Background
The Court is called upon to determine the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 13th July 2026, in which they seek the following orders;
Paragraph 1 →Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Court is called upon to determine the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 13th July 2026, in which they seek the following orders;
Paragraph 1 →On the issue of whether the status quo order was clear and unambiguous, the Court considers the relevant part of the order issued on 12th May 2026 where the it directed that “the current status quo on the suit property be maintained pending inter partes hearing.” The Plaintiffs contend that the order required the property to remain vacant and untransferred, while the Defendants maintain that the 2nd Defendant had already taken…
Paragraph 21 →Upon considering the evidence as a whole, I find that the Plaintiffs have not established the precise state of affairs prevailing on 12th May 2026, the specific post-order acts that materially altered that position, or the deliberate participation of each person cited in the alleged disobedience. The requirements for civil contempt, as set out in Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 Others (supra) have therefore not been…
Paragraph 38 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
MILIMANI LAW COURTS
ELC CASE NO. E087 OF 2026
TARRY ABDUB ADHI ................................................................. 1ST APPLICANT
FARIHIYA ALI SHARIFF .......................................................... 2ND APPLICANT
VERSUS
PORTOFINO PROPERTIES LIMITED……....................….1ST RESPONDENT
MAHIR ALI SHARIFF ............................................................ 2ND RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The Court is called upon to determine the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 13th July 2026, in which they seek the following orders;
1) Spent
2) The 2nd Defendant, MAHIR ALI SHARIFF, and authorized agents of the 1st Defendant, RONAL SAMANI and JANAKAN MURUGESAN, be cited for contempt of court for willfully disobeying and/or failing to comply with the orders of this Honorable Court issued on 12th May 2026, which required them to maintain the status quo as it then was over Maisonette No. 429, erected on L.R. No. 209/12221/244.
3) Upon being cited MAHIR ALI SHARIFF, RONAL SAMANI and JANAKAN MURUGESAN be committed to civil jail for a period of six (6) months or for such other period as this Honorable Court may deem fit and just, unless they forthwith purge the contempt by complying with the aforesaid Court Order.
4) The Honourable Court be pleased to order that the Land Registrar, Nairobi, places a caveat to stop any further dealings on Maisonette No. 429, erected on L.R. No. 209/12221/244, Nairobi and avert the intended transfer of the suit property or any other dealings over it in order to protect the integrity of the of status quo.
5) The costs of this application be borne by the Defendants.
2. Although the grounds in support of the application and submissions by Counsel sometimes refer to the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the contempt prayers specifically name the three individuals. The Court will therefore determine the allegations against the persons cited, separately and according to the evidence concerning each of them. The 1st Defendant company is not expressly named in the prayer for committal.
3. The dispute herein arises from competing claims concerning the suit property. The Plaintiffs rely on an Agreement for Sale dated 29 November 2024 between themselves and the 1st Defendant, under which the purchase price was stated to be KShs. 38,737,500. The Defendants rely on a subsequent sale agreement in favour of the 2nd Defendant, said to have been made on 24 February 2026 for KShs. 36,000,000.
4. The question in the present application is whether the Plaintiffs have proved, to the standard applicable to contempt proceedings, that the persons cited knowingly and deliberately disobeyed the Court’s order of 12th May 2026.
5. The Plaintiffs contend that, on 12th May 2026, the suit property was unoccupied and had not been transferred, a position which they say was confirmed by counsel for the 1st Defendant. They maintain that the order required that state of affairs to be preserved pending the inter partes hearing.
6. In the supporting affidavit sworn on 13th July 2026, the 1st Plaintiff states that, on or about 23rd June 2026, he passed by the property and observed construction works. He was allegedly informed that the 2nd Defendant was preparing the house for occupation. The Plaintiffs subsequently instructed their advocates to write to the Defendants on 24th June 2026, as evidenced by annexure TAA-2. They state that the letter elicited no response.
7. The 1st Plaintiff further states that, on 10th July 2026, while driving past the property, he saw a truck offloading furniture under the supervision of the 2nd Defendant. From these circumstances, the Plaintiffs infer that the 2nd Defendant must have received authority and keys from the 1st Defendant or its agents after the status quo order. They also allege that they received information that the 1st Defendant had initiated a transfer of the property, although the source of that information and the precise stage reached in the transfer process are not specified.
8. The Plaintiffs rely on annexure TAA-3, being their Agreement for Sale dated 29th November 2024, and contend that Ronal Samani and Janakan Murugesan are named therein as agents responsible for dealings concerning the property. They accordingly seek to hold the two individuals personally liable for the alleged disobedience. Annexure TAA-4 comprises the affidavit of service relied upon in support of the application.
9. The 1st Defendant’s response is contained in the affidavit sworn on 27th July 2026 by Janakan Murugesan, a director of the company. The 1st Defendant acknowledges knowledge of the order of 12th May 2026 but denies disobeying it.
10.The 1st Defendant’s case is that it entered into a sale agreement with the 2nd Defendant on 24th February 2026 for KShs. 36,000,000, that the purchase price was paid in full, and that possession and keys were handed over to him on 17th April 2026. It relies on the sale agreement, payment evidence, handover documents and transfer documents exhibited in its replying affidavit.
11. The 1st Defendant maintains that the process of making the house habitable commenced before the order of 12th May 2026 and that it retained neither possession nor day-to-day control of the property after the handover. It further states that, although transfer documents were executed before the order, the transfer had not been lodged at the Lands Office. It also contends that the Plaintiffs knew of the subsequent sale because their application dated 2nd April 2026 sought to join the 2nd Defendant to the proceedings on account of that transaction.
12.The 2nd Defendant similarly states that he paid the purchase price of KShs. 36,000,000 and took possession of the property on 17th April 2026, pending registration of the transfer. He relies on annexure MAS-2 as evidence of handover. According to him, the works undertaken at the house were repairs to rain-damaged walls, painting and other remedial works necessary to make the property habitable. He says that the works began in April 2026 and that substantial renovations had been completed by the end of that month.
13. The 2nd Defendant disputes the allegation that construction undertaken after the order altered the status quo. He also states that no photographs, videos or other independent evidence of the alleged construction or furniture delivery was produced. He does not, however, expressly deny the delivery of furniture alleged to have occurred on 10 July 2026.
14. Regarding knowledge of the order, the 2nd Defendant states that he received an email from the Plaintiffs’ advocate on 16th May 2026 enclosing the application dated 6th March 2026, the amended plaint, the witness list, witness statements and a bundle of documents. He maintains that the order of 12th May 2026 was not attached, that he was not previously a party to the proceedings and that he first saw the order when it was exhibited as TAA-1 to the supporting affidavit.
Submissions by the Parties
15. The Plaintiffs filed submissions dated 2nd September 2026 setting out the legal
required and standards of proof of contempt of Court. The Counsel for the Applicant submits that they have met the required standard of proof The 1st Defendant filed submissions opposing the application, and the 2nd Defendant filed submissions dated 6th October 2026. The Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove the essential elements of contempt, particularly a deliberate breach of a clear order. They rely on the alleged pre-order sale, payment, handover and execution of transfer documents, and contend that the Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning subsequent activities are unsupported by sufficiently cogent evidence.
16. The 1st Defendant additionally argues that a good-faith belief in entitlement to the
property is inconsistent with deliberate disobedience; that the transfer has not been lodged; and that the caveat sought should not be granted through contempt proceedings while the substantive application for injunctive relief remains pending. The Defendants also challenge the adequacy of the evidence concerning the Plaintiffs’ own contractual payments and rely on the authorities cited in their submissions.
Analysis and Determination
17. The Court has considered the Notice of Motion, the grounds in support thereof, the
supporting and replying affidavits and their respective annexures, as well as the written submissions and authorities cited by the parties. The issues arising for determination are
A) Whether the status quo order issued on 12th May 2026 was sufficiently clear and unambiguous;
B) whether the persons cited had knowledge of the order;
C) whether they deliberately disobeyed it;
D) whether an order should issue directing the Land Registrar to place a caveat against the suit property; and who should bear the costs of the application.
18. The jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt is founded on Section 5(1) of the Judicature Act. Following the invalidation of the Contempt of Court Act, 2016, in Kenya Human Rights Commission v Attorney General & Another [2018] eKLR, Section 5 of the Judicature Act remains the applicable statutory foundation. The power is exercised to uphold the authority and dignity of the Court and to ensure obedience to its orders.
19.The applicable principles were set out in Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 Others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR), where the Court identified four essential elements of civil contempt: that the order was clear and unambiguous; that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the order; that the order was breached; and that the breach was deliberate. These elements must be established cumulatively.
20. Further, in Gatharia K. Mutitika v Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KLR 227, the Court of Appeal held that the standard of proof in contempt proceedings is higher than a balance of probabilities, though not exactly beyond reasonable doubt. This heightened standard is justified by the quasi-criminal nature of contempt proceedings and the possibility of deprivation of personal liberty. The same position was reiterated in Ubora Housing Co-operative Society Ltd v Tripple Two Properties Ltd & 7 Others [2023] KECA 675 (KLR) and Republic v Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & Another [2018] KESC 51 (KLR).
21. On the issue of whether the status quo order was clear and unambiguous, the Court considers the relevant part of the order issued on 12th May 2026 where the it directed that “the current status quo on the suit property be maintained pending inter partes hearing.” The Plaintiffs contend that the order required the property to remain vacant and untransferred, while the Defendants maintain that the 2nd Defendant had already taken possession and commenced renovations before the order was issued and thus, according to them, the status quo was as described by them.
22. In Shimmers Plaza Limited v National Bank of Kenya Limited [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal explained that status quo ordinarily refers to the existing state of affairs at the time the order is made. Similarly, in Bia Tosha Distributors Limited v Kenya Breweries Limited & 6 Others [2023] KESC 14 (KLR), the Supreme Court emphasised the need to identify the existing position which the Court intended to preserve.
23. The order of 12th May 2026 was intended to preserve the existing state of affairs concerning the suit property pending the inter partes hearing. It did not, however, expressly direct that the property remains vacant, prohibit occupation, restrain renovations or prohibit the delivery of furniture. Neither did it expressly direct the 2nd Defendant to vacate the premises. The order did not describe the status quo that was existing at the time when the order was issued.
24. The order was therefore binding and sufficiently clear in its general preservatory purpose. However, its application to the alleged particular acts must be determined against the actual circumstances prevailing on 12th May 2026. The Court cannot enlarge the order retrospectively to impose prohibitions that were not expressly stated or reasonably contemplated by its terms.
25. The Court must consequently distinguish between the physical possession and occupation of the property, renovations undertaken thereon, delivery of furniture and dealings with the registered title. These are separate acts and must be considered independently.
26. On the issue of whether knowledge of the order and deliberate disobedience have been established, the 1st Defendant, through its director Janakan Murugesan, acknowledges being aware of the order. In Shimmers Plaza Limited case (supra), the Court of Appeal held that personal service is not invariably necessary where actual knowledge of the order has been established.
27. The 2nd Defendant, however, disputes having received the order itself, maintaining that the email of 16th May 2026 merely transmitted pleadings and other court documents. As regards Ronal Samani, the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated that he was served with, or otherwise had knowledge of the order. His description as an agent in the sale agreement does not, without more, establish knowledge or personal participation in the alleged breach.
28. In any event, knowledge of an order, without proof of deliberate disobedience, cannot sustain a finding of contempt. The Court must therefore consider whether the specific acts complained of have been proved against each person cited.
29. The Plaintiffs allege that construction works were undertaken on the suit property on 23rd June 2026. The 2nd Defendant maintains that the renovations commenced immediately after he took possession on 17th April 2026 and were substantially completed by the end of April 2026, before the status quo order was issued.
30. The handover documents dated 17th April 2026 support the Defendants' assertion that possession had been delivered before the order. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have not sufficiently identified the nature and extent of the works allegedly undertaken on 23rd June 2026, or demonstrated how those works materially altered the state of affairs existing on 12th May 2026.
31. Although the 1st Plaintiff's evidence that he witnessed construction works is relevant, the general description of the alleged works, when considered alongside the evidence of prior possession and renovations, does not establish to the requisite standard that new works were undertaken in deliberate disobedience of the Court order. The Court, therefore finds that the alleged construction works have not been proved to constitute contempt.
32. The Plaintiffs further allege that on 10th July 2026, a truck delivered furniture to the suit property under the supervision of the 2nd Defendant. Even assuming that the delivery occurred, the question remains whether it amounted to a breach of the status quo order.
33. The Defendants' evidence is that possession had been handed over on 17th April 2026 and that the 2nd Defendant had commenced preparing the premises for occupation before the order was issued. The Plaintiffs have not established that the property was vacant on 12th May 2026 or that the delivery of furniture materially altered the position which the Court intended to preserve.
34. Further, there is insufficient evidence connecting the 1st Defendant, Janakan Murugesan or Ronal Samani to the alleged delivery or demonstrating that they authorised or procured it in deliberate disobedience of the order. I am therefore not satisfied that the alleged delivery of furniture establishes contempt.
35. The Plaintiffs also allege that the 1st Defendant initiated the transfer of the suit property after the issuance of the status quo order. The 1st Defendant maintains that the sale agreement was executed on 24th February 2026, possession was handed over on 17th April 2026 and the transfer documents were executed before the order was issued.
36. There is a distinction between execution, lodgment and registration of a transfer. The mere execution of transfer documents before the order cannot constitute disobedience of an order subsequently issued. The Plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that a particular dealing undertaken after 12th May 2026 altered the registered status of the property contrary to the order.
37. No official search or other documentary evidence has been produced to establish that the transfer was lodged or registered after the issuance of the order. The allegation therefore remains unsubstantiated. I accordingly find that no deliberate breach of the order has been established against the 1st Defendant or the persons cited in connection with the alleged transfer.
38. Upon considering the evidence as a whole, I find that the Plaintiffs have not established the precise state of affairs prevailing on 12th May 2026, the specific post-order acts that materially altered that position, or the deliberate participation of each person cited in the alleged disobedience. The requirements for civil contempt, as set out in Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 Others (supra) have therefore not been satisfied.
39. Consequently, the Court declines to cite Mahir Ali Shariff, Ronal Samani and Janakan Murugesan for contempt or to commit them to civil jail. For avoidance of doubt, this finding does not determine the validity or priority of the competing sale agreements, nor does it determine the merits of the separate application dated 6th March 2026.
40. On the issue of whether the Land Registrar, Nairobi should be directed to place a caveat on the suit property as sought by the Applicant to prevent further dealings pending determination of the dispute, the Court has considered Sections 71 to 76 of the Land Registration Act which provide mechanisms for the protection of interests in land through the lodging of cautions and the registration of restrictions. However, the existence of those statutory remedies does not automatically entitle the Plaintiffs to the specific order sought in the present contempt application.
41. The court has also noted that the orders issued in the ruling delivered on the application dated 6th March 2026 offer protection and preservation of the suit property against transfer, charge, leasing and other dealings in the said property. The court thus declines to issue the order sought directing the Land Registrar to register a caveat against the suit property.
42. The issue of Costs also arise for determination. Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act gives the Court discretion over costs, subject to the general principle that costs ordinarily follow the event unless the Court, for good reason, orders otherwise.
43. The contempt application has not succeeded. However, it arose from a general status quo direction whose precise physical baseline was not expressly recorded, while the parties have advanced materially different accounts of possession, renovation and the state of the property. In those circumstances, the Court considers it just that each party bear its own costs of the application.
44. For the reasons set out above, the Court finds that:
I) The Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 13th July 2026 lacks merit and is dismissed in its entirety.
II) Each party shall bear shall bear its own costs of the application.
Delivered, dated and signed via Microsoft Teams this 5th day of November 2026.
HON. L. G. KIMANI
JUDGE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
The Ruling read in the presence of-
M/s Odhiambo holding brief for Munyeri for Applicant
Gachai for 1st Defendant/Respondent
Kipkoech for 2nd Defendant/Respondent