid monthly, terminable by notice under Section 35(1)(c), and, by Section 37(3), attracting the terms and conditions the employee would have enjoyed had she not initially been engaged as a casual. So understood, the conversion finding is affirmed.
Passage 35 →
Ratio
The 1st issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent’s casual employment converted to a term contract of service under Section 37 of the Employment Act. This provides that where a casual employee works for a period or number of continuous working days amounting in the aggregate to not less than one month, or performs work that cannot reasonably be expected to be completed within three months or more, the contract of service is deemed to be one in which wages are paid monthly, to which Section 35(1)(c) applies. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Nanyuki Water & Sewerage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 Others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) confirms that Section 37 operates to convert such engagements and that the label an employer attaches to the relationship is not decisive of its true character. It is common ground that the Respondent was engaged from on or about September 2013 and that the relationship continued until on or about August 2024, a period in excess of ten years.
Passage 34 →
Section 10(7) of the Employment Act, 2007 places the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment on the employer where no written contract or particulars are produced. The Appellant produced no written casual engagement contract nor employment records to rebut the Respondent’s account of continuous service.
Passage 34 →
Held. No. The finding of procedurally and substantively unfair termination was affirmed. The employer’s account of the alleged absconding was internally inconsistent, and it did not prove actual service of the show-cause, return-to-work, or disciplinary-hearing notices. Unanswered telephone calls did not establish desertion or a fair process.
Ratio. Sections 43 and 45 require the employer to prove both a valid and fair reason and a fair procedure. Procedural fairness requires proof that the employee actually received the notice and explanation and had an opportunity to be heard; unanswered calls, without proof the employee was reached or the absence properly documented and reported, do not discharge that burden.
Issue
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent’s employment was procedurally and substantively unfair.
Passage 31 →
Held
The Appellant places reliance on a decision of this court, on materially similar facts, in which no compensation was awarded for a termination founded on absconding. That authority, whatever its precise terms, cannot assist the Appellant on this record: DW1’s evidence went no further than unanswered telephone calls made in an attempt to trace the Respondent, and the record does not establish that her desertion, as distinct from ordinary disciplinary correspondence, was ever notified to the labour office or otherwise formally recorded before termination. On the principles already set out in Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR and Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR, an employer cannot discharge its burden of procedural fairness on unanswered calls alone, absent proof that the employee was actually reached or that her absence was properly documented and reported. The finding of unfair termination, both procedural and substantive, is affirmed.
Passage 38 →
Ratio
Of critical notation, none of the three notices said to have been served on the Respondent, the show cause letter, the return-to-work notice and the disciplinary hearing notice was accompanied by an affidavit of service or other evidence of actual service. The shop steward called to give evidence on service admitted under cross-examination that no affidavit of service was available. In Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that an employer is duty-bound to explain to the employee, in the presence of another employee or a union official, the reasons for the proposed termination, and to afford the employee an opportunity to be heard; that duty presupposes proof that the notice and explanation actually reached the employee, which is absent here. The principle in Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR, that fairness requires both substantive justification and procedural fairness, is to the same effect. It is precisely the procedural limb that fails on this account.
Passage 37 →
The Appellant places reliance on a decision of this court, on materially similar facts, in which no compensation was awarded for a termination founded on absconding. That authority, whatever its precise terms, cannot assist the Appellant on this record: DW1’s evidence went no further than unanswered telephone calls made in an attempt to trace the Respondent, and the record does not establish that her desertion, as distinct from ordinary disciplinary correspondence, was ever notified to the labour office or otherwise formally recorded before termination. On the principles already set out in Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR and Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR, an employer cannot discharge its burden of procedural fairness on unanswered calls alone, absent proof that the employee was actually reached or that her absence was properly documented and reported. The finding of unfair termination, both procedural and substantive, is affirmed.
Passage 38 →
Held. Partly. The awards of Kshs. 164,100 compensation (ten months’ salary), Kshs. 16,410 notice pay, and Kshs. 34,461 for three years’ untaken leave were affirmed. However, the Kshs. 16,410 award for August 2024 salary was set aside because the employer’s uncontroverted evidence was that it had already been paid and the Respondent tendered no document proving non-payment. The revised award was Kshs. 214,971. The trial court’s half-costs order remained undisturbed, and each party bore its own appeal costs.
Ratio. A section 49 compensation award is discretionary and will be disturbed on appeal only for error of principle, such as failure to consider relevant matters or consideration of irrelevant ones. Notice pay followed from the section 37 conversion and section 35(1)(c). Although an employer’s record-keeping failure may bear on employment terms, a claimant seeking a specific unpaid wage must prove non-payment on a balance of probabilities.
Issue
3. Whether the trial court erred in the reliefs awarded to the Respondent.
Passage 32 →
Held
Nguti [2019] eKLR, it was affirmed that an award under Section 49 is a matter of judicial discretion, subject to the statutory cap of twelve months’ salary, which an appellate court will not disturb absent a demonstrated error of principle. None has been shown. Grounds 4 and 5 fail, and the award of Kshs. 164,100.00 is affirmed.
Passage 39 →
A claim for a specific unpaid wage, unlike the burden-shifting presumption in Section 10(7) which governs proof of the terms of a contract, remains a matter the claimant must prove on a balance of probabilities, and no payslip, bank entry or other document was tendered to displace DW1’s unrebutted account. Ground 7 succeeds, and the award of Kshs. 16,410.00 for August 2024 salary is set aside.
Passage 42 →
(ii) Save as to the variation in Order (i) above, the judgment and Decree of the trial court delivered on 25th August, 2025 in MC. ELRC E035 of 2025 is upheld.
Passage 46 →
Ratio
On the 3rd issue for determination, and turning first to the compensation of Kshs. 164,100.00 Grounds 4 and 5, Section 49(4) of the Employment Act, 2007 sets out the matters a court must consider in assessing compensation for unfair termination, including the length of service, the manner of termination and the extent to which the employee’s own conduct contributed to it. A discretionary award under Section 49 is open to interference on appeal only where the trial court failed to consider relevant factors or took into account irrelevant ones. The trial court’s reasoning on this head was brief, but the underlying record amply supports an award at the upper end of the statutory range: over a decade of unbroken service, a termination process wholly unsupported by proof of notice or hearing, and no evidence of any contribution by the Respondent to her own termination. In Kridha Limited v Peter Salai Kituri [2020] KEHC 707 (KLR), applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K.
Passage 39 →
The award of Kshs. 16,410.00 as salary in lieu of notice (Ground 6) is the direct statutory consequence of the finding, affirmed above, that the Respondent’s contract had by operation of Section 37 become one to which Section 35(1)(c) applies. Ground 6 does not disclose any independent basis on which to disturb it, and it is therefore similarly affirmed.
Passage 40 →
A claim for a specific unpaid wage, unlike the burden-shifting presumption in Section 10(7) which governs proof of the terms of a contract, remains a matter the claimant must prove on a balance of probabilities, and no payslip, bank entry or other document was tendered to displace DW1’s unrebutted account. Ground 7 succeeds, and the award of Kshs. 16,410.00 for August 2024 salary is set aside.
Passage 42 →
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent’s employment had converted to permanent despite evidence showing that the Respondent never worked continuously.
Paragraph 1 →Whether the respondent’s casual engagement converted under section 37 of the Employment Act; whether the termination was substantively and procedurally unfair; and whether the trial court’s awards, including compensation, notice pay, leave pay and August 2024…
Alice Njoki Macharia claimed that Sana Industries Limited employed her as a hand piper/general hand from about September 2013 at Kshs. 16,410 monthly and terminated her on about 1 August 2024 without notice or hearing. Sana contended that she was a casual…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E294 OF 2025
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
SANA INDUSTRIES LIMITED ………………………………………….………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
ALICE NJOKI MACHARIA …………………………………………..………… RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 28th August, 2025. It arises from a judgment delivered on 25th August, 2025 in MC. ELRC E035 of 2025.
By a Memorandum of Claim dated 11th February, 2025 the Respondent had sued the Appellant, claiming that she was employed on or about September, 2013 as a general hand piper earning Kshs. 16,410.00 a month and that she was unlawfully and unfairly terminated on or about 1st August, 2024 without notice or a hearing. The Appellant’s Memorandum of Response denied the claim, averring that the Respondent was a casual labourer who absconded duty and was lawfully terminated after due disciplinary process. At the trial, the Respondent testified as PW1, and the Appellant called its Human Resource Officer, Agnes Kagwiria (DW1) and the union shop steward, Lucas Mbala Juma (DW2). The trial court found for the Respondent on all three issues before it and entered judgment in the sum of Kshs. 231,381/=, together with half costs and interest.
The Memorandum of Appeal raises the following eight grounds as follows;
1. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent’s employment had converted to permanent despite evidence showing that the Respondent never worked continuously.
2. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent’s employment was unlawfully terminated despite the Appellant having demonstrated that it made all reasonable effort to subject the Respondent to the disciplinary process after she absconded duty.
3. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in failing to find that the Respondent absconded duty, which then entitled the Appellant to terminate her employment.
4. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in awarding excessive damages when the Respondent in fact absconded duty, hence abetting her own dismissal from employment.
5. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in failing to give a reasoned justification of how she arrived at ten months’ salary of Kshs. 164,100/= as damages for unfair termination.
6. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in awarding one month’s salary in lieu of notice despite evidence showing that the Respondent had absconded duty.
7. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in awarding August 2024 salary of Kshs. 16,410/= despite having made a finding that the Respondent was never at work for that month.
8. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law by failing to consider the Appellant’s evidence presented in court.
The Appellant prays for orders thus;
a) This Honourable Court allows this appeal.
b) The Judgment of Hon. Diana Orago delivered on 25th August 2025 be set aside and in its place, the awards be dismissed.
c) The costs of the appeal as well as costs of the lower court be awarded to the Appellant.
It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the Respondent was a casual employee earning a consolidated daily wage of Kshs. 650.00 payable fortnightly and whose engagement had not converted to a term contract under Section 37 of the Employment Act. Relying on Rashid Odhiambo Allogoh & 245 others v Haco Industries Ltd [2015] eKLR, the Appellant submits that Section 37(1) ought not to be misconstrued to convert casual employees to permanent status merely on account of non-daily payment or duration, and further submits that the burden lay on the Respondent to prove continuity of engagement which burden it submits she failed to discharge.
On the issue of termination, it is submitted that the Respondent absconded duty and that the Appellant’s three notices, namely the show cause letter, the return-to-work letter and the disciplinary hearing notice, were all duly served through the union shop steward. Citing the authority of Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR on the dual requirement of substantive and procedural fairness, the Appellant submits that it satisfied both limbs.
On quantum, the Appellant submits that a termination founded on a lawful reason ought not to attract compensation and that the award of ten months’ compensation is excessive and insufficiently reasoned. On unpaid leave, relying on Rogoli Ole Manadiegi v General Cargo Services Limited [2016] KEELRC 1607 (KLR), it submits that the burden remained on the Respondent to prove her leave claim, and that on its own wage computation any entitlement would not exceed Kshs. 27,300.00. On the award of August, 2024 salary, it submits that wages are payable only for work actually done, and that the award is irreconcilable with the Respondent’s absence from duty that month.
The Respondent’s case and submission is that she was employed by the Appellant from on or about September, 2013 as a hand piper and that her bank statements demonstrate a continuous, decade-long pattern of payments inconsistent with casual, cash-in-hand engagement, triggering conversion under Section 37(1) of the Employment Act, 2007. She submits that Section 10(7) of the Employment Act aforesaid placed the burden on the Appellant, as custodian of employment records, to disprove her continuity of service, a burden it failed to discharge and relies on the same authority applied by the trial court, Nanyuki Water & Sewerage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 Others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR).
On the issue of termination, the Respondent submits that the Appellant produced no affidavit of service and no evidence of actual service of any of the three notices it relied upon to establish absconding, and that the shop steward called to give evidence admitted under cross-examination that no affidavit of service for any notice was available. She submits that the authority on which the Appellant relies for a zero-compensation outcome on absconding facts succeeded only in part and is in any event distinguishable, and that unanswered telephone calls, without more, do not establish that the Appellant took adequate steps to trace her or to account for her absence through the labour office. She further submits that engaging an employee on repeated short engagements over a period of years is inconsistent with genuinely casual status.
After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent’s casual employment converted to a term contract of service under Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007.
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent’s employment was procedurally and substantively unfair.
3. Whether the trial court erred in the reliefs awarded to the Respondent.
This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to re-evaluate, re-assess and reanalyse the evidence on record and to reach its own independent conclusions on both fact and law, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify — see Abok James Odera t/a A.J. Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates [2013] eKLR.
The 1st issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent’s casual employment converted to a term contract of service under Section 37 of the Employment Act. This provides that where a casual employee works for a period or number of continuous working days amounting in the aggregate to not less than one month, or performs work that cannot reasonably be expected to be completed within three months or more, the contract of service is deemed to be one in which wages are paid monthly, to which Section 35(1)(c) applies. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Nanyuki Water & Sewerage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 Others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) confirms that Section 37 operates to convert such engagements and that the label an employer attaches to the relationship is not decisive of its true character. It is common ground that the Respondent was engaged from on or about September 2013 and that the relationship continued until on or about August 2024, a period in excess of ten years. Section 10(7) of the Employment Act, 2007 places the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment on the employer where no written contract or particulars are produced. The Appellant produced no written casual engagement contract nor employment records to rebut the Respondent’s account of continuous service.
The Appellant relies on Rashid Odhiambo Allogoh & 245 others v Haco Industries Ltd [2015] eKLR for the proposition that non-daily payment, standing alone, does not convert a casual engagement and submits that the burden of proving continuity rests on the employee. That authority is correct as far as it goes, but it does not assist the Appellant here: the aggregate period of engagement is undisputedly measured in years rather than weeks, and the Appellant’s own account of the Respondent’s daily wage is itself inconsistent, variously pleaded at Kshs. 650.00, Kshs. 670.00 and in the Respondent’s own cross-examination evidence, Kshs. 720.00 a state of the record that undermines rather than supports the case for a genuinely casual engagement. The court would clarify that Section 37 does not convert a casual engagement into permanent and pensionable employment; it deems the contract to be one in which wages are paid monthly, terminable by notice under Section 35(1)(c), and, by Section 37(3), attracting the terms and conditions the employee would have enjoyed had she not initially been engaged as a casual. So understood, the conversion finding is affirmed.
The 2nd issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination of the Respondent’s employment was procedurally and substantively unfair. Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 place the burden of proving both a valid and fair reason and a fair procedure on the employer. The Appellant’s account of when the absconding began is internally inconsistent: its Memorandum of Response pleads that the Respondent absconded duty for two consecutive days without specifying a date, its submissions on appeal at one point assert that she absconded from 1st July 2024 and elsewhere that she failed to report on 2nd August, 2024. Their witness, DW1 on the other hand testified that the Respondent was at work, per the attendance sheet, on 1st August, 2024. These are not immaterial discrepancies in a case that turns entirely on the sequence and service of disciplinary correspondence in August and September, 2024.
Of critical notation, none of the three notices said to have been served on the Respondent, the show cause letter, the return-to-work notice and the disciplinary hearing notice was accompanied by an affidavit of service or other evidence of actual service. The shop steward called to give evidence on service admitted under cross-examination that no affidavit of service was available. In Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that an employer is duty-bound to explain to the employee, in the presence of another employee or a union official, the reasons for the proposed termination, and to afford the employee an opportunity to be heard; that duty presupposes proof that the notice and explanation actually reached the employee, which is absent here. The principle in Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR, that fairness requires both substantive justification and procedural fairness, is to the same effect. It is precisely the procedural limb that fails on this account.
The Appellant places reliance on a decision of this court, on materially similar facts, in which no compensation was awarded for a termination founded on absconding. That authority, whatever its precise terms, cannot assist the Appellant on this record: DW1’s evidence went no further than unanswered telephone calls made in an attempt to trace the Respondent, and the record does not establish that her desertion, as distinct from ordinary disciplinary correspondence, was ever notified to the labour office or otherwise formally recorded before termination. On the principles already set out in Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR and Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR, an employer cannot discharge its burden of procedural fairness on unanswered calls alone, absent proof that the employee was actually reached or that her absence was properly documented and reported. The finding of unfair termination, both procedural and substantive, is affirmed.
On the 3rd issue for determination, and turning first to the compensation of Kshs. 164,100.00 Grounds 4 and 5, Section 49(4) of the Employment Act, 2007 sets out the matters a court must consider in assessing compensation for unfair termination, including the length of service, the manner of termination and the extent to which the employee’s own conduct contributed to it. A discretionary award under Section 49 is open to interference on appeal only where the trial court failed to consider relevant factors or took into account irrelevant ones. The trial court’s reasoning on this head was brief, but the underlying record amply supports an award at the upper end of the statutory range: over a decade of unbroken service, a termination process wholly unsupported by proof of notice or hearing, and no evidence of any contribution by the Respondent to her own termination. In Kridha Limited v Peter Salai Kituri [2020] KEHC 707 (KLR), applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2019] eKLR, it was affirmed that an award under Section 49 is a matter of judicial discretion, subject to the statutory cap of twelve months’ salary, which an appellate court will not disturb absent a demonstrated error of principle. None has been shown. Grounds 4 and 5 fail, and the award of Kshs. 164,100.00 is affirmed.
The award of Kshs. 16,410.00 as salary in lieu of notice (Ground 6) is the direct statutory consequence of the finding, affirmed above, that the Respondent’s contract had by operation of Section 37 become one to which Section 35(1)(c) applies. Ground 6 does not disclose any independent basis on which to disturb it, and it is therefore similarly affirmed.
On the issue of unpaid leave, the Respondent testified that she made a written leave application only once, in 2017, and did not apply in other years; the Appellant, as custodian of leave records, produced none to rebut her account or to show that leave taken or paid in lieu exceeded what she claimed. The principle in Rogoli Ole Manadiegi v General Cargo Services Limited [2016] KEELRC 1607 (KLR) that the evidential burden remains on the employee even where the employer defaults on its record-keeping duty is unexceptionable, but the Respondent’s uncontroverted testimony, unmet by any documentary rebuttal, was sufficient to discharge it. The Appellant’s alternative computation of Kshs. 27,300.00, built on its own inconsistent daily-wage figures rather than the pleaded and largely unrebutted monthly salary, is not preferred. The award of Kshs. 34,461.00 is also affirmed.
The award of Kshs. 16,410.00 for August, 2024 salary (Ground 7) stands on a different footing. The trial court’s judgment does not, in fact, contain a discrete finding that the Respondent was never at work in August, 2024; the award appears to have followed automatically from the general finding of unfair termination, without separate evaluation of the evidence bearing on this specific claim. The only direct testimony on the point is that of DW1, who stated under cross-examination that the Respondent “was paid all the dues including the salary in August,” and that testimony was not controverted. The Appellant’s own submission, that wages are earned only for work done, does not assist it here either: the undisputed evidence is that the wage in question was in fact paid, so the point cuts against maintaining a separate award rather than for one. A claim for a specific unpaid wage, unlike the burden-shifting presumption in Section 10(7) which governs proof of the terms of a contract, remains a matter the claimant must prove on a balance of probabilities, and no payslip, bank entry or other document was tendered to displace DW1’s unrebutted account. Ground 7 succeeds, and the award of Kshs. 16,410.00 for August 2024 salary is set aside.
As to costs, this court, exercising its discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, sees no clear or specific reason to interfere with the trial court’s half-costs order and no reason to make any additional order as to the costs of this appeal.
I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;
(i) The award of Kshs. 16,410.00 being salary for August, 2024 salary is set aside.
(ii) Save as to the variation in Order (i) above, the judgment and Decree of the trial court delivered on 25th August, 2025 in MC. ELRC E035 of 2025 is upheld.
(iii) The revised award comes out thus;
a) Ten (10) months salary as compensation for unfair termination of employment …………………………………………………………………..Kshs. 164,100.00
b) One (1) months salary in lieu of notice …………………………..Kshs. 16,410.00
c) Compensation for three (3) years untaken leave……………….….Kshs. 34,461.00
Total of Award…………………………………………………Kshs. 214,971.00
(iv) Interest on the sum of Kshs. 214,971.00 shall accrue at court rates from the date of the trial court’s judgment until payment in full.
(v) Each party shall bear the costs of this appeal.
Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Mr. Eredi instructed by Eredi Mulama & Company Advocates for the Appellant.
2. Mr. Rogers Alinyo instructed by Adoli & Company Advocates for the Respondent.