THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT OF KENYA
AT MACHAKOS
JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO. E007 OF 2025
REPUBLIC………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………APPLICANT
VERSUS
KENYA DEFENCE FORCES...………….…..………………………........................................……...........1ST RESPONDENT
THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL..…..…………………………………………..……….....…….........2ND RESPONDENT
EX-PARTE: PRESTON KIMANTHI
CORAM
Before Lady Justice Jemimah Keli
C/A Otieno
JUDGMENT
1. The Ex-Parte Applicant was dismissed from service with the respondent on the basis of being charged with a criminal offence. Upon conviction by the Magistrate's Court, he successfully appealed and, following acquittal at the High Court, the Ex-Parte Applicant, was granted leave of the court and filed judicial review proceedings against the respondents vide a Notice of Motion dated 15th August 2025 seeking: -
a) A Declaration that the Applicant's dismissal from the Kenya Defence Forces was unlawful, unconstitutional and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.
b) An Order of Certiorari to quash the dismissing the Applicant from service.
c) An Order of Mandamus compelling the 1st and 2nd Respondents to reinstate the Applicant into the Kenya Defence Forces with full salary, rank, benefits, and privileges from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement.
d) In the alternative, an Order for terminal benefits and compensation in lieu of
reinstatement.
e) Costs of this application be provided for.
f) Any other relief this Honourable Court may deem fit and just.
2. The Notice of Motion was supported by the Ex-Parte Applicant’s Verifying Affidavit sworn on 15th August 2025, a Statutory Statement of even date, as well as the bundle of documents attached. The Ex-Parte Applicant later filed a further affidavit dated 15th May 2026 in reply to the Replying Affidavit sworn by G.A. Ajierh sworn on 14th May 2026.
3. In response to the Motion, the 2nd Respondent filed Grounds of Opposition dated 6th May 2026; while the 1st Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by G.A. Ajierh sworn on 14th May 2026.
The Ex -Parte Applicant’s case in summary
4. The Ex-Parte Applicant’s case is that he was enlisted into the Kenya Defence Forces in the year 2010 and served until he was unlawfully dismissed from service vide a letter dated 23rd July 2024, following conviction in Sexual Offence Case No. E016 of 2022 at the Senior Principal Magistrate's Court at Tawa with the offences of rape and in the alternative, committing an indecent act with an adult. The reason for dismissal was expressly indicated in the letter dated 23rd July 2024 as “ON CONVICTION OF CIVIL OFFENCE”.
5. The Ex-Parte Applicant takes issue with the 1st Respondent’s conduct of dismissing him from service, emphasizing that he pleaded not guilty in the trial court, and lodged an appeal against the conviction and sentence at the High Court at Makueni in Criminal Appeal No. E059 of 2024. Subsequently, through a judgment delivered on 14th May 2025, the High Court allowed the Ex-Parte Applicant’s appeal, quashed his conviction and set aside the sentence, but by this time he had already been dismissed from service.
6. It is the Ex-Parte Applicant’s case that the quashing of his conviction rendered the basis of/reason for his dismissal from service non-existent and invalid. However, the 1st Respondent has refused to reinstate him to his position within the Kenya Defence Forces. The Ex-Parte Applicant takes the position that the Respondents, through their actions of dismissing him from service prior to determination of his appeal and of failing to reinstate him, have acted ultra vires, and violated his Constitutional rights to fair labour practices under Article 41; fair administrative practices under Article 47; fair hearing under Article 50; and under Article 236.
7. On the averment by the 1st Respondent that they recognize the appeal judgment of the High Court and have revoked the discharge, the Ex-Parte applicant responds that having admitted that the discharge was revoked, the 1st Respondent ought to reinstate/restore the Ex-Parte applicant to service by allowing him to resume duty and restore his rank and salary, and regularize his continuity of service, rather than process his terminal benefits. He points out that his employment status with the 1st Respondent has not been communicated.
Respondents’ case in brief
1st Respondent
8. The 1st Respondent admits the version of events put forth by the Ex-Parte Applicant, but argues that his discharge from the Kenya Defence Forces has been revoked following the High Court's judgement dated 14th May 2025. As such, they intend to process the Ex-Parte applicant's terminal benefits upon his clearance from the Service pursuant to the Kenya Defence Forces Act Cap. 199 and the applicable Terms and Conditions of Service.
9. They state that the delay in payment has not been deliberate, wilful, or intended to deny the Ex-Parte Applicant the fruits of its judgment but is a result fo the Ex-Parte Applicant’s failure to clear from the Service. The 1st Respondent categorizes the present application as premature.
2nd Respondent’s case in brief
10. On their part, the 2nd Respondent challenges the application on the premise that the Ex-Parte Applicant has not met the threshold of judicial review cases as set out in Republic-versus-Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 others Ex Parte Sanitam Services (E.A) Limited (2013) eKLR. Further, they contend that the Ex Parte applicant has approached the wrong forum as judicial review is concerned with the decision-making process, rather than the merits of the decision. The issues raised by the Ex Parte applicant are stated to be factual issues which fall outside the ambit of judicial review. The 2nd Respondents also avers that the actions complained of can be categorized as ordinary challenges between an employer and employee which can be resolved more adequately through an ordinary claim in the private law arena where viva voce evidence could be called, authenticity of documents and allegations tested and witnesses cross-examined. Nothing in the claim warrants the invocation of the public law remedy of judicial review.
11. It is the 2nd Respondent’s case that the grant of orders of certiorari is discretionary, but should not be granted as there is no published decision that is brought before the court for quashing pursuant to Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Similarly, judicial review orders of mandamus and prohibition cannot issue to compel the exercise of statutory discretion in a particular way or to achieve particular results. They urge the court to limit judicial intervention to acts that are actually in breach of the law or where the court is satisfied that the decision made is wrong and influenced by other considerations. Finally, they contend that the application is time-barred and incompetent due to lack of jurisdiction.
DETERMINATION
12. Following directions by the court that the judicial review application should be canvassed through written submissions, both parties filed.
Issues for determination
13. The Ex-Parte Applicant, in his submissions dated 20th May 2026 identified the following issues for determination:
i. Whether the continued exclusion of the Applicant from service after acquittal is unlawful, irrational and unfair.
ii. Whether the Respondents' alleged revocation of discharge without reinstatement constitutes adequate redress.
iii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to reinstatement and restoration of benefits.
iv. Whether the Applicant is entitled to judicial review reliefs sought.
14. Conversely, in their submissions dated 10th June 2026, the 2nd Respondent identified the following issues for determination:-
i. Whether court has jurisdiction to determine issues in the Notice of Motion.
ii. Whether the court should grant the reliefs sought.
15. The court found the all issues by the parties to be relevant and framed the issues for determination as follows-
i. Whether the court has jurisdiction to determine issues in the Notice of Motion.
ii. Whether the continued exclusion of the Applicant from service after acquittal and revocation of discharge is unlawful, irrational and unfair.
iii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to judicial review reliefs sought.
The law
16. Article 27 of the Constitution
17. Article 41 of the Constitution.
18. Article 47 of the Constitution.
19. Article 50 of the Constitution.
20. Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Whether the court has jurisdiction to determine issues in the Notice of Motion.
21. The issue was raised by the 1st respondent who submitted as follows: What is before the court is an application for judicial review orders of certiorari and mandamus. It is trite law that judicial review is concerned not with the merits of the decision but the decision making process itself. It should not be the intention of an applicant to substitute the opinion of this court for that of the impugned decision. In Republic -versus-Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 others Ex Parte - Sanitam Services (E.41 Limited (2013) eKLR, Mumbi Ngugi J. stated as follows: Judicial review proceedings are that the remedy of judicial review is concerned with reviewing, not the merits of the decision in respect of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process. The purpose of the remedies availed to a party under the judicial review regime is to ensure that the individual is given fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. The purpose is not to substitute the opinion of the court for that of the administrative body in which is vested statutory authority to determine the matter in question. It is for this reason that judicial review is predicated upon sufficient grounds being proved. While it is true that the scope of judicial review was expanded by the 2010 constitutional dispensation the bottom-line has remained to be that you cannot use judicial review proceedings to challenge the merits of the impugned decision or seek to substitute a decision of a tribunal with that of the court. Unfortunately, this court is being called to sit on the merits or otherwise of the respondent's decision. The facts pleaded by the ex parte applicant go beyond the scope of judicial review and test the merit of the 1st respondent's decision.
22. What is coming out from the facts is that this is a normal employer and employee dispute where an employee is merely claiming that he was wrongfully dismissed and seeks for reinstatement. Clearly these are matters surrounding the validity or otherwise of the impugned decision to dismiss the applicant. We rely on Erick Samuel Bwibo v Teachers Service Commission & 2 others [2021] eKLR in which Justice Radido held:
"Lastly, although the Court appreciates that judicial review orders now have a constitutional anchor, judicial review orders are discretionary and may not even be granted where merited. More so where alternative remedies are available (see Kenya Revenue Authority & 2 Ors v Darasa Investments Limited (2015) e KLR).
‘In the case of unfair termination of employment underpinned by general employment law, there are clear statutory provisions on how to challenge the termination with clear remedies set out under section 49 of the Employment Act, 2007. The applicant proposes to challenge his dismissal not through the manner outlined in the governing statutes of this Court but through the special vehicle of judicial review, long after the lapse of the prescribed limitation under section 90 of the Employment Act, 2007."
23. It cannot be gainsaid that the actions complained of are normal employer-employee disputes which could be resolved more adequately through an ordinary claim in the private law arena where viva voce evidence could be called, authenticity of documents and allegations tested and witnesses cross-examined. There is clearly nothing that warrants invocation of a public law remedy of judicial review. The applicant's complaints are outside the purview of judicial review. ro. The Court of Appeal Republic -versus- Mwangi S. Kimenyi (supra), referring to Eric Makokha and others versus Lawrence Sagini and others ,CA NO. 20 OF 1994 –‘This is a private law matter. There is no statute that confers upon the respondent the right to continue in employment indefinitely. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the respondent's employment had a statutory underpinning as defined in Erick Makhokha case.’
24. Secondly, even assuming that the dispute could be resolved by judicial review, the applicant did not annex any decision capable of being quashed pursuant to the provisions of Order 53 rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules. He only claims that he was dismissed by the 1st respondent. The applicant did not avail any evidence to demonstrate that, in fact, the alleged decision existed or that the decision was made by the respondents or at the instance of officials of the 1st respondent. The questions that this court would, as it retires to write the ruling, ask itself are as follows: what is the court being asked to call and quash? Which decision? Can certiorari lie against a nonexistent decision or against a perception that some verbal decision was made? What is the import and purport of Order 53 rule 7 of Civil Procedure Rules? We place reliance on the case of Republic -versus- Mwangi S. KimenYI where the Learned Judges faulted the trial judge for issuing judicial review order of certiorari against a non-existent decision.
25. Even if the applicant felt aggrieved by the entire decision, judicial review was not the right avenue to challenge the validity of the alleged verbal transfer which arose from his contract of employment. The right forum would be for him to pursue for a recourse for breach of contract of employment or for damages for what he calls untold suffering and confusion. Such are not matters to be ventilated in a judicial review court. We place reliance on the case of Republic -versus- Mwangi S. Kimenyi (supra) where the Court of Appeal held as follows:
‘We concur with the above proposition and find that the breach or threatened breach of the respondent's contract of employment was not a public act or matter of public law but was a matter of contractual relationship between the respondent and KIPPRA governed by private law. We find that the respondent's contract of employment had no statutory underpinning.’
Decision on jurisdiction
26. The ex parte applicant was an employee of the Kenya Defence Forces. All decisions cited by the 2nd respondent related to normal employment contracts for civilians. The employment of the ex parte applicant had statutory underpinning under the KDF Act. Indeed, the Employment Act ousts claims like the instant ones under section 3 which provides-
‘ Application
(1)This Act shall apply to all employees employed by any employer under a contract of service.
(2)This Act shall not apply to—
(a)the Kenya Defence Forces or the reserve as respectively defined in the Kenya Defence Forces Act (Cap. 199);’’
27. The ex parte applicant invoked the provisions of the Constitution, the Fair Administrative Action Act (FAAA), and the Civil Procedure Rules Order 53 in his Notice of Motion. The court was thus seized of both the traditional judicial review jurisdiction and the jurisdiction under Article 22 and 23, which empowers the court to issue orders of certiorari and mandamus on finding a violation of the rights of the ex parte applicant. Article 23(3) states-
‘(3)In any proceedings brought under Article 22, a court may grant appropriate relief, including—
(a)a declaration of rights;
(b)an injunction;
(c)a conservatory order;
(d)a declaration of invalidity of any law that denies, violates, infringes, or threatens a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights and is not justified under Article 24;
(e)an order for compensation; and
(f)an order of judicial review.’
28. I do find the court has jurisdiction and the ex parte applicant is properly before it, as its employment has statutory underpinning, the KDF Act, contrary to the assertions of the 2nd respondent.
Whether the continued exclusion of the Applicant from service after acquittal and revocation of discharge is unlawful, irrational and unfair.
29. The ex parte applicant contended that he ought to be returned to service instead of payment of terminal benefits to exit. The ex parte applicant relied on the decision in Charles Maina Ngare v Republic [2016] KEHC 7781 (KLR) where the Appellant, who served as a College Paymaster at the National Defence College under the Kenya Defence Forces, had been convicted on multiple counts of civil offences and consequently suffered the attendant disciplinary and service consequences arising from the conviction. Upon Appeal, however, the High Court quashed the conviction in its entirety, set aside all the sentences imposed, and significantly proceeded to order the reinstatement of the Appellant back into service together with restoration of his terms of service and decorations, if any.
30. The ex parte applicant contended that the importance of the foregoing authority to the present proceedings cannot be overstated. It demonstrates that where termination or adverse military consequences are founded upon a conviction subsequently overturned on appeal, restoration into service is not alien to the Kenya military and employment jurisprudence. On the contrary, the Court in Charles Maina Ngare case recognized that once the conviction collapses, the punitive administrative and institutional consequences flowing from it cannot lawfully continue to subsist in isolation from the extinguished conviction.
31. The Applicant submitted that the present case stands on even firmer footing. Here, the Respondents themselves expressly admit that the Applicant's discharge was revoked following the High Court judgment quashing the conviction. Having acknowledged the destruction of the legal foundation underlying the dismissal, the Respondents cannot now seek to preserve the punitive consequences of that same extinguished conviction through administrative inertia, procedural ambiguity or selective restoration. To permit such conduct would amount to allowing the Respondents to indirectly enforce a punishment whose legal basis has already been nullified by a superior Court of competent jurisdiction.
32. The Respondents did not submit on this issue.
33. The Applicant concedes the established principle that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not automatically invalidate disciplinary proceedings. That disciplinary liability may survive acquittal where, independently, those authorities are distinguishable because in those cases independent disciplinary proceedings existed and separate findings of misconduct were made. In the present matter, no independent disciplinary proceedings were conducted, no separate evidentiary findings exist and dismissal was expressly conviction-based Once conviction was quashed, the dismissal lost its entire juridical foundation.
34. The 2nd respondent submitted -the applicant seeks to compel the respondent to reinstate him to his prior position or, in the alternative, order for terminal benefits. On the reliefs sought of reinstatement or payment of terminal benefits is a private arrangement between an employer and employee. It is a general duty imposed an employer on satisfaction that an employee is entitled to such orders upon demonstrating wrongful dismissal. Evidence will be required to show whether applicant is actually entitled to the benefits as sought before the court can entertain such a relief. We submit that an order for payment of terminal benefits or reinstatement is outside the purview of judicial review and this court cannot entertain it. Mandamus cannot, therefore, be granted to compel reinstatement or payment of terminal benefits as this is purely a private law issue.
35. According to the Halsbury's Laws of England at paragraph 34, mandamus:
'commands no more than to do that which the party against whom the application is made is legally bound to perform. where a general duty is imposed, a mandatory order cannot require it to be done at once. Where a statute which imposes a duty leaves discretion as to the mode of performing the duty in the hands of the party on whom the obligation is laid, a mandatory order cannot command the duty in question to be carried out in a specific way.' 28. In Republic -versus- Marshland and Fen District Commissioners (1910.) I K.B. 155 at 165 the court stated that: 'it may be that the Act of Parliament has granted a power rather than imposed a duty, has conferred a discretion rather than an obligation. If a power or discretion only as distinct from a duty, exists then the prerogative writ of mandamus will not be issued by the Court.'
Decision
36. It was not in dispute the ex parte applicant was discharged from service vide letter dated 6th September 2024, which stated in part-
‘AUTHORITY FOR DISCHARGE FROM THE SERVICE - SERVICE MEMBER SVC NO: 79100 RANK: SSGT NAME: PRESTONE MWANZIA KIMANTHI TRADE: MED RECS UNIT 1. ISIOLO LEV IV HOSP The above named Service Member whose discharge has been approved was discharged from the service on 23-Jul-24 accordance with instructions contained in the DEFSO Chapter 4 Para вg. 2. Reason for discharge: ON CONVICTION OF CIVIL OFFENCE.’’(PK1)
37. However, on appeal against the conviction, the ex parte applicant was acquitted by the High Court, Makueni, and the sentence set aside vide judgment dated 14th May 2025. The court held as follows-
‘The upshot is that I find prosecution established that the complainant was attacked and raped on the night of 8th May 2022, however from my analysis of the evidence and what was placed before the trial, court it is my finding from all the foregoing that the alleged visual identification or recognition of the appellant as the perpetrator is unreliable and unsafe to sustain the conviction herein. I find that the appeal is merited and allow it. The conviction on each count is quashed and the sentence be and is hereby set aside. The appellant be set at liberty unless otherwise legally held.’
38. The 1st respondent, vide replying affidavit of G A Ajuerh dated 14th May 2026, stated that the ex parte applicant’s discharge from Kenya Defence Forces had been revoked following the High Court judgment dated 14th May 2025 and his redress(sic) of 30th June 2025. That his terminal benefits would be processed upon his clearance from the service as statutorily required under the KDF Act and applicable terms and conditions of service.
39. I concluded that the employer had already reinstated the ex parte applicant to service. Only outstanding issue in dispute was resumption of duty after the reinstatement.
40. The ex parte applicant contended that since the conviction was the only basis of the dismissal and having been acquitted and the discharge from service revoked, the only rational position was for his reinstatement to service. He relied on the decision of the High Court in Charles Maina Ngare v Republic [2016] KEHC 7781 (KLR) where the Judge sitting as court martial held – ‘
‘In the end, I find that the prosecution did not tender sufficient evidence to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. This appeal must therefore succeed. I quash the conviction and set aside all the sentences. The Appellant shall forthwith be set free unless otherwise lawfully held. I further order the Appellant be reinstated back to service on the previous rank of Warrant Officer II before the demotion. His terms of service including decorations, if any, are hereby restored. It is so ordered.’
41. In the instant case the Judge(Makueni High Court) held-
‘I find that the appeal is merited and allow it. The conviction on each count is quashed and the sentence be and is hereby set aside. The appellant be set at liberty unless otherwise legally held.’’
42. I find the case of Charles Maina Ngare v Republic [2016] KEHC 7781 (KLR) is a relevant authority to the instant case as the facts of discharge /dismissal are similar, being that the officer was dismissed on conviction for an offence and reinstated upon acquittal by the higher court. Whereas one judge, on setting aside the conviction and sentence, ordered reinstatement to previous rank, the judge in the instant case, on setting aside the sentence, did not make a further order. However, suo moto the employer revoked the discharge, meaning the ex parte applicant was reinstated to service. The only issue was failure to be returned to duty.
43. The 1st respondent in replying affidavit sworn by the legal officer of the Ministry of Defence stated they had not refused to comply with the judgment of the court. That the ex parte applicant’s discharge from the Kenya Defence Forces had been revoked following the High Court judgment of 14th May 2025. The deponent then stated the terminal dues will be processed. The deponent did not respond to the issue of resumption of duty and the court concluded this was because there was no rational reason. The court concluded that the respondents had the intention to terminate the petitioner's services without basis and fairness. The question then was on what basis would they process the terminal dues while the ex parte applicant’s discharge had been revoked. For context, discharge is provided for in the KDF Act as follows-
‘255. Discharge
(1)A service member may be discharged by the Service Commander or an officer authorised in that behalf, at any time during the member's period of colour service—(a)if, within two years after the date of attestation, the commanding officer considers that the member is unlikely to be an efficient member of the Defence Forces;(b)for activities or behavior likely to be prejudicial to the preservation of public security;(c)if the member is convicted of a civil offence; or’’ (emphasis given)
44. The court agreed with the ex parte applicant's position that upon setting aside the conviction for the civil offence, the discharge /dismissal had no foundation. The 1st respondent revoked the discharge but failed to give the ex parte applicant reasons why, as in Charles Maina Ngare v Republic [2016] KEHC 7781 (KLR), the ex parte applicant was not reinstated to his rank. The 1st respondent stated they had revoked the discharge. The court holds that the purported decision to pay the ex parte applicant terminal benefits without due process, after the discharge was revoked, was unlawful, unfair, and irrational. The action of the respondents(with the 2nd respondent representing the Ministry of Defence ) of attempting to remove the ex parte applicant from employment after the revoking the discharge through payment of terminal dues without procedural fairness was in violation of the right to fair labour practices under Article 41 of the Constitution to wit-
‘41. Labour relations
(1)Every person has the right to fair labour practices.’
45. The Court finds that the respondents, for failure to give the ex parte applicant the reason in writing for termination of service vide intended payment of terminal dues are in violation of Article 47 of the Constitution to wit-
‘47. Fair administrative action
(1)Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2)If a right or fundamental freedom of a person has been or is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action.’
46. The court finds that the failure to accord the ex parte applicant a hearing under its statutory mechanisms under the Kenya Defence Forces Act on the fate of his continued service after the revocation of the discharge amounts to violation of his right to fair hearing under Article 50 –
‘(1)Every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body.’
47. In the upshot, I return in the positive that the continued exclusion of the Applicant from service after acquittal and revocation of discharge by the respondents is unlawful, irrational and unfair.
Whether the Applicant is entitled to judicial review reliefs sought.
48. The ex parte applicant sought for the following reliefs-
a) A Declaration that the Applicant's dismissal from the Kenya Defence Forces was unlawful, unconstitutional and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.
b) An Order of Certiorari to quash the dismissing the Applicant from service.
c) An Order of Mandamus compelling the 1st and 2nd Respondent to reinstate the Applicant into the Kenya Defence Forces with full salary, rank, benefits, and privileges from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement.
d) In the alternative, an Order for terminal benefits and compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
e) Costs of this application be provided for.
f) Any other relief this Honourable Court may deem fit and just.
a) Whether to issue a Declaration that the Applicant's dismissal from the Kenya Defence Forces was unlawful, unconstitutional and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.
49. The respondents stated they were to process terminal dues having revoked the discharge. The court held that the purported intention to process the ex parte applicant’s terminal dues without due process was unlawful, unfair and irrational. It amounts to dismissal from service without fairness. The ex parte applicant had not been taken through a disciplinary process to explain why he was being cleared from service when the reason for the discharge had been declared null by the High Court and the discharge had been revoked. No reason was disclosed to the court for the purported decision. I upheld the decision in in Lieutenant Colonel Lukale Moses Sande v Kenya Defence Forces & another [2018] KEELRC 509 (KLR) which was a claim of unfair termination. The trial court upon hearing the case on merit held-
‘I have found that by filing this suit claiming compensatory damages, the claimant accepted that his commission was terminated by the first respondent. I have further found that the said termination was procedurally unlawful and unfair, and indeed a violation of his right to fair labour practices, fair administrative action, fair hearing and right to protection from dismissal, removal from office, or otherwise subjected to disciplinary action without due process of the law as enshrined under Articles 41, 47, 50 and 236(b) of the Constitution, KDF Act and the rules of Natural Justice.’
50. I hereby declare that the intended clearance of the Ex Parte Applicant amounts to amount to unfair dismissal from the Kenya Defence Forces and is unlawful, unconstitutional and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47 and fair hearing under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
b) on whether to issue an Order of Certiorari to quash the dismissal of the Applicant from service.
51. As stated earlier, there was an intention to dismiss the ex parte applicant from service, as disclosed in the replying affidavit, that they were in the process of dealing with his terminal dues. The basis of the intended decision was not disclosed to the court. I do declare that the intended dismissal through the processing of terminal dues is unlawful and unfair, and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47, and Fair hearing under Article 50 of the Constitution.
c) whether to issue an Order of Mandamus compelling the 1st and 2nd Respondents to reinstate the Applicant into the Kenya Defence Forces with full salary, rank, benefits, and privileges from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement.
52. In defining the scope of the Order of Mandamus, the Court of Appeal in Kenya National Examination Council v Republic; GGN & 9 others (Ex parte) [1997] KECA 58 (KLR) stated-
‘24.The next issue we must deal with is this: What is the scope and efficacy of an Order of Mandamus? Once again we turn to Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th Edition Volume 1 at page 111 from paragraph 89. That learned treatise says:-“The order must command no more than the party against whom the application is made is legally bound to perform. Where a general duty is imposed, a mandamus cannot require it to be done at once. Where a statute, which imposes a duty leaves discretion as to the mode of performing the duty in the hands of the party on whom the obligation is laid, a mandamus cannot command the duty in question to be carried out in a specific way.’
53. The practice of the exparte applicant as demonstrated in Ngare case is to reinstate officers on being cleared of offences by the Court. Indeed, the ex parte applicant's discharge/dismissal was revoked as stated by the respondents in the replying affidavit of Ajierh. It would be an act of discrimination to treat officers in similar circumstances differently, as that would be in violation of Article 27 of the Constitution. The return of the exparte applicant to previous or next rank, as is applicable in the circumstances, as the discharge was set aside by the court, would be merited . This position is supported by fact that the respondents revoked the discharge thus restoring the exparte applicant to status quo ante discharge. The status quo ante was that the exparte applicant was serving in employment of the 1st respondent. In Ngare case the High Court ordered as follows-
‘I further order the Appellant be reinstated back to service on the previous rank of Warrant Officer II before the demotion. His terms of service including decorations, if any, are hereby restored. It is so ordered.’
54. Consequently, the court having found that it was a practice to reinstate officers on acquittals of civil offences and in this case having revoked the discharge, I find merit to issue An Order of Mandamus compelling the 1st and 2nd Respondent to restore the Applicant to the Kenya Defence Forces with full salary, rank, benefits, and privileges from the date of discharge.
55. The ex-parte applicant apprehensive the respondents may terminate his service, asked for alternative prayer - In the alternative, an Order for terminal benefits and compensation in lieu of reinstatement. I have to clarify that the exparte applicant has already been reinstated to employment as per the replying affidavit to the petition. What is before the court is contemplation to dismiss/retire him from service after the revocation of service, which I held as unlawful, irrational and unfair.
56. The court, in pursuance of finality of litigation, and in the event the respondents proceed with the unlawful, irrational and unfair action of termination of the employment of the exbparte applicant, then besides payment of terminal dues , for violation of articles 41, 47 and 50 of the Constitution, the ex parte applicant is entitled to the remedy of compensation. The Court of Appeal in Chief of Kenya Defence Forces & another v Etyang (Civil Appeal E001 of 2024) [2025] KECA 1409 (KLR) (31 July 2025) (Judgment)outlined the principles for award of compensation of violation of constitutional rights as follows-
‘The Supreme Court of Canada emphasised that a remedy in cases of constitutional violations should balance fairness to the opposing party, effectively uphold the rights and freedoms of the claimants, align with the principles of constitutional democracy, and utilise judicial mechanisms to enforce and protect the violated rights. In the case of Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, it was held, “A remedy must be fair to the party against whom the order is made, must meaningfully vindicate the rights and freedoms of the claimants, must employ means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy, and must be a judicial remedy which vindicates the right while invoking the function and powers of a court.” The case of Gitobu Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR addressed the issue of awards in constitutional petitions by emphasising that damages for constitutional violations are not automatically granted but must be justified by evidence of harm suffered. This Court stated: “The primary purpose of a constitutional remedy is not compensatory or punitive but to vindicate the rights violated and to prevent or deter any future infringements. The appropriate determination is an exercise in rationality and proportionality. In some cases, a declaration only will be appropriate to meet the justice of the case, being itself a powerful statement which can go a long way in effecting reparation of the breach, if not doing so altogether. In others, an award of reasonable damages may be called for in addition to the declaration." Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Peter Ndegwa Kiai t/a Pema Wines and Spirits v Attorney General & 2 others (supra) stated, “the guiding principle to be gleaned from these decisions is that an award of general damages in constitutional petitions is discretionary and will depend on the circumstances of each case, and can indeed be granted as compensation for proven loss.” This principle underscores that the focus of constitutional remedies is to uphold and protect rights rather than to provide excessive or unwarranted compensation. From the proceedings, compensation was intended to address broader violations and the petitioner’s ongoing needs’
57. Guided by the above decision, I found a violation of the ex parte applicant's constitutional rights under Articles 41, 47 and 50 of the Constitution. It is a truism that there cannot be a violation without a remedy. The Constitution allows a remedy of compensation on a finding of violation. The violations are multiple. The expert applicant pleaded immense financial loss of livelihood, reputational damage and psychological trauma. The trauma was not proved, but it is not far-fetched to conclude that he would suffer financial stress for loss of his livelihood. Under the revoked discharge letter dated 6th September 2024 (PK-1) the period of service was indicated as follows-
‘His last day of paid Service will be 23-Jul-24. Assessment of service, including 23-Jul-24, is 16 Year (s) and 241 day (s) reckonable Service and NIL year (s) and 28 day (s) non-reckonable Service. ‘
58. The ex parte applicant produced his payslip which indicated he was 40 years and his date of retirement was 28th October 2025. I do take judicial notice that service in the military is not governed by regular norms in employment and labour relations. It is thus not possible to apply the remaining period of service as a criteria for compensation. Having found violation of the constitutional rights of the ex parte applicant in the alternative and taking into account the foregoing and the fact that in the discharge the exparte applicant is entitled to pension, I find award compensation of violations equivalent of Kshs. 2,000,000 (Two Million )sufficient to vindicate his rights to fair labour practice, fair administrative action right and right to fair hearing. The compensation is only applicable in the alternative of restoration to service with previous rank and benefits paid from the date of discharge.
Disposition
59. In the upshot, the judicial review application dated 29th April 2026 is allowed.
60. The court enters judgment for the petitioner against the respondents jointly and severally as follows-
a. I hereby declare that the intended clearance of the Ex Parte Applicant amounts to unfair dismissal from the Kenya Defence Forces and is unlawful, unconstitutional and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.
b. I do declare that the intended dismissal through processing of terminal dues is unlawful and unfair and in violation of his right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.
c. An Order of Mandamus is hereby issued compelling the 1st Respondent to reinstate the Applicant into the Kenya Defence Forces with full salary, rank, benefits, and privileges from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement.
In the alternative to b, c and d above
d. Payment to the ex parte applicant’s of terminal dues and compensation award for violations of constitutional rights, Article 41, 47 and 50, equivalent of Kshs. 2,000,000 (Two Million) to vindicate the violation of the ex parte applicant’s rights to fair labour practice, fair administrative action, and the right to a fair hearing.
61. Cost of the suit.
62. It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER , 2026.
Jemimah Keli,
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Court Assistant: Otieno
Ex-Parte Applicant – Kerubo
Respondents –absent