Background
The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Respondent had been unfairly terminated by the Appellant without establishing any evidence of such termination having taken place.
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The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Respondent had been unfairly terminated by the Appellant without establishing any evidence of such termination having taken place.
Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
APPEAL NO. E285 OF 2024
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
JEFFERY MWAURA KIBORO APPELLANT
VERSUS
NANCY VIKE VUGUSU RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 1st October, 2024. It arises from a judgment delivered on 13th September, 2024 in MCELRC No. E1194 of 2021.
Here the trial court found that the Respondent was employed by the Appellant as a domestic worker from November, 2010 to December, 2020 at a monthly wage of Kshs. 18,000.00, had been unfairly and unprocedurally terminated and awarded her Kshs. 552,000.00 comprising notice pay of Kshs. 18,000.00, compensation for unfair termination of Kshs. 180,000.00, annual leave of Kshs. 27,000.00 and house allowance of Kshs. 327,000.00, together with costs and interest.
It is based on the following grounds;
1. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Respondent had been unfairly terminated by the Appellant without establishing any evidence of such termination having taken place.
2. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact as well as misdirected himself by shifting the evidentiary burden of proving termination of employment upon the Appellant as opposed to the Respondent as is required by law.
3. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by admitting as evidence and relying upon the Respondent's Witness Statements dated 24th May, 2021 despite the Respondent wholly disowning its contents and averments during cross examination.
4. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by admitting as evidence and relying upon the Respondent's oral testimony that was wholly inconsistent and in conflict with Respondent's own prior written witness statement and pleadings.
5. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding Kshs 180,000.00 as compensation for unlawful termination despite there being no evidence of the alleged termination of employment ever taking place.
6. The Learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding Kshs 327,000.00 to the Respondent as unpaid house allowance despite the Appellant having paid her consolidated gross pay that was inclusive of house allowance for the entire duration of her employment.
7. The Learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding Kshs 327,000.00 to the Respondent as unpaid house allowance despite her consolidated gross pay being Kshs 18,000.00 which was well above the statutory minimum wages inclusive of house allowance that was required by law.
8. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding the Respondent unpaid house allowance claims stretching back ten (10) years despite the same being limited by the law to a maximum of three (3) years.
9. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the oral contract for employment between the parties entitled the Respondent to housing allowance separate from and in addition to her gross pay despite her having been estopped by way of conduct from implying such a term.
10. The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding Kshs 18,000.00 as notice pay despite the Appellant never having terminated the Respondent's employment
11. The Learned Magistrate erred in fact and in law by awarding Kshs 27,000.00 as eighteen (18) months unpaid leave despite the Respondent having admitted in her own pleadings to have proceeded on leave.
12. The entire Judgment and orders of the Learned Magistrate made on 13th September, 2024 and the entire reasoning was fatally flawed and/or erroneous in law.
The Appellant prays for orders thus;
a) This appeal be allowed.
b) The Judgment and orders of the trial court dated 13th September 2024 be vacated and/or set aside.
c) Judgment be entered dismissing the Respondent's claim.
d) Costs of this appeal be awarded to the Appellant.
It is the Appellant's case and submission that the Respondent was employed as a domestic worker from November, 2010 and that in 2020, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, they offered her accommodation in his servant quarters for her safety, which she declined, continuing instead to commute to work daily.
The Appellant’s other case is that in December, 2020 the Respondent, of her own accord, communicated her intention to leave employment, served her notice through to the end of January 2021 and was paid her full salary to the end of that month and that she was at no time terminated. On the burden of proving termination, the Appellant submits that the trial court erred by requiring him to furnish evidence of termination rather than requiring the Respondent, as the party asserting termination, to prove it at the threshold, relying on Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 and on the authorities of Pius Machafu Isindu v Lavington Security Guards Limited [2017] eKLR, Lydia Ayuma v Francisca Omunga (Appeal E220 of 2023) [2025] KEELRC 673 (KLR) and Protus Wanjala Mutike v Anglo African Properties t/a Jambo Mutara Lodge Laikipia (Cause 30 of 2019) [2021] KEELRC 1084 (KLR), the last being a decision of this court dismissing a claim for want of proof of the fact of termination. Reliance is further placed on Zakayo Ndungu Ngugi v National Bank of Kenya Limited & Another [2012] eKLR for the proposition that a party cannot be required to adduce positive evidence to prove a negative.
On the reliability of the Respondent's testimony, the Appellant submits that she disowned, under cross-examination, the contents of paragraph 4 of her own Witness Statement dated 24th May 2021, rendering her testimony unreliable within the meaning of Sections 159 and 161 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80, Laws of Kenya.
On house allowance, the Appellant submits that the award offends both the limitation period applicable to employment claims and the substance of the applicable Wage Order, which he submits prescribes a consolidated wage inclusive of housing for domestic workers.
On annual leave, the Appellant submits that leave is a time-bound statutory entitlement to rest which is forfeited under Section 28(4) of the Employment Act, 2007 if not taken within the permitted eighteen-month carry-forward period, and that in any event the Respondent's own admission that she was released for a December holiday shortly before her employment ended is inconsistent with her claim to have never taken leave.
The Respondent's case and submission is that she was employed by the Appellant from November, 2010 as a house help, at a monthly salary of Kshs. 18,000.00, and that she was dismissed from employment in December, 2020 having been released on 28th December, 2020 for the December holiday and turned away on reporting back to work on 10th January 2021.
Relying on the authority of Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Limited & Others [1968] EA 123, she submits that this court, while entitled to reconsider the evidence, ought to be slow to disturb the trial court's findings on credibility, not having itself seen or heard the witnesses. The Respondent submits that having established the fact of termination through her testimony, which was not displaced by the Appellant's evidence, and relying on the bifurcated burden recognised in Isindu v Lavington Security Guards Limited [2017] eKLR, this burden correctly shifted to the Appellant to demonstrate valid reason and fair procedure under Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007. On house allowance, the Respondent submits that her entitlement thereto is provided for under Section 31 of the Employment Act, 2007 and is separate from the consolidated wage paid to her.
On limitation, the Respondent submits that non-payment of house allowance, being due and unpaid on a monthly basis throughout her employment, gave rise on each occasion to a fresh cause of action, with the result that the claim was not stale under Section 90 of the Employment Act, 2007. On annual leave, the Respondent submits that the Appellant produced no leave records as required under Section 74 of the Employment Act, 2007 and that the resulting evidentiary gap ought to be resolved against him as the defaulting party.
The issues for determination in this cause therefore are;
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's employment was terminated by the Appellant, and in its treatment of the burden of proof.
2. Whether the trial court erred in relying on the Respondent's evidence notwithstanding the inconsistencies identified by the Appellant.
3. Whether the awards of notice pay and compensation for unfair termination are sustainable.
4. Whether the award of Kshs. 327,000.00 as house allowance is sustainable, having regard to Sections 31 and 90 of the Employment Act and to the applicable Wage Order.
5. Whether the award of Kshs. 27,000.0 as annual leave is sustainable.
6. What orders should issue, including as to costs.
On the 1st issue for determination, Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 places on an employee, at the threshold, the burden of proving that unfair termination or wrongful dismissal has occurred. Once this foundation is laid that Section 43 casts on the employer the burden of proving the reason for the termination, in default of which it is deemed unfair within the meaning of Section 45. This bifurcated approach was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Pius Machafu Isindu v Lavington Security Guards Limited [2017] eKLR, applied in Lydia Ayuma v Francisca Omunga (Appeal E220 of 2023) [2025] KEELRC 673 (KLR), and applied by this court itself in Protus Wanjala Mutike v Anglo African Properties t/a Jambo Mutara Lodge Laikipia (Cause 30 of 2019) [2021] KEELRC 1084 (KLR), where a claim was dismissed for want of any evidence of the fact of termination.
The distinction the Appellant draws is a real one, and it is worth stating precisely what it requires. In Ayuma v Omunga, the appellate court set aside a dismissal of the claimant's suit precisely because the trial court had failed to engage with evidence capable of establishing the fact of termination, notwithstanding the employer's denial; the employee's sworn account was not to be brushed aside merely because it was contested. The present case is the converse: it is the Respondent's sworn account, not the Appellant's, that stands uncontradicted by anything beyond assertion. The two decisions are consistent, not opposed: in each, the party who gave direct, first-hand testimony of the operative fact prevailed over a bare, undocumented denial or assertion from the other side. That is the ordinary business of fact-finding, not a reversal of the burden of proof.
The Respondent's testimony was that she was informed her services were no longer required and that she found a replacement already installed in her position on returning to the Appellant's home. That testimony, given in her evidence-in-chief, was not materially displaced under cross-examination. The Appellant's own evidence, that the Respondent instead gave notice and served it through to the end of January, 2021 was on his own admission unsupported by any document, notwithstanding his duty as an employer to keep records touching on his employees' employment under Section 74 of the Employment Act, 2007. A party who asserts a fact peculiarly within his own means to prove, and fails to produce any corroboration of it, cannot complain if the court declines to accept that assertion over the sworn and consistent testimony of the other side; this is not, as the Appellant would have it, a case of requiring him to prove a negative within the meaning of Zakayo Ndungu Ngugi v National Bank of Kenya Limited & Another [2012] eKLR, but simply an assessment of which of two competing accounts is, on the evidence, more probably true.
Although the Appellant suggests the Respondent voluntarily resigned, this account was neither put to the Respondent in cross-examination as a specific proposition in a manner that gave her a fair opportunity to address it, nor corroborated by any documentary or independent evidence. Applying the standard restated in Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Limited & Others [1968] EA 123, this court, not having seen or heard the witnesses, is slow to disturb a trial court's assessment of conflicting oral accounts unless it is shown to rest on no evidence or a plain misapprehension of the evidence. No such basis is made out here. The trial court's finding that the Respondent's employment was terminated by the Appellant is not plainly wrong and is not disturbed, save that, for the avoidance of doubt, the proper basis for that finding is that the Respondent's own evidence sufficiently discharged her burden under Section 47(5), and not that the burden had shifted to the Appellant to disprove termination. The 1st issue is resolved against the Appellant.
On the 2nd issue for determination, it is correct that the Respondent, in cross-examination, stated of paragraph 4 of her Witness Statement dated 24th May 2021, which recorded that she had been released for the December holiday before being turned away on her return, that "the said paragraph is not truthful". That inconsistency was properly before the trial court and, under Sections 159 and 161 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80, Laws of Kenya and the holding in Hillary Kiplagat Kipyego v Republic [2013] eKLR, entitled it, and entitles this court, to treat that specific aspect of her account with caution.
It is not, however, an inconsistency that goes to the whole of her evidence. In re-examination, the Respondent maintained, consistently with the core of her pleaded case, that she went home and, on coming back after Christmas, found that a new person had been employed and was told that work was over. The disavowal in cross-examination concerned the characterisation of the December break as leave properly so called, not the central and consistently maintained fact that she was turned away on her return to find a replacement in place. A witness's credit is not destroyed in its entirety by an inconsistency on one discrete point, particularly one which the trial court, having seen and heard her testify, was better placed than this court to weigh. The 2nd issue is resolved against the Appellant.
On the 3rd issue for determination, it follows from the foregoing that the finding that the Respondent's employment was terminated, without a valid reason having been proved and without the procedural safeguards required under Section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 having been observed, is affirmed. No show cause letter was issued and no hearing was convened before her employment came to an end. The award of one month's notice pay of Kshs. 18,000.00 under Section 36 of the Employment Act, 2007 is properly founded and is sustained.
As to compensation, Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 empowers the court, where it finds a termination unfair, to award compensation not exceeding twelve months' wages, and Section 49(4) directs the court, in fixing the amount, to have regard to factors including the wishes of the employee, the circumstances in which the termination took place, the extent to which the employee caused or contributed to the termination, the practicability of recommending reinstatement, the employee's length of service, the opportunity available to the employee for other employment, and the value of any severance already paid or accrued. Applying those factors, the Respondent's length of service of just over ten years, the complete absence of a show cause process or hearing of any kind, and the absence of any contributory conduct on her part established on the record, an award of ten months' compensation, being Kshs. 180,000.00 falls comfortably within the range properly open to the trial court and is not shown to be excessive or unprincipled. The award is sustained. The 3rd issue is resolved against the Appellant.
On the 4th issue for determination, two distinct challenges are advanced against the award of Kshs. 327,000.00 as house allowance. The first, on limitation, is misconceived as framed. Section 90 of the Employment Act provides that, notwithstanding Section 4(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act, no civil action or proceedings based on or arising out of the Employment Act or a contract of service shall lie or be instituted unless commenced within three years next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or, in the case of a continuing injury or damage, within twelve months next after the cessation thereof. Non-payment of a monthly house allowance said to be due and unpaid throughout a continuous period of employment is properly a continuing injury within the meaning of that section, giving rise on each monthly non-payment to a fresh default, so that the applicable period runs from cessation of the wrong rather than from its inception. This construction accords with Jelan Abu Mohamed v Hussein Yunis Balali (Appeal E106 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 758 (KLR), in which non-payment of house allowance was treated as a continuing injury to be addressed within twelve months of cessation.
I am aware that a stricter line of authority exists, applying the three-year period from Section 90 without resort to the continuing injury proviso to claims of this kind: see Dismas Mokweri Ayanga v Mahendra Shah (Cause 1333 of 2017) [2024] KEELRC 1620 (KLR) and Marambe v For You Chinese Restaurant [2021] KEELRC 2425 (KLR), both cited by the Appellant. Those decisions are distinguishable rather than wrong: on the facts of each, the claimant's employment had continued for a substantial period after suit was filed, or the claim was framed and argued purely as one for arrears accruing from a fixed historical date, without the continuing injury limb of Section 90 being engaged on the pleadings or in argument. Here, the non-payment complained of ceased only on termination of the Respondent's employment in December, 2020 or January, 2021 and it is that cessation, not the date any individual month's allowance first fell due, from which the twelve-month period in the proviso to Section 90 properly runs. The Respondent's suit, filed on 24th May, 2021 falls comfortably within that period. To the extent that the appeal is founded on limitation, it accordingly fails.
The second and more substantial challenge is whether a domestic worker paid a consolidated gross wage above the applicable statutory minimum is entitled to a separate house allowance in addition. Section 31(1) of the Employment Act, 2007 obliges an employer either to provide reasonable housing or to pay a sufficient sum as rent in addition to wages, while Section 31(2) permits this obligation to be discharged by a consolidated wage that already incorporates a housing element, provided the total meets the prescribed minimum.
The Appellant's written submissions filed before the trial court on 31st July, 2024 set out, year by year, the minimum wage prescribed for domestic workers in Nairobi under the successive Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Orders for the period 2010 to 2020, inclusive of the statutory house allowance component, ranging from approximately Kshs. 7,754.00 in 2010 to Kshs. 15,608.84 for 2018 to 2020. This submission rests on gazetted subsidiary legislation of general application, of which judicial notice may properly be taken of and was squarely placed before the trial court. On those figures, undisputed by the Respondent, her consolidated wage of Kshs. 18,000.00 exceeded the prescribed minimum, inclusive of housing, in every year of her employment. In those circumstances the trial court fell into error in awarding a separate house allowance without regard to this comparison and the Respondent's wage is properly treated as a consolidated sum inclusive of housing within the meaning of Section 31(2). The award of Kshs. 327,000.00 as house allowance is accordingly set aside. Grounds 6, 7 and 9 of the appeal succeed; ground 8, founded on limitation, fails for the reasons issued above.
On the 5th issue for determination, Section 28(4) of the Employment Act entitles an employee, on termination after six consecutive months of service, to be paid for leave earned but not taken, save that such leave must be taken within eighteen months of the year in which it was earned, failing which it is forfeited. The trial court, faced with an employer who kept no leave records as required under Section 74 of the Act, and who conceded as much at the hearing, confined the Respondent's recovery to eighteen months' leave pay of Kshs. 27,000.00, being the outer limit of what Section 28(4) itself preserves from forfeiture as at the date her employment ended. Far from being inconsistent with the forfeiture principle the Appellant invokes that approach gives effect to it: it does not compensate the Respondent for a decade of accumulated leave, but only for the single most recent eighteen-month window the statute does not treat as lapsed. This accords with the approach taken in Kariamburi v Bins (Nairobi) Services Ltd [2024] KEELRC 1975 (KLR), affirmed in Bins (Nairobi) Services Limited v Hardard Macharia Kariamburi [2025] KECA 1726 (KLR.)
As to the Appellant's submission that the Respondent's own pleadings establish that leave was taken, the premise is not made out on the certified record. The Respondent's pleaded case referred to a single December holiday immediately preceding the end of her employment, not an annual entitlement taken every year; and, as already found on the 2nd issue, she disowned even that characterisation in cross-examination, stating in re-examination, without demur, that she "never went on leave". There is, on this record, no reliable evidence that the Respondent was afforded and took annual leave at any point during her employment such as would displace the trial court's award. I find no basis to interfere with the award of Kshs. 27,000.00 as annual leave, and ground 11 of the appeal fails. Ground 12, which merely restates in general terms the specific grounds already addressed, does not require separate analysis.
On the 6th issue for determination is costs. In the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and finding no clear or specific reason to depart from this court's way of doing things, the costs of this appeal and the lower court shall be borne by the Respondent.
In summary, the appeal succeeds only to the extent of the house allowance award, and otherwise fails. The affirmed decretal sum payable by the Appellant to the Respondent is Kshs.225,000.00, being notice pay of Kshs. 18,000.00, compensation for unfair termination of Kshs. 180,000.00 and annual leave of Kshs. 27,000.00.
I am therefore inclined to allow the appeal in part and order as follows;
(i) The award of Kshs. 327,000.00 made in respect of house allowance in the judgment of the trial court dated 13th September, 2024 is set aside and the claim for house allowance is dismissed.
(ii) The awards of notice pay of Kshs. 18,000.00 compensation for unfair termination of Kshs. 180,000.00 and annual leave of Kshs. 27,000.00 made in the said judgment, are affirmed.
(iii) The decretal sum payable by the Appellant to the Respondent pursuant to this judgment is Kshs. 225,000.00 with interest at court rates from the date of the trial court's Judgment until payment in full.
(iv) The costs of this appeal and the lower court shall be borne by the Respondent.
Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Mr. Waithaka instructed by Waithaka & Associates Advocates for the Appellant.
2. Mr. Odhiambo instructed by Lemmy Regau & Company Advocates for the Respondent.