Employment law

T&K Sprayers Investment Ltd v Nzou & another (Suing as the legal representatives Of The Estate Of The Late Peter Sila Mateli) [2026] KEELRC 14734 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Machakos
Judgment date
16 October 2026
Judge(s)
Jemimah Keli

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The appeal lacked merit. The court upheld the Magistrate’s judgment and decree, including Kshs. 800,000 general damages, Kshs. 4,000 special damages, costs and interest, and dismissed the appeal with costs to the respondents.

Supporting judgment passages

78. In the upshot, the appeal is held to lack merit. The Judgment and Decree of the Hon. G. Omodho (PM) delivered on 26th November 2025 in Mavoko CMCC NO. 65 of 2018 is upheld.

Paragraph 78 →

79. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent.

Paragraph 79 →
Issue 1Whether the suit had abated.

Held. No. The substitution application was filed within one year of the worker’s death and was allowed by the trial court. The suit had therefore not abated, and this ground of appeal was disallowed.

Ratio. Under Order 24 rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, a suit abates only where no application for substitution is made within one year of the plaintiff’s death. A timely filed substitution application complies with that requirement; its later hearing and allowance do not render the suit abated.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

a. Whether the suit had abated.

Passage 54 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

37. I hold that the application to substitute the deceased plaintiff was filed within 1 year of the death, thus in compliance with Order 24, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The ground of appeal has no merit. My decision is consistent with authority relied on by the appellant - Gabriel Mutava, Elizabeth Kwini & Mary Martha Masyuki v Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority & Kenya Ports Authority [2016] KECA 411 (KLR) –

Paragraph 37 →

38. The facts in the above case are distinguished from the instant case for there was never any substitution. In the instant case the application was filed within a year and allowed and thus as time of the hearing and decision the plaintiff had been substituted. The court further notes that this was not a contested issue before the trial. I disallow the ground of appeal.

Paragraph 38 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

(2)Where within one year no application is made under subrule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff: Provided the court may, for good reason on application, extend the time.’(emphasis given)

Passage 81 →

37. I hold that the application to substitute the deceased plaintiff was filed within 1 year of the death, thus in compliance with Order 24, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The ground of appeal has no merit. My decision is consistent with authority relied on by the appellant - Gabriel Mutava, Elizabeth Kwini & Mary Martha Masyuki v Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority & Kenya Ports Authority [2016] KECA 411 (KLR) –

Paragraph 37 →
Issue 2Whether the deceased was present at work on the material day.

Held. Yes. The appellate court found no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding that the deceased was at work and injured at the appellant’s premises. The muster roll was unreliable because it was supervisor-prepared, unsigned by employees, and unsupported by an accident register; the absence of action over the alleged extended absence also supported the conclusion that the deceased had been hospitalized after the accident. PW2’s account was not undermined: his employment and entry to the premises had not been challenged at trial, and the court found it possible to hear a commotion from 100 metres away.

Ratio. A first appellate court will not displace a trial court’s factual finding where the record supplies evidence supporting it and no proper basis shows the finding was plainly wrong. Attendance records may be given little weight where their reliability is materially weakened by the manner of preparation and missing corroborative workplace records.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

b. Whether the deceased was present at work on the material day.

Passage 55 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

47. In the instant case, there was no clocking in of employees, but a muster roll ,a document prepared by a supervisor on seeing the employee. This was very unreliable evidence of attendance at work, as the employee had no chance to verify he was recorded as having come to work. The lack of an accident register, a legal requirement for every manufacturer, leads the court to agree with the trial court that the muster roll was not reliable documentary evidence.

Paragraph 47 →

49. The evidence of PW2 was impugned by the appellant on the ground-

Paragraph 49 →

51. On the re-evaluation of the evidence before the trial court, I find no basis to disturb the finding of the trial court (Mbogo v Shah, supra, applied)

Paragraph 51 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

‘My understanding of the law, is that an appeal court cannot properly substitute its own factual finding for that of a trial court unless there is no evidence to support the finding or unless the judge can be said to be plainly wrong. In the cited case of Peters v Sunday Post [1958] EA 424 this court accepted the principle laid down by the House of Lords in Watt v Thomas [1947] 1 All ER 582.

Passage 62 →

47. In the instant case, there was no clocking in of employees, but a muster roll ,a document prepared by a supervisor on seeing the employee. This was very unreliable evidence of attendance at work, as the employee had no chance to verify he was recorded as having come to work. The lack of an accident register, a legal requirement for every manufacturer, leads the court to agree with the trial court that the muster roll was not reliable documentary evidence.

Paragraph 47 →

51. On the re-evaluation of the evidence before the trial court, I find no basis to disturb the finding of the trial court (Mbogo v Shah, supra, applied)

Paragraph 51 →
Issue 3Whether the Respondent proved liability against the Appellant.

Held. Yes. The court upheld liability. The appellant did not produce evidence, such as an issuance register, showing that protective gear had actually been issued to the deceased. The medical report had been produced before the trial court, and the appellant had not obtained a second medical opinion despite having joined the proceedings in 2019. The trial court’s finding was supported by expert evidence and was not impeached on appeal.

Ratio. An appellate court should not substitute its factual finding for that of the trial court unless there is no supporting evidence or the trial court was plainly wrong. On these facts, photographs requiring protective gear did not establish that gear had been issued to the deceased, while the expert medical evidence supported the liability finding.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

c. Whether the Respondent proved liability against the Appellant.

Passage 56 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

64. The trial court held that it was the obligation of the appellant to provide protective gear. The respondent stated the deceased was not given protective gear. The appellant relied on evidence at pages 228-233 of the record. On perusal of the annexures, the court found they were photos requiring employees to wear helmets, masks and footwear. However, there was no register or evidence before the court of issuance of the alleged protective gear to the deceased. If that was in place, nothing would have been easier than to produce the same.

Paragraph 64 →

65. On the medical report, one was filed and produced before the trial court by the respondent in proceedings that were set aside. The appellant came on board in 2019 but failed to file a 2nd medical opinion. The worker died in 2023. The court finds no merit in the attempt to impugn the finding on the injuries.

Paragraph 65 →

66. I find no basis to impugn the finding of the trial court on liability as the decision is supported by the expert opinion/ evidence before the trial court. The court applied decision in Mbogua Kiruga v Mugecha Kiruga & another [1988] KECA 122 (KLR) Apaloo JA.

Paragraph 66 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

64. The trial court held that it was the obligation of the appellant to provide protective gear. The respondent stated the deceased was not given protective gear. The appellant relied on evidence at pages 228-233 of the record. On perusal of the annexures, the court found they were photos requiring employees to wear helmets, masks and footwear. However, there was no register or evidence before the court of issuance of the alleged protective gear to the deceased. If that was in place, nothing would have been easier than to produce the same.

Paragraph 64 →

66. I find no basis to impugn the finding of the trial court on liability as the decision is supported by the expert opinion/ evidence before the trial court. The court applied decision in Mbogua Kiruga v Mugecha Kiruga & another [1988] KECA 122 (KLR) Apaloo JA.

Paragraph 66 →

‘My understanding of the law, is that an appeal court cannot properly substitute its own factual finding for that of a trial court unless there is no evidence to support the finding or unless the judge can be said to be plainly wrong.’(Emphasis given)

Passage 142 →
Issue 4Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion by awarding damages.

Held. Yes. The Kshs. 800,000 general-damages award for chemical injury to the left eye, head injury and chest trauma was not inordinately high. The trial court had considered the nature and multiplicity of the injuries and comparable awards. Although no percentage of permanent incapacity was assessed and the deceased returned to work, the medical prognosis recorded chronic disabling pain and headaches, visual disturbance, and chest-related vulnerability to respiratory infections.

Ratio. An appellate court may interfere with damages only where the trial court acted on wrong principles, considered irrelevant matters, omitted relevant matters, misapprehended the evidence, or made an award so inordinately high or low as to be an entirely erroneous estimate. Those conditions were not established.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

d. Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion by awarding damages.

Passage 57 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

74. On perusal of the judgment I find the trial court took into account the nature of injuries and comparable awards. The trial court relied on decision in Muyila v Wasula (Civil Appeal E066 of 2022) [2025] KEHC 5431 (KLR) (29 April 2025) (Judgment) where the injury was total loss of left eye where the High Court on appeal increased quantum from 500000 to 1 million.

Paragraph 74 →

76. The trial court admitted the percentage of permanency of the injuries was not assessed in the medical report. PW1 told the court the deceased had returned to work. The damages related to pain and suffering as per the medical report, which gave a prognosis of chronic disabling pains, chronic headaches, disabling concentration, chest injuries making the worker vulnerable to respiratory infections, and visual disturbance. (page 25 of RoA).

Paragraph 76 →

77. Taking into account the foregoing I find the decision of the trial court was not plainly wrong based on facts and the comparable awards. The amounts awarded of Kshs. 800000 for the multiple injuries is not inordinately high.

Paragraph 77 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

‘It is trite law that the assessment of general damages is at the discretion of the trial court and an Appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded by the Court below simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. The Appellate Court can justifiably interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the trial court only if it is satisfied that the trial court applied the wrong principles,

Passage 155 →

9.As by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account some relevant one) or misapprehended the evidence and so arrived at a figure so inordinately high or low as to present an entirely erroneous estimate (see Kemro v A M Lubia & Olive Lubia (1982-88) 1 KAR 727 and Kitavi v Coast Bottlers Limited [1985]KLR 470).’

Passage 156 →

77. Taking into account the foregoing I find the decision of the trial court was not plainly wrong based on facts and the comparable awards. The amounts awarded of Kshs. 800000 for the multiple injuries is not inordinately high.

Paragraph 77 →
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Case at a glance

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Background

The Appellant herein, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Decree of the Hon. G. Omodho (PM) delivered on 26th November 2025 in Mavoko CMCC NO. 65 of 2018 between the parties, filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated the 10th of December 2025 seeking the following orders: -

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

The court having perused the grounds of appeal and submissions of the parties discerned the issues for determination in the appeal to be –

Paragraph 23 →

Decision / orders

The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent.

Paragraph 79 →

Reasoning passage

I find no basis to impugn the finding of the trial court on liability as the decision is supported by the expert opinion/ evidence before the trial court. The court applied decision in Mbogua Kiruga v Mugecha Kiruga & another [1988] KECA 122 (KLR) Apaloo JA.

Paragraph 66 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the deceased worker’s suit had abated because substitution allegedly occurred outside one year of his death; whether he was at the appellant’s workplace on 17 June 2014 and injured there; whether the respondents proved the appellant’s liability,…

Material facts

The respondents, legal representatives of the estate of Peter Sila Mateli, claimed damages for injuries allegedly sustained when chemical products splashed on him at the appellant’s workplace. The appellant disputed that he attended work on the material date,…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT MACHAKOS

APPEAL NUMBER E057 OF 2025

T&K SPRAYERS INVESTMENT LIMITED…………….….....................................................................APPELLANT

-VERSUS

LUCY KASYOKA NZOU & SAMUEL KIOKO SILA (suing as the legal representatives

of the estate of the late PETER SILA MATELI) ......................................................................... RESPONDENT

(Being an Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the Hon. G. Omodho (PM) delivered on 26th November 2025 in Mavoko CMCC NO. 65 of 2018)

CORAM

Before Lady Justice Jemimah Keli

C/A Otieno

JUDGMENT

1. The Appellant herein, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Decree of the Hon. G. Omodho (PM) delivered on 26th November 2025 in Mavoko CMCC NO. 65 of 2018 between the parties, filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated the 10th of December 2025 seeking the following orders: -

a) The Appeal herein be allowed.

b) The Judgement of the Hon. Grace Omodho (Principal Magistrate) delivered on 26th November 2025 at the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Mavoko, in Mavoko CMCC 65 of 2018; LUCY KASYOKA NZOU & SAMUEL KIOKO SILA (suing as the legal representatives of the estate of the late) PETER SILA MATELI VERSUS T & K SPRAYERS INVESTMENT LIMITED and the decree emanating therefrom be set aside in its entirety.

c) The Costs of the Appeal herein and in Mavoko CMCC 65 of 2018; LUCY KASYOKA NZOU & SAMUEL KIOKO SILA (suing as the legal representatives of the estate of the late) PETER SILA MATELI VERSUS T & K SPRAYERS INVESTMENT LIMITED be allowed in favour of the Appellant.

GROUNDS OF THE APPEAL

2. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in law and fact in finding that the Deceased was at work on the 17th of June 2014 despite overwhelming evidence by the Appellant showing that he was absent from work on the said date.

3. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in law and fact in failing to consider, and dismissing the Appellant’s muster roll/attendance register which clearly demonstrated that the Deceased was never at work on the 17th of June 2014.

4. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in relying on the testimony of Matata Mbithi (PW2) to find that the Deceased was at work on the 17th of June 2014 when it was clear that Matata Mbithi was never an employee of the Appellant, there being zero evidence of the said PW2 ever having been an employee of the alleged sister company and the fact that it was impossible for the said PW2 to have heard the alleged commotion as claimed and/or to have gained entry into the Appellant's premises.

5. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in finding that the Deceased was injured while at the Appellants place of work.

6. 5 The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in failing to consider the evidence by the Appellant on all the Appellant’s employees being required to wear protective equipment at work without fail and in the learned magistrate’s finding that the Appellant had failed to lead any evidence of the deceased having been issued with protective equipment despite the same having been availed both through oral and documentary evidence.

7. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the deceased’s medical bills were paid for by the Appellant despite the receipts produced by the Respondent indicating that the same was paid by the Deceased himself, the learned magistrate further erred in going forward to rely on the said position as proof of the Deceased having been injured while at work.

8. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the Appellant did not contest the nature of injuries alleged to have been suffered by the deceased by virtue of having failed to produce any contrary medical document when it was open that the Appellant could not have been able to produce any medical document on the deceased injuries, the deceased having died before the Appellant filed its defense.

9. The Honourable Magistrate misdirected herself in finding that the deceased’s alleged injuries including the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head were as a result of the alleged chemical splashing despite the Plaintiff’s (PW1) admission that the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head could not have been as a result of chemical injuries and there being no evidence led to show any connection or nexus between the alleged splashing and the trauma injuries to the chest and head.

10. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the deceased was yet to heal even at the time of his death despite the lack of proof to the same effect and PW1’s admission that the Deceased had soon thereafter recovered from the injuries and even returned to work.

11. The Honourable Magistrate erred in both fact and law in awarding extremely and manifestly excessive general damages vis a vis the injuries allegedly sustained.

12. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in failing to consider the Appellant’s submissions, authorities and evidence.

13. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent had proved its case against the overwhelming weight of evidence produced by the Appellant.

14. The Honourable Magistrate erred in both fact and law in finding that the suit was properly before court despite the same having abated and the Plaintiff having failed to file any application for extension of time to substitute.

15. The Honourable Magistrate’s findings were plainly wrong in law and fact and amounted to erroneous exercise of discretion.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL

16. The Respondents filed a suit against the Appellant vide a plaint dated 21st January 2025 seeking the following orders: -

a. General damages for pain and suffering.

b. Special damages in the sum of Kshs. 2,000/-.

c. Costs and interest on (a) and (b) above at Court rates.

d. Any other relief that this Honourable Court might deem fit to grant.(pages 142-144 of RoA).

14. The Respondents filed their list of witnesses dated 21st January 2025, undated witness statement of LUCY KASYOKA NZOU, witness statement of PETER SILA MATELI dated 17th January 2028, and list of documents dated 21st January 2025 together with the bundle of documents attached (pages 145-165 of ROA). They later filed the witness statement of MATATA MBITHI dated 19th August 2025 (pages 244 of ROA).

15. The claim was opposed by the Appellant who entered appearance and filed a statement of defence dated 7th March 2025 (pages 166-168 of ROA).

16. To support their case, the Appellant also filed a list of witnesses dated 13th March 2025; a witness statement of WYCLIFFE KIILU of even date; and a list of documents of even date with the bundle of documents attached (pages 169-233 of ROA). The Appellant later filed a further list of documents dated 14th July 2025 (pages 234-238 of ROA).

17. The Plaintiff/Respondent’s case was heard on 14th May 2025 and 1st October 2025, with LUCY KASYOKA NZOU testifying as PW1 and MATATA MBITHI testifying as PW2. Both witnesses adopted their filed witness statements as their respective evidence in chief, and PW1 produced the Plaintiff’s documents as exhibits. Both witnesses were cross-examined by counsel for the Appellant Mr. Waiyaki (pages 300-302 and 306-307 of ROA).

18. The Appellant/Respondent’s case was heard on 1st October 2025 with the Respondent’s witness, WYCLIFFE KIILU testifying as DW1. He adopted his filed witness statement as his evidence in chief, and produced the Appellant/Respondent’s documents as exhibits. The witness was cross-examined by counsel for the Claimant/Respondent Mr. Moturi (pages 307-309 of ROA).

19. The Court entered Judgment on 26th November 2025 allowing the Respondent’s case to the extent of Kshs. 800,000/- as general damages for pain and suffering, special damages of Kshs. 4,000/-, plus costs of the suit and interest (judgment at pages 311-314 of ROA).

DETERMINATION

20. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. Both parties complied.

Issues for determination

21. In their submissions dated 15th July 2026, the Appellant submitted on the grounds of appeal generally.

22. On his part, the Respondent identified the following issues in his submissions dated 13th August 2026:

i. Whether the suit had abated.

ii. Whether the deceased was present at work on the material day.

iii. Whether the Respondent proved liability against the Appellant.

iv. Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion by awarding damages.

23. The court having perused the grounds of appeal and submissions of the parties discerned the issues for determination in the appeal to be –

a. Whether the suit had abated.

b. Whether the deceased was present at work on the material day.

c. Whether the Respondent proved liability against the Appellant.

d. Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion by awarding damages.

24. This being a first appellate court, it was held in Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123 that:- “The appellate court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to the Court of Appeal from a trial by the High Court is by way of a retrial and the principles upon which the Court of Appeal acts are that the court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular the court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial Judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally.”

25. Further, in on principles for appeal decisions in Mbogo V Shah [1968] EA Page 93 De Lestang V.P (As He Then Was) Observed At Page 94:

“I think it is well settled that this court will not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong, because it has misdirected itself or because it has acted on matters on which it should not have acted or because it has failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion.’’

26. On factual findings, at the first appellate court it was held in Mbogua Kiruga v Mugecha Kiruga & another [1988] KECA 122 (KLR) Apaloo JA.

‘My understanding of the law, is that an appeal court cannot properly substitute its own factual finding for that of a trial court unless there is no evidence to support the finding or unless the judge can be said to be plainly wrong. In the cited case of Peters v Sunday Post [1958] EA 424 this court accepted the principle laid down by the House of Lords in Watt v Thomas [1947] 1 All ER 582.

Sir O’Connor who spoke for the court on this aspect of the case said:-

“It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding, on a question of fact of the judge who tried the case, and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate court has, indeed, jurisdiction to review the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion reached upon that evidence should stand. But this is a jurisdiction which should be exercised with caution; it is not enough that the appellate court might itself have come to a different conclusion.”

Whether the suit had abated

27. The ground of appeal was-

The Honourable Magistrate erred in both fact and law in finding that the suit was properly before court despite the same having abated and the Plaintiff having failed to file any application for extension of time to substitute.

28. The Respondent worker died when the suit was pending before the trial court on the 21st December 2023. (page 165 was the limited grant ad litem indicating date of death) The appellant submitted that, as per the provisions of Order 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules, it was upon the Deceased’s representative to substitute the deceased plaintiff within a period of one year following the plaintiff's death, failing which the plaintiff's suit was to stand abated. With the respondent having died on 21/12/2023, it was incumbent upon the Plaintiff’s representative to substitute the Plaintiff on or before 21/12/2024

29. Order 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules is on death and bankruptcy of parties and provides-

‘Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff [Order 24, rule 3] 8.

(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the cause of action does not survive or continue to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives or continues, the court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Where within one year no application is made under subrule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.’

30. The appellant submitted that the Plaintiff’s representative having failed to substitute the Plaintiff by 21/12/2024 and only having substituted the Plaintiff on 21/01/2025 as can be seen in the Respondent’s Amended Plaint (See page 143 of the Record of Appeal). The Plaintiff’s suit automatically stood abated by operation of the law on 21/12/2024. With the suit having already abated on 21/12/2024, it was upon the Plaintiff to file an application for extension of time to substitute and for the revival of the suit before proceeding to substitute the Plaintiff, failing which the suit and all subsequent proceedings remained null. The Respondent having never filed any application for extension of time and revival of the suit, it only follows that the suit was nonexistent with all the subsequent orders and proceedings being a nullity. The appellant urged the court to find the suit had abated and relied on Gabriel Mutava, Elizabeth Kwini & Mary, Martha Masyuki v Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority & Kenya Ports Authority [2016] KECA 411 (KLR) . The appellant submitted that the suit herein abated on 30th June 2010, a year after the death of the plaintiff as no application for substitution of the plaintiff was made by the applicants or any other person.

31. The appellant submitted that the suit having abated it is, in law, dead and none existent. The only way to breathe life into it is by way of an application for its revival under Order 24 rule 7 (2) aforesaid. No such application has been made before this court or any other court. The application before me is therefore premature and fatally defective as the same is based on a none (sic) existent suit…..” The appellant also relied on other authorities to effect that the case had abated.

32. Conversely, the respondent submitted - As correctly captured by the Appellants in their submissions and the Death Certificate appearing on page 140 of the Record of Appeal, the Plaintiff passed away on 21st December 2023 , an application for substitution ought to have been made within one year in 2024. The Respondents duly complied with the above provision of the law because a Notice of payment for the Application dated 18th October, 2024 was filed in Court on 4th November, 2024 and was noted on 20th November, 2024. Clearly, this fell within the prescribed timelines, and there need for the Respondents to seek an extension of time and revival of the suit. (Refer receipt to the copy attached of the Application on pages 136-141 of the Record of Appeal and the payment hereto.)

33. Further, the Respondent submitted that, Order 24 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which the Appellant has cited, "Where within one year no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall Plaintiff's abate...". death, The application for substitution having been made within one year of the this ground of appeal is unmerited. Further, 21st January, when 2025, the Respondent's Application dated 18th October, 2024 came for hearing on the prayer for the Appellant's counsel informed the court that he had no objection to page substitution and the same was allowed. Refer to the typed proceedings on 297 of the Record of Appeal. Based on the foregoing, the Appellant's contention that the suit had abated is misguided and contrary to the law.

Decision on whether the suit before the trial court had abated

34. On perusal of the record of appeal, I confirmed that the death of the plaintiff/worker occurred on 21st December 2023(page 140 was the death certificate). The court further confirmed that the respondent filed an application seeking substitution of the deceased with his spouse by way of a Notice of Motion dated 18th October 2024 (page 136 of RoA). The relevant law is Order 24 (3)of the Civil Procedure Rules which states –

‘3. Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff [Order 24, rule 3]

(1)Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the cause of action does not survive or continue to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives or continues, the court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2)Where within one year no application is made under subrule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff: Provided the court may, for good reason on application, extend the time.’(emphasis given)

35. There is evidence that the application for substitution of plaintiff was filed before the trial court in compliance with Order 24(3) above. Indeed, on 13th November 2024, Muturi, Advocate for the plaintiff, informed the trial court that they had filed an application to substitute. (page 297 of RoA).

36. When the application was listed for hearing on the 21st January 2025 , Counsel for the appellant stated, ‘We do not object to the application . It can be allowed.’ The trial court proceeded to record, ‘ Application seeking to substitute plaintiff is hereby allowed.’(page 297 of RoA).

37. I hold that the application to substitute the deceased plaintiff was filed within 1 year of the death, thus in compliance with Order 24, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The ground of appeal has no merit. My decision is consistent with authority relied on by the appellant - Gabriel Mutava, Elizabeth Kwini & Mary Martha Masyuki v Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority & Kenya Ports Authority [2016] KECA 411 (KLR) –

‘The suit herein abated on 30th June 2010, a year after the death of the plaintiff as no application for substitution of the plaintiff was made by the applicants or any other person. The suit therefore, abated.’

38. The facts in the above case are distinguished from the instant case for there was never any substitution. In the instant case the application was filed within a year and allowed and thus as time of the hearing and decision the plaintiff had been substituted. The court further notes that this was not a contested issue before the trial. I disallow the ground of appeal.

Whether the deceased was present at work on the material day.

39. The grounds of appeal were as follows –

a. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in law and fact in finding that the Deceased was at work on the 17th of June 2014 despite overwhelming evidence by the Appellant showing that he was absent from work on the said date.

b. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in law and fact in failing to consider, and dismissing the Appellant’s muster roll/attendance register which clearly demonstrated that the Deceased was never at work on the 17th of June 2014.

c. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in relying on the testimony of Matata Mbithi (PW2) to find that the Deceased was at work on the 17th of June 2014 when it was clear that Matata Mbithi was never an employee of the Appellant, there being zero evidence of the said PW2 ever having been an employee of the alleged sister company and the fact that it was impossible for the said PW2 to have heard the alleged commotion as claimed and/or to have gained entry into the Appellant’s premises.

d. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in finding that the Deceased was injured while at the Appellants place of work.

40. The appellant submitted as follows:- the Learned Magistrate indeed erred in finding that the Deceased was at work on 17/06/2014. The Respondent, through PW1 and PW2 alleged that the Deceased was injured while at the Defendant’s premises. It was PW1’s testimony that she was never there and that she did not witness the deceased suffering the alleged injuries at the Defendant’s premises, instead her testimony was based solely on what she was allegedly told by the deceased. On the part of the Appellant, it was the Appellant witness’ (DW1) evidence that on 17/06/2014 the Deceased did not report to work and as such could not have suffered the alleged injuries at work, that he was the supervisor on the night of 17/06/2022 and that if at all there was any accident on the said date, he would have been the first to know, in support of the same, DW1 produced the complete muster roll for the whole year of 2014 with the relevant date of 17/06/2025 being captured under page 25 and 26 of the Defendant’s List of Documents dated 13/03/2025.(See pages 198 and 199 of the record of appeal) From the said muster roll, it is clear that the Deceased was never at work on the said date. It thus follows that it is impossible that the deceased sustained the alleged injuries at the Defendant’s premises. That despite the above facts, the learned magistrate proceeded to dismiss the Defendant’s evidence without any valid reason and hold that the Deceased was at work on the said date. We submit that the learned magistrate was in error in doing so.

41. In Sokoro Saw Mills Ltd V Bernard Wainaina Gachanja [2007] KEHC 1129 (KLR), the appellant relied on the testimony of DWI Samuel Kiambuthi, who produced a muster roll which indicated that the respondent was on sick leave when he alleged that he was on duty. The muster roll was produced as defence’s exhibit No.1. In the same muster roll, it was noted that the respondent was on sick off on several days between the 4th and the 28th February 1998…. A second aspect of the appellant’s case that raises doubt on his testimony that he was injured while he was at his place of work was the testimony of DW1Samuel Kiambuthi, a supervisor at the saw mill. He produced a muster roll which indicated that the respondent was on sick leave on the day that he claimed that he was on duty. While it is conceded that the said muster roll being a document prepared by the appellant could be tampered with, having carefully perused the said document, it is evident that the said muster roll is a genuine document which the trial magistrate erroneously failed to consider. It contains names of other employees other than that of the respondent. It is not disputed that the respondent was injured. The appellant has, however, raised doubt about the respondent’s allegation that he was injured while he was on duty at the appellant’s premises….. The upshot of the above reasons is that the appeal by the appellant on liability succeeds. The respondent failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, to the required standard of proof, that he was injured at his place of work.

42. In Timsales Limited v Noel Agina Okello [2014] KEHC 1312 (KLR) 26 it was held-

‘I do not agree that the contents of the muster roll or accident register cannot be taken as conclusive proof of the fact of employment, and these are my reasons. Firstly, a muster roll by definition is a record of daily attendance by employees in a farm or factory. It is like a clocking register. If an employee claims that he was at work on a particular day, but failed to clock-in his name at the particular time of reporting to work, he must show by other evidence that he was actually present on the particular day, and give reasons why he failed to have his name entered in the muster roll. This is particularly so where an employee is engaged on a daily or casual basis, the terms of whose engagement provide for his payment at the end of each day, and even if such an employee may not have an identification document his name must at least appear in the muster roll. There is no evidence that the Respondent received any wages for the time (if any) worked.Secondly, a muster roll and an Accident Register are management tools. They are prepared and maintained by management through designated officers at levels established by respective industries. There is no evidence of basis for any suggestion that because they are prepared and kept by management, they are manipulated by such management employees either to protect themselves or to protect their employer from liability to pay wages or claims arising from industrial accidents. When therefore a name of a litigant who claims to have been a casual or even permanent employee, who is required to have his name entered in the Muster Roll, or an Accident Register (in the event of an accident), does not appear in either the Muster Roll or Accident Register, the degree of proof of probability of having worked, or having had an accident on a particular day becomes much higher… … That proof cannot be made by the court or the Respondent by way of summations that because both the Muster Roll and the Accident Register are prepared and kept by the Appellant, they must be false or otherwise manipulated. There must be evidential proof or basis for that imputation of “mala fides” (bad faith)’

43. The appellant, relying on the above decision, contended that the learned magistrate erred in relying on the testimony of PW2, one Matata Mbithi. In its judgement, the learned magistrate relied on the testimony of the PW2 to find that the Deceased was at work on the 17/06/2026, this was despite the fact that Pw2’s testimony was at best unreliable; It was PW2’s testimony that at the time of the alleged accident, he was working for Mosewa Company Limited a different company from the Appellant which company was around 100 meters away from the Appellant’s premises, that he heard some commotion from the 100 meters and it was reported to him that the Plaintiff had suffered an accident and that he rushed to the scene where he found the Plaintiff in pain having suffered the accident. 20.PW2 was unable to provide any evidence of ever having ever worked for Mosewa Company limited, or offer an explanation on how he was able to hear commotion from the Defendants premises some 100 meters away and further explain how he was able to gain access to the Defendants premises which premises one has to have a gate pass to gate entry without ever being an employee of the Appellant.

44. The trial court held that the admission by DW1 that the muster roll which he prepared as the supervisor could have errors weakened the reliability of the documentary registers. I noted in the proceedings that the trial court noted the witness was evasive. That was a finding that only the trial court, on observation of the witness, could have made. The court on appeal cautioned itself of not having heard or seen the witness(Selle case). The court noted that the muster roll was not signed by the employees. That further weakened the credibility of the muster roll as evidence of presence of workers at the shop floor. The court noted this was an accident yet no accident register was produced. The accident register is alluded in decision relied on by the appellant in Timsales Limited v Noel Agina Okello [2014] KEHC 1312 (KLR) where the court observed-

‘ I do not agree that the contents of the muster roll or accident register cannot be taken as conclusive proof of the fact of employment, and these are my reasons. Firstly, a muster roll by definition is a record of daily attendance by employees in a farm or factory. It is like a clocking register. If an employee claims that he was at work on a particular day, but failed to clock-in his name at the particular time of reporting to work, he must show by other evidence that he was actually present on the particular day, and give reasons why he failed to have his name entered in the muster roll. ‘

45. It appears the court in the above case spoke of clocking in by the employee or production of the accident register. The accident register is a requirement under section 21(5) of The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 2007 -

‘(5) An employer shall cause all workplace injuries to be entered in the general register specified in section 122’’

46. Section 122 provides for the aforesaid register as follows-

‘122.(1)There shall be kept in every workplace a register, in the prescribed form, called the general register, and there shall be entered in or attached to that register –

(a) the certificate of registration of the workplace;

(b) every other certificate issued in respect of the workplace by the Director under this Act; …

(d) the prescribed particulars as to every accident and case of occupational disease occurring in the workplace of which notice is required to be sent to a occupational safety and health officer under the provisions of any law for the time being in force; ‘’

47. In the instant case, there was no clocking in of employees, but a muster roll ,a document prepared by a supervisor on seeing the employee. This was very unreliable evidence of attendance at work, as the employee had no chance to verify he was recorded as having come to work. The lack of an accident register, a legal requirement for every manufacturer, leads the court to agree with the trial court that the muster roll was not reliable documentary evidence.

48. The court noted from the alleged muster roll that the employee is indicated to be away from work for more than 7 days. No show-cause notice or justification for his absence from the shop floor was produced against the deceased employee. It is unreasonable that the employee can be absent from work for that long period without permission of the employer and no disciplinary action is taken. The only plausible reason for non-disciplinary action is that the appellant knew the employee was admitted to the hospital following the accident.

49. The evidence of PW2 was impugned by the appellant on the ground-

‘The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in relying on the testimony of Matata Mbithi (PW2) to find that the Deceased was at work on the 17th of June 2014 when it was clear that Matata Mbithi was never an employee of the Appellant, there being zero evidence of the said PW2 ever having been an employee of the alleged sister company and the fact that it was impossible for the said PW2 to have heard the alleged commotion as claimed and/or to have gained entry into the Appellant's premises.’

50. During cross-examination, PW2 told the trial court he was at Musewe at night and rushed to the scene. That one of the bosses took up the matter. He heard commotion and dashed to the scene. From the proceedings, the court finds that the appellant did not challenge the employment of PW2 at Musewe, or his entry to the appellant's company. I find these were not issues before the trial court. DW1 confirmed Musewe and the appellant were in the same location, with 100 meters distance apart. I find it is possible for a person 100 metres away to hear commotion within 100 metres as PW2 alleged.

51. On the re-evaluation of the evidence before the trial court, I find no basis to disturb the finding of the trial court (Mbogo v Shah, supra, applied)

Whether the Respondent proved liability against the Appellant.

52. The grounds of appeal were -

a. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in failing to consider the evidence by the Appellant on all the Appellant’s employees being required to wear protective equipment at work without fail and in the learned magistrate’s finding that the Appellant had failed to lead any evidence of the deceased having been issued with protective equipment despite the same having been availed both through oral and documentary evidence.

b. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the deceased’s medical bills were paid for by the Appellant despite the receipts produced by the Respondent indicating that the same was paid by the Deceased himself, the learned magistrate further erred in going forward to rely on the said position as proof of the Deceased having been injured while at work.

c. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the Appellant did not contest the nature of injuries alleged to have been suffered by the deceased by virtue of having failed to produce any contrary medical document when it was open that the Appellant could not have been able to produce any medical document on the deceased injuries, the deceased having died before the Appellant filed its defense.

d. The Honourable Magistrate misdirected herself in finding that the deceased’s alleged injuries including the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head were as a result of the alleged chemical splashing despite the Plaintiff’s (PW1) admission that the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head could not have been as a result of chemical injuries and there being no evidence led to show any connection or nexus between the alleged splashing and the trauma injuries to the chest and head.

e. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the deceased was yet to heal even at the time of his death despite the lack of proof to the same effect and PW1’s admission that the Deceased had soon thereafter recovered from the injuries and even returned to work.

The appellant submissions

53. The appellant submitted that it led uncontroverted evidence both oral and

documentary to the effect that indeed it was a requirement for all of the Appellant’s employees to at all times wear protective clothing and equipment. (See pages 228 to 233 of the Record of Appeal) That the learned magistrate erred in both law and fact in finding that the Appellant did not contest the nature of the injuries allegedly suffered by the Respondent on the mere basis that the Appellant did not produce a second medical report despite the fact that it was clear that the Deceased had died before the Appellant filed its defence and as such the Appellant could not possibly have had the chance of referring the deceased for any examination by its doctor. That the above was illogical and outrightly unfair against the Appellant.

54. Further, the learned magistrate’s finding was despite the fact that the Appellant had expressly denied the injuries suffered in its defence (See page 167 of the Record of Appeal at paragraph 8) and even having insisted that the Respondent call a doctor to produce the medical report to allow the appellant a chance of challenging the injuries (See page 301 of the Record of Appeal). Despite the clear denial of the injuries as captured herein, the learned magistrate erred in holding that the injuries were not contested and proceeding to hold that they had been proved. That despite there having been no medical report produced in proof of the injuries as the proceedings will show and the Appellant having expressly highlighted the same even in its submissions, the learned magistrate still proceeded to hold that the Respondent had proved the alleged injuries.

55. The learned magistrate misdirected herself in finding that the deceased’s alleged injuries including the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head were as a result of the alleged chemical splashing despite the Plaintiff’s(PW1) admission that the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head could not have been as a result of chemical injuries and there being no evidence led to show any connection or nexus between the alleged splashing and the trauma injuries to the chest and head with the Respondent having failed to produce any medical report before the court in the first place. Despite the deceased’s case being that he had suffered the alleged injuries as a result of soap making products splashing into his left eye, the deceased alleged several injuries including trauma injuries to the chest and head, the deceased however failed to show any nexus between the splashing of soap making products into the eyes and the alleged trauma injuries to the chest and head, we humbly submit that even with an active imagination it is difficult to imagine how the splashing of a reagent into one’s eyes could cause trauma injuries to the head and chest.

56. With there being no nexus between the alleged accident and the pleaded injuries, we humbly submit that the learned magistrate indeed erred both in fact and law in finding that the Respondent had proved the same, especially with there having been no medical report produced in support of the alleged injuries in the first place.

57. The appellant relied on the decision in Lukas Ochola Wangulu V Securicor Kenya Ltd. [2000] KEHC 381 (KLR) –

‘I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he did sustain injuries and to what extent. The medical report was crucial to this case. The Plaintiff choose not to produce them.’

The respondent’s submissions

58. The respondent submitted that the Appellant owed the deceased a statutory duty to provide a safe working environment and protective gear. In the lower court, the Appellant did not adduce evidence that it had discharged this duty to the deceased of having issued protective gear. This negligent conduct occasioned injuries when chemicals splashed on him and led to the fatal injuries. Further, the Appellant did not adduce evidence of any enforcement mechanisms it had in place to ensure that its employees complied with the safety measures. The respondent relie don the decision in Faith Mutindi V Safepark Limited [2018] KЕНС 1834 (KLR) in which the court stated as follows on the duty owed by employers to employees-

"80. It was held in Purity Wambui Muriithi --Vs- Highlands Mineral Water Co. Ltd (2015) eKLR as follows:- Section 6(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act provides:-

"Every occupier (employer) shall ensure the safety, health and welfare at work of all persons working in the workplace."

59. It is therefore follows that as a general rule, the employer is liable for any injury or loss that occurs to his employees while at the workplace as a result of the employer's failure to ensure their safety. The aspect of a safe working environment was explained in the case of Sokoro Saw Mills Limited -Vs- Bernard Muthimbi Njenga Nakuru High Court Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1995 where the court stated that the duty of the employer to provide a safe place of work to the employee, comprises,

"not merely to warn the employee against unusual dangers known to them....but also make the place of employment as safe as the exercise of reasonable skill and care would permit."

60. In the present matter, the Respondent did not adduce evidence demonstrating the Appellant had been issued proper protective gear suitable to her role. It was not sufficient to offer the Appellant ear muffs. The measures adopted by the Respondent did not match the common law duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure the employee's safety. The treatment notes adduced by the Respondent are in congruence with the injuries he to have suffered. (Refer to pages 17, 20, 24 and 25 of the Record of Appeal.)

61. Further, the medical report on pages 24 and 25 of the Record of Appeal establishes a nexus between the head and chest trauma and the injuries sustained on the day of the accident. The Appellant's averment that there was no evidence that the deceased was still ailing, as reported, from where chemical injuries are rebutted by the doctor's findings at Chapters 6 and 7 of his report, in which he refers to the injuries as chronic. (See page 25 of the Record of Appeal which we quote hereunder.)

62. Under the medical report, the professional opinion was:- The injuries are consistent with the nature of the force that caused them-BLUNT. His current medical complaints and findings on clinical examination are also consistent with the injuries sustained and are a DIRECT RESULT of them. PROGNOSIS -The injuries have resulted in chronic disabling pains in the affected areas, a source of chronic ill health which might need medication on and off. The injuries have resulted in chronic headaches disabling him from concentrating in his daily socio-economic activities. The injuries by their effects in the chest render him vulnerable to recurrent respiratory tract infections. The injuries by their effects have resulted in visual disturbances in the affected eye. He needs further ophthalmic attention. The aforementioned treatment notes and medical report have a higher probative value as opposed to the Appellant's mere denials of liability.

63. Whereas the Appellant avers that it did not get the opportunity to subject the deceased to an alternative medical examination, the Appellant never made that request at the pre-trial.

Decision on liability

64. The trial court held that it was the obligation of the appellant to provide protective gear. The respondent stated the deceased was not given protective gear. The appellant relied on evidence at pages 228-233 of the record. On perusal of the annexures, the court found they were photos requiring employees to wear helmets, masks and footwear. However, there was no register or evidence before the court of issuance of the alleged protective gear to the deceased. If that was in place, nothing would have been easier than to produce the same.

65. On the medical report, one was filed and produced before the trial court by the respondent in proceedings that were set aside. The appellant came on board in 2019 but failed to file a 2nd medical opinion. The worker died in 2023. The court finds no merit in the attempt to impugn the finding on the injuries.

66. I find no basis to impugn the finding of the trial court on liability as the decision is supported by the expert opinion/ evidence before the trial court. The court applied decision in Mbogua Kiruga v Mugecha Kiruga & another [1988] KECA 122 (KLR) Apaloo JA.

‘My understanding of the law, is that an appeal court cannot properly substitute its own factual finding for that of a trial court unless there is no evidence to support the finding or unless the judge can be said to be plainly wrong.’(Emphasis given)

Quantum

67. On quantum the grounds of appeal were as follows-

a. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in holding that the deceased was yet to heal even at the time of his death despite the lack of proof to the same effect and PW1’s admission that the Deceased had soon thereafter recovered from the injuries and even returned to work.

b. The Honourable Magistrate erred in both fact and law in awarding extremely and manifestly excessive general damages vis a vis the injuries allegedly sustained.

c. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and law in failing to consider the Appellant’s submissions, authorities and evidence.

d. The Honourable Magistrate erred both in fact and in law in finding that the Respondent had proved its case against the overwhelming weight of evidence produced by the Appellant.

The appellant’s submissions

68. Without prejudice to the above, we humbly submit that even if the finding of the Respondent being entitled to damages was proper, which finding we submit is not proper, the learned Magistrate erred in awarding extremely and manifestly excessive general damages vis-à-vis the injuries allegedly suffered. Despite the Appellant having extensively quoted contemporary authorities involving injuries similar to the ones allegedly suffered by the Deceased, the learned Magistrate chose to disregard the same and instead relied on authorities involving more serious injuries to award manifestly excessive damages in the sum of a whopping Kshs 800,000.

69. With the deceased having allegedly suffered chemical irritation to the left eye alongside trauma to the head and chest and the Claimant having completely healed from the same and even resumed work, we humbly submit that the appropriate award should have been the sum of Kshs 100,000 as was submitted before the trial court in line with the following authorities; Wondernut [K] Limited v Caleb Odhiambo Olago [2016] KEELRC 1609 (KLR). The Plaintiff suffered traumatic left eye conjunctivitis. The trial court awarded general damages for pain and suffering at Kshs 70,000 which award was upheld on appeal. Atuga v Siafee Chemicals Limited [2025] KEELRC 2200 (KLR), where the Claimant suffered chemical irritation of both eyes (chemical conjunctivitis), which exposure led to progressive deterioration of his eyes, with the Claimant suffering a Permanent disability in each eye at 8% (eight per cent). The court assessed general damages for pain and suffering at Kshs 200,000 Homegrown (K) Limited v Karuga [2023] KEHC 17841 (KLR). The Plaintiff suffered chemical burns on the face and both eyes, the trial court assessed general damages for pain and suffering at Kshs 250,000, on appeal, the high court set aside the award and substituted the same with that of Kshs 120,000 Hannah Wanjeri Njuguna v Anestar Secondary School [2020] KEHC 5214 (KLR) the Plaintiff suffered injuries on the left eye and mouth which was pricked by shattered window, the teeth became loose and her face was swollen. The injuries resulted in chronic disabling pain in the affected areas and in permanent scars which are rather unsightly in the affected areas. The Plaintiff was awarded general damages of Kshs 100,000 which award was enhanced on appeal to Kshs 150,000. 20.

70. In light of the above comparative authorities, the appellant submitted that the award of Kshs 800,000 as damages for the injuries suffered was extremely excessive and should not be allowed to stand.

The respondent’s submissions on quantum

71. Conversely, the respondent submitted that it is an established principle that since the award of damages is an exercise of judicial discretion, an appellate court should be slow to disturb the damages awarded by the trial court simply because it would have awarded a different sum. The respondent relied on the decision Catholic Diocese of Kisumu v Tete [2004] KECA 154 (KLR)  -

‘It is trite law that the assessment of general damages is at the discretion of the trial court and an Appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded by the Court below simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. The Appellate Court can justifiably interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the trial court only if it is satisfied that the trial court applied the wrong principles,

9.As by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account some relevant one) or misapprehended the evidence and so arrived at a figure so inordinately high or low as to present an entirely erroneous estimate (see Kemro v A M Lubia & Olive Lubia (1982-88) 1 KAR 727 and Kitavi v Coast Bottlers Limited [1985]KLR 470).’

72. The respondent submitted that the learned Magistrate exercised her discretion properly when she awarded the general damages, taking into account the comparable damages awarded to parties with similar injuries, and the severity of the chronic injuries suffered by the deceased. Whereas this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the damages awarded by the trial court, the same can only be done if any of the conditions established in the case of MARY WAIRIMU NJUGUNA VS. KENYA POWER & LIGHTING COMPANY LIMITED [2018] KECA 770 (KLR) -

"7. The principle guiding this Court on when to interfere with an award of damages was stated in the case of Butt v Khan [1981] KLR 349 where it was held (per Law, JA) that:

"... An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles, or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect, and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low..."

73. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the learned Magistrate proceeded on wrong principles, failed to consider relevant factors, considered irrelevant factors, or misapprehended low. the evidence and thereby awarded damages that are inordinately high.

Decision on quantum

74. On perusal of the judgment I find the trial court took into account the nature of injuries and comparable awards. The trial court relied on decision in Muyila v Wasula (Civil Appeal E066 of 2022) [2025] KEHC 5431 (KLR) (29 April 2025) (Judgment) where the injury was total loss of left eye where the High Court on appeal increased quantum from 500000 to 1 million.

75. The injuries in the instant case, as per the medical report , was of chemical injury to left eye , head injury and chest trauma. It was a multiple of injuries. The court considered authorities cited by appellant and found authorities relied on by the appellant concern less severe injuries. The appellant submitted as follows- in Wondernut [K] Limited v Caleb Odhiambo Olago [2016] KEELRC 1609 (KLR) The Plaintiff suffered traumatic left eye conjunctivitis. The trial court awarded general damages for pain and suffering at Kshs 70,000 which award was upheld on appeal. Atuga v Siafee Chemicals Limited [2025] KEELRC 2200 (KLR)where the Claimant suffered chemical irritation of both eyes (chemical conjunctivitis) which exposure led to progressive deterioration of his eyes with the Claimant suffering a Permanent disability in each eye at 8% (eight percent). The court assessed general damages for pain and suffering at Kshs 200,000 Homegrown (K) Limited v Karuga [2023] KEHC 17841 (KLR) The Plaintiff suffered chemical burns on the face and both eyes, the trial court assessed general damages for pain and suffering at Kshs 250,000, on appeal substituted with Kshs.120000.

76. The trial court admitted the percentage of permanency of the injuries was not assessed in the medical report. PW1 told the court the deceased had returned to work. The damages related to pain and suffering as per the medical report, which gave a prognosis of chronic disabling pains, chronic headaches, disabling concentration, chest injuries making the worker vulnerable to respiratory infections, and visual disturbance. (page 25 of RoA).

77. Taking into account the foregoing I find the decision of the trial court was not plainly wrong based on facts and the comparable awards. The amounts awarded of Kshs. 800000 for the multiple injuries is not inordinately high.

Disposition

78. In the upshot, the appeal is held to lack merit. The Judgment and Decree of the Hon. G. Omodho (PM) delivered on 26th November 2025 in Mavoko CMCC NO. 65 of 2018 is upheld.

79. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent.

DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 16TH OCTOBER 2026.

JEMIMAH KELI

JUDGE.

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Court Assistant: Otieno

Appellant – Waiyaki h/b Muumbi

Respondent – Makomere h/b muturi

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