Employment law

Nasio v Sana Industries Company Ltd [2026] KEELRC 2824 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E308 of 2025
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

THAT the Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence adduced before the trial court in arriving at its final conclusion.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E308 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

MIRIAM OMULUBI NASIO .......................................................................... APPELLANT

VERSUS

SANA INDUSTRIES COMPANY LIMITED ............................................ RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th September, 2025. It arises from a judgment and decree delivered on 8th August, 2025 in MCELRC No. E188 of 2024. Here that judgment the trial court found that the Appellant was a casual employee of the Respondent that her claim was in consequence unsustainable and dismissed it in its entirety with costs to the Respondent.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the present appeal, which comes out on the following grounds;

1. THAT the Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence adduced before the trial court in arriving at its final conclusion.

2. THAT the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the Appellant failed to prove her case on a balance of probability on unlawful termination on account of redundancy.

3. THAT the learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider that the Appellant's employment was terminated without a valid reason and in breach of the fair procedure provided under Sections 40, of the Employment Act, 2007 thereby arriving at a wrong finding.

4. THAT the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to award the Appellant terminal dues resulting from the unfair termination on account of redundancy.

5. THAT the Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Respondent failed to produce any documentary evidence in support of allegations laid by it hence arriving at a wrong conclusion.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

1. The Honourable Trial Magistrate's judgement dated and delivered on the 8th day of August 2025 be set aside in its entirety;

2. Costs of this Appeal be awarded to the Appellant; and

3. This court makes such further orders as it may deem just in the circumstances and in the interest of Justice.

It is the Appellant's case and submission that she was employed by the Respondent on 16th November, 2018 as a general worker at a basic salary of Kshs. 17,680.00 per month. She served it with loyalty and diligence until 16th June, 2023 when her employment was terminated.

On that day, she states, the Respondent's supervisor Mr. Muli summoned her with other colleagues, told them the company was experiencing a low workload and that they should go home and would be called back to collect their pay. She was never called back. She received no redundancy notice, no notice was given to the labour officer and she was paid no terminal dues.

The Appellant contends that the Respondent, having asserted that she was a casual labourer engaged intermittently, adduced no evidence in support of that assertion. She relies on Section 74 of the Employment Act and Section 112 of the Evidence Act, in support of the fact that the employer being the custodian of employment records and possessed of special knowledge of those facts. She relies further on Empire Feeds Ltd v King'ou (Appeal 6 of 2020) [2022] KEELRC 1501 (KLR) for the proposition that an employer which produces a casual payroll covering a handful of days has not proved that the employee was engaged otherwise than regularly and continuously.

She submits that the Respondent complied with neither Section 40 nor Section 45 of the Employment Act 2007, that no reason was given, that no notice was issued to her or to the labour officer, and that no regard was had to seniority, skill, ability or reliability in any selection exercise. She claims Kshs. 460,516.00 made up of one month's salary in lieu of notice, house allowance, unpaid leave days, severance pay and twelve months' salary as compensation, with a certificate of service, interest and costs.

The court notes a difficulty with the Appellant's written submissions. They refer to her throughout in the masculine. They give the termination date as 29th June, 2023 against a pleaded 16th June 2023. They speak of employment from February, 2022 to 28th August, 2023 of twelve days worked in October, 2023 and of the one year that she worked for the Respondent company, when her pleaded service is four years and eight months. None of that appears anywhere in the Record. It is the residue of another file carried across in drafting. A submission which contradicts a party's own pleadings and evidence which carries no weight whatsoever. This court does not consider these, instead taking the Appellant's case from her pleadings, their witness statement, the documents produced and her Memorandum of Appeal.

It is the Respondent's case and submission that the Appellant was never a permanent employee but was retained as a casual worker earning a consolidated daily wage of Kshs. 653.00 payable fortnightly according to the days actually worked, and that she worked only intermittently as work became available. It denies that she was declared redundant on 16th June, 2023 or at all. Its case is that she remained at work well beyond that date and had a history of absence stretching back to August, 2022. It says she took two weeks from 26th June, 2023 and returned on 10th July, 2023 without a doctor's report, worked part of that day, left at 11.23 a.m. after being granted a further two weeks' leave, and was expected back on 24th July, 2023. She did not report, did not contact the Human Resource Department and remained incommunicado.

On that footing its position was, at different points, both that she was never terminated at all and that she was summarily dismissed for absconding duty after frustrating disciplinary proceedings. On appeal it submits that the trial court properly evaluated the pleadings and evidence and that the threshold for appellate interference has not been met. This is in reliance on the authority of Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123. It further submits further that the Appellant failed to discharge the burden under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act of proving that a termination occurred at all and prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs. A word is necessary about authority.

A substantial part of the case law relied upon on both sides could not be verified against the law reports. I have treated those passages as the argument of counsel and no more, and decide this appeal on the law and subsisting authorities.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether this court should interfere with the findings of the trial court.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant was a casual employee.

3. Whether the termination of the Appellant's employment was fair and lawful.

4. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

5. Who bears the costs of this cause.

The 1st issue for determination is whether this court should interfere with the findings of the trial court. This is a first appeal and both parties cite the same authority for the standard. In Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123 the first appellate court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses.

The Respondent invokes that authority and urges repeatedly that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. That submission cannot survive contact with the record. At paragraph 7 of its judgment the trial court states in terms that the parties agreed to have the claim proceed by way of documentary evidence and submissions. The certified proceedings bear this out, disclosing four appearances only. These were on 16th October, 2024, 5th December, 2024, 11th March, 2025 and 8th August, 2025 being three mentions and the delivery of judgment. No witness was ever sworn and no cross-examination took place.

Where the trial court enjoyed no advantage of demeanour, the caution that ordinarily restrains a first appellate court has no work to do. As was held in Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424, the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court where the material consists of documents and inference rather than the credibility of witnesses seen and heard. That is this case and the deference argument accordingly falls by the wayside.

Again, there is a second and more troubling feature. The judgment appealed from recites evidence that does not exist on the record. It speaks of at paragraph 8 of oral evidence adduced before the court and at paragraph 11 of the defence witnesses in the plural, when indeed no witness testified and the Respondent listed only one.

It further attributes to the Appellant a statement that she left work during the coronavirus period in April, 2022 a claim that she sought a refund of NSSF contributions, an assertion that she had asked for permission to take her child to school, and a denial that she received a letter asking her to report back to work. Not one of those matters appears in her Memorandum of Claim, her verifying affidavit, her witness statement, her trial submissions or the certified proceedings. The NSSF refund was never pleaded and never in issue, yet the judgment disposes of it. Findings resting on material which is nowhere on the record are not findings this court can be asked to defer to. The 1st ground of appeal is made out and answered the 1st issue in the affirmative. This court is in a position and has capacity to interfere with the finding of the trial court.

The 2nd issue for determination is whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant was a casual employee. Everything in the judgment appealed from turns on a single finding. The trial court held at paragraph 13 that it was instrumental that the Claimant stated she would be paid every two weeks for the number of days worked, and that it was thus clear she was a casual employee as she was only paid for the days worked. From that premises the court derived that she required only a day's notice under Section 35(1)(a), that her wages were inclusive of house allowance, that as a casual she was not entitled to leave, and that her claim was unsustainable in its entirety. The premise will not bear that weight. Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007 defines a casual employee as an individual the terms of whose engagement provide for his payment at the end of each day and who is not engaged for a longer period than twenty-four hours at a time. The definition is conjunctive and specific.

The trial court’s finding does not satisfy these limbs. An employee paid fortnightly is not an employee paid at the end of each day and the Respondent's own pleaded case is that the wage was payable every fortnight depending on the number of days worked. These defeats the finding of casual status.

Payment reckoned by reference to days worked describes the measure of the wage, not the frequency of payment, and it is the frequency of payment upon which the statutory definition fixes. Even taking the Respondent's case at its highest, Section 37(1) of the Employment Act, 2007 intervenes. It provides that notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, where a casual employee's contract of service continues for a period or number of continuous working days amounting in the aggregate to not less than one month, or where the employee performs work which cannot reasonably be expected to be completed within an aggregate of less than three months, the contract shall be deemed to be one where wages are paid monthly and Section 35(1)(c) applies.

The conversion operates by force of statute and requires neither election by the employee nor consent by the employer. In Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 Others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held that Section 37 applied to the employment of the respondents to the effect that their casual employment was converted into a contract of service where wages are paid monthly and that they were entitled to such terms and conditions of service as they would have been entitled to under the Act had they not initially been employed as casual employees.

The Appellant produced a bank statement for her account with Kenya Commercial Bank, certified by the bank as a true copy of the original. From 16th November 2018 it records credits narrated "Salary Payment SANA MID SALARY" and "Salary Payment SANA END SALARY", arriving twice in every month without material interruption through 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022 and into 2023. That is not the payment pattern of a person engaged for no more than twenty-four hours at a time. It is the payment pattern of a person in continuous employment and covers a period of four years and eight months. Against this record the Respondent produced nothing. There is no written contract of casual engagement, no muster roll, no daily engagement register, no wage or payroll record and no payslip.

Section 74(1) obliges an employer to keep a written record of all employees including the wage rate and particulars of employment. Section 10(7) provides that where an employer fails to produce a written contract or the prescribed particulars, the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term rests on the employer. An employer required by statute to keep the records and who then produces none, cannot ask the court to prefer its bare assertion to the employee's documented account.

I find that the Appellant was engaged from 16th November, 2018 and that, whatever the original character of that engagement, it had by operation of Section 37(1) long since been deemed a contract on which wages are payable monthly. She was not, at the date of separation, a casual employee. The contrary finding was reached on a misapprehension of the statutory definition and without regard to Section 37, which is nowhere mentioned in the judgment and was nowhere addressed by the Respondent either at trial or on appeal. The findings that followed from it, as to notice, house allowance and leave, fall with it. The 2nd ground of appeal succeeds to that extent.

On the 3rd issue for determination, the Respondent's principal answer is that the Appellant failed to discharge the burden under Section 47(5) of proving that a termination occurred at all. The proposition is sound but it does not assist the Respondent, because the Respondent's own case is that it dismissed her.

Its written submissions state in terms that it commenced disciplinary proceedings against her for abscondment of duty. She frustrated the process and that this led to her eventual summary dismissal. They state again that one month's salary in lieu of notice is not payable as she was summarily dismissed on account of gross misconduct. Its witness statement asserts that she waived the right to respond to the notice to show cause. And the trial court recorded at paragraph 11 that the Claimant was summarily dismissed from employment on 24th July, 2023.

A party cannot plead and submit that it summarily dismissed an employee and simultaneously submit that the employee failed to prove she was dismissed. The Respondent is bound by the case it chose to run and the fact of termination is established on its own admission.

As to character, I am not persuaded that this was a redundancy. Section 2 defines redundancy as the loss of employment by involuntary means through no fault of the employee, at the initiative of the employer, where the services of the employee are superfluous.

The Appellant's evidence is of a supervisor telling a group of workers that the workload was low and that they should go home pending recall. That is a thin foundation on which to erect a statutory redundancy and it stands directly denied. There is no evidence of restructuring, abolition of office, selection criteria, an affected class or notice to the area labour officer, and the Respondent's case has never been that it declared her redundant. I find that no redundancy within the meaning of Section 2 has been established and the 2nd ground fails insofar as it asserts one. That is not the end of the matter, and the trial court erred in treating it as though it were. An employee who mischaracterises the legal label attaching to her separation does not thereby forfeit her remedy for a separation which was in fact unfair. The substance of her complaint, pleaded at paragraph 6 of her Memorandum of Claim, is that her employment was ended at the initiative of the employer without valid reason and without procedure, and that must be answered on its merits.

Section 45(2) renders a termination unfair unless the employer proves that the reason is valid and fair and that it was carried out in accordance with fair procedure. The two requirements are cumulative and both must be satisfied. Section 43(1) requires the employer to prove the reason, failing which the termination is deemed unfair.

Section 41, which by Section 41(2) applies equally to summary dismissal under Section 44, requires the employer before terminating to explain to the employee in a language she understands the reason for which termination is contemplated, in the presence of a fellow employee or shop floor union representative, and to hear and consider her representations.

In the authority of Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui [2019] eKLR the Court of Appeal held that four elements must be discernible for the procedure to pass muster: an explanation of the grounds of termination in a language understood by the employee; the reason for which the employer is considering termination; the employee's entitlement to the presence of another employee of her choice when that explanation is made; and the hearing and consideration of any representations made. None of these was observed in our circumstances.

The Respondent's submissions assert reliance on various disciplinary notices copied to the union shop steward for onward transmission to the Claimant, yet no such notice appear anywhere on record. There is no notice to show cause, no letter inviting her to a hearing, no minutes, no letter of dismissal and no proof of service. The entire disciplinary process on which the defence rests is asserted and nowhere evidenced. The same is true of the alleged attempts to reach her. The Human Resource Officer asserts that the Respondent tried on multiple occasions, but no call log, message, letter or witness to any such attempt was produced. Desertion is an inference, and an inference cannot be drawn from an employer's silence about its own conduct.

There is a further difficulty and it is fatal. The Respondent has never been able to say when the Appellant is supposed to have deserted. Its Response says she was expected back on 24th July, 2023 and did not report. Its witness statement at paragraph 3 that she was working until 24th July, 2023 when she started absconding duty from 4th December, 2023. Its written submissions say at paragraph 31 that she sneaked out of work on 4th August, 2023 and never reported again.

Three dates, in three documents, in the same defence. An employer which cannot state when its employee absconded has not proved that she absconded at all. Nor do the documents produced assist. Its list of documents promises attendance sheets between 19th August, 2022 and 23rd August, 2023 but what is reproduced is a dozen scattered days in August, 2022 and June and July, 2023 with a gap of some ten months in the middle. The permission slips record absences for a brother's burial, a grandmother's burial, a child's sickness and illness of the employee herself. Those are the ordinary incidents of a working life, not evidence of desertion, and several are on their face grants of permission, which is the opposite of absence without leave.

This court finds that the Respondent has proved neither a valid and fair reason for the termination nor compliance with Section 41, and that the termination, which on its own case took effect on 24th July, 2023 was unfair and unlawful. The 3rd and 5th grounds of appeal succeed.

On the 4th issue for determination, I begin with the wage, because every head of claim is computed upon it. The Appellant pleads Kshs. 17,680.00 per month but has not proved it. The bank statement they produced is their only evidence of what she was paid and it shows no monthly credit of that order at any point across more than four years, the largest single remittance from the Respondent being Kshs. 8,080.00. A claimant is not assisted by a pleaded figure which their document contradicts and this court therefore declines to adopt it.

The Respondent pleaded, and repeated through its witness statement, that she earned a consolidated daily wage of Kshs. 653.00 payable fortnightly. That is an admission and a party is bound by its pleadings. In submissions it later shifted to Kshs. 670.00 and then Kshs. 672.00, but submissions do not amend pleadings. The daily rate is taken at Kshs. 653.00, being the only rate on this record which is admitted rather than asserted.

The contract having been deemed by Section 37(1) to be one on which wages are paid monthly, the monthly wage falls to be computed on that rate over the ordinary working month of twenty-six days, yielding Kshs. 16,978/=. The Appellant's service ran from 16th November 2018 to 24th July 2023, four years and eight months, being four completed years.

On notice, Section 35(1)(c), which applies to the deemed contract, entitles the Appellant to twenty-eight days' notice in writing. She received none and no payment was made in lieu. Section 36 entitles her to compensation equivalent to the wage she would have earned in that period and I award one month's wage of Kshs. 16,978.00.

On house allowance, she claims fifteen per cent of the monthly wage over fifty-five months and submits the head was not controverted. It was controverted expressly at paragraph 8(b) of the Response. Section 31(1) obliges an employer either to provide reasonable housing accommodation or to pay sufficient house allowance in addition to the wage, but Section 31(2) expressly permits consolidation.

The head cannot succeed on the basis on which the wage has been found. I have measured the monthly wage by the daily rate of Kshs. 653.00 which the Respondent pleaded, which corresponds to the statutory minimum prescribed for her category and locality under the Regulation of Wages (General) Order, and those prescribed rates are themselves expressed to be inclusive of housing allowance. Having taken the rate I cannot also treat it as exclusive of the very allowance it is prescribed to include, for that would be to award the same relief twice. The claim is disallowed.

On unpaid leave days, Section 28(1) entitles an employee who has completed two consecutive months of service to not less than twenty-one working days of annual leave with full pay for each twelve months of service. The Respondent answers that she took leave whenever due and that Section 28(4) bars accumulation beyond eighteen months.

The permission slips relied on record compassionate and sick absences, not annual leave, and no leave register was produced, Section 74(1) requiring an employer to keep exactly such a record. Section 28(4) constrains an employee from unilaterally accumulating leave without the employer's approval. It does not arm an employer which kept no leave record at all, and which never granted or refused any application because it never operated a leave system for her, with a defence to the entitlement itself. The Appellant claims Kshs. 49,476.00 under this head. Computed on the admitted daily rate the figure would be higher, but the court does not award more than is pleaded, and this court awards Kshs. 49,476.00.

On severance pay, the entitlement arises under Section 40(1)(g) and only on redundancy. I have found no redundancy established. That head fails, and the learned Magistrate was right to refuse it, though for reasons other than those he gave.

On compensation, Section 49(1)(c) empowers the court to award a sum not exceeding twelve months' gross wages and Section 49(4) sets out the matters to be taken into account. The twelve months is a ceiling and not a starting point, and the discretion must be exercised judicially on the considerations the law permits. Several considerations favour the Appellant. Her service of four years and eight months was substantial. The procedural failure was not a technical slip but a total absence of process: no show cause, no hearing, no representative, no decision communicated. The Respondent kept and produced none of the records the statute obliged it to keep and its account of when she left has never been consistent. Other considerations pull the other way. Her own attendance record, as disclosed by the permission slips and attendance sheets, shows repeated absences over the final year of her service. She took no complaint to the labour officer under Section 47(1) and gave the Respondent no notice of grievance before suit. And her own bank statement shows that by 4th November, 2023 within some three and a half months of separation, she was receiving substantial monthly salary credits from another payer, indicating that she mitigated her loss reasonably promptly. Balancing these, an award at or near the statutory maximum would be excessive and I assess compensation at six months' wages, being Kshs. 101,868.00.

On the certificate of service, Section 51(1) obliges an employer to issue one upon termination. The obligation is unqualified and the Respondent's position that it is contingent upon the employee first clearing with the company has no statutory foundation. The certificate shall issue. The total decretal sum, exclusive of interest and costs, is Kshs. 168,322.00.

On costs, in the exercise of the discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and this being a contest in which each side has been partly right and partly wrong, and in which the Appellant, though substantially successful, has failed on her pleaded wage, on redundancy, on house allowance and on severance pay, each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the trial court.

I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The judgment and decree delivered on 8th August, 2025 in MCELRC No. E188 of 2024 is set aside in its entirety and substituted as set out below.

(ii) A declaration be and is hereby issued that the termination of the Appellant's employment by the Respondent on 24th July, 2023 was unfair and unlawful.

(iii) The Respondent shall within thirty (3) days of this judgment of court pay the Appellant as follows;

a) One (1) month's wage in lieu of notice of …………….…..…Kshs. 16,978.00

b) Unpaid and untaken leave days of …………………………..Kshs. 49,476.00

c) Six (6) months salary as compensation for unfair termination………………………………………………… Kshs. 101,868.00,

Total of claim ……………………………………………..Kshs. 168,322.00

(iv) The claims for house allowance and for severance pay are dismissed.

(v) The Respondent shall issue the Appellant with a certificate of service pursuant to Section 51 of the Employment Act, 2007 within thirty days of the date of this judgment of court.

(vi) Interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.

(vii) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the trial court.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Nyamagwa holding brief for Miss Mburia instructed by Samuel, Mburia & Company Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Eredi instructed by Wambugu & Muriuki Advocates for the Respondent.

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