Land law

Chepkwony & another v Gulflink Enterprises Ltd [2026] KEELC 7455 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
5 November 2026
Judge(s)
Mbogo C.G.

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Background

Before this court for determination is the chamber summons dated 18th April, 2026 filed by the defendant/applicant and it is expressed to be brought pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) and (4) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014 seeking the following orders:-

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

The application was not opposed for the following reasons. While the CTS shows that the plaintiffs/respondents filed grounds of opposition dated 30th June 2026, the same was not paid for despite an invoice having been issued to the plaintiffs/respondents advocates. As it is, this document lies bare in the system, and in the absence of a receipt, the court cannot admit such document as a pleading that is properly filed before the court.…

Paragraph 6 →

Decision / orders

From the above, I find merit in the chamber summons dated 18th April, 2026 and I grant the following orders:-

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Reasoning passage

The instruction fees in this matter had already been determined by the ruling above, and the taxing officer only needed to apply the same in taxing the party and party bill of costs. It is evidently clear that the taxing officer fell into serious error in taxing the bill of costs. As a result of the errors, the getting up fees which is dependent on the instruction fees was assessed wrongly. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that…

Paragraph 16 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCC NO. E271 OF 2022

ELIUD K. CHEPKWONY...........................1ST PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

SAMUEL PATRICK NJUE........................2ND PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VERSUS

GULFLINK ENTERPRISES LIMITED..............DEFENDANT/APPLICANT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the chamber summons dated 18th April, 2026 filed by the defendant/applicant and it is expressed to be brought pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) and (4) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014 seeking the following orders:-

1. That this honourable court be pleased to extend time for the defendant/applicant to file a reference against the taxation ruling delivered without notice to the defendant/applicant on 10th March, 2026 (but erroneously indicated as having been delivered on 8th December, 2025 on the court’s e-filing dashboard).

2. That this honourable court be pleased to set aside the ruling on taxation delivered by the honourable deputy registrar (Vincent Kiplagat) on 10th March, 2026 in its entirety.

3. That this honourable court be pleased to re-tax the defendant/applicant’s party and party bill of costs dated 23rd April, 2025 afresh.

4. That in the alternative to prayer 3 above, this honourable court be pleased to refer the defendant/applicant’s party and party bill of costs dated 23rd April, 2025 back for fresh taxation before a different taxing officer.

5. Spent.

6. That the costs of this application be provided for.

2. The application is premised on the grounds on its face and further supported by the affidavit of Aisha Taib, advocate for the defendant/applicant sworn on even date. The defendant/applicant deposed that the taxing officer committed errors of principle in taxing its party and party bill of costs dated 23rd April 2025, particularly in the assessment of instruction fees and getting-up fees.

3. The defendant/applicant deposed that the plaintiffs/respondents instituted the suit claiming ownership of properties known as LR. no. 209/20626 and LR. no. 209/16880, measuring approximately 2.996 hectares. The defendant/applicant entered appearance, filed a defence and counterclaim and subsequently sought security for costs. By a ruling delivered on 3rd July 2023, the court ordered the plaintiffs/respondents to provide security for costs in the sum of Kshs.20,000,000/-. The plaintiffs/respondents suit was subsequently dismissed following non-compliance with the security for costs order, giving rise to the defendant/applicant’s party and party bill of costs dated 23rd April 2025, drawn in the sum of Kshs.34,834,933.40/- which was based on the unchallenged valuation of the suit property at Kshs.1,450,000,000/-.

4. The defendant/applicant deposed that although the taxation ruling is dated 10th March 2026, the court’s e-filing dashboard indicates that a ruling was delivered on 8th December, 2025. The defendant/applicant maintained that no notice of delivery was served upon its advocates and that the ruling was not uploaded onto the case tracking system. According to the defendant/applicant, its advocates obtained a copy of the ruling from the registry on 17th April 2026, following correspondence to the deputy registrar. For this reason, they seek enlargement of time to challenge the taxation.

5. On the substantive challenge, the defendant/applicant faults the taxing officer for finding that no valuation report had been produced to establish the value of the subject matter, notwithstanding the existence of a valuation report marked AAS 001, annexed to the affidavit of Arafat Abdulla sworn on 1st December, 2022 which valued the suit properties at Kshs.1,450,000,000/-. The defendant/applicant further deposed that the taxing officer failed to consider the said valuation report and the ruling of Oguttu Mboya, J on security for costs and consequently awarded instruction fees of Kshs.200,000/- against the claimed sum of Kshs.21,955,000/- and getting-up fees of Kshs.66,666.67 against the claimed sum of Kshs.7,500,000/-.

6. The application was not opposed for the following reasons. While the CTS shows that the plaintiffs/respondents filed grounds of opposition dated 30th June 2026, the same was not paid for despite an invoice having been issued to the plaintiffs/respondents advocates. As it is, this document lies bare in the system, and in the absence of a receipt, the court cannot admit such document as a pleading that is properly filed before the court. The application was canvassed through written submissions. The defendant/applicant filed written submissions dated 17th June, 2026. I have considered the application and the written submissions filed. The issues for determination are as follows:-

i. Whether the defendant/applicant has established sufficient grounds for enlargement of time to challenge the taxing officer’s decision.

ii. Whether the taxing officer committed any error(s) of principle warranting interference with the taxation.

7. Paragraph 11(1) and (2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order provides for the procedure for challenging a taxation decision, including notification of the disputed items and filing a reference before a Judge. Paragraph 11(4) empowers the court to enlarge the prescribed time, even where that period has expired. The discretion must, however, be exercised judicially, taking into account the reasons for the delay, the conduct of the applicant and the circumstances of the case.

8. From the proceedings as recorded in this file, this matter was in court on various dates including 2nd July 2025, 20th August 2025, 6th November, 2025 and 20th November, 2025. On 20th August 2025, 6th November and 20th November 2025, the advocates for the defendant/applicant were not present in court. On these dates, the taxing officer issued directions more so on 6th November 2025, and 20th August, 2025 that the defendant/applicant be served. From the CTS and even the file, there is no record of service upon the defendant/applicant in compliance with the directions issued by the taxing officer.

9. On 20th November 2025, this court reserved a date for ruling of the party and party bill of costs for 2nd December, 2025. There is no record of any proceedings that took place on 2nd December, 2025. Thereafter, a date is inserted as 5th March, 2026 without coram indicating that a ruling will perhaps be delivered on 10th March, 2026. Notably, it is unknown which parties appeared before this court, if there were any. Not even the court assistant. There was no ruling notice to issue to the parties on this particular date. Thereafter, on 10th March 2026, the taxing officer appears to have delivered a ruling in the presence of Ms. Waweru for the plaintiffs/respondents and further granted stay of execution for 45 days. Again, there are no directions given to the parties notifying them of this ruling. A question arises, in the absence of a mention notice, how was the plaintiff/respondent notified of the proceedings before the taxing officer on 5th March, 2026 to enable them appear before the court on 10th March, 2026?

10. In determining the first issue, the court observes that although the ruling bears the date 10th March 2026, the defendant/applicant deposed that it only obtained a copy on 17th April, 2026 and filed the instant application on 20th April, 2026. From the CTS, it appears that the ruling was uploaded on the platform on the same date it was delivered i.e. 10th March, 2026. The defendant/applicant sought to have a copy of the said ruling in a letter that was sent on 4th April, 2026. The explanation for the delay has been sufficiently explained. In the circumstances, and bearing in mind the apparent discrepancy in the court records concerning the date of delivery, the court is satisfied that the defendant/ applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause for enlargement of time.

11. On the second issue, the circumstances under which this court may or can interfere with the taxing officer’s exercise of discretion are now well known. The taxing master must be guided by the principles governing taxation as was held in the leading case of Premchand Raichand Ltd Another -vs- Quarry services of East Africa Ltd and Another No. 3 (1972) EA 162. The principles laid out are:-

i. The instruction fee should cover the advocates work including taking instructions and preparing the case for trial or appeal;

ii. The taxing master was expected to tax each bill on its merits;

iii. The value of the subject matter had to be taken into account;

iv. The taxing master’s discretion was to be exercised judicially and not whimsically or capriciously;

v. Though the successful litigant was entitled to a fair reimbursement, the taxing master had to consider the public interest such that costs were not allowed to rise to a level that would confine access to the courts to the wealthy;

vi. No appeal or reference can be allowed unless the appellant can show or demonstrate that above mentioned principles have been breached because judges on appeal as a principle do not like to interfere with an assessment of costs by the taxing officer unless the officer has misdirected himself or herself in a matter of principle, but if the quantum of an assessment is manifestly extravagant, a misdirection of principle may be a necessary inference.”

12. On assessment of instruction fees, in the case of Joreth Ltd vs Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 E.A. 92, the court of appeal stated as follows:-

“We would at this stage point out that the value of the subject matter of a suit for the purposes of taxation of a bill of costs ought to be determined from the pleadings, judgment or settlement (if such be the case) but if the same is not so ascertainable the taxing officer is entitled to use his discretion to assess such instruction fee as he considers just, taking into account, amongst other matters, the nature and the importance of the cause or the matter, the interest of the parties, general conduct of the proceedings, any direction by the trial judge and all other relevant circumstances.”

13. On instruction fees, the defendant/applicant argued that the taxing officer failed to consider the valuation report marked ‘AAS 001’, which placed the value of the suit properties at Kshs.1,450,000,000/. The report was annexed to the affidavit of Arafat Abdulla sworn on 1st December, 2022 in support of the defendant’s/applicant’s application for security for costs. The defendant/applicant contends that the report formed part of the court record and was also considered by the trial court when directing the plaintiffs to provide security for costs in the sum of Kshs.20,000,000/-.

14. Upon examining the impugned ruling, the court notes that the taxing officer acknowledged the existence of the valuation report in the introductory portion of the determination of Item 1. However, the taxing officer subsequently stated that no valuation report had been produced to ascertain the value of the subject matter and proceeded to assess the instruction fees at Kshs.200,000/-.

15. More importantly, the ruling giving rise to the party and party bill of costs was quite clear on instruction fees. In Njue & another v Gulflink Enterprises Limited [2023] KEELC 18623 (KLR) Mboya, J held as follows:-

“49. Towards and in an endeavor to assist the honourable on the question of quantum of costs, the applicant herein has filed and lodged with the court a valuation report pertaining to and concerning the monetary value suit property.

50. From the valuation report, which has been availed before the honourable court; it is indicated that the suit property has a value of Kshs.1,450,000,000/= only. For good measure, it is imperative that the suit property is indeed valuable and perhaps forms the basis of why same is being disputed before the honourable court.

51. Nevertheless, despite having been served with the affidavit together with the valuation report, the respondents herein and in particular; the 1st respondent has neither disputed nor controverted the value alluded to at the foot of the valuation report filed with the court.

52. In the absence of any contrary valuation report, the honourable court is at liberty to assume that indeed the valuation report beforehand captures and reflects the correct value attendant to the suit property.

53. Having come to the conclusion that the valuation report beforehand has not been controverted and challenged in any manner whatsoever, it would therefore be appropriate to adopt the value at the foot thereof and use same as the requisite benchmark/yardstick for computation and ascertainment of the Instructions fees that may be due and payable to the defendant, if ultimately the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed.

54. Further and in addition, the Advocate Remuneration Order 2014, provides a scheme for ascertainment of Party and Party costs. In this regard, such costs are reckoned and ascertained on the basis of the monetary value appearing on the face of pleadings, settlement and/or judgment, whichever is appropriate.

55. In this respect, it is instructive to adopt and reiterate the ratio decidendi that was elaborated upon by the Court of Appeal in the case of Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others (2019) eKLR, where the court succinctly observed and held as hereunder; “It seems to us quite plain that the basis for determining subject matter value for purposes of instruction fees is wholly dependent on the stage at which the fees are being taxed. Where it happens before judgment, it is the pleadings that form the basis for determining subject value. Once judgment has been entered, and for what seems to us to be an obvious reason, recourse will not be had to the pleadings since the judgment does determine conclusively the value of the subject matter as a claim, no matter how pleaded, gets its true value as adjudged by the court. Where, however, a suit is settled, then, from a literal and practical reading of the provision, the subject matter value must be sought by reference, in the first instance, to the terms of the settlement. Just as one would not start with the pleadings in the face of a judgment, it is indubitable that one cannot start with the pleadings where there is a settlement. It is only where the value of the subject matter is neither discernible nor determinable from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement, as the case may be, that the taxing officer is permitted to use his discretion to assess instructions fees in accordance with what he considers just bearing in mind the various elements contained in the provision we are addressing. He does have discretion as to what he considers just but that discretion kicks in only after he has engaged with the proper basis as expressly and mandatorily provided: either the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement. He has no leeway to disregard the statutorily commanded starting point. And we think, with respect, that the starting point can only be one of the three. It is not open to the taxing officer to choose one or the other or to use them in combination, the provision being expressly disjunctive as opposed to conjunctive. It is also mandatory and not permissive.”

56. Having ascertained that the value of the suit property is worth Kshs.1,450,000,000/= only, or thereabouts; and taking into account the provisions of The Advocate Remuneration Order, I come to the conclusion that the sum of Kshs.20,000,000/= only, is a reasonable measure of the instruction fees that may be due and payable to the defendant, if at all, the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed whilst the counterclaim is upheld.

57. Premised and based on the foregoing, I am obliged and obligated to find and hold that the plaintiffs/respondents herein, either jointly and/or severally, shall be called upon to deposit the sum of Kshs.20,000,000/= Only, in an escrow account in the names of the advocates for the respective parties, within a set timeline.” (With emphasis)

16. The instruction fees in this matter had already been determined by the ruling above, and the taxing officer only needed to apply the same in taxing the party and party bill of costs. It is evidently clear that the taxing officer fell into serious error in taxing the bill of costs. As a result of the errors, the getting up fees which is dependent on the instruction fees was assessed wrongly. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is need to interfere with the taxing officer’s ruling.

17. From the above, I find merit in the chamber summons dated 18th April, 2026 and I grant the following orders:-

i. Owing to the delivery of the ruling without notice on 10th March, 2026, the court hereby extends time for the defendant/applicant to file a reference against the said ruling.

ii. The ruling of the Hon. Vincent Kiplagat Deputy Registrar delivered on 10th March, 2026 is hereby set aside in its entirety.

iii. The party and party bill of costs dated 23rd April, 2025 is remitted for taxation afresh before another taxing officer besides Hon. Vincent Kiplagat.

iv. The defendant/applicant is awarded costs of this application.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED & DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT

THIS 5TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026.

HON. MBOGO C.G.

JUDGE

05/11/2026.

In the presence of:

Mr. Benson Agunga - Court assistant

Ms. Aisha Taib holding brief for Mr. Taib (senior counsel) for the Defendant/Applicant

No appearance for the Plaintiffs/Respondents

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