Employment law

Mutisya v Delmonte Kenya Ltd [2026] KEELRC 2822 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E111 of 2025
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

Whether the Appellant proved the existence of an employment relationship with the Respondent, as opposed to a contractor relationship.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E111 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

FREDRICK NGILAH MUTISYA ………………………………………… APPELLANT

VERSUS

DELMONTE KENYA LIMITED ………………………………………… RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 4th April, 2025. It arises from a judgment delivered on 27th March, 2025 in Thika ELRC No. E006 of 2023.

It is on record that the suit before the trial court was the lead file in a series of seven related matters filed by mammal control contractors engaged by the Respondent, namely Thika ELRC No. E019 of 2023, E020 of 2023, E021 of 2023, E023 of 2023, E037 of 2023 and E022 of 2024, and that the trial court’s judgment was expressed to apply mutatis mutandis to those six companion suits. Nothing in this judgment purports to determine any appeal other than the one before this court. The grounds of the appeal, as set out in the Memorandum of Appeal, are many, running to thirty-three in number. They are condensed for the purposes of analysis, to the following core issues:

1. Whether the Appellant proved the existence of an employment relationship with the Respondent, as opposed to a contractor relationship.

2. Whether the trial court misdirected itself on the burden of proof by relying on Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act rather than on Sections 10(7) and 74 of the Employment Act.

3. Whether, and if so on what basis, the Appellant’s engagement was converted into a term contract under Section 37 of the Employment Act.

4. Whether the Appellant was a unionisable plantation employee entitled to the benefits of the CBA dated 13th August 2020.

5. Whether the Appellant’s termination was unlawful and/or unfair.

6. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the terminal dues and other benefits pleaded.

7. Who should bear the costs of the appeal.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) This appeal be allowed.

b) The judgment and orders of 27th March, 2025 be set aside and substituted with a judgment in favour of the Appellant in the full sum of the claims as pleaded.

c) Costs of this appeal be awarded to the Appellant.

The Appellant’s case and submission is that in the first instance the trial court erred at the very first hurdle by finding that the Appellant had not discharged the burden of proving an employment relationship with the Respondent. It is their case and submission that the trial court erroneously conflated the existence of a contract of service with the existence of a permanent contract of employment and required proof of the latter as a precondition to establishing the former.

On Section 37, counsel submitted that the trial court erroneously conflated Section 37 with Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007 and required the Appellant to prove daily payment before Section 37 could apply, relying on Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) for the proposition that continuous service of the length pleaded here converts an engagement by operation of law regardless of the label the parties gave it. On the burden of proof, counsel relied on Meshack Kiio Ikulume v Prime Fuels Kenya Limited [2013] KEELRC 921 (KLR) for the submission that an employer’s failure to produce complete employment records is fatal to its denial of the relationship.

On union coverage, counsel submitted that the CBA did not list a Mammal Control Officer among the categories excluded from its coverage under Part One, Section 1(ii), and, relying on Civicon Limited v Amalgamated Union of Kenya Metal Workers [2016] KECA 164 (KLR), that the Appellant was accordingly a unionisable employee entitled to its benefits regardless of whether he had subscribed as a member. On termination, counsel submitted that the non-renewal of the Appellant’s fixed-term contract, for want of work, amounted to redundancy under Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007 relying on Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 others [2014] KECA 404 (KLR).

The Respondent’s case and submission is that this was a classic contract for services rather than a contract of service, applying the control test in Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant was engaged on a series of short-term fixed-term Mammal Control Contracts, each for a specific purpose and period, paid a consolidated rate inclusive of labour, insurance and statutory obligations rather than a fixed monthly salary in the manner of its permanent, unionised workforce, and that the contracts left the manner of performance to the Appellant himself. On Section 37, the Respondent submitted that the provision applies only to a casual employee as statutorily defined, being one paid at the end of each day for engagement not exceeding twenty-four hours. The Appellant was never a casual employee within this definition.

On union coverage, the Respondent submitted that the CBA covers plantation employees only, requires the Respondent to deduct union dues from covered employees’ wages, and that no union dues were ever deducted from the Appellant’s payments, relying on Tailors & Textiles Workers Union v New Wide Garments Kenya (EPZ) Limited [2013] KEELRC 925 (eKLR) and Kenya Union of Commercial, Food and Allied Workers v Jade Collections Limited [2025] KEIC 1 (KLR) for the proposition that a bare claim of union membership, unsupported by evidence of dues paid or benefits received, cannot found entitlement to a collective agreement’s benefits.

On termination, the Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s engagement was validly brought to an end under Clause 2.5.1 of the Mammal Control Contract, which provides for termination where there is no available work and that he was paid seven days’ salary in lieu of notice together with his pay for days worked before termination.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination come out as;

1. Whether the Appellant proved the existence of an employment relationship with the Respondent.

2. Whether the trial court misdirected itself on the burden of proof.

3. Whether Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007 applied to the Appellant’s engagement.

4. Whether the Appellant was a unionisable plantation employee entitled to the benefits of the CBA.

5. Whether the Appellant’s termination was unlawful and/or unfair.

6. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the terminal dues claimed.

7. Who bears the costs of this appeal.

This being a first appeal, this court is entitled and bound to re-evaluate and re-analyse the evidence on record and reach its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify, and will accordingly be slow to depart from the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are shown to be based on no evidence or to proceed from a misapprehension of the applicable principles as in the authorities of Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123; Jabane v Olenja [1986] KLR 661; Thistle Limited v Chief Magistrate, Mombasa; Kombe (Interested Party) [2026] KECA 40 (KLR). I turn to each issue on that footing.

On the 1st issue for determination, there is a well-recognised distinction between a contract of service, which creates an employment relationship and a contract for services, which does not. The test as applied in Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101 and adopted locally in Everret Aviation Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority [2013] KEHC 6352 (KLR), asks whether the engaging party controls not merely what is to be done but how it is to be done, and whether the worker’s efforts are integrated into the business or merely accessory to it. The Employment and Labour Relations Court has more recently applied the indicative factors in ILO Recommendation No. 198, including control, integration, continuity and the provision of tools and equipment in the case of Wanjihi v Gibb Africa Limited [2026] KEELRC 876 (eKLR).

On the record, the Appellant was paid a consolidated rate under successive fixed-term Mammal Control Contracts. He was not enrolled on the Respondent’s payroll as a permanent employee, was not deducted union dues or NSSF contributions at the rate applicable to permanent employees, and produced payslips for only a limited period of a claimed eleven-year engagement, with no proof of engagement at all in 2012 or in 2015 to 2018. A letter dated 14th June, 2021 produced by the Appellant described his engagement as intermittent from March 2013 to April, 2021 and he did not seriously challenge its contents in his evidence. The trial court’s finding that the Appellant did not discharge the burden of proving a contract of service is not plainly wrong and is affirmed.

On the 2nd issue for determination, Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act codify the ordinary rule that he who alleges must prove and place the initial burden on the party making an assertion. Sections 10(7) and 74 of the Employment Act, 2007 shift the burden as to the terms of employment and employment records once an employment relationship is established or is not genuinely in dispute: Monica Kanini Mutua v Al-Arafat Shopping Centre & another [2018] KEELRC 960 (eKLR). But the foundational question, whether a contract of service as opposed to a contract for services existed, was squarely in dispute from the outset, and the Respondent did not fail to produce written particulars; it produced the actual Mammal Control Contract governing the last engagement together with comparative sample documents for its permanent and unionised staff. The authorities relied upon by the Appellant, Meshack Kiio Ikulume v Prime Fuels Kenya Limited [2013] KEELRC 921 (KLR) and Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR), concerned employers who failed to produce any contract or particulars at all in the face of an admitted or otherwise established employment relationship; they do not assist the Appellant on the anterior question of whether an employment relationship existed in the first place. The trial court did not misdirect itself by requiring the Appellant to prove that foundational question.

On the 3rd issue for determination, Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007 defines a casual employee as one whose terms of engagement provide for payment at the end of each day and who is engaged for a period not exceeding twenty-four hours at a time. Section 37(1) converts such an engagement, once continuous working days amounting in the aggregate to not less than one month have accrued, into one where wages are paid monthly. The Appellant was paid a monthly consolidated rate under successive fixed-term contracts of several months’ duration, not a daily wage payable at the end of each day; he was never a casual employee within that statutory definition and Section 37 has no application to his case.

The authorities relied upon by the Appellant, Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited (supra) and Chemelil Sugar Company v Ebrahim Ochieng Otuon & 2 others [2015] KECA 202 (KLR), concerned workers genuinely engaged and paid on a casual, day-to-day basis before their engagements were treated as converted by operation of law. They do not extend Section 37 to a fixed-term contractor paid a consolidated rate. The length of the Appellant’s cumulative engagement, standing alone, does not convert a contract for services into a contract of service.

On the 4th issue for determination, Section 59(1) of the Labour Relations Act provides that a collective agreement binds only unionisable employees and parties to the agreement, and unionisable employees are not to be confused with the whole of an employer’s workforce as in Civicon Limited v Amalgamated Union of Kenya Metal Workers [2016] KECA 164 (KLR). The CBA dated 13th August 2020 covers plantation employees only and requires the Respondent to deduct union dues from members’ pay. No union dues were ever deducted from the Appellant’s payments, and he conceded that he had never signed any document to join the union. A bare claim of union membership, unsupported by proof of dues paid or benefits received, cannot found entitlement to a collective agreement’s benefits as cited in Tailors & Textiles Workers Union v New Wide Garments Kenya (EPZ) Limited [2013] KEELRC 925 (eKLR).The Appellant is not a unionisable plantation employee within the meaning of the CBA.

On the 5th issue for determination, the Appellant’s last Mammal Control Contract, dated 14th February 2021, was for a fixed term of three months and was due to expire on 15th May, 2021. The unchallenged evidence, including the Appellant’s own pleaded case, was that he was informed by his supervisor that his services were no longer required for want of work and that he was paid seven days’ salary in lieu of notice under Clause 2.5.1 of the contract together with his pay for days worked in April, 2021 before his services in fact ended on 30th April, 2021.

Applying the test of reasonableness in British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91, and the requirement of both substantive justification and procedural fairness restated in Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR, the non-renewal of a fixed-term contractual engagement, upon payment of the contractual notice, was fair and lawful. The redundancy safeguards under Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007 and the principles discussed in Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 others [2014] KECA 404 (KLR) apply to the termination of a permanent employee’s services on account of redundancy; having found that the Appellant was not a permanent employee but was engaged under a fixed-term contract for services which was not renewed for want of work, Section 40 does not arise for consideration on this record.

On the 6th issue for determination, the several heads of terminal dues claimed, being anchored either on the Appellant’s claimed status as a permanent employee or on unionisable benefits under the CBA, fail together with those foundational findings.

The claim for service pay was in any event correctly excluded under Section 35(6) of the Employment Act given the Appellant’s own NSSF membership. The claim for accrued leave required proof of twelve consecutive months of continuous service, which was not established. On the evidence, the Appellant was paid at a daily rate in excess of the prescribed minimum for unskilled agricultural employees under the Regulation of Wages (Agricultural Industry) (Amendment) Order, 2018, so that no underpayment was established, and the claims for overtime, rest days, public holidays and dog-handling fees were, without exception, tied either to the CBA, which did not apply to the Appellant, or to hours and days of work pleaded but never proved by any contemporaneous record.

It is noted, for accuracy, that a discrepancy exists between the Respondent’s submissions before this court, which described the trial court as having awarded notice pay of Kshs. 3,538.85 and apportioned 50% of costs, and the certified judgment. The certified judgment shows that the notice claim was rejected on the basis that notice had already been paid before the suit was filed and that no apportionment of costs was made. The order that a certificate of service do issue under Section 51 of the Employment Act, 2007 was, however, correctly made and is not disturbed. Where the submissions conflict with the certified judgment, the certified judgment applies.

On the 7th issue, costs are ordinarily in the discretion of the court under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act as was observed in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2014] eKLR. Having regard to the considerations that moved the trial court, namely the age of the Appellant and the fact that this appeal is the lead matter in a series of similar suits, each party shall bear their costs of the appeal.

I am therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The judgment and decree of the trial court delivered on 27th March, 2025 in Thika ELRC No. E006 of 2023 is upheld and affirmed.

(ii) Each party bears their costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Miss Omollo holding brief for Ochogo instructed by Okello Ochogo Advocates LLP for the Appellant.

2. Mr. Uvyu instructed by M.M. Uvyu & Company Advocates for the Respondent.

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