Land law

Waweru t/a Thames Water v Parkins Properties Limited & another [2026] KEELC 7756 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elcl Case E193 of 2026
Judgment date
12 November 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

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Background

Vide a Notice of Motion dated 8th May, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Articles 40, 48 and 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A of Civil Procedure Act, Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Land Registration Act, and Order 40 Rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicant seeks the following reliefs:

Paragraph 1 →

Decision / orders

In the end, the Notice of Motion partly succeeds as follows:

Paragraph 91 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCL CASE NO E193 OF 2026

SAMUEL MACHARIA WAWERU T/A

THAMES WATER........................................................PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

PARKINS PROPERTIES LIMITED........................1st DEFENDANT

PAUL KINUTHIA NJENGA.................................2nd DEFENDANT

RULING

Background

1. Vide a Notice of Motion dated 8th May, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Articles 40, 48 and 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A of Civil Procedure Act, Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Land Registration Act, and Order 40 Rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicant seeks the following reliefs:

i. That pending hearing and determination of this suit, this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a temporary prohibitory injunction restraining the Defendants/Respondents, whether by themselves, their directors, agents, servants or any person acting under their authority, from accessing, entering upon, or exercising any form of control over the property to include collecting, receiving, demanding or in any manner dealing with rent arising from Title No. Nairobi Block 113/92 or otherwise remining upon, managing, supervising, administering or interfering with the occupation and tenancy of the said property; or dealing with the suit property in any manner whatsoever, and or threatening, harassing or intimidating the Plaintiff or persons claiming under him or in whatsoever way interfering with the Plaintiff’s interest in the said property.

ii. That pending the hearing and determination of this suit, this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a mandatory injunction compelling the Defendants/Respondents to forthwith relinquish all control, management and administration of Title No. Nairobi Block 113/92 and yield vacant managerial possession of the property to the Plaintiff and/or his duly appointed managing agents.

iii. That pending the hearing and determination of this suit, this Honourable Court be pleased to order the Defendants, jointly and severally, within such period as this Honourable Court may direct, to produce, disclose, and deliver to the Plaintiff and to this Honourable Court a full, true, and complete account of all rental income collected, received, handled, deposited, withdrawn, expended, controlled, or otherwise dealt with in respect of Title Number Nairobi Block 113/92 from 22nd August 2025 to date, together with all supporting documents including tenancy agreements, tenant registers, rent schedules, bank deposit slips, bank statements, reconciliations, expenditure vouchers, receipts, maintenance records, and all documents relating to the management of the suit property, for purposes of immediate reconciliation, verification, and accounting under the supervision and further directions of this Honourable court.

iv. That upon production of the said accounts and supporting records, this Honourable Court be pleased to conduct, supervise, or direct a reconciliation of all rental income received from the suit property from 22nd August 2025 to date and to make such consequential orders for payment, restitution, tracing, deposit, or restoration of any sums found due to the Plaintiff/Applicant pending determination of the suit.

v. That the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) Embakasi Police Station or such other officer as this Honourable Court may designate be directed to provide security, supervision and enforcement to ensure compliance with the orders herein and to maintain law and order during the transition of management.

vi. That the costs of this Application be met by the Defendants/Respondent.

2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Samuel Macharia Waweru, the Plaintiff/Applicant. He deponed that he is the registered proprietor of Nairobi Block 113/92, situated in Pipeline Estate, Embakasi South Constituency, and that the property comprises approximately 150 residential units occupied by tenants and generates monthly rental income of approximately Kshs. 780,000.

3. He explained that he had engaged the 1st Defendant/Respondent, acting through its director, the 2nd Defendant/Respondent, to construct the residential units and that he financed the construction through loan facilities secured against the property and remained responsible for servicing them.

4. According to him, construction was prolonged and financially burdensome, requiring him to continue servicing the loan despite delays. Upon completion and occupation of the units, he found himself financially overstretched and decided to sell the property to the 1st Respondent culminating in a sale agreement dated 8th April 2025.

5. The Plaintiff averred that the 1st Respondent failed to pay the purchase price within the agreed timelines, prompting him to issue a completion notice dated 14th July 2025. When the 1st Respondent failed to comply, he issued a notice of rescission dated 22nd August 2025, and invoked the contractual forfeiture clause. He maintained that the rescission attracted no protest from the 1st Respondent and that no written agreement subsequently revived or varied the terminated contract.

6. He further stated that the 1st Respondent neither challenged the rescission nor instituted proceedings for specific performance or lodged a competing registrable claim over the property.

7. Mr. Waweru explained that, pending completion of the anticipated sale, he had informally permitted the Respondents to oversee the property, collect rent and remit it into his designated Equity Bank loan account. The arrangement contemplated that, upon completion, the 1st Respondent will take over the property and the loan facility. He stated that the Respondents initially collected and deposited monthly rent of Kshs. 780,000 into that account, which he solely operated.

8. He maintained that this arrangement was gratuitous, unwritten and dependent upon successful completion of the sale; that the Respondents had not been appointed as licensed managing agents, and no commission, remuneration or independent management obligations had been agreed upon and that rescission of the sale agreement extinguished the basis of their involvement in the property’s management. He added that, in any event, he had expressly withdrawn all consent and authority permitting them to manage, access or interfere with the property.

9. Notwithstanding that withdrawal, he averred, the Respondents continue to control the property, deal directly with tenants as though they were its owners, collect rental income and make operational decisions to his exclusion. He stated that they had withheld tenant registers, tenancy agreements, rent schedules, reconciliations, accounts of rent collected and expenditure records, leaving him unaware of the tenants’ identities and the terms of their occupation.

10. According to Mr Waweru, the property remains charged to Equity Bank and that its rental income is his principal means of servicing the loan. According to him, the Respondents remit rent irregularly and after the instalment due dates, exposing him to default, additional interest, penalties and possible enforcement against the charged property. He therefore maintained that the threatened prejudice extends beyond loss of income to the potential loss of the property itself.

11. To restore control, he stated, he appointed FRAWA Agencies, a licensed real estate agency, to take over management. Through his advocates’ letter dated 16th February 2026, he demanded that the Respondents hand over management and the relevant records. He averred that they neither responded nor complied and continued dealing with the property as though they were its proprietors. He expressed apprehension that they would obstruct or intimidate those seeking to effect the transition.

12. Regarding the 2nd Respondent, he maintained that he is the directing mind of the 1st Respondent and personally made and implemented all decisions concerning the property. He contended that the company was being used to perpetuate unlawful control and that the 2nd Respondent should consequently be held personally accountable.

13. As advised by counsel, he urged, the Respondents conduct constitutes trespass, wrongful exclusion, conversion of rental income, wrongful detention of records and unjust enrichment, and that they hold the rental income as constructive trustees.

14. He maintained that his registered ownership establishes a prima facie case and that continued loss of control, income and exposure to lender enforcement would occasion him irreparable harm inadequately compensable by damages. He urged that the balance of convenience favours restoring management to him and that the circumstances warrant an interlocutory mandatory injunction.

15. The 1st and 2nd Defendants/Respondents responded vide the replying affidavit of Paul Kinuthia Njenga, the 2nd Respondent and the 1st Respondent’s director dated 24th May, 2026. He maintained that the Motion is misconceived, bad in law and an abuse of the court process, alleging that the Applicant had deliberately concealed material facts and misrepresented the relationship between the parties.

16. According to him, contrary to the Applicant’s assertion that the Respondents had merely been granted an informal oral licence to collect rent, they had been contracted under an agreement dated 1st February 2022 to construct a multi-storeyed residential building on the suit property, Title No. Nairobi Block 113/92. The agreed project budget and contract cost was Kshs. 64,929,945 at supply-and-fix rates.

17. He explained that the Applicant sought financing from Equity Bank, which agreed to advance Kshs. 45,500,000 towards the construction. Before the security could be perfected, the Applicant was required to demonstrate that works valued at Kshs. 12,929,945, representing his contribution, had been undertaken.

18. The 2nd Respondent deposed that following disbursement of the financing, the Applicant transferred portions of the funds to his account in staggered instalments to facilitate construction. However, he failed to remit the outstanding Kshs. 19,000,000, which formed part of the agreed construction cost, either during construction or after its completion. According to Mr Njenga, despite that shortfall, the 1st Respondent used its own resources to complete the construction and fulfilled its obligations under the agreement dated 1st February 2022.

19. It is the Respondents’ case that the project was completed around June 2024, after which he and the Applicant agreed that he would take over management of the property and collect rent to service the Equity Bank loan, as the Applicant was experiencing financial difficulties in repaying it.

20. It was deposed that they subsequently entered into a sale agreement dated 8th April 2025, under which the Applicant agreed to sell the suit property to the Respondents for Kshs. 64,000,000 and that they agreed that approximately Kshs. 43,000,000 of the purchase price would be paid directly to Equity Bank Kenya Limited to settle the outstanding loan and discharge the existing security over the property, with the balance being remitted to the Applicant.

21. Further, he stated, the Respondents were to be partially financed by Equity Bank to facilitate the purchase of the property which fact the Applicant was well aware of. Consequently, he was issued with a letter of offer dated 2nd July, 2025 by Equity Bank for financing in the sum of Kshs 51, 200,000 with the balance to be met by himself.

22. He explained that in compliance with the agreement for sale dated 8th April, 2025, he made payments in the sum of Kshs 16,000,000 towards the deposit of the purchase price of the suit property and the remainder was to be paid within 90 days. However, the Applicant thereafter became un-cooperative and frustrated the completion which would allow the transfer. Consequently, the financing process stalled making the bank unable to release the partial purchase price it was financing.

23. He explained that from September, 2024, he has been collecting rent from the premises as per the unanimous agreement aforesaid. The premises, he explained, contains 9 floors with 15 units per floor totalling 135 units contrary to the Applicants claim of 150 units with an expected monthly rent of Kshs 649, 300 with full occupancy contrary to the claim of Kshs 780,000 monthly rent.

24. The 2nd Respondent deposed that he has been remitting the rent collected aforesaid to the Applicant’s account towards the payment of the loan instalment which is substantially an aggregate of Kshs 778,000. Additionally, he deposed, the Respondents have since September, 2024 been supplementing the rental income with their own funds to meet the shortfall since the rental income collected is not sufficient to fully pay the monthly instalments as seen from the account statement.

25. He asserted that the Respondents incur monthly management expenses on several items including salary and wages commission, water, electricity, garbage collection, DSTV, Rental Income Tax of 7.5%, House Levy of 1.5% and cleaning and sanitation. The breakdown is as follows:

YEAR

TOTAL AMOUNT

2024

Kshs 574,909

2025

Kshs 1, 697,994

2026

Kshs 353, 434

26. He urged that the Respondents have consistently and faithfully remitted the rental income collected together with his own resources directly to the Applicant’s loan account with Equity Bank; that the Applicant has received the benefit of these payments and has never objected to this arrangement until now and that he has made the loan payment of the loan instalment for the month of May, 2026 and the same is evinced by the account statements.

27. As advised by counsel, he stated, the Applicant rescinded the agreement for sale without justifiable cause or lawful basis. Moreover, upon rescission and forfeiture of 10% of the purchase price amount, the Applicant was to refund excess monies paid by him within 7 days pursuant to special condition E of the Agreement.

28. It was asserted that the Applicant has failed, neglected and refused to acknowledge or settle the Respondent’s outstanding claim of Kshs. 19,000,000, being the balance of the construction costs payable under the bill of quantities and that the Applicant has also failed to reimburse the Respondent for the additional sums advanced towards servicing the loan account beyond the rental income received.

29. The Respondent maintained that the Applicant has neither established a prima facie case nor demonstrated that the conditions for granting a mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage had been met, and that the balance of convenience tilted in the Respondents’ favour.

30. Mr Njenga stated that the Respondents are in possession and control of the suit property and have made financial contributions as herein:

ITEM

AMOUNT KSHS

Loan top ups from 2/9/24 to 29/5/26(aggregated)

2, 702, 700/=

Management Expenses

2, 626, 337/=

Construction balance

19,000,000/=

Balance of excess monies paid towards deposit

9,000,000/=

Total Amount

33, 329, 037/=

31. The 1st and 2nd Respondents also filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 2nd June, 2026 premised on the grounds that:

i. This Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the Application and the Suit, as the dispute does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011.

ii. The dominant and substantive issue in controversy is not the use, occupation, or title to land, but rather the lawful rescission of an Agreement for Sale dated 8th April 2025, the collection and accounting of rental income arising from a management arrangement that is accessory to the sale agreement and claims for accounts, restitution, and damages emanating from the sale agreement which is contractual in nature.

iii. This Honourable Court, lacking jurisdiction, should not entertain this matter and must consequently dismiss both the Suit and the Application with costs to the Respondents.

32. Vide a supplementary affidavit dated 3rd September 2026, Samuel Macharia Waweru, the Plaintiff/Applicant maintained that the Respondents did not controvert his supporting affidavit of 8th May 2026 and denied having concealed material facts or misrepresented the parties’ relationship.

33. He disputed the authenticity of the construction agreement dated 1st February 2022 and the bill of quantities annexed to the replying affidavit, stating that he had first seen them in these proceedings. He alleged that the signature attributed to him was forged and noted that the agreement predated his acquisition of the suit property, Title No. Nairobi Block 113/92, on 15th May 2023.

34. According to him, the bill of quantities did not correspond with the actual development regarding the number and design of units, ceilings, doors, storage tanks and alleged rooftop units, discrepancies which a site visit would reveal.

35. He denied owing the Respondents Kshs. 19,000,000 or any other construction debt and maintained that they had produced no documentary evidence of the alleged outstanding amount or their contribution towards completing the works. He reiterated that construction had been fully financed by Equity Bank, which held a legal charge over the property, and contended that the 2nd Respondent’s bank statements did not establish any connection with its financing.

36. Explaining the rent-collection arrangement, he stated that the prolonged and financially burdensome construction had left him financially overextended and desirous of exiting the project. He consequently agreed to sell the property to the 2nd Respondent through the 1st Respondent company under the sale agreement dated 8th April 2025. Pending completion, he informally and gratuitously permitted the Respondents to oversee the property, collect rent and remit it to his designated Equity Bank loan account. The anticipated arrangement was that the 1st Respondent would take over the property and loan facility upon successful completion of the purchase.

37. He admitted the sale agreement and its terms but observed that it made no provision for the alleged construction debt of Kshs. 19,000,000. In his view, any such debt would have been expressly recorded and set off against the purchase price. He further stated that he was not privy to the Respondents’ financing arrangements and had first seen their alleged letter of offer dated 30th July 2025 in these proceedings. He added that they had neither sought his consent to charge the property nor responded to his notice to complete dated 14th July 2025.

38. According to the Plaintiff, the agreed completion period was sixty days from execution of the sale agreement; that at the time of the notice to complete, the Respondents had paid only Kshs. 7,000,000 of the agreed deposit of Kshs. 12,800,000 and that following their failure to comply with the notice, he rescinded the agreement through a notice dated 22nd August 2025 and invoked the contractual forfeiture of ten per cent of the purchase price. He stated that Kshs. 6,400,000 was accordingly deducted from the amount paid, while the balance of Kshs. 600,000 was refunded through banker’s cheque No. 001987 dated 26th August 2025.

39. Mr Waweru acknowledged the Respondents’ deposit of Kshs. 9,000,000 on 16th August 2025 but maintained that it was made to the loan account into which rental proceeds were ordinarily deposited, rather than his personal account stipulated in clause 1.1 of the sale agreement. He stated that the purchase price ought to have been paid into the latter account by 4th August 2025. According to him, the deposit was unexplained and differed from the usual monthly rental remittance of Kshs. 780,000.

40. Further, he stated, on the 18th February 2026, he refunded Kshs. 8,220,000 to the Respondents after deducting the August 2025 rent of Kshs. 780,000. He stated that they received the refund without complaint. He maintained that the sale had not been completed and denied frustrating financing arrangements of which he had no knowledge.

41. He disputed the allegations that the Respondents supplemented rental income with their own funds or incurred management expenses on his behalf. According to him, despite his formal requests, they had failed to provide management records, and no supporting documents were annexed to their replying affidavit. He maintained that their monthly remittances comprised solely rent collected from his tenants.

42. He further stated that, although the tenancy agreements required rent to be paid by the third day of each month, the Respondents failed to remit it before the loan instalment fell due on the fifteenth day, exposing him to the risk of default. He reiterated that the sale agreement had been lawfully rescinded, the forfeiture clause enforced and the refunds received without protest.

43. The Plaintiff denied that the Respondents held any registrable or equitable interest in the property or its rental income and disputed their alleged losses as unsupported by documentary evidence. On advice from his advocates, he maintained that his application satisfied the conditions for a mandatory injunction and that collecting and managing rent was not a statutory mode of acquiring land. He therefore urged the court to allow the motion.

44. Both parties filed written submissions and a list of authorities which I have considered.

Analysis and Determination

45. Having considered the preliminary objection, the Motion and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are:

i. Whether the preliminary objection is merited and if not?

ii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to the injunctive reliefs sought?

iii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders for accounts and reconciliation sought?

46. The law with respect to preliminary objections is now well settled. Law JA in Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. West End Distributors (1969) EA 696 at 700 stated that:

“…a ‘preliminary objection’ consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”

47. Newbold, P further held:

“A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion. The improper raising of points by way of Preliminary Objection does nothing butt unnecessarily increases costs and, on occasion, confuse the issues. This improper practice should stop.”

48. In Hassan Ali Joho & Another vs Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles established in the Mukisa Biscuit case and identified examples of preliminary objections, including challenges to the court’s jurisdiction, pleas of limitation and submissions that the contract giving rise to the suit requires the parties to refer their dispute to arbitration.

49. The present objection challenges this court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit and the application under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. Although the Applicant contends that the objection rests on contested affidavit evidence rather than a pure point of law, particularly as the Respondents have not filed a defence, the court disagrees.

50. The challenge requires an examination of the legal foundation and nature of the dispute as disclosed in the pleadings against the court’s statutory and constitutional mandate, without resolving contested facts. It therefore constitutes a proper preliminary objection capable of disposing of the entire suit.

51. Turning to the merits of the objection, jurisdiction is fundamental to a court’s authority to entertain proceedings. In Owners of Motor Vessel ‘Lillian S’ v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] KLR 1, the Court of Appeal held that a court lacking jurisdiction must immediately cease further proceedings.

52. The Supreme Court reiterated in, In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (Applicant) (Constitutional Application 2 of 2011) [2011] KESC 1 (KLR) (20 December 2011) (Ruling) that jurisdiction flows from the Constitution and statute and must be exercised within the limits prescribed by law. A court cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself through interpretation where the law is clear, and any jurisdictional challenge must be resolved at the earliest opportunity on the material before it.

53. The Environment and Land Court and the High Court are courts of equal status with distinct jurisdictions. Under Article 165(3) of the Constitution, the High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, jurisdiction to determine alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, and authority to interpret the Constitution, including questions concerning the constitutionality of laws and acts, national and county government powers and relationships, and conflicts of laws under Article 191.

54. On the other hand, the broad jurisdiction of this court is donated by Article 162(2) (b) of the Constitution which provides that the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land.

55. Jurisdictional questions continue to arise in “cross-cutting,” “cocktail” or “mixed grill” disputes that overlap the mandates of the three courts, prompting two approaches where land and contractual matters intersect.

56. In Suzanne Achieng Butler & 4 Others v Redhill Heights Investments Limited & Another [2016] eKLR, Ngugi J adopted the predominant purpose test, examining whether the transaction principally concerned land or the provision of goods or services, guided by the contractual terms, the vendor’s business, the relative value of its components, the substance of the dispute and the remedies sought.

57. Conversely, in Lydia Nyambura Mbugua v Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited & Another [2018] eKLR, Munyao J favoured the predominant issue test, focusing on the actual dispute rather than the transaction’s original purpose, with the Environment and Land Court’s jurisdiction turning on whether the principal issue concerns the use or occupation of land, or affects title to land.

58. The Court of Appeal had an occasion to and dealt with the issue. In Joel Kyatha Mbaluka t/a Mbaluka & Associates Advocates vs Daniel Ochieng Ogola t/a Ogola Okello & Co Advocates [2019] eKLR it held:

“We reiterate the position taken in Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna (supra), that in construing whether the ELC had jurisdiction in a matter, the consideration must be the dominant issue in the dispute and whether that issue relates to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land. The dispute between the appellant and the respondent related to the professional undertaking given by the appellant to facilitate the land transaction between his client and the respondent’s client.

We could not have put it more clearly. A professional undertaking in a legal transaction is a separate contract between advocates that creates legal obligations anchored on professional relationship and etiquette between the advocates. It creates an independent cause of action separate from the transaction undertaken by the advocates’ clients. Such an independent cause of action is reflected herein in the OS lodged by the respondent (who was the plaintiff) wherein the respondent sought orders against the appellant (who was the defendant) that:

“the defendant do honour the professional undertaking dated 11th March 2016 and…fully indemnify the clients in respect of all claims of interest to the tune of Kshs 800,000/= suffered by reason of breach of the defendant?s professional undertaking...”

[15] The dominant issue in the dispute that was before the learned Judge was the honouring of the professional undertaking, and not the land transaction between the advocates’ clients. The undertaking had nothing to do with the environment, or the use and occupation of land, or title to land. The land transaction that the advocates’ clients were engaged in was not in issue. The learned Judge therefore properly rejected the application to have the respondent’s suit transferred to the ELC.”

59. Guided by the exposition by the Court of Appeal in Joel Kyatha(supra), the court will adopt the pre-dominant issue test.

60. By way of brief background, the Applicant instituted this suit seeking inter-alia a declaration that the sale agreement dated the 8th April, 2025 was lawfully rescinded, that the Respondents have no legal or equitable interest in the property, injunctive orders restraining the Respondents from exercising any control over the property and mandatory injunctive relief compelling the Respondents to relinquish all management of the property.

61. According to the Applicant, after engaging the Respondents to construct residential units on the property, he agreed to sell it to the 1st Respondent under an agreement dated 8th April 2025. Pending completion, he permitted the Respondents to manage the premises and collect rent for remittance to his loan account. He maintains that this arrangement was incidental to the anticipated sale and that, following the purchaser’s failure to complete, he rescinded the agreement on 22nd August 2025 and withdrew the Respondents’ authority to manage the property.

62. The Applicant alleges that notwithstanding the rescission and withdrawal of authority, the Respondents have retained control of the premises, continued dealing with tenants and collecting rent, withheld management records and excluded him from access and management.

63. The Respondents dispute that account, contending that they completed construction using their own resources and are owed the outstanding construction balance. They further state that they assumed management of the property by agreement with the Applicant and incurred additional expenses for which they remain unpaid.

64. According to the Respondents, the Applicant’s rescission of the sale agreement was unjustified. Accordingly, they characterise the dispute as contractual, concerning rescission, the taking of accounts and the recovery of money, and therefore falling outside this court’s jurisdiction.

65. The court has keenly considered the pleadings and the parties positions as set out therein. At the heart of this dispute lies the right to possess, control and manage the suit property. The Applicant contends that rescission of the sale agreement and withdrawal of his consent extinguished the Respondents’ authority, while the Respondents challenge the rescission and rely on the parties’ agreements and outstanding payments to justify their continued management of the suit property.

66. Possession and management of the suit property in these circumstances necessarily concerns the use and occupation of the premises, including dealings with tenants and control of access. The claims for accounts and repayment arise from that central dispute.

67. As aforesaid, Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13(2)(a), and (d) of the Environment and Land Court Act confer this court with jurisdiction over disputes concerning land use and occupation, land administration and management, and contracts granting enforceable interests in land. On the other hand, Sections 38–42 of the Land Act address land sale contracts, remedies for breach, possession and relief against rescission.

68. The land transaction itself and its effect on possession and management are contested here. Indeed, the Respondents have contested the legality of the rescission of the sale agreement by the Applicant. The contractual and monetary aspects do not displace the dispute’s predominant character. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction. The preliminary objection is found to be unmerited.

69. The Applicant seeks a temporary prohibitory injunction restraining the Respondents whether acting personally or through any person from accessing, or exercising any control over Title No. Nairobi Block 113/92. He further seeks a mandatory injunction compelling the Respondents to forthwith relinquish control, management and administration of the property and yield vacant managerial possession to him or his duly appointed managing agents.

70. The court will first consider whether the Applicant has met the more stringent threshold for the grant of an interlocutory mandatory injunction before addressing the Applicant's prayer for a temporary injunction.

71. The principles governing the grant of mandatory injunction are well settled. In Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition para 948, it was stated thus:

“A mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing, but, in the absence of special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However, if the case is clear and one which the court thinks it ought to be decided at once, or if the act done is a simple and summary one which can be easily remedied, or if the defendant attempted to steal a march on the plaintiff…a mandatory injunction will be granted on an interlocutory application.”

72. Closer home, the Court of Appeal in Joseph Kaloki t/a Royal Family Assembly vs Nancy Atieno Ouma [2020] KECA 831 (KLR) reaffirmed its decision in Kenya Breweries Limited & another vs Washington O. Okeyo [2002] eKLR and stated that:

“a mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing but should not normally be granted in the absence of special circumstances but that if a case is clear and which the court thinks it ought to be decided at once, a mandatory injunction will be granted at an interlocutory application.”

73. The court also reaffirmed its decision in Shariff Abdi Hassan vs Nadhif Jama Adan [2006] eKLR that, although courts are reluctant to grant interlocutory mandatory injunctions, such relief may issue where the requisite legal threshold is met and the respondent’s wrongdoing is prima facie established, warranting intervention before the full hearing.

74. The court has carefully considered the matter. The Applicant’s ownership of the suit property is undisputed, as is the fact that the contemplated sale did not materialise. Responsibility for its collapse, the lawfulness of the rescission and the resulting consequences remain for determination at trial. The immediate question is whether the Respondents have demonstrated a basis for retaining management after the Applicant expressly withdrew their authority.

75. It is undisputed that the Respondents were not appointed as licensed managing agents and that no commission, remuneration or independent management obligations were agreed upon. Their authority to collect rent arose from an informal arrangement premised on the intended sale. Although they also rely on the construction agreement dated 1st February 2022, that agreement contains no provision authorising them to manage the property or collect rent. It therefore supplies no independent basis for their continued control.

76. The Respondents further invoke an alleged construction balance of Kshs. 19,000,000 and sums advanced towards servicing the Applicant’s loan. They explain that, since September 2024, they have supplemented rental receipts because the expected monthly income of Kshs. 649,300 is insufficient to meet the loan instalment of approximately Kshs. 778,000.

77. However, no agreement entitling them to retain management as security for those payments has been demonstrated. Whereas their claims raise questions of indebtedness and reimbursement requiring proof and accounting, they do not, by themselves, confer a right to continue controlling the property.

78. Accordingly, the court is satisfied that the stringent threshold for an interlocutory mandatory injunction has been met. The continued exercise of managerial authority after withdrawal of consent, without any demonstrated independent entitlement, presents a clear case warranting immediate intervention. A handover restores the Applicant’s control while leaving the disputed contractual and monetary claims for trial.

79. Moving next to the plea for the grant of a temporary interlocutory injunction, the same is governed by Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The provision empowers the court to issue a temporary injunction where it is demonstrated, by affidavit or otherwise, that the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated, or where a defendant threatens to dispose of property in circumstances that may obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may ultimately be issued.

80. In determining whether a plea for injunction is merited, the court must have regard to the well-settled principles enunciated in Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely, an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate that irreparable injury would result if the injunction is not granted, and where the court is in doubt, the matter is to be determined on a balance of convenience.

81. These requirements must be satisfied sequentially. As affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the establishment of a prima facie case, proof of irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience are distinct and logical hurdles, each of which must be satisfied before the court can grant interlocutory injunctive relief.

82. Beginning with a prima facie case, as cited by the parties the same was succinctly defined in Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others  [2003] eKLR thus:

“...So, what is a prima facie case? I would say that in civil cases it is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”

83. In Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others(supra), the Court of Appeal affirmed the definition of a prima facie case in Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd(supra) and clarified that an applicant must demonstrate a clear and identifiable right that is directly threatened by the act sought to be restrained. The invasion of the right must be substantive and that there must be urgency to prevent irreparable harm.

84. The Respondents have admittedly been exercising management and control of the suit property, including entering the premises, dealing with tenants, collecting rent and overseeing its operations. An order restraining those activities would necessarily require them to cede their existing control.

85. Although framed as prohibitory, the relief is therefore mandatory in substance and practical effect, as it would alter the prevailing state of affairs by requiring a handover of management. In essence, what is sought is a mandatory relief[See Singh vs Kingorani Investment Ltd (Environment and Land Case E015 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 5629 (KLR).]

86. Having found that the injunction sought is mandatory in substance, and having already granted an order compelling the Respondents to relinquish management and control of the suit property to the Applicant, that relief has been addressed. No separate determination of the prayer framed as a temporary prohibitory injunction is therefore necessary.

87. The Applicant also seeks a full account of rental income received and expenditure incurred by the Respondents from 22nd August 2025, together with supporting management records, followed by reconciliation and consequential orders for any sums found due.

88. The Respondents acknowledge collecting rent and applying it towards the Applicant’s loan, but maintain that they also incurred expenses and supplemented the repayments from their own resources. Their obligation to account for their dealings with the property is distinct from the disputed question of whether either party ultimately owes the other money.

89. As such, the Respondents must disclose what they received, how it was applied and the supporting records. Their assertion that all monies received were remitted to the loan account does not dispense with that obligation, particularly where the parties disagree on the rental income, management expenses and alleged supplementary payments.

90. As regards the prayer for reconciliation and consequential orders for payment, restitution, tracing, deposit or restoration of any sums found due, this stands on a different footing. These are disputed matters whose resolution forms part of the substantive determination of the suit.

91. In the end, the Notice of Motion partly succeeds as follows:

a) The Respondents’ preliminary objection dated 2nd June 2026 is dismissed with costs.

b) Pending the hearing and determination of the suit, a mandatory injunction is hereby issued compelling the Respondents, whether acting personally or through their directors, agents or servants, to relinquish all control, management and administration of Title No. Nairobi Block 113/92 and hand over managerial possession to the Applicant or his duly appointed managing agents within 30 days of this ruling.

c) Within thirty (30) days of this ruling, the Respondents shall furnish the Applicant and file in court a full and accurate account of all rental income received and expenditure incurred in respect of the suit property from 22nd August 2025 to the date of handover, together with supporting tenancy agreements, tenant registers, rent schedules, relevant bank statements, deposit slips, receipts, expenditure vouchers and maintenance records within their possession or control.

d) The Officer Commanding Station, Embakasi Police Station, shall provide security during the handover to maintain law and order.

e) The Applicant shall have the costs of the application.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 12th day of November, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Mr. Nderitu for Kariuki for Plaintiff/Applicant

Ms Kyumu for Mr. Musyimi for Respondent

Court Assistant: Tracy

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