REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO. E261 OF 2022
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
SAMUEL P.M. KAMANDE CLAIMANT
VERSUS
KENYA REVENUE AUTHORITY RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
By a Memorandum of Claim dated 28th April, 2022 amended on 20th January, 2025 the Claimant sued the Respondent over the termination of his employment on 30th April, 2019. He was then a Head Verification Officer at the Container Terminal, Kilindini Port, Mombasa.
The Respondent filed a Memorandum of Response dated 24th June, 2022 and the Claimant a Reply dated 13th July 2022. The court has considered the pleadings, the Claimant's statement, the witness statement of the Respondent's officer Peter Kiambi, the documents on record and the written submissions of both parties.
The Claimant prays for:
(a) A declaration that his termination, and the attendant delay in taking administrative action, is illegal, null and void.
(b) Reinstatement to employment.
(c) Payment of all his dues and emoluments.
(d) Compensation for time lost out of employment.
(e) Damages for unlawful termination.
(f) Costs of the suit.
(g) Any other relevant relief.
(h) Interest on (c), (d), (e) and (f).
The Claimant's case is that he joined the Respondent in January 2005 and served diligently until his termination. He was suspended on 27th May, 2016 and remained on suspension until 30th April, 2019.
The Claimant’s further case is that he acted on the verification account posted by the Verification Officer and on a KPA KWATOS position slip in the folder, which showed the containers to be in the port yard. He says the arrival date in column 6 of the entry is only an estimate that proves wrong on many entries.
This matter was investigated by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) that three officers were absolved, and that he testified as a prosecution witness. He also says that a customs expert at his disciplinary hearing said he would have done the same. He complains that he was not given the documents relating to his case before the hearing, that his right to representation was not explained, and that he was not given the minutes of the hearing for his appeal.
The Claimant further complains that the case was dragged on from suspension in May, 2016 to termination in April 2019, contrary to Article 47 of the Constitution, the Respondent's Code of Conduct and the Muthaura Guidelines of 24th May, 2010. In buttressing his case the Claimant relies on Rebecca Ann Maina & 2 Others v Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology and Emy Amwayi Mattakwa v Kenya Revenue Authority [2022] eKLR, in which protracted disciplinary processes were found unfair.
The Respondent's case is that on 11th May, 2016 the Claimant, as Head Verification Officer, released online the goods under customs entry 2016MSA5998239, and later the goods under entry 2016MSA5998250, before the vessel MV Katharina S had arrived at Mombasa. The vessel docked on 13th May, 2016.
The Respondent further case is that the containers were found, on interception, to hold concealed and undeclared garments, that the Claimant's conduct facilitated tax evasion and exposed the nation to a security risk, and that he was guilty of negligence of duty coupled with dishonesty under Section 44(4)(c) and (g) of the Employment Act, 2007 and their Code of Conduct.
They rely on two investigation reports of 21st October, 2016 and 9th October, 2017. It’s further case is that the Claimant was issued with notices to show cause on 12th January, 2017 and 19th December, 2017 answered both and was heard by the Disciplinary Committee on 13th February, 2018. He appealed on 3rd June, 2019 and the appeal was dismissed on 3rd July, 2019.
On delay, it says it complied with clauses 8.2.7 and 8.4.7 of the Code, which call for determination of suspension cases within six months “as much as may be possible”, and that the Claimant was paid basic salary, house allowance and transport allowance and kept his medical cover throughout his suspension.
The Respondent further avers that the Claimant was paid his salary to the date of termination, three months' salary in lieu of notice and his pension benefits and was issued with a certificate of service. It opposes reinstatement and prays that the claim be dismissed with costs.
The issues for determination are:
(i) Whether the Respondent had a valid and fair reason to terminate the Claimant's employment.
(ii) Whether the procedure leading to the termination was fair.
(iii) Whether the delay between suspension and termination makes the termination unfair or unlawful.
(iv) What reliefs, if any, the Claimant is entitled to.
On the first issue, Section 43 of the Employment Act, 2007 places on the employer the burden of proving the reason for termination. Section 43(2) says the reason is the matter the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time. Section 45(2)(b) adds that the termination must be fair in all the circumstances.
The material facts are not in dispute. On 11th May, 2016 the Claimant released entry 2016MSA5998239 online at 19:25 hours, 18 minutes after the Verification Officer posted his verification account at 19:07. The entry showed an expected arrival of 14th May, 2016. The vessel was at sea. It docked on 13th May, and the container was discharged on 14th May.
On the same evening the Claimant released entry 2016MSA5998250, covering five 40-foot containers, at 19:32 hours after a verification account posted at 19:17. The vessel had again not arrived. The Claimant accepts, in his replies, that he released both entries.
When the containers were later intercepted and opened, they held bales of new garments, not the ladies' plastic shoes declared. The report on the first entry puts the unpaid duty at Kshs 2,804,963 and the report on the second puts it at Kshs 6,807,280. The Claimant does not dispute any of this.
The question is therefore whether the Claimant's conduct amounted to misconduct justifying dismissal, in view of his explanations. This court has considered them sequentially.
First, the Claimant says the folder had already been allocated and verified by others and that he was only to confirm the tax computation against the verification account. In his own appeal he accepts that the releasing officer was expected to confirm the documents. An HVO's release is the last internal check before goods leave the port. Reliance on a colleague's paperwork cannot be absolute where the paperwork itself indicates a problem and is issue ridded.
Second, he says the arrival date in column 6 is only an estimate. That may be so, but here the entry gave 14th May, the release was on 11th May, and the vessel docked on 13th May. A verification account that purports to show goods physically sampled from a container, posted three days before the stated arrival date, called for a question. The Claimant asked none. This is lack of diligence in the performance of his duties.
Third, he relies on the KWATOS position slip. No copy was produced to the court. Even if one existed, a slip placing a container in the yard while its vessel was still at sea was itself a warning that something was badly wrong. If, as he says, KPA officers later turned out to have tampered with the system, that explains how he may have been misled. It does not show that he took reasonable care.
Fourth, he points to the time-release study and the target of two hours from receipt of a folder to release. Speed is a proper aim of a customs station, but it cannot displace the verification which a release is meant to certify.
Fifth, he says the DCI absolved him and that he testified for the prosecution. No document from the DCI or from the criminal court was produced. The Respondent's reports name only the Verification Officer, Bernard Otieno Okoth, as charged in Mombasa Chief Magistrate's Criminal Case No. 1577 of 2016. Whether or not the Claimant was prosecuted is not decisive. A criminal process uses a different standard of proof and raises a different question from a disciplinary one. A decision not to prosecute is not a finding that an officer performed his duty with care.
Sixth, he says a customs expert at the hearing would have acted as he did. That statement appears for the first time in his appeal letter. The Respondent produced no minutes, and nothing on record shows what the expert said beyond the Claimant's own assertion. It cannot outweigh the objective facts above.
This court finds that the Claimant carelessly and improperly performed a duty which it was his responsibility to perform carefully and properly. That is gross misconduct under Section 44(4)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 and falls under clauses 6.1.7 and 6.2.5.2 to 6.2.5.6 of the Code of Conduct, which were cited in the notices to show cause. The Respondent has discharged its burden under Sections 43 and 47(5) on the negligence limb.
This court is not satisfied that dishonesty was proved. The reports say the officers acted “knowingly” and “deliberately”, but the Respondent called no investigator and produced no evidence that the Claimant knew the goods were misdeclared, was paid anything or dealt with the importer. The Claimant's own answers, which are consistent over two years, are those of an officer who believed the documents. Nor does the termination letter address itself to dishonesty. Every step of its reasoning is about negligence.
That does not help the Claimant. An employer need not prove every ground it cites if one valid ground stands as in Kenfreight (E.A.) Ltd v Benson K. Nguti [2016] KECA 409 (KLR.) The stray reference to dishonesty adds nothing to the reasons for the decision and has not been shown to have changed the outcome.
Two features of the termination letter need mention. It carries the number of the wrong earlier letter, which the Respondent says was inadvertent. It also states the revenue loss as Kshs 6,428,054. That is the figure given in the notice to show cause of 19th December, 2017 for the second entry, while its reasoning is directed mainly at the first entry. These are drafting errors. The Claimant knew from the two notices that both entries were in issue and answered both, so he was not misled.
This court also notes that both reports record that the Respondent's Investigations and Enforcement unit compounded the offence and recovered the additional revenue, fine and penalties. The Claimant's conduct did not therefore leave the Respondent permanently out of pocket in the sum stated in the letter. That does not make the lapse minor. Entries covering six containers were released and removal documents validated before any goods had landed, and one container of undeclared garments left the port and escaped interception. Only an intelligence report on 12th May, 2016 led to a stoppage of the others. This is derelict.
Section 45(2)(b) asks whether dismissal was within the range of responses open to a reasonable employer. The Claimant held the senior verification role at the port. He released two entries seven minutes apart, covering six containers, ahead of the vessel. The Code of Conduct classifies negligence of this kind, resulting in serious loss or exposure of the revenue, as gross misconduct. His long service without previous discipline, by his own account, is a real mitigating factor, but it does not in any way dilute or dislodge the dismissal issued. The court will not substitute its own view of the penalty. The court finds that the Respondent had a valid and fair reason to terminate the Claimant's employment.
On the second issue, Section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 requires an employer to explain to the employee the grounds of the intended termination, allow him to have a fellow employee or union representative present, and hear and consider his representations. The Court of Appeal set out these elements in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR). Section 45(2)(c) requires fair procedure.
The Claimant was given two written notices to show cause, dated 12th January, 2017 and 19th December, 2017. Each set out the entry number, the date and time of release, the report number and four specific allegations. He answered both in writing, and each answer addressed the allegations one by one.
By letter of 6th February, 2018 the Claimant was invited to appear before the Disciplinary Committee on 13th February, 2018. The letter told him he was entitled to have a fellow employee present and to bring any documents supporting his case. He attended and made oral representations. His own appeal letter refers to what happened at the hearing. His complaint that his right to representation was never explained is contradicted by that letter.
The Claimant says he was not given documents. He does not say that he asked for any, or that any document needed for his answers was withheld. The notices set out the allegations in detail, and his replies show he understood them. He has not demonstrated any prejudice.
It is true that the Respondent produced no minutes of the hearing and the Claimant says he did not get them. Section 41 does not require minutes to be supplied to an employee. The Claimant does not identify a single representation made at the hearing that was left unconsidered and the termination letter states that his representations were considered and found unacceptable. The absence of minutes is a shortcoming in the Respondent's record. It does not make the hearing unfair.
The Claimant further says the termination letter introduced matters not in the notices. It says the goods were red-channel goods which were only partly verified. That restates the third allegation in the notices, the failure to put an alert for 100% verification to which he answered fully in both replies. The finding of dishonesty was not separately answered, but this court has not upheld it and therefore no prejudice occurs.
The internal appeal was dismissed in one paragraph for want of new grounds. That is brusque. A look at the Claimant's appeal letter repeated points he had already made. A right of appeal is created by the Respondent's Code rather than by Section 41, and this was afforded. The court finds that the procedure leading to the termination was a fair one.
On the third issue, the chronology is as follows. Suspension was on 27th May, 2016. The first investigation report is dated 21st October, 2016. The first notice to show cause was dated 12th January, 2017 and was answered on 13th April, 2017. The second report is dated 9th October 2017. The second notice was dated 19th December, 2017 and was answered on 26th December, 2017. The hearing was on 13th February 2018 and the termination letter is dated 30th April, 2019. The whole period from suspension to termination is about 35 months.
The Code envisages that suspension cases are determined within six months “as much as may be possible”. The Muthaura Guidelines call for investigations to be completed within one month and for action to be taken without delay. The process here took many times longer than either.
Some of the time is explained. The matter involved two entries, six containers and five officers, parallel criminal proceedings and a second investigation. The Claimant himself took three months to answer the first notice, which he explained by saying he could not access his email. The court does not hold the whole period against the Respondent.
The gap of about fourteen months between the hearing on 13th February 2018 and the termination letter of 30th April, 2019 is another matter. The Respondent's pleadings, witness statement and submissions do not explain it. The court finds that this unexplained delay was inconsistent with the expeditious administrative action required by Article 47 of the Constitution and with the Respondent's Code of Conduct.
The question is what follows from that. The Claimant relies on the decisions mentioned above. In each, the delay was considered alongside its effect on the employee. The Claimant here was paid basic salary, house allowance and transport allowance, and kept his medical cover, throughout. He did not plead or prove any other loss, such as lost promotion or opportunity, or that evidence was lost and his defence impaired. The delay did not alter the reason for the dismissal, which was established on facts he does not dispute.
Section 45 delves into the issue of whether the reason for termination and the procedure followed were fair. A delay in concluding an otherwise fair process, which caused no proven prejudice, does not turn a justified dismissal into an unfair one, still less one that is null and void. This court records its finding on the delay in the Respondent's conduct. It does not award compensation for it, since none has been proved.
On the fourth issue, this court has found that the termination was neither substantively nor procedurally unfair. The prayers for a declaration that it was illegal, null and void, for damages for unlawful termination and for compensation for time lost out of employment therefore fail. Section 49 gives no remedy for a termination that was not unfair. It is not applicable.
The prayer for reinstatement also fails. Section 12(3)(vii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 2011 allows reinstatement only “within three years of dismissal”, and the Court of Appeal has held that this period runs to the date of judgment as in Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital v Hosea Cheruiyot Maru, Civil Appeal No. 113 of 2014. The Claimant was dismissed on 30th April, 2019. The three years expired on 30th April, 2022 long before this judgment. The prayer for reinstatement was introduced only by the amendment of January 2025, after the period had run, and the amendment could not revive a remedy already out of time.
The prayer for payment of dues and emoluments is not supported. The Respondent's evidence is that the Claimant was paid his salary and allowances to the date of termination, three months' salary in lieu of notice and his pension benefits, and was issued with a certificate of service. The Claimant has not identified any sum that remains unpaid.
On costs, the dispute is one between an employer and its former employee. The Respondent has succeeded on the main question but was itself slow in concluding its process. Let parties bear their respective costs of this cause.
I therefore inclined to dismiss the claim with orders that each party bears their costs of the same.
Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Mr. Odhiambo Odhim instructed by Mutisya & Company Advocates for the Claimant.
2. Ms. Gitau instructed by Marion Gitau Advocate for the Respondent.