Land law

Kinyua v Motaroki & another [2026] KEELC 7633 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Appeal E048 of 2026
Judgment date
9 November 2026
Judge(s)
Mohammed N. Kullow

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The Notice of Motion dated 19 June 2026 was dismissed in its entirety: the Applicant was not joined as 2nd Respondent and the consent dated 12 June 2026 was not set aside or vacated. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the application.

Supporting judgment passages

33. In the result, I find that the Notice of Motion dated 19th June 2026 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs of the application.

Paragraph 33 →
Issue 1Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to warrant her joinder as the 2nd Respondent in the appeal.

Held. No. The Applicant had not established a sufficient independent legal interest in the appeal or that her presence was necessary for effectual and complete determination of the appeal. Her alleged contributions to rent and litigation, assistance with documents, court attendance, witness role, and disputed spousal relationship did not make her a party to the tenancy or establish a necessary interest. The joinder prayer was without merit.

Ratio. Under Order 1 Rule 10(2), joinder requires that the person ought to be joined or is necessary to enable complete and effective adjudication of the questions in the suit. An applicant must demonstrate an identifiable personal legal interest, likely prejudice if excluded, and relevance to the questions before the court. Participation in prior litigation or financial support, without an independent tenancy right or a question requiring that person's participation, is insufficient.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

a) Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to warrant her joinder as the 2nd Respondent in the appeal.

Passage 31 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

25. In view of the foregoing, I find that the Applicant has not established a sufficient legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal or demonstrated that her presence is necessary for the effectual and complete determination of the issues arising therein. Accordingly, the prayer for her joinder as the 2nd Respondent is without merit.

Paragraph 25 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, be struck out. And that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added.”

Passage 36 →

23. The Applicant's alleged contributions towards rent and litigation expenses, together with her participation in preparing documents and attending court, do not, without more, establish that her presence is necessary for the determination of the appeal. Her participation as a witness before the Tribunal did not make her a party to those proceedings. Equally, the alleged spousal relationship, which is disputed by the Respondent, does not, of itself, establish an independent legal interest in the tenancy or demonstrate why the appeal cannot be determined in her absence.

Paragraph 23 →

24. Further, the Applicant has not identified any question arising from the Tribunal's determination which requires her participation for its effective and complete adjudication. The dispute before the Tribunal concerned the tenancy relationship between the existing parties, whereas the Applicant's proposed participation is principally founded on her alleged relationship with the Respondent and her financial involvement in the litigation. The determination of those matters would introduce questions which were not the subject of an independent claim before the Tribunal and which do not arise for determination in the present appeal.

Paragraph 24 →
Issue 2Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for setting aside the consent dated 12th June 2026.

Held. No. The Applicant failed to establish fraud or any other sufficient basis to interfere with the consent. The existing parties voluntarily executed it to settle their dispute, and the Applicant's exclusion from negotiations did not invalidate it because she had no established independent legal interest in the appeal. The prayer to set aside or vacate the consent was without merit.

Ratio. A party alleging fraud or other facts that invalidate an agreement bears the burden of proving them. Exclusion from settlement negotiations, without sufficient evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, collusion, or other unlawful conduct in procuring the consent, does not justify setting it aside—particularly where the challenger has not established an independent legal interest in the proceedings.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

b) Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for setting aside the consent dated 12th June 2026.

Passage 32 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

32. In the circumstances, I find that the Applicant has not established fraud or any other sufficient ground to warrant interference with the consent dated 12th June 2026. Accordingly, the prayer seeking to set aside or vacate the consent is without merit.

Paragraph 32 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

28. Further, Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80 place the burden of proving the existence of particular facts upon the party asserting them. Accordingly, where fraud or other circumstances invalidating an agreement are alleged, the party making those allegations bears the burden of establishing them.

Paragraph 28 →

30. The Applicant has not placed before the Court sufficient evidence demonstrating that the consent was procured through fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or collusion. Her objection is principally founded on her exclusion from the settlement negotiations and her alleged financial and personal involvement in the earlier proceedings. However, as already determined under the first issue, the Applicant has not established an independent legal interest warranting her participation in the appeal. Her exclusion from the negotiations, without evidence of unlawful conduct in procuring the agreement, is therefore insufficient to invalidate the consent.

Paragraph 30 →
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Case at a glance

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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

The application before me is the Notice of Motion dated 19th June 2026, brought under Order 1 Rules 3, 8 and 10 and Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act.

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Similarly, in Francis Karioki Muruatetu & Another v Republic & 5 Others [2016] eKLR, the Supreme Court emphasised that an applicant seeking joinder must demonstrate an identifiable personal interest in the proceedings, the prejudice likely to be suffered if joinder is declined, and the relevance of the proposed participation to the questions before the Court.

Paragraph 20 →

Reasoning passage

Having considered the application, the affidavits filed by the respective parties and their submissions, I find that the following two issues arise for determination:

Paragraph 17 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether Christine Kendi Gikunda had shown sufficient legal interest and necessity to be joined as the intended 2nd Respondent in the appeal; and whether she had proved grounds to set aside or vacate the parties’ consent dated 12 June 2026.

Material facts

The appeal originated in a landlord–tenant dispute between Shelmit Kinyua and Polycarp Motaroki before the Rent Restriction Tribunal. Gikunda alleged that she was Motaroki’s wife, lived with him at the premises, was forcibly evicted with him, contributed to…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

MILIMANI LAW COURTS

ELC APPEAL NO. E048 OF 2026

SHELMIT KINYUA………………………………………………………………APPELLANT

-VERSUS-

POLYCARP MOTAROKI………………………………………………….. RESPONDENT

CHRISTINE KENDI GIKUNDA……………APPLICANT/INTENDED 2ND RESPONDENT

RULING

The Application

1. The application before me is the Notice of Motion dated 19th June 2026, brought under Order 1 Rules 3, 8 and 10 and Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The Applicant, Christine Kendi Gikunda, seeks leave to be joined in these proceedings as the 2nd Respondent and for her Advocate to come on record after judgment. She further seeks orders setting aside and/or vacating the consent dated 12th June 2026, that the matter proceeds to hearing on its merits, and that the costs of the application be in the cause.

3. The application is premised on the grounds that the Applicant was residing with the Respondent, Polycarp Motaroki, at the suit premises when they were allegedly forcibly evicted by the Appellant on 9th February 2026. She contends that she actively participated in the proceedings before the Rent Restriction Tribunal from their inception by preparing and filing court documents, financing the litigation and attending court sessions. She further alleges that the Respondent entered into the consent dated 12th June 2026 without her knowledge or involvement, notwithstanding her participation in the proceedings, thereby prejudicing her interests.

4. In her supporting affidavit sworn on 19th June 2026, the Applicant deposes that she is the Respondent's wife and that following their alleged eviction on 9th February 2026, they reported the incident to the Chief's Office and Mowlem Police Station before pursuing the dispute before the Rent Restriction Tribunal. She states that although the proceedings were instituted in the Respondent's name, she participated as a witness and assisted in preparing, printing and filing court documents, meeting litigation expenses and attending court proceedings. She further avers that she personally delivered documents to the Respondent's workplace for his signature whenever required.

5. The Applicant further deposes that on 4th June 2026, she and the Respondent attended the offices of Celyne Odembo & Associates Advocates, where an agreement concerning legal representation was executed. She alleges that the Respondent subsequently distanced himself from her and, on 12th June 2026, entered into a consent with the Appellant without informing or consulting her.

6. She maintains that the consent compromised proceedings in which she had invested her time, finances and effort. Her account of the consultation with the Advocates is supported by the affidavit of Paul Munguti, who states that he accompanied the Applicant and the Respondent to the Advocates' offices on 4th June 2026 and witnessed the execution of the agreement concerning their legal representation.

The Responses

7. The application is opposed by the Appellant, Shelmit Kinyua, through her Replying Affidavit sworn on 25th August 2026. She deposes that the dispute before the Rent Restriction Tribunal arose exclusively from the landlord-tenant relationship between herself and Polycarp Motaroki. She maintains that the Applicant was never her tenant, did not reside in the suit premises and instead lived in a neighbouring building. She further states that all rent payments and communications concerning the tenancy were undertaken by Polycarp Motaroki and that she had no contractual or tenancy relationship with the Applicant.

8. The Appellant denies that the Applicant participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal in her own capacity or acquired any legal interest through her alleged financial contributions, preparation of documents or attendance at court. She contends that the Applicant was neither a party to the Tribunal proceedings nor a person against whom any relief was sought. She further denies having forcibly evicted the Applicant or having been served with summons requiring her attendance before the Chief. She maintains that the allegations contained in the affidavits of Paul Munguti and Benjamin Muriuki do not establish any independent legal interest warranting the Applicant's joinder.

9. Regarding the consent dated 12th June 2026, the Appellant avers that Polycarp Motaroki voluntarily entered into the agreement in his capacity as the Respondent in the appeal and the tenant in the proceedings before the Tribunal. She denies that the Applicant's consent was necessary for the settlement of the dispute. She further contends that the Applicant's joinder at the appellate stage would introduce matters that were never adjudicated upon by the Tribunal and unnecessarily enlarge the scope of the appeal. She consequently urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

10. The Respondent, Polycarp Motaroki, similarly opposes the application through his Replying Affidavit. He denies ever having been married to or cohabited with the Applicant, whom he describes as a neighbour and friend who occasionally visited him at the suit premises. He states that he is married to Milkah Wambui Mwangi, with whom he has three children, and that they reside in Kisii County. He further deposes that he occupied the suit premises as the Appellant's tenant between February 2025 and March 2026, personally paid the rent and utility bills, and dealt directly with the Appellant on all matters relating to the tenancy.

11. The Respondent maintains that he instituted the proceedings before the Rent Restriction Tribunal in his own capacity and that the Applicant neither held any tenancy or proprietary interest in the premises nor participated in those proceedings as a party. He denies having instructed the Applicant to commence, prosecute or defend proceedings on his behalf and disputes having executed the alleged fee agreement with Celyne Odembo & Associates Advocates. He further states that the Applicant's occasional attendance at court was voluntary and that she never sought joinder before the Tribunal despite being aware of the proceedings.

12. On the circumstances surrounding the consent, the Respondent deposes that he personally approached the Appellant with a proposal to settle the dispute amicably rather than continue litigating. Following discussions, he attended the offices of the Appellant's Advocates, where the parties executed the consent dated 12th June 2026, upon an agreed payment of Kshs. 100,000.

13. He confirms receiving the said amount through M-Pesa and annexes a transaction confirmation marked PM-1. He maintains that he executed the consent voluntarily, without coercion or misrepresentation, and that he was unaware, at the time, of any Notice of Appointment filed by an Advocate purporting to represent him. He states that he no longer wishes to pursue the litigation and urges the Court to adopt the consent and mark the appeal as settled.

14. In his Supplementary Affidavit, the Respondent reiterates that the Applicant was neither his wife nor a tenant of the suit premises and that he was solely responsible for payment of rent. He annexes an M-Pesa statement marked PM-1 and copies of birth certificates marked PM-2 in support of his assertions concerning rent payments and his family. He maintains that the Applicant's presence at the premises was merely as a visitor and did not confer upon her any tenancy, contractual or proprietary interest. He consequently urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

15. In response, the Applicant filed a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 8th September 2026, in which she disputes the Respondent's account and reiterates that they lived together at the suit premises, when they were allegedly evicted. She maintains that she contributed towards rent payments, including through cash and M-Pesa transfers, and financed part of the litigation before the Tribunal. She further alleges that the Respondent received Kshs.100,000 from the Appellant and subsequently abandoned her without her knowledge or consent to the settlement. She contends that the consent was fraudulently procured and seeks its setting aside to enable her participation in the appeal.

Parties’ Submissions

16. Pursuant to the directions issued by the Court on 23rd September 2026, the application was canvassed by way of written submissions. I have considered the submissions filed by the respective parties together with the authorities relied upon.

Issues for Determination

17. Having considered the application, the affidavits filed by the respective parties and their submissions, I find that the following two issues arise for determination:

a) Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to warrant her joinder as the 2nd Respondent in the appeal.

b) Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for setting aside the consent dated 12th June 2026.

Analysis and Determination

Issue no:1 Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to warrant her joinder as the 2nd Respondent in the appeal.

18. Joinder of parties is governed by Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, which provides that:

“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, be struck out. And that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added.”

19. In Lucy Nungari Ngigi & 128 Others v National Bank of Kenya Limited & Another [2015] eKLR, Gikonyo J. stated as follows:

“Joinder of parties is governed by Order 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In law, joinder should be permitted of all parties in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally; or in the alternative, where such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise. See also Order 7 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The Court may even on its own motion add a party to the suit if such party is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute or whose presence is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. Therefore, joinder of parties is permitted by law and it can be done at any stage of the proceedings. But, joinder of parties may be refused where such joinder: will lead into practical problems of handling the existing cause of action together with the one of the party being joined; is unnecessary; or will just occasion unnecessary delay or costs on the parties in the suit. In other words, joinder of parties will be declined where the cause of action being proposed or the relief sought is incompatible to or totally different from existing cause of action or the relief. The determining factor in joinder of parties is that a common question of fact or law would arise between the existing and the intended parties.”

20. Similarly, in Francis Karioki Muruatetu & Another v Republic & 5 Others [2016] eKLR, the Supreme Court emphasised that an applicant seeking joinder must demonstrate an identifiable personal interest in the proceedings, the prejudice likely to be suffered if joinder is declined, and the relevance of the proposed participation to the questions before the Court.

21. Turning to the present application, the appeal arises from proceedings before the Rent Restriction Tribunal involving the Appellant, Shelmit Kinyua, as the landlord, and the Respondent, Polycarp Motaroki, as the tenant. The Applicant was not a party to those proceedings. She contends that she was the Respondent's wife, that they resided together at the suit premises and that she participated in the Tribunal proceedings by attending court, assisting in the preparation and filing of documents and meeting litigation expenses. It is on this basis that she seeks to be joined as the 2nd Respondent in the appeal.

22. The Appellant disputes the Applicant's alleged interest in the tenancy and maintains that the tenancy relationship existed exclusively between herself and the Respondent, who paid rent and dealt directly with her concerning the premises. The Respondent equally denies having been married to or cohabited with the Applicant and maintains that she was merely a friend who occasionally visited him. Although the Applicant maintains that they lived together and jointly participated in the dispute, she has not demonstrated that she was a party to the tenancy agreement or that she asserted any independent tenancy rights before the Tribunal.

23. The Applicant's alleged contributions towards rent and litigation expenses, together with her participation in preparing documents and attending court, do not, without more, establish that her presence is necessary for the determination of the appeal. Her participation as a witness before the Tribunal did not make her a party to those proceedings. Equally, the alleged spousal relationship, which is disputed by the Respondent, does not, of itself, establish an independent legal interest in the tenancy or demonstrate why the appeal cannot be determined in her absence.

24. Further, the Applicant has not identified any question arising from the Tribunal's determination which requires her participation for its effective and complete adjudication. The dispute before the Tribunal concerned the tenancy relationship between the existing parties, whereas the Applicant's proposed participation is principally founded on her alleged relationship with the Respondent and her financial involvement in the litigation. The determination of those matters would introduce questions which were not the subject of an independent claim before the Tribunal and which do not arise for determination in the present appeal.

25. In view of the foregoing, I find that the Applicant has not established a sufficient legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal or demonstrated that her presence is necessary for the effectual and complete determination of the issues arising therein. Accordingly, the prayer for her joinder as the 2nd Respondent is without merit.

Issue No. 2: Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for setting aside the consent dated 12th June 2026.

26. Having determined the question of joinder, I now turn to the Applicant's prayer seeking to set aside or vacate the consent dated 12th June 2026. The Applicant challenges the consent principally on the ground that it was entered into without her knowledge or involvement, notwithstanding her alleged participation in the proceedings before the Rent Restriction Tribunal and her financial contributions towards the litigation. The Appellant and the Respondent, on the other hand, maintain that they voluntarily entered into the consent in settlement of the dispute between them.

27. The recording and adoption of consent agreements is governed by Order 25 Rule 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, which provides that:

“Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, and the court after hearing the parties directs, that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall, on the application of any party, order that such agreement, compromise or satisfaction be recorded and enter judgment in accordance therewith.”

28. Further, Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80 place the burden of proving the existence of particular facts upon the party asserting them. Accordingly, where fraud or other circumstances invalidating an agreement are alleged, the party making those allegations bears the burden of establishing them.

29. In the present case, the Applicant alleges that the consent was fraudulently entered into without her involvement. However, the Respondent expressly acknowledges having initiated negotiations with the Appellant for an amicable settlement of the dispute. He confirms that he voluntarily executed the consent and received the agreed sum of Kshs. 00,000 through M-Pesa on 12th June 2026. The payment is supported by the transaction confirmation annexed to his Replying Affidavit. The Appellant equally confirms that the agreement was voluntarily reached and maintains that she remains bound by its terms.

30. The Applicant has not placed before the Court sufficient evidence demonstrating that the consent was procured through fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or collusion. Her objection is principally founded on her exclusion from the settlement negotiations and her alleged financial and personal involvement in the earlier proceedings. However, as already determined under the first issue, the Applicant has not established an independent legal interest warranting her participation in the appeal. Her exclusion from the negotiations, without evidence of unlawful conduct in procuring the agreement, is therefore insufficient to invalidate the consent.

31. I also note that the material before the Court establishes that the consent was executed by the Appellant and the Respondent, who have consistently expressed their intention to have the dispute settled on the agreed terms. The parties have sought its adoption by the Court. No material has been presented demonstrating that the consent had already been formally adopted as an order of the Court. Its adoption must therefore be distinguished from its execution by the parties.

32. In the circumstances, I find that the Applicant has not established fraud or any other sufficient ground to warrant interference with the consent dated 12th June 2026. Accordingly, the prayer seeking to set aside or vacate the consent is without merit.

Final Disposition

33. In the result, I find that the Notice of Motion dated 19th June 2026 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs of the application.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED virtually at NAIROBI on this 9th day of November, 2026.

MOHAMMED N. KULLOW

JUDGE

Ruling delivered in the presence of: -

Ms. Ihara for the Appellants

Ms. Odembo for the Intended 2nd Respondent/Applicant

Ms. Mwangi Court Assistant

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